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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I try to defend the concept of residence-based citizenship. My point of departure is the 
puzzling observation that, in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, a quite large number of 
countries practiced ius domicilii and unconditional ius soli as the most important principles of 
citizenship acquisition, against a growing number of states following the 1804 French Civil Code 
which reinvented ius sanguinis. In less than one hundred years however, ius sanguinis became the most 
important principle of citizenship acquisition all over the world, ius soli was largely restricted, and ius 
domicilii almost disappeared. 
My intention is not to investigate this historical process, but to explore the ways in which normative 
theories and academic research in immigration studies may reveal the need to re-evaluate a residence-
based citizenship theory based on ius domicilii. In this sense I am analysing four test cases which have 
in common the essential fact underlined by Joseph Carens that in time immigrants become members of 
society, irrespective of political authorities’ decisions. This is enough to substantiate a claim to 
citizenship. 
The test cases are irregular migrants, temporary workers, dual citizens and ‘external quasi-citizens.’ I 
argue that the ‘undocumented’ have a moral claim to regularisation after one year of illegal residence, 
and further that the first two categories of migrants have a moral claim to citizenship acquisition after 
three years of legal residence, which is the threshold supported today by a few liberal states. But if 
residence supports a claim to citizenship, then lack of it for an extended period sanctions loss of this 
status. Thus I argue against dual citizenship, trying to explain that its advantages are either rather 
imagined than real, or they can be achieved through more convenient means. However, in order to 
acknowledge the fact that many people have real and strong ties to more than one country I suggest the 
status of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ which may be accessed by non-residents and may provide 
numerous entitlements, possible all citizenship rights except the right to vote and the right to stand for 
elections. 
I also analyse legal provisions in fifty states and try to make a normative plea for residence-based 
citizenship. In a final step, I discuss four alternative theories of citizenship which do not easily come to 
terms with the idea of residence-based membership and try to make a case for the latter.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Towards a Residence-Based Conception of Citizenship 
 
‘Home is where one lives, and where one lives is the crucial  
variable for interests and for identity, both empirically  
and normatively’ (Carens 2014, forthcoming: chapter two) 
 
‘There is certainly a need for democratic states to reform their own  
conceptions of citizenship. Those that receive immigrants ought to adopt  
some form of ius soli and should turn naturalization into an entitlement  
after several years of residence’ (Bauböck 2003: 150) 
 
‘the migrant perhaps produces the maximum anxieties around  
whom discourses of crisis in citizenship are woven’ (Roy 2010: 36) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Political theorists generally consider that in a liberal democracy, long-term immigrants must be set on 
the path to full citizenship. Otherwise, they would become ‘second-class’ citizens, being subjected to 
the coercion of a democratic decision-making process in which they are not represented. Moreover, it 
seems that all substantive conceptions of social justice define societies as communities of equal citizens 
(Bauböck 2010b). Citizenship – more exactly, equal citizenship, understood as a unitary concept which 
confers equal rights for all those present within borders – seems to be the only solution unless we want 
to transform a liberal democracy into a ‘caste-like society’ (Bosniak 2006). 
Historically, in many political communities citizens were considered to be those individuals 
resident within that community’s borders (the caveat is important here, since many historical political 
communities did not have any status equivalent to what we call citizenship today and most of those that 
did, had other inhabitants who had some different, usually subordinate, legal status).1 Residence-based 
citizenship had been the norm of citizenship acquisition in the civilised world until France reinvented2
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this caveat (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
2 This idea is ‘re-invented’, since ius sanguinis is an old principle, and it determined citizenship in the ancient republics.  
 
the idea of ius sanguinis in the 1804 Civil Code (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 2) and disseminated it 
throughout Europe as the most important basis for assigning social and political membership. It is true 
that the creation of ius sanguinis had been considered at that moment a liberal movement, as long as ius 
soli ‘connoted feudal allegiance’ (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 3). But it is also true that, in fewer than two 
hundred years, the perception of emancipation has been turned on its head: for many theorists today, 
ius soli and ius domicilii provisions seem to be a very liberal device, while exclusive ius sanguinis may 
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appear to some of us as an intolerant expression of a narrow-minded, nationalistic view of a political 
community. It is true that this prejudiced view is supported by almost every government today: indeed, 
nowadays, some states do everything in their power to keep the link with emigrants and kin minorities 
abroad on the one hand, and also to prevent accession of immigrants (allegedly seen as ‘different from 
us’) to full membership status, on the other hand. This research does not intend to investigate how such 
a move has been historically, politically or morally possible: it merely seeks to defend and support the 
idea of residence-based citizenship. 
In consequence, this study starts with a puzzle: on the one hand, 150 years ago many countries 
applied the principles of ius domicilii, ius soli and residence for citizenship acquisition. Today the 
situation is reversed: the ‘modern’ principle of ius sanguinis and strong requirements regarding proof 
of integration before naturalisation are applied. On the other hand, according to an author in 2008 
there were over 200 million inter-state migrants worldwide, which amount to over 3% of the world’s 
population (Abizadeh 2010: 358). Regarding the situation relative to each country, in general the 
number of non-citizen permanent or temporary residents is around the same. If we take into account the 
total population with some ‘migrant background’ (citizens included)3 the percentage was, for example, 
16.6% of the total population in Germany in 2006 (Cyrus 2009).4
I intend to make this case in seven steps. The first step is taken in the second chapter, which 
tries to offer a historical view of citizenship understood as residence as it was practiced in Europe in the 
19th and 20th centuries. The following two steps are classified under the label ‘citizens-minus’. They 
take into account actual cases where long-term residents are nowadays denied access to full citizenship 
status: the first instance is that of irregular migrants
 The difference between the relatively 
small number of immigrants worldwide and the relatively high standards for citizenship acquisition in 
the countries they reside in has been the subject of fierce debates in normative political theory. I want 
to sidestep this discussion and take a step forward, by asking whether the principle of residence 
(together with its subordinate principles of ius soli and ius domicilii) has any chance to be revived and 
used again in the 21st century. To make the case for a residence-based citizenship is the main task of 
this study. 
5
                                                 
3 One ought to keep in mind the fact that incompatible statistics should not be mixed, since there are different categories of 
persons: migrants, foreign-born, non-citizens, etc. However, Cyrus uses the term ‘migrant background’ in order to include 
the total population connected in some way or another with the migration phenomenon.  
4 For figures of migration in other European countries see Annex, Table 1: ‘Irregular migrants – numbers and percentages 
out of total population in twelve European Countries, European Union and the USA’. 
 (chapter three) and the second is that of temporary 
5 For the purposes of this study I am considering the terms ‘irregular immigrants,’ ‘illegal migrants,’ ‘undocumented 
migrants’ and ‘clandestine migrants’ as synonyms, setting aside various problems raised by using each term. However, I 
will generally use the term ‘irregular’ when referring to persons and the term ‘illegal’ when referring to status or actions (for 
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workers (chapter four). The subsequent two steps are labelled ‘citizens-plus’. I discuss here situations 
where either long-term emigrants or ‘ethnic kins’ living within the borders of another state are offered 
more than one full citizenship status: the first instance is that of multiple citizens (chapter five) and the 
second is that of ‘external quasi-citizens’ (chapter six). Finally, chapter seven attempts a 
straightforward defence of the concept of residence-based citizenship by normatively discussing the 
current citizenship laws of fifty states. My conclusions (chapter eight) will admit honestly what my 
residence-based theory cannot explain, will try to defend citizenship as residence against four 
alternative normative theories, and will finally offer some avenues for further research. 
Before proceeding, it is important to make some conceptual and methodological clarifications. 
Firstly, both notions of citizenship and nationality are subject to a conceptual confusion both in current 
laws and normative discussions. Starting with chapter five on multiple citizens the difference between 
the two concepts will become extremely important, so section four of that chapter will clearly define 
(and also defend) the two concepts according to the way I am using them in this research. For the 
moment, it is important to submit at the very beginning that for the purposes of this study citizenship is 
defined as a legal bond between the individual and the state, while nationality is seen as ‘belonging’ to 
a particular ethnicity or to a particular cultural nation. This is surely not the way these notions are 
defined in many western states, where citizenship defines a political space of rights in internal affairs, 
while nationality is seen as an external dimension used in international law (Handoll 2012: 2).  
However, the distinction I have made is commonly used in many countries (although in 
common understanding rather than in legal documents) and will better support my own arguments. The 
distinction between citizenship as legal bond and nationality as ethnicity6
                                                                                                                                                                       
example: ‘irregular migrant’, but ‘illegal crossing’, ‘illegal status’, ‘illegal employment’, ‘illegal work’). I would like to 
thank Anna Triandafyllidou for this suggestion (personal communication on file with the author, November 2013). 
6 For example, ‘a Romanian citizen of Hungarian nationality’. 
 is commonly used in the 
following 22 (both Western and Eastern European) countries: Belarus (Ulasiuk 2011: 1), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Sarajlić 2010: 1), Bulgaria (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 11), Croatia (Ragazzi, Štiks et al. 
2010: 2), Czech Republic (Baršová 2010: 1-2), Estonia (Järve and Poleshchuk 2010: 1), Georgia 
(Gugushvili 2012: 2), Hungary (Kovács and Tóth 2010: 16), Iceland (Jóhannesson, Pétursson et al. 
2010: 2), Italy (Zincone and Basili 2010: 1), Kosovo (Krasniqi 2012b: 2), Lithuania (Kūris 2010: 1), 
Macedonia (Spaskovska 2012: 4), Malta (Buttigieg 2010: 1), Moldova (Gasca 2012: 2), Montenegro 
(Džankic 2012: 1), Norway (Brochmann 2010: 1-2), Poland (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 1), 
Portugal (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 1), Russia (Salenko 2012: 1-2), Slovakia (Kusá 2010: 1), and Sweden 
(Bernitz 2012: 1). 
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Secondly, I will largely use in this study the following concepts of nationality law: ius 
sanguinis, jus soli, and ius domicilii. According to ius sanguinis (which means in Latin ‘right of 
blood’), citizenship is determined by having one or both parents who are (or were) citizens of the 
specific state. Some variations also exist, for example when citizenship is determined by ius sanguinis 
in relation to a grandparent or any other relative or ancestor. This method of passing on citizenship is 
now the most common one in European countries. According to ius soli (which means in Latin ‘right of 
the soil’), anyone born in the territory of a state has a right to obtain that state’s citizenship. There are 
different types of this provision, since it may be unconditional (the person born in the territory gets 
citizenship irrespective of other considerations), conditional (usually, on parents’ residence in the 
territory for a number of years) or it may be in the form of double ius soli (as in France, where a child 
born in the territory of a foreign parent also born in France gets automatic French citizenship).  
Today, unconditional ius soli is the most common method of passing on citizenship on the 
American continents, the United States of America and Canada being the most economically developed 
countries applying it. In Europe no country grants unconditional birthright citizenship since 2004, the 
last country that dropped it being Ireland. According to ius domicilii (in Latin ‘right of residence’) 
anyone present in the territory of a state has the right to citizenship after a residence threshold is met, 
irrespective of other considerations. This principle has been applied by some countries in the 19th and 
the beginning of the 20th centuries, but it is not applied anymore in its unconditional form by any state. 
It is important to note that ius soli (birth in the territory) is conceptual distinct from ius domicilii 
(residence). However, as I explain in chapter two, for the purposes of this study I am going to stretch 
the meaning of ius soli and treat it as a principle ‘subordinated’ to ius domicilii, in the sense that a state 
offers citizenship based on ius soli because is expecting the child to live (hence, to have permanent 
residence) for a long enough period of time in the home country. Finally, I will also use other (usually 
outdated) types of determining citizenship like ius conubii (spousal transfer of citizenship without any 
other requirement). I am defining these forms in the places I am using them. 
Thirdly, it is crucial to keep in mind the important distinction between ‘residence’ and 
‘domicile’: while the former is a sociological concept and it strictly refers to presence in the territory, 
the latter is a legal category and refers to ‘a legal relationship between a person and a country governed 
by a particular system of law’ (Hammar 1990: 193-194), (Rubio-Marín 2000: 22). When talking about 
residence-based citizenship, my focus is on the simple presence in the territory which makes an 
individual a societal member over time – and not on the legal notion of ‘domicile’. However, if not 
otherwise stated, I will treat the concepts of permanent residence and domicile as synonymous. 
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Fourthly, it is essential to underline that I will consider as ‘liberal’ those countries which are 
implementing today a form of residence-based citizenship which is closest to my theoretical model. I 
use the term ‘liberal’ primarily in the sense of ‘generous’ and ‘strengthening individual rights’. This is 
important, since most sufficiently comprehensive liberal views would balance individual rights claims 
against the condition for maintaining an institutionalised regime of individual rights. For example, a 
‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view may fail to qualify as liberal in this sense. 
Fifthly, methodological clarifications are needed to strictly define the subject of this study. My 
case studies refer to irregular migrants, temporary workers, multiple citizens and ‘external quasi-
citizens’. I have chosen these groups since their situation calls attention to the fact that the category of 
migrants most commonly refers to settlers – to those who tend to stay and make a new life in the host 
state. In consequence, I have set aside for the purposes of this work other categories of migrants, such 
as sojourners and daily commuters. This is not to say, of course, that such cases are not interesting in 
other respects – but I believe they are not central for a case that supports residence-based citizenship. 
Again, I have set aside the situation of refugees since the problem is, in my opinion, their lack of access 
to most basic human, economic and social rights; otherwise, according to the residence-based theory, 
they must be set on the road to citizenship as any other migrant after a time threshold requirement is 
met. Finally, I do not take into account the type of citizenship that has emerged in the supra-national 
and regional integration project of the European Union: EU citizenship, otherwise extremely 
interesting, is perfectly compatible with the project of residence-based citizenship since both apply to 
different levels: the basic level is that of state membership, and the level of supra-national or regional 
citizenship is secondary, and dependent on the basic one. 
Sixthly, an introductory clarification must be made on the methods used by this study. My 
approach is normative, and it is based on political theory and on moral philosophy applied to 
citizenship and immigration issues. In consequence, the methods used are philosophical and, where 
necessary (as in the second chapter) historical. However, the main basis of this study is particularly 
empirical: as I explain later in this chapter, eight projects in political science and sociology constitute 
its main core. However, this research situates itself mainly in political theory: all empirical cases 
referred to are intended as examples, not as (a) results of different methods use in political science such 
as trend analysis, systematic comparative data (longitudinal data), or descriptive quantitative analysis, 
or (b) results of a systematic legal interpretation devised on the model of legal studies. Especially in 
chapter seven below, the plea for residence-based citizenship is made using examples of current 
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citizenship laws by way of illustration, and eventual patterns are rather suggested than claimed to be 
discovered using political science methods. 
Finally, regarding the level the normative theorising engaged in the study is intended to operate 
at,  it is important to note that I am arguing at a mid-level of abstraction where I assume as given the 
international system of territorial states and raise the question what equality and inclusiveness of 
citizenship require in contexts of migration. This cuts out from view ideal theories that might argue for 
a radical transformation of the state system itself.  However, I largely leave aside questions of 
feasibility, which would be at the fully applied and realist end of the spectrum. The principle of 
residential citizenship I am defending is obviously not a “highest order principle” (such as freedom or 
equal dignity), but a practical mechanism for determining membership that is by itself normatively 
neutral. It can also be used in illiberal ways, for example by an authoritarian regime that would turn 
every resident into a subject. At the end of the day, birthright, residence and consent are all 
membership mechanisms that are in themselves normatively neutral, but normative commitments to 
liberalism and democracy make certain interpretations and combinations of these principles required or 
permissible while ruling out others as impermissible. My argument is that, in the context of 
international migration, liberal states ought to commit to residence-based membership as the most 
important basis of their citizenship and migration policies for the sake of maintaining sufficiently 
inclusive and egalitarian citizenship regimes. 
 
1.2. Alternative normative theories to residence-based citizenship 
Up to the present day no political theorist has tried to defend a residence-based theory of citizenship. 
From ethnic nationalism to liberal democracy, numerous theories offered an answer to the question of 
‘who should be a citizen of a specific political community’. This study challenges six main, more or 
less complete answers to this question that have been advanced to the present day in political and 
migration theories. The proposed criteria for political membership that I want to dispute are the ‘all 
affected interests’ principle, the ‘all subject to political coercion’ criterion, the ‘stakeholdership’ 
principle, and the liberal inclusion principle. To these I am adding two other proposals that do not offer 
a full criterion of membership in general but only one related to migrants: a principle of automatic 
naturalisation based on a social membership principle, and a principle proposing either a negotiated or 
a forced political exclusion of migrant workers. Let me take these in turn. 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
7 
 
The first two criteria are not considered well-founded today because they fail to meet serious 
critiques. The ‘all affected interests’ principle basically state that democratic decisions must be justified 
towards all individuals affected by them (Dahl 1989). Rainer Bauböck nicely summarises four main 
problems such a principle faces: (a) it falsely derives a criterion for participation from a duty of 
justification ; (b) this criterion implies an unstable demos, since the scope of the inclusion is different 
for each decision; moreover, it is impossible to guess who will be affected by a decision before the 
decision is taken; (c) not all decisions affect citizens equally, and some decisions also affect people 
living in other states; (d) as Robert Goodin puts it, at the end of the day the principle requires an ‘all-
inclusive global demos’ (Bauböck 2009a: 17-18). 
The ‘all subject to political coercion’ criterion accepts the existing political authority and its 
democratic institutions in a given territory but asks that all those present in that territory and subject to 
the coercive power of those institutions should be considered members of that democratic polity 
(Walzer 1983). But as in the case of ‘all affected interests’, Bauböck lists four main problems it has to 
face: (a) indeterminacy: claiming that ‘all subject’ must be included into the demos does not offer an 
answer to the prior problem of who can be legitimately subject; (b) it supports the right to citizenship 
for long-term residents but not for long-term emigrants and their children (however, we will see that 
this is not necessarily a problem, since a residence-based theory of citizenship would also support such 
a view); (c) membership must have a ‘sticky quality’, since tourists and migrants leave and enter states 
and becomes subject to their laws without acquiring these polities’ citizenships; (d) it is too narrow as a 
criterion for membership inclusion since it ‘fails to accommodate the interests of migrants in being able 
to choose their memberships’ (Bauböck 2009a: 18-20). 
Bauböck thus proposes another principle of political membership and puts forward the 
‘stakeholdership criterion’: according to it, only a ‘stakeholder’ has a claim of membership in a 
particular polity. And one person is a stakeholder ‘if the polity is collectively responsible for securing 
the political conditions for [her] well-being and enjoyment of basic rights and liberties’ (Bauböck 
2009a: 15). Basically, according to this proposal only those individuals have a claim to citizenship in a 
polity who satisfy (a) the ‘dependency criterion’ (i.e., they depend on the polity for long-term 
protection of their basic rights) and (b) the ‘biographical subjection criterion’ – i.e., they ‘are or have 
been subjected to that community’s political authorities for a significant period over the course of their 
lives’ (Bauböck 2009c: 479). Thus he supports not only the status of ‘external’ citizenship (for 
emigrants and first generation born abroad), but also the right long-term immigrants have to access 
citizenship after they meet the time threshold. Since a residence-based citizenship accepts the latter 
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claim, I will further concentrate only on the former (which supports a claim to citizenship for long-term 
emigrants). 
Besides the characteristics underlined in its definition, the ‘stakeholder’ status also have other 
features: probably the most important one is that this standing must have a ‘sticky’ quality in order to 
guarantee the correct functionality and stability of a democratic state over the generations.  To avoid 
boundary indeterminacy, a polity should make the citizenship status permanent: once a citizen, the 
person should keep her status even when she is taking permanent residency or even a second 
citizenship in another state. Moreover, under some conditions (usually, residency for a specific period 
of time) even the second generation migrants should be able to keep their citizenship status. However, 
Bauböck limits the transmission of citizenship to the first generation born abroad: all the other 
subsequent generations may have a right to retain citizenship status if and only if they prove a genuine 
link with their ancestors’ origin state. 
Besides this legal provision of a guaranteed lifelong citizenship for the individuals who acquire 
citizenship status through ius sanguinis, ius soli, or other type of regularisation,  Bauböck adds a 
psychological condition for a polity’s continuity and stability over the generations: citizens should ‘see 
each other as belonging to [a] particular intergenerational political’ community (Bauböck 2009a: 2). 
Thus, even if migrants and the first generation born abroad do not have a permanent residence in the 
home state anymore, they should be entitled to keep their citizenship status in the home state not only 
because of the ‘sticky’ quality of citizenship, but also because they are simply connected with it in 
various ways. In consequence, Bauböck claims that migrants who ‘retain strong economic, social, 
cultural and family ties with a sending country have a plausible claim to citizenship’ in both origin and 
host states (Bauböck 2007a: 72). The reasons for this is not only that that they are ‘stakeholders in both 
their country of origin and settlement’ (Bauböck 2009a: 17), but also that they are members of several 
self-governing polities that have to be experienced as ‘communities of fate’, ‘in which citizens will 
share a common future that they shape through their present political actions’ (Bauböck 2007b: 2417). 
But what rights does the ‘stakeholdership’ status offer to long-term emigrants? Bauböck thinks 
that the most important rights in this case that must be ‘unconditionally attached’ to this status are the 
right to diplomatic protection and the right to return, which are established by the dependency criterion. 
Bu this principle cannot also establish who among the persons originating in the home country enjoys 
these rights. This problem is solved by the ‘biographical subjection’ criterion, which points to the first-
generation emigrants. Under some conditions that are usually but not obligatory related to the residence 
principle, this category can be extended, as we have already seen, to second generations (Bauböck 
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2009c: 482).  However, in contrast to these unconditional rights, an ‘external franchise’ should be seen 
only as ‘permissible’, but not as ‘a fundamental individual right’ (Bauböck 2009c: 487). 
A second, liberal theory of citizenship has been proposed by David Owen. He puts forward a 
concept of ‘transnational citizenship’ based on the principle of ‘all subjected persons’ (Owen 2010) and 
argues that both immigrants and emigrants should be included in a liberal democratic polity (Owen 
2011a). Since a residence-based theory readily accepts and even requires citizenship status for 
immigrants, I want to concentrate here directly on Owen’s discussion of long-term emigrants’ 
inclusion. In order to make his case, he discusses López-Guerra’s reading of the inclusion principle 
proposed by Dahl, according to which ‘all subjected to the laws’ of a political community should have 
a say in making those laws (Dahl 1989). However, since long-term emigrants are no longer subject to 
the origin country’s laws, it follows according to López-Guerra (2005) that they should not have a say 
in the making of those laws – in other words, they should lose full citizenship status. 
Owen discusses three claims that López-Guerra takes to follow from Dahl: (a) the justified 
exclusion of expatriates; (b) the choice to sever or to maintain the link between citizenship and political 
rights; and (c) the relationship between dual citizenship and democracy is politically meaningless. 
Owen critiques all three points. Regarding to the later, according to him the claim should be dismissed 
because even if expatriate voting is banned because long-term emigrants are not subjected to their 
home state laws, citizens still have under the international law a basket or rights (like diplomatic 
protection and the right to return) to any state of which they are citizens. As such the relationship 
between dual citizenship and democracy is not political meaningless. Regarding the second claim, it 
also has to be dismissed since the ‘either/or’ solution is false: there is a third alternative to either 
severing or maintaining the link between citizenship and political rights, and this is called ‘dormant 
citizenship’. According to it, political rights are ‘active’ only when a citizen has a permanent residence 
in the country of citizenship; when he changes his permanent residency to another country of 
citizenship his full membership status is not lost, but political rights become ‘inactive’. Regarding to 
the first claim, it also fails since being a habitual resident is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition 
of being subject to the rule of a state (Owen 2011c). Thus, if a state decides to have a constitutional 
referendum or a referendum to abolish expatriate voting or to denaturalise long-term emigrant citizens, 
then the latter do have a say since they are indeed affected by these decisions. 
What about the proposal of implementing a system of ‘dormant citizenship’ which consigns 
political rights to residence? Owen accepts that this is the case for local or municipal citizenship, and 
possibly (though not desirable) the case for national elections (Owen 2011b), (Owen 2011c). However, 
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he claims that this model cannot be employed in cases of constitutional referendum, which directly 
takes into account the nature of citizenship in a specific state, hence engage ‘the fundamental interest of 
all citizens as citizens’ (Owen 2010). In this latter case, political rights of ‘external’ citizens cannot be 
suspended.  
Finally, Owen believes that the only way to avoid the status of ‘external citizenship’ and the 
voting rights attached to it is to accept López-Guerra’s residence-based citizenship but to also match 
the category of residents and citizens through mandatory naturalisation of residents and compulsory 
denaturalisation of non-residents. However, according to Owen this is not feasible, since such a 
proposal cannot meet ‘certain basic standards of sociological and psychological realism’ (Owen 2010). 
And it cannot meet such standards since one’s sense of belonging to a polity is not simply a function of 
residence combined with automatic full inclusion. In the same vein, non-residence plus automatic full 
exclusion are not enough to eliminate one’s identification with one’s origin state. In consequence, 
according to Owen, a ‘purely territorialist conception of political community fails to acknowledge the 
salience of sources of belonging that are not based on residence’ (Owen 2010). 
The last two proposals I am taking into account do not intend to offer a general theory of 
citizenship that discusses the critical question of who has the right to be a member of a polity. They 
simply approach the question of membership in the context of migration and discuss the membership 
claims of different categories of migrants. The first account is proposed by Ruth Rubio-Marín and is 
known as the ‘social membership principle’ (Owen 2011c): she accepts a claim made by Joseph Carens 
according to which living in a society makes one a member of that society; moreover, because living in 
a specific society one is subject to its laws, according to Rubio-Marín people have a right to be citizens 
of the states they are living in. The interesting thing is that in this author’s point of view no issue 
regarding individual option should be considered here: after a period of 10 years of residence in a 
specific polity, any (regular or irregular) migrant should be automatically transformed into an official 
member of that society irrespective of her own preference. 
This is not a perspective shared by the previous two theorists: according to Bauböck, migrants’ 
agency should always be taken into account: they should always have the right to decide whether they 
apply for host state’s citizenship or not. He builds his case on a Rawlsian argument based on the worth 
of liberty to persons:  immigrants have a larger structure of social ties than native-born citizens, so they 
should have the right to choose their citizenship in an international system where dual citizenship is not 
allowed. However, Bauböck agrees that in a different international system where dual citizenship is 
largely accepted his argument loses its force: as long as a strict choice is not required, the immigrant 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
11 
 
can keep multiple citizenship, so a state may have the right to impose its citizenship on a long-term 
resident (Bauböck 1994a: 91). Owen also answers to the proposal of automatic naturalisation by trying 
to strike a balance between Rubio-Marín’s and Bauböck’s views. He is defining the debate as ‘an 
antinomy of incorporation’, where the immigrant should be either ‘automatic entitled’ or ‘automatically 
required’ to become a national citizen. Owen proposes to dissolve this antinomy by making a 
‘distinction between political membership and national citizenship’ (Owen 2011c): political 
membership implies having full political rights (thus, acquiring full political membership) and this 
should be mandatory after the residence threshold is met. However, national citizenship – which 
includes ‘the “external rights” of diplomatic protection and automatic right of re-entry to the state as 
well as the automatic entitlement to pass nationality on to their children via the jus sanguinis 
provisions’ (Owen 2011c) – should be based on migrants’ will and thus must be seen as a voluntary 
acquisition. 
The second interesting thing in Rubio-Marín’s account is that, in what regards long-term 
emigrants, she considers that their exclusion as members can be justified as long as they are not 
directly and systematically affected by the origin state’s decisions. However (and she agrees here with 
Owen) such exclusion is neither morally nor democratically required: on the contrary, an inclusion of 
long-term emigrants is a recommended policy, since this may prove to be a clear way of 
acknowledging their personal or subjective attachment to their origin polities. 
The second account also comes from within migration theory and is proposed by several 
authors who do not want to provide a membership criterion in general, but only for a specific category 
of migrants – that is, temporary workers (although, as we will see later, we could also include here 
irregular migrants to a more or less extent). The first author is Daniel A. Bell, who contrasts the 
situation of migrant workers in Western states like Canada to their condition in Asian states (Bell 
2005). He observes different practices regarding migrants’ access to rights: if today Western states 
receive few temporary workers but also set them on the path to full citizenship, some Asian states 
receive large numbers but severely restrict their rights and do not offer them the possibility of 
becoming full citizens (irrespective of the time they spent in the host state). Interestingly, Bell prefers 
not to adopt a theoretical point of view: he accepts that the best thing to do in theory is to offer 
temporary migrants all possible rights and finally, after a residence threshold is met a chance to apply 
for citizenship status. But given the real-world conditions (where some countries refuse to offer such 
path to citizenship for migrants), he claims that it is better for a state to accept large numbers of 
immigrants (while restricting their rights) than to accept few numbers who would enjoy extended 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
12 
 
rights. He makes his argument in four steps. Firstly, he underlines that migrant workers are more 
interested in economic and work-related problems than in having equal rights with native workers; 
secondly, lack of democracy benefit temporary workers because decision-makers are not obliged to 
support their citizens’ opinions (which may go against migrants’ interests); thirdly, as we will see in 
chapter eight, Bell accepts that ideally migrant workers should be given equal rights, but nevertheless 
he claims that some counter-arguments have their own merit; and finally, he argues that cultural 
characteristics must be taken into account: unlike in the Western states migrant workers are considered 
in Asia as part of an ‘extended family’, which also explains for example the lack of demand for day-
care centers in the region. 
A second point of view is offered by Ottonelli and Torresi, who draw attention to an unresolved 
dilemma in the standard liberal approach to migration. Their main claim is that temporary migrants’ 
self-assumed vulnerability undermines liberal egalitarian ideals (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). This 
happens because, even in cases where temporary migrants enjoy equal rights, they are still ready to 
trade them off in order to secure employment and financial security. The problem is that liberal 
democracies presuppose an identity between the political space of rights and the social space of self-
respect: equal political rights are indispensable for their citizens to pursue their own happiness and life 
plans. However this is not true for temporary migrants. Their bases of self-respect are situated in the 
origin country (they want to work in a wealthy state as temporary workers in order to improve their 
condition in the home state); but the political space of rights is situated in the host state. The trade-off 
becomes possible because the disentanglement of these two spaces: migrant workers are ready to trade 
their rights in order to improve their future condition at home. This raises a problem for liberal 
democracies because they value individual equality; but in this case the choice of a liberal democracy is 
between letting migrants pursue their plans (thereby abdicating the liberal democratic principle of equal 
standing) and upholding this principle, disregarding migrants’ life plans. 
 
1.3. A normative motivation for a residence-based citizenship theory 
The theories and points of view expressed above have their own merits, so what is the point of 
designing (or enlivening) another theory of citizenship? A new, residence-based theory must be 
normatively motivated. But in order to do this, we have to clearly define from the outset what 
citizenship means and what it implies. In my view, two dimensions of citizenship must be taken into 
account here. The first dimension is a psychological one: being a citizen means being a part of 
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collective endeavour, with a common territory, history, language, and fate/destiny; and having such a 
status also implies a responsibility regarding this polity’s stability, a duty concerning its present and 
future. The second dimension is a practical one: citizenship is a legal status which confers to its bearer 
a set of rights. My claim here is that today being a citizen strictly and exclusively means, in this second 
dimension, being a bearer of political rights (more specifically, the right to vote and the right to stand 
for elections) in a particular polity’s territory. In the international state system today human, social and 
economic rights are not linked to citizenship status anymore: one migrant can access them because she 
is simply a human being, because she is resident in a particular territory, or because she simply 
contributed to a social scheme. Even some political rights like the right to demonstrate or to campaign 
for a political party can be accessed by someone without being a citizen of a specific country. 
Moreover, as I will try to show in chapter six, today even the right to return is not attached to 
citizenship status anymore. Different countries design an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ which offers a 
large varieties of rights (including the right to return) to citizens of other states, even if they are not 
considered ‘full citizens’ by the state that offers such a status. However, ‘external quasi-citizens’ do not 
enjoy voting rights because they are not citizens. In consequence we may confidently support the view 
that citizenship today, in its practical (that is, formal, or legal) dimension means being a bearer of only 
political rights – that is, having the right and responsibility to decide on how one’s state must be ruled. 
If this is correct, then a normative defence of a residence-based citizenship must take into 
account three different perspectives: immigrants, emigrants and polity’s own points of views. 
Regarding legal immigrants, almost every political theorist accepts today that after a period of 
residence (which may be longer or shorter depending on each scholar’s view) an immigrant should be 
offered the chance to be set on the path to full citizenship status. Otherwise the host state may lose its 
liberal democratic character, since in such a case it would become a ‘caste-like society’ (Bosniak 
2006), where some individuals are ‘subjects of a band of citizen tyrants, governed without consent’ 
(Walzer 1983).  
The situation is more complicated in the case of irregular migrants because they are living in the 
territory without host state’s consent. However, even in such a case most scholars argue that time 
matters morally: after some time of residence irregular migrants become full social members of their 
state of residence, and keeping them in an illegal status would again transform the host state in a caste-
like society. This is accepted even by some immigration countries today where, as we will see, after a 
long period of residence at least a legal status of permanent residence, if not even citizenship, can be 
offered to irregular migrants (though usually this is not seen as an individual right, but as a kind of 
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absolution at the government’s discretion). The basic point here is that after a specific period of 
residence (which may be a longer or a shorter one, depending on the liberal degree of a particular 
state’s view) immigrants must be put on the path to full citizenship status. It is important to underline 
that the period of residence is the most important factor today regarding migrants’ access to citizenship. 
However, it is not the only one. Most countries today have other requirements for successful 
citizenship application. Thus, according to the legislation in various countries the candidate must have 
a good knowledge of the official language, must have accommodation and a permanent source of 
subsistence means, she must prove that she has not been sentenced to prison in her home state and has 
not been a subject to criminal proceedings, that she doesn’t pose a threat to the security and defence of 
the host country, and finally according to other national laws sometimes she must sign a loyalty oath, 
must know the national anthem, be familiar with local habits, customs, and tradition, must prove that 
she has contacts with local citizens, and must show an interest in social coexistence in her municipality.  
However, I will try to prove in chapter seven that all of these requirements beyond residence 
should not be connected with citizenship. Indeed, in practice migrants can live and socially function for 
all of their lives in the host state without meeting any of these requirements. Moreover, some countries 
abandoned in the past some requirements that seem absurd to many of us today, like mental sanity or 
even proof of being able to economically support oneself. So why isn’t possible to think about knowing 
the language or the national anthem as being similarly absurd? If this is true, then denying long-term 
migrants the right to full citizenship status even if they fulfilled the residence threshold and became full 
social members of the host society is once again close to creating a caste-like society. 
If we accept that long-term immigrants should be put on the path to citizenship after a residence 
criterion is met, then what about long-term emigrants? The same principle of residence-based 
citizenship requires that they must lose citizenship status in the country of origin. This may seem 
extreme, but I am trying to show in chapter six on dual citizenship that keeping home state’s citizenship 
and acquiring the citizenship of the host state may create various difficult problems for states in 
international relations (when for example several states can claim jurisdiction over a multiple citizen, 
or multiple citizenship can endanger bilateral relations because of a difficult history, or even when 
multiple citizenship is used in order to evade judicial prosecution) and for individuals (when, for 
example, dual citizens can be stripped by one home state of their citizenship as long as they retain other 
citizenships, or they must serve in the military service in several countries, etc.).  
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In this study I am trying to make a list of possible violations of the democratic principle of 
citizenship equality by dual/multiple citizenship status: these generally relate to the welfare state, to the 
substantive exit options, and to military-related judicial considerations. But probably the most 
important problem raised by dual citizenship is related to citizenship’s meaning and core substance – 
that is, voting rights. Usually the two problems associated here with dual citizenship appear every time 
when either external citizens’ votes decide the result of elections in the host state (thus they decide a 
political state of affairs they will not be subjected to and their will not have to bear the consequences of 
their vote), or they have multiple votes in international or supra-national and regional organisations 
because of their multiple citizenship. 
Residence-based citizenship can overcome all of these problems since it consigns one citizen to 
only one state. But this doesn’t mean that such a theory cannot recognise or accept different ties people 
have to different polities. On the contrary, it is perfectly consistent with a status used today by several 
states, called ‘external quasi-citizenship.’ Having this status implies an official recognition by a state 
that one person has different (emotional, cultural, linguistic, familial, etc.) ties with her community, and 
also represents an insurance that one can always return to live in that state. However, as long as she is 
not permanently resident in that country, she cannot be considered a full citizen. The normative thrust 
of residence-based citizenship is that it relegates one person to one state, and thus is avoiding different 
problems created by multiple citizenship to both states and individuals. 
One serious counter-argument here is that dual citizenship can still avoid problems like those 
just presented by making a distinction between active and dormant citizenship. According to this 
proposal, the state of residence should offer an ‘active citizenship’ (that is, a full citizenship with 
political, especially voting rights) while the other states’ citizenships should be ‘dormant’ (i.e., should 
not offer voting rights) as long as the individual is not a permanent resident in any of them. In this way, 
voting rights are consigned to residence (as a residence-based theory is requiring), but dual citizenship 
status is also secured. However, I will try to show in chapter six on dual citizenship that (a) a system of 
‘active’ and ‘dormant’ citizenship cannot avoid all the problems raised by dual citizenship, and (b) a 
‘dormant citizenship’ – that is, citizenship without the right to vote and the right to stand for elections – 
is an incoherent notion, as long as we accept, as I have tried to argue at the beginning of this section, 
that the only significance of citizenship today refers to the possession of voting rights in the state 
territory one resides in. 
Finally, a residence-based citizenship must take into account polities’ own point of view. 
Usually, political theorists argue that citizens must see each others as members of an inter-generational 
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community in order to guarantee the preservation of a polity over the generations. This is a major 
critique to the theory I am defending, since if this condition is critical for maintaining an inter-
generational community, then a residence-based citizenship cannot provide it. And it cannot provide it 
because such a theory claims that citizenship is a basket of rights one individual enjoys because and 
only as long as she is a permanent resident of a specific state. When this individual is changing her 
state of permanent residency, she loses her basket of rights in the former state of residence after a 
period of time spent abroad and is offered another one basket of rights in the new state of residence 
after the time threshold is met. Of course, by the notion of ‘basket of rights’ I do not want to claim that 
all rights are lost when one changes her permanent residency. On the contrary, as I have already 
argued, states may offer an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ which may confer a large number of rights to its 
bearer. However, usually these depend on each state, so the content of this basket varies. 
In consequence, throughout this work I intend to challenge the claim that in order to guarantee 
the preservation of a polity over the generations, citizens must see each others as members of an inter-
generational community. I follow Costica Dumbrava and maintain that a society’s membership rules 
should be ‘partly voluntaristic’ (since some may choose to join that society) but most importantly 
‘minimalist politic’ in the sense that (a) their only scope is to foster ‘a political community instrumental 
for individuals’ interests’ and (b) they require ‘only a minimum connection that is sufficient to maintain 
a functional political community [emphases mine]’ (Dumbrava 2010: 3). 
From this perspective, it is difficult to understand why members of a polity should see each 
others as members of an inter-generational community. And if such a need could still be not only 
coherently supported at the normative level, but also empirically proved that it is a sine qua non 
condition for a political community’s  continuity over time, then another problem must be taken into 
account. People tend to take roots at one point or another in their lives: they find a permanent job, they 
get married and have children. Being a part of the community where one lives and where one’s children 
are going to grow up seems enough in order to offer a stable sense of an inter-generational community. 
Why such a status needs citizens to see one another as being a part of collective endeavour, with a 
common territory, history, language, and fate/destiny? Such attitude seems to be more than ‘minimalist 
politics’ (as defined by Dumbrava) and more close to a masked or concealed nationalist view of a 
political community. This is why I reject the psychological dimension of citizenship this section began 
with and I claim that citizenship should be exclusively seen as a basket of legal rights any permanent 
resident should enjoy. 
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I am aware, of course, that such a residence-based theory of citizenship may seem unrealistic 
and may encounter real feasibility issues today. However, if migration will continue to rise and more 
people will migrate from one state to another, some residence-based theory will need to be employed in 
order to avoid the consequences of a ‘hypermigration model’, where the majority of residents are non-
citizens and the majority of citizens are non-residents (Bauböck 2011). Indeed, this would be another 
example of a caste-like society, where the majority of residents would be the ‘subjects of a band of 
[external – my insertion] citizen tyrants, governed without consent’ (Walzer 1983). In such a case the 
only options may be either to ban migration (i.e., people’s right to leave a state) or to employ some 
form of a residence-based theory of citizenship. 
 
1.4. Research Plan 
 
1.4.1. Chapter two: residence-based citizenship in history 
Chapter two offers a historical journey which tries to emphasise different avatars of residence-based 
citizenship in the 19th and 20th centuries. Firstly, it takes into account past practices of ius domicilii 
(residence): the Austrian Heimatrecht (‘the right of abode in a municipality’) practiced until 1938 and 
Switzerland’s three-level citizenship system are taken into account. I also show that ius domicilii has 
been applied by many states which came into existence in the last two centuries in order to determine 
their initial body of citizens. An interesting comparison between the early 19th century French Civil 
Code (1804) and the Italian Codice Albertino (1837) shows that both ius soli and ius sanguinis had 
their supporter-states; however, given the rise of nationalism, in time ius sanguinis took the lead in 
European citizenship legislation. Finally, I show that even communist states have sometimes used 
remarkably liberal citizenship provisions regarding ius domicilii and the right of option. 
The second part of this chapter surveys historical practices of ius soli. A good example is 
offered by the Nordic countries (in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries), which offered ius 
soli acquisition of citizenship combined with a voluntary act at the age of majority to those individuals 
who were born or who grew up in the country. The same optional ius soli at majority was also applied 
by France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain. Portugal offered an interesting ex lege and automatic ius 
soli between 1959 and 1981. Another example of a traditional ius soli country is the United Kingdom 
until 1983. However, not only Western countries applied this liberal provision, but also Eastern states, 
like Romania and Bulgaria. Finally, some historical instances of double ius soli are presented. 
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The third section takes into account historical naturalisation provisions. The oldest example is 
Russia, where in the 18th century an oath of allegiance was considered to be sufficient.7
However, the second important requirement for naturalisation (after residence) was 
renunciation of former citizenship: dual citizenship was not historically accepted by any country under 
consideration except probably France after the First World War. According to two authors, even though 
France formally signed the 1963 European Convention designed to reduce cases of dual citizenship, in 
practice it ‘has always allowed newly naturalised citizens to retain their previous citizenship. In fact, 
since the First World War, France has always tolerated dual citizenship, but for some extreme cases a 
provision permits revocation of citizenship for dual citizens (primarily for those who become an enemy 
of the French state)’ (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 2).
 Even the first 
Russian communist constitution (1918) provided naturalisation for residents without imposing any 
formal condition. However the remaining European countries requested nothing more than a residence 
requirement for naturalisation in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Usually there were 
few other mild obligations in some cases, such as having a good reputation or the capacity to support 
oneself. Still more important, in many European states at the end of the 19th century once an individual 
(usually, a man) was naturalised, his wife and children were also automatically naturalised (at that time 
in many places policies were not gender neutral, and in many places the status of the wife followed that 
of the husband). 
8
                                                 
7 It is also true that in this case naturalisation was not a right; on the contrary, the process was discretionary. 
8 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this exception (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
  
The fourth section discusses historical instances of residence-based citizenship loss. Setting 
aside different exceptions, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century simple residence 
abroad for more than a specific number of years usually implied loss of citizenship. However, in 
several countries, resuming permanent residence in the territory triggered citizenship reacquisition 
without any problems. But residence-based citizenship was also applied in cases where contested 
territories were ceded between states: inhabitants of those regions acquired citizenship of the new state 
because of their residence (however, they also had the right to choose to keep a former citizenship and 
to return to the former country of citizenship). Another example of loss concerns children born abroad 
who have never resided in the country, who were losing their citizenship at the age of majority. Finally, 
an illiberal type of law imposed loss only for non-ethnic citizens who took up permanent residence 
abroad. 
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The fifth section discusses historical provisions against residence-based citizenship in Europe 
and beyond the continent, especially the infamous, internationally-sanctioned practice of ‘population 
exchange’. Such treaties have been signed, for example, by Turkey with Greece involving 
approximately two million people (1923), and by Bulgaria with Greece regarding 300,000 people 
(1920) and with Romania (1940). But we can spot at least three other historical examples of regulations 
that run against the principle of residence-based citizenship, under the ‘partial citizenship’ label: the 
case of non-resident quasi-citizens – this is the situation of ‘Dutch subjects, non-Dutch citizens’ (van 
Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 33-34) in 1910 concerning native population of the Dutch East Indies; the 
case of non-citizen permanent residents (Jews in Romania until the end of the First World War, but 
also different ethnic groups excluded from citizenship by the first republican Turkish Constitution in 
1924); and the case of citizens without full citizenship rights (this includes the positive example of the 
1865 Italian ‘piccola cittadinanza’ (‘small citizenship’), but also the negative case of naturalised 
persons who enjoy full citizenship status only some years after naturalisation, as in Lebanon and 
Morocco). 
The sixth and last section presents two more historical examples of residence-based citizenship: 
one is offered by Bulgaria in 1879, which opted for residence-based citizenship rather than for ius 
sanguinis because of the problems a mass exodus of Bulgarians from the region would have created for 
the new state. The second example is Yugoslavia, which (because of its many ethnics groups) had to 
play in the communist period the residence rather than the ethnicity card in order to maintain an 
artificially constructed political community. In conclusion I claim that throughout most of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century the principle of residence-based citizenship, or ius 
domicilii, was the usual standard for citizenship acquisition (through ius soli and naturalisation) and 
also for loss of citizenship (through long-term residence abroad). 
 
1.4.2. Chapter three: irregular migrants 
Chapter three examines the problem of illegal migration in our time. In the second section it 
acknowledges that all scholars agree that such a status is not acceptable, but it also sidesteps the never-
ending debate in normative theory between those concerned with individuals’ lack of rights and those 
worried about the consequence such a status could have on the liberal-democratic outlook of our 
present-day polities. The chapter bypasses this quarrel by considering a third alternative, which tries to 
disentangle the status of irregular individuals from the rights they should enjoy as human beings. In this 
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sense, one author proposes a ‘firewall’ between immigration authorities and agencies responsible with 
the protection of specific rights which are normally not related with the immigration status of an 
individual (Carens 2008a). Another scholar proposes the concept of ‘ethical territoriality’, according to 
which the simple presence on a territory should trigger legal recognition of a large area of rights, 
irrespective of the legal status of that presence (Bosniak 2006). This latter proposal is very close to the 
idea of residence-based citizenship, since territoriality-based rights are doing a better job in annihilating 
caste-like distinctions than status-based rights. The problem with these two normative accounts is that 
neither goes as far as requesting and justifying full citizenship rights for resident irregular migrants, 
although this is the right solution because of the slippery slope character of their argument. On the one 
hand, disconnecting civil and social rights from immigration status does not solve the problem of 
illegal migration: irregular migrants will simply remain irregular even if they can access some rights; 
on the other hand, if both accounts are nevertheless compelled to extend voting rights to irregular 
migrants, then citizenship status becomes irrelevant. I argue that detaching enjoyment of rights from 
immigration and citizenship status cannot be a good way to deal with illegal migration. 
In the third section I turn to the old quarrel between supporters of deportation and those of 
regularisation. This disagreement underlines two special features of irregular migrants: on the one 
hand, they are illegally present in the territory (even if their illegal presence is usually sanctioned by the 
host state); on the other hand, they settle in the country of immigration. The problem is that these two 
features pull in opposite directions: while illegality triggers deportation, settlement requires 
regularisation. However, as I argue in section four, deportation cannot be taken into account since there 
are both empirical obstacles and normative objections against it: I claim that all four main clusters of 
reasons which defend legitimate exclusion (public order, cultural disruption, protection of the welfare 
state, and community’s right to self-determination) are morally indefensible when applied to irregular 
residents. 
But if it is the case both that irregulars become in time social members, and exclusion is not 
available from an ethical point of view, then regularisation seems to be the only solution. Against 
previous and current forms of regularisation (individual legalisation or collective amnesties), I claim in 
the fifth section that the only moral requirement for regularisation must be residence in the territory, 
and state policies requesting other conditions cannot be morally defended. As to what constitutes 
residence, I argue against both the ‘long term residence’ condition and the idea of a collective rolling 
amnesty (based on the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view) – and finally I support a shorter term of 
residence. I do not suggest a specific policy regarding the number of years required to live in the 
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country before accessing legal status; however, since chapter seven will show that liberal countries 
require three years of residence before an individual can qualify for naturalisation, then for obvious 
reasons a legal status should be obtained even quicker (I support a period of less than one year of 
residence). 
In the second part of the chapter I discuss the problem of the voting rights irregular migrants 
should have in both home and host states. I emphasise in the sixth section the dilemma the home state 
may have between enfranchising its citizens-with-illegal-status-abroad and helping host state’s 
authorities to fight illegal migration: I offer the example of a recent international conflict between 
Romania and France on the problem of Roma migrants, perceived as ‘European citizens with illegal 
status’. Section seven claims that voting rights in the host state must be accessed by irregular migrants 
only after regularisation: this is not as obvious as it may seem, since in developing Asian countries 
(because of conditions regarding ‘networks of complicity’ and ‘blurred membership’) there are many 
situations when irregulars vote, and by voting they access documents which are afterwards used in 
order to legalise their stay. Moreover, both home states and host states are using irregular migrants in 
order to accomplish their own political goals such as claiming territories under foreign administration 
or implementing policies of ethnic cleansing. 
Section eight concludes by claiming that irregular migrants should be regularised according to a 
short-term residence criterion and afterwards they should be set on the path towards becoming full 
citizens: a status of permanent residence without citizenship cannot be morally defended from a 
residence-based theory of citizenship, since it transforms the state of residence into a ‘caste-like 
society’. Resident irregular migrants must receive quickly a legal status and then they must be set on 
the road to full citizenship, even if in their case this road can be longer as a penalty for trespassing 
immigration laws. 
 
1.4.3. Chapter four: temporary workers 
Chapter four investigates the problem of the second category of ‘citizen-minus’ – i.e., temporary 
workers. They are usually citizens of rather poor countries accepted by the host state on an (intended) 
short-term basis, in order to be employed in economic sectors where local citizens cannot or do not 
want to fill the market demand. The chapter surveys the problem of their rights both at the international 
and national levels and both from host states’ and immigrants’ points of view. 
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The second section discusses whether temporary migrant workers’ rights can be secured 
through a progressive development at the international level. My answer is negative, and it is based on 
the argument that in this field international institutions cannot live well with the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. I examine the situation of a major international covenant regarding migrant workers’ 
rights which have been signed by no important Western power (nor by any other member of The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). I accept Bosniak’s explanation that such 
conventions do not have any chance to be signed as long as states see them as undermining their 
sovereignty on immigration issues. However, since states usually do sign international legal documents 
that limit their sovereignty (as an important objection might underline), why is the case of the Migrant 
Worker Convention so different? In order to answer this question I appeal to international relations 
theory and survey the conditions under which states accept to limit their sovereignty under international 
treaties; however, I argue that none of the conditions obtains in the case of the Migrant Worker 
Convention. 
If at the international level it is difficult to see an improvement in the foreseeable future in what 
concerns states’ observance of Migrant Workers convention, then I believe it is important to understand 
both actors’ perspectives. This is done by the following two sections. The third section discusses 
immigrant states’ view on temporary workers and in this sense asks what happens when migrants’ 
interests clash with host country’s concerns. I thus examine the rights versus numbers dilemma and 
claim that one cannot solve it unless temporary migrants’ own perspective and interests are taken into 
account. 
In consequence, the fourth section discusses temporary migrants’ own view and examines two 
different perspectives. The first one is offered by Daniel A. Bell who believes that various practices 
regarding temporary migrants around the world should not be subsumed under a Western model. In his 
view, different political and social spaces have different practices, so it is morally acceptable for a 
Western state to admit few temporary workers, to offer them a large set of rights and to even set them 
on the path to citizenship when a time threshold is met. But it is morally acceptable as well for an 
Asian state to admit large numbers without offering them too many rights or any possibility of 
accessing full citizenship status.  
The second perspective is offered by Ottonelli and Torresi and it is known as the bases of self-
respect puzzle. According to it, liberal democracies presuppose an identity between the political space 
of rights and the social space of self-respect: pursuing one’s life plans is thus critically based on 
enjoying equal political rights. In the case of temporary workers however, these two spaces are 
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separated. The space of rights is situated in the host country, while the space of self-respect is located 
in the origin state. This way, temporary workers are ready to trade many of their rights in the host state 
in order to improve their future condition at home. I conclude this section by following these authors 
and supporting the view that migrants’ agency and their preferences should be somehow taken into 
account.  
Thus section five claims that democracy’s concerns with formal equality should be balanced 
against migrant workers’ needs. But it also argues that this balance can be accepted only if such a 
trade-off is temporarily limited, is respecting basic human rights, and is acceptable in migrants’ own 
view. Using Soysal’s distinction between human rights and citizens’ rights, I further claim that human 
rights cannot be negotiated. However under very strict conditions some social and political rights may 
be traded off, but this can be done only as long as immigrants do not qualify yet for the three years 
residence-based criterion which sets them on the path to full citizenship rights.9
1.4.4. Chapter five: multiple citizens 
 However, I do not go 
further in order to finally design a complete range of rights that can be traded off, since in my opinion 
these may vary according to the local culture and customs. 
Sections six hints at a problem in political philosophy situated beyond the subject of this study: 
the link between temporary workers (but also migrants in general) and the consent theory of political 
obligation. I claim that taking into consideration migrants’ agency (i.e., their consent to move to 
another country to work, as well as their decision to respect host states’ laws) can revive the consent 
theory as a serious component of a general theory of political obligation which combines several 
principles that can support political obligations of different categories of individuals. 
 
Chapter five examines the problem of multiple citizenship, and tries to investigate what the normative 
justifications and practical advantages of this condition are. In the second section I firstly explain the 
recent international acceptance of multiple citizenship against the long two-century history of ‘one 
citizen, one state’ policy. Both liberal (increasing inter-state cooperation, development of international 
institutions, acceptance of human rights norms) and neo-realist (lacking coordination among states) 
schools of thoughts can easily explain this phenomenon. But we might ask why multiple citizenship is 
desirable in the first place. 
                                                 
9 This chapter leaves open the problem of democratic legitimacy of human rights in self-governing polities – which could be 
the subject of a whole new study. 
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If we pay attention to this status, we surprisingly find out both that (a) its advantages are more 
imagined than real, and (b) its benefits are more easily realised through more convenient means. This 
applies to all three actors involved: sending states, receiving states, and individuals. I secondly explain 
that for sending states advantages are rather imagined: the flow of remittances decreases in time, the 
lobby for the origin country is difficult to spot, the spreading of liberal norms is counter-balanced with 
terrorists’ enhanced free movement, and bilateral relations are rather worsened than improved. Thirdly, 
the same goes for receiving countries: dual citizenship is supposed to support the principle of 
congruence between the demos and the resident population. However this is rather false, since dual 
citizenship cannot legitimately be offered in an asymmetric manner to immigrants but not to emigrants; 
and if it is also obtainable by emigrants, then the congruence principle is violated. Moreover, the 
relationship between double citizenship and integration is debated; all things considered, in spite of 
political theorists’ insistence on the positive value of dual citizenship, it seems that it is desired for its 
instrumental value rather than for promoting integration. Fourthly, is dual citizenship good for 
individuals who are enjoying multiple status? The argument here comes from freedom of movement, 
but this can also be achieved for a much larger category of persons through creating forms of political 
union (like the European Union) rather than through dual citizenship. Further, as we have already seen, 
the relation between this status and integration is rather inconclusive. And if dual citizenship provides 
an exit option whenever things go wrong, then it is difficult to defend it since this choice is accessed by 
only a group of privileged persons. 
On the contrary, dual citizenship comes with many disadvantages: states can easily strip 
unwanted individuals of their citizenship if they possess multiple statuses (otherwise such an option is 
not available according to international agreements on the prevention of statelessness). Other 
disadvantages are related to access to different public positions, the problem of loyalty in cases of state 
and non-state modern terrorism, the idea of ‘identity dilution’, the promotion of irredentist policies, 
international conflicts regarding diplomatic protection, and judicial cooperation in civil matters. 
Actually there are few genuine benefits of dual citizenship; very often, disadvantages outweigh 
benefits; and finally, when these benefits are real, they can be promoted through other means. 
 The third section tries to demonstrate that dual citizenship is still acceptable, if it does not 
violate the democratic principle of citizenship equality. However, I find four ways in which such 
violation occurs. The first violation regards the welfare state and implies enjoying social benefits 
without contributing to the welfare scheme. The second one concerns the exit option provided only for 
dual (but not for mono-) citizens. The third violation is linked to some military and judicial 
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considerations, and the fourth one is linked to political rights and it comes in three instances: the impact 
of external voting on domestic politics, the problem of multiple voting, and the problem of office 
holding by dual citizens. One rejoinder asks for accessing political rights based on residency, such that 
political rights in other countries of citizenship become at the same time ‘dormant’. However, since 
nowadays human, civic, social and economic rights are decoupled from citizenship, decoupling 
political rights also would render citizenship status meaningless – since a status of ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ can very well safeguard the last rights (free movement and the right to return) offered by 
such a weak perspective on citizenship. In consequence, since plural citizenship violates the democratic 
principle of citizenship equality it cannot be normatively justified. 
The fourth section asks how political communities could still officially recognise individuals’ 
ties to multiple societies. Firstly, it is important to make a move backwards and see who has a 
membership claim in a polity: I claim that the principle of ‘genuine link’ can be easily but also 
radically interpreted as residence: thus both the need and the justification for multiple citizenship status 
disappear. But this does not amount to denying other various ties individuals may have to more than 
one polity: I only claim such ties do not need officially recognition through citizenship. Secondly, I 
propose to take seriously the difference between citizenship and nationality practiced today by many 
states: citizenship is a formal status (and thus I claim it should be exclusive and restricted to the country 
of residence) while nationality refers to ethnic, cultural and other ties an individual may have to other 
states (and thus it is non-exclusive). I advance the concept of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ (Bauböck 
2007b: 2396), (Owen 2011a), which is intended to cover all other ties individuals may have to other 
polities except the state of residence and citizenship. Thirdly, I offer some real-world examples. 
 
1.4.5. Chapter six: ‘external quasi-citizens’ 
Chapter six develops the idea that strong ties people may have to other countries than the state of 
residence/citizenship must be officially recognised even though dual citizenship is dismissed. I propose 
a status called ‘external quasi-citizenship’ (Bauböck 2007b: 2396), (Owen 2011a): people enjoying it 
are either migrants (or their descendants) who live (have residence and citizenship) in another country 
than that of their origin, or ethnic groups which, after different re-drawings of borders, have found 
themselves living in another, different state. Such authentic links legitimate different economic, social 
and cultural interests in securing them. The difficulty is that such people are not citizens of their ethnic 
or origin countries: they do not have any claim against such states except those based on international 
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laws. Global agreements may sometimes be enough for securing some economic interests but language 
and cultural interests, as well as freedom of movement cannot be secured unless the origin state accepts 
to offer them under some ‘favourable treatment’. So the normative question is what type of relationship 
is acceptable between ‘external quasi-citizens’ and their origin countries? Some scholars believe these 
types of links can be legally accepted, and their range is very large, from simple economic assistance to 
a straightforward offer of full citizenship rights. Others think that in world regions where bilateral 
relations are historically tense, ethnic communities’ right to self-government is better than a quasi-
citizenship status offered by another state whose actions can be perceived as unfriendly. 
I begin by investigating four cases of recent laws dedicated to ‘external quasi-citizens’. I divide 
this category into two sub-groups: the first class is made of migrants (second section), while the second 
one is made of ‘ethnic kins’ (third section). I have selected India, Mexico and Turkey (which offer 
‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes for migrants) and Hungary (offering a similar regime for ‘ethnic 
kins’). This selection is not random, but it wants to cover the whole range of possibilities from the most 
restrictive regime (India, offering a special status only to emigrants in wealthy states) to the most 
generous one (Hungary, which offered dual citizenship to all ‘ethnic kins’ from neighbouring 
countries). 
The fourth section discusses both common developments and differences between these four 
cases of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime. Firstly, India and Mexico are more liberal than Turkey and 
Hungary, since qualification for this status is given in the first case by former presence in the territory 
(or former presence of a close relative), while in the second case it can be accessed only by ‘ethnic 
kins’. Moreover, Turkey offers this status only to native-born Turks and only if they have renounced 
citizenship with the state’s approval. Finally, Hungary’s regime has been based on ‘ethnizenship’ rather 
than on ‘external quasi-citizenship’. Secondly, regarding the rights offered by ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ laws, I analyse the most important ones offered by all countries: the right to return (an 
exclusive citizenship right before this status has been invented), the right to re-acquire full citizenship 
status, the right to buy and own property, educational and cultural rights, and the right to live, work and 
invest in the country. Finally, other special rights offered by each government are considered. 
The fifth and last section offers some normative considerations. Firstly, I claim that such a 
position must be seen as ‘favourable treatment’ rather than a special legal ‘status’. Regarding its extent, 
I endorse in a first step the Venice Commission’s decision in 2001 according to which special bonds 
between kin minorities and kin states must be acknowledged, but preferential treatment is acceptable 
only in the fields of culture and education. Moreover, I claim that this is not the case only for ‘ethnic 
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kins’, but also for migrants and their descendants. Secondly, I ask why a state should be interested in 
offering benefits to non-citizens, as long as this also implies spending a large amount of funds: is there 
something to gain here? Four reasons seem to explain this attitude: flow of remittances, nationalistic 
sentiments, releasing pressure on the job market and keeping influence in the region. Thirdly, I 
normatively justify this status for two categories of people: for first generations born abroad (and 
generations beyond), who might well be interested in preserving their culture and learning the 
language; and also for first generation immigrants, as a better substitute of dual citizenship. 
Fourthly, I enquire what other rights can be offered to ‘external quasi-citizens’ besides the 
provision of cultural and educational rights already accepted by the Venice Commission. I make an 
argument that the right to return should be also provided; however, the precise extent of rights can be 
decided by each country according to its own interests – as long as these are not based on ethnicity, but 
only on previous residence on the territory or on descending from previous residents. Fifthly, I raise the 
problem whether this quasi-citizenship regime may be discriminatory: I criticise the perspective that it 
can be inequitable for all the other citizens of a country if only a group of that country’s citizens 
qualifies. What is indeed discriminatory is to link advantages not to former nationality or actual 
descent, but to ‘ethnic kinship’. Moreover, if discrimination is a problem, then I believe that its real 
target regards citizens of the origin state, who are supposed to financially support an ‘external-quasi 
citizenship’ regime: in consequence, such a policy cannot be implemented unless citizens approve it. 
Finally, I argue that such a system can evade discrimination in situations in which a dual citizenship 
status cannot: I offer here some examples of European Union countries offering dual citizenship (hence 
European citizenship too) to some groups from non-European countries, thus discriminating between 
members of the same state regarding the possession of European Union citizenship. 
 
1.4.6. Chapter seven: a plea for residence-based citizenship 
We have seen that there are no serious arguments to deny access to full citizenship status to residents 
(temporary workers and irregular migrants) after a certain period of time. On the other hand, non-
residents (multiple citizens and ‘external quasi-citizens’) lack a moral claim to have a say in their origin 
states and thus to full citizenship rights. It is interesting to see how this theory of residence-based 
citizenship is implemented in current laws. In this sense my analysis is relying on the 47 country 
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reports on citizenship legislation offered by the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship10
                                                 
10 EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, Country Profiles: 
 plus the 
legislation in three other countries (Canada, the USA, and New Zealand). I am also referring to the 
EUDO Observatory on Citizenship’s database on acquisition and loss of citizenship, and sometimes to 
a more recent EUDO comparative study called ACIT – Access to citizenship and its Impact on 
Immigrant Integration, which has compared citizenship laws, their implementation and their impact in 
Europe. It is important to note that this investigation is made from a political theory’s perspective: it 
does not intend to substitute a cross-country legal interpretation, and it takes into account only the 
elements that support or deny the hypothesis I am trying to defend. 
Section two discusses citizenship acquisition by ius soli. Ultra-liberal policies of a pure ius soli 
regime were abandoned in Europe at the end of the 20th century in order to avoid both ‘accidental 
citizenship’ and ‘citizenship-tourism’, and I accept that an unconditional ius soli regime is not always 
the best policy a liberal-democratic theory of membership based on residence could adopt. Following 
Carens, I also argue that the double ius soli system is hardly acceptable in a liberal democracy. In 
consequence, ius soli acquisition is now implemented by liberal countries in two different ways related 
to residence in the territory: for the child to acquire citizenship, some countries apply the residence 
criterion to parents while others apply it directly to the child, after only two years of residence or at the 
age of majority, offering the child a free choice regarding her legal status. 
In section three I discuss residence-based naturalisation in four main steps. Firstly, I show that, 
except for a small number of liberal countries requesting only previous residence for naturalisation, 
most of the states are making naturalisation more difficult by adding various requirements and 
procedures. Secondly, I categorise these supplementary conditions and administrative practices in five 
main groups, which I am dismissing after discussing them in detail. I also interpret the principle of 
‘genuine link’ as residence and offer arguments for disconnecting citizenship from nationality. Thirdly, 
I take a closer look at the number of residence years required to qualify for citizenship: I differentiate 
here between liberal requirements (three years), normal conditions (five years) and conservative 
thresholds (twelve years). Fourthly, I discuss different instances of residence-based naturalisation in 
present citizenship laws. The most interesting cases are those of Belgium, Norway and Sweden, where 
the concept of legal residence has become more important than the concept of citizenship in recent 
years. 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles (last accessed 22 
November 2012). This chapter is based on the reports present on this website on November 2012.  However, the reports are 
regularly updated when a country legislation is changed, so changes made after the said date are not taken into account. 
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Section four takes into account the relation between a theory of residence-based citizenship and 
multiple status, and tries to argue against multiple citizenship in three main steps. Firstly I discuss 
external voting rights by attacking two unacceptable situations where either external votes decide the 
results of elections (offering persons a say in a political process they are not subjected to), or permanent 
residents representing more than a half of a state’s population do not have the right to vote (this is the 
reverse of the situation of a majority resident population not having a say in the political process it is 
subjected to). In order to avoid such cases, I argue that the right to vote and the right to stand for 
elections should be restricted to residents.  
Secondly, I claim that dual citizenship should not be accepted: I offer some real-world examples 
(the best one is Norway, which sees the loss of citizenship for living continuously abroad as the normal 
complement of citizenship acquisition for living continuously in Norway) and I criticise the normative 
theory of ‘stakeholdership’, according to which first generation emigrants and also the second-
generation (under some conditions) are entitled to keep citizenship even when they become citizens of 
the host state. Thirdly, I offer examples of dual citizenship prohibition in present legislation and I make 
the point that in many situations multiple citizenship can and should be avoided because of reasons 
related to international relations. I show that out of the 50 countries studied, 28 practice one form or 
another of avoiding dual citizenship and I conclude by criticizing practices of dual citizenship which 
cannot be morally accepted. The first case is when a state allows one set of individuals to access dual 
citizenship, but denies the same status to others. The second case regards states which accept dual 
citizenship but impose restrictions on those enjoying this status. 
Section five explains the connection between residence-based citizenship and free choice by 
discussing the internationally sanctioned provisions of ‘the right to choose’ and ‘zero option’ in the 
case of state formation and state succession. These stipulations are a legacy of peace treaties entered 
into after the First World War and were applied all over the European continent until the end of the 20th 
century. While ‘the right to choose’ is connected to an individual’s free choice, the ‘zero option’ rather 
refers to residence. I finally discuss an illiberal instance opposed to ‘the right to choose’ and ‘zero 
option’ applied by Latvia and Estonia, which used the ‘state continuity’ option and did not offer 
citizenship to Soviet-era settlers. 
The sixth and final section concludes by arguing against real-world cases which dismiss 
residence-based citizenship, either by legally sanctioning unacceptable cases of permanent partial 
citizenship, or by offering citizenship without requesting applicants to reside in the territory. I finally 
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argue against a recent claim according to which long-term residence is no longer considered to imply 
integration (hence it should not be the only criterion for citizenship acquisition). 
 
1.4.7. Chapter eight: conclusions 
Chapter eight tries to offer some conclusions. In the first section I criticise four alternatives of 
residence-based citizenship and explain why they are less successful than my proposal in offering a 
comprehensive theory of citizenship by hitting upon some problems each of them faces. The first 
alternative is the ‘stakeholdership’ principle – put forward by Rainer Bauböck – which is, according to 
my first objection, over-inclusive: it cannot justify the inclusion of long-term emigrants and second 
generation born abroad into the demos. The second objection claims that the insistence on the idea that 
citizens must see each other as belonging to an ‘intergenerational community’ rests on a false 
psychological assumption. The third objection criticises a claim regarding the proper function of a 
liberal-democracy where people frequently change membership (the ‘hypermigration model’): I 
question both the number of persons frequently changing citizenship and the frequency of this change. 
 The second theory is the liberal view of transnational citizenship advanced by David Owen, 
according to which all four categories I have discussed in this study must be included. I claim this 
theory is over-inclusive, too: its author cannot dismiss López-Guerra’s arguments for a residence-based 
citizenship theory, since his critique targets a different level: while López-Guerra asks the basic 
question of who should be a citizen, Owen raises a secondary question of how to treat individuals who 
are already citizens and live outside the territory. Even if this author could reply by showing that 
everyone (resident or non-resident) should have a say in deciding who should be a citizen, I argue that 
every normative principle we could employ excludes ab initio some categories in one way or another. 
Moreover, against Owen, I claim that the ‘non-instrumental value’ membership in a country other than 
that of residence may have is not enough in order to support a citizenship claim. Finally, I criticise his 
distinction between ‘political membership’ and ‘national citizenship’ and dismiss the claim that 
citizenship based on pure residence cannot meet ‘certain basic standards of sociological and 
psychological realism’ (Owen 2010). 
The third theory is not only over-inclusive, but it also applies what I call forced inclusion: 
besides accepting non-resident members of a political community, Ruth Rubio-Marín proposes forced 
inclusion of temporary and irregular migrants through an automatic naturalisation after ten years of 
residence. I readily grant that such a perspective would solve the problem of ‘citizens-minus’, but it 
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cannot answer three other difficulties: (a) it can justify neither the inclusion of ‘citizens-plus’ nor their 
advantages; (b) it sets an unacceptable threshold of ten years of residence for citizenship acquisition; 
moreover, it cannot justify the perspective of five years-period an irregular migrant must avoid the law 
and live in precarious social and legal conditions in order to access legal residency; and (c) it cannot 
accommodate forced inclusion (a mandatory and automatic process) with liberal-democratic principles. 
The fourth alternative is an over-exclusive one since it excludes both categories of ‘citizens-
minus’ from access to full citizenship status. It comes in two versions: the first is a ‘negotiated 
exclusion’. According to Torresi and Ottonelli, in case of temporary migrants democratic standards 
should be ‘relaxed’ in order to accommodate ‘citizen-minus’s’ plans. The second version is a ‘forced 
exclusion’: Daniel A. Bell argues that if a state has to choose between accepting a small number of 
immigrants and putting them on the path to full citizenship rights (on the one hand) and accepting a 
large number of people without offering them any possibility of accessing citizenship status, then the 
second solution is morally better since it fares better in reducing world poverty. I challenge these 
views, by showing that (a) a residence-based citizenship is better than conscious infringement of liberal 
democratic values; and (b) Bell’s ‘either/or’ alternative is false: other possibilities like Western-backed 
programs of reducing world poverty may prove to be both normatively and practically better 
alternatives. 
In the second section I honestly survey what problems residence-based citizenship can solve 
and what it cannot provide for (i.e., the problems my proposal finds difficult to answer). This theory 
can easily terminate partial statuses like those imposed on irregular migrants and temporary workers. 
Secondly, it can also easily help to match the two categories of ‘permanent residents’ and ‘citizens’, 
which is a rather complicated subject in today’s political theory. Thirdly, it can help terminating the 
present concern of many states regarding fictitious marriages (or other instrumental incentives for 
acquiring citizenship): indeed, since residence is the only requirement for citizenship acquisition, being 
married or not with a citizen has no influence on the naturalisation procedure. Fourthly, it does away 
with the immoral supplementary requirements for citizenship acquisition like citizenship tests, 
knowledge of local language and history, etc. 
However, as any other normative theory, it also meets some serious difficulties. Firstly, it finds 
it difficult to answer to the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ perspective on irregular migrants. Since 
irregular migrants are ‘impossible subjects’, I believe no solution can be entirely decent and flawless. 
Secondly, another difficulty is the difference between dual citizenship and ‘external quasi-citizenship’: 
why not use instead the Spanish system of ‘dormant’ and ‘active’ citizenship? My theory may have 
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difficulties in approaching such a proposal, but it is important to note that (a) a ‘dormant citizenship’ is 
still a full citizenship status so it still raises the problems discussed in chapter five; and (b) it can still 
generate international conflicts like those based on diplomatic protection. 
The third and last part of this chapter discusses avenues for further research regarding each of 
the four categories I have analysed: irregular immigrants, temporary workers, dual citizens and 
‘external quasi-citizens’. I also discuss reasonable and realisable prospects of residence-based 
citizenship in the future. Even if today such a theory does not seem to have many chances except in a 
very restricted number of countries, I believe that from a normative point of view this is (and should 
be) the way to go. 
 
1.5. Commented bibliography 
Before discussing the main bibliography in political theory, political philosophy, political science and 
sociology that represent the basis of this study, it is important to note that eight important projects 
constituted its starting point. The first is the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship11 project (started in 
2009), supported by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the European University 
Institute: at the time of writing this study, it already provided 47 country reports on current citizenship 
legislation in all European countries, and other countries from Asia and Africa. These country reports 
were essential for writing chapter two (on the history of residence-based citizenship) and also for 
writing the seventh chapter on present-day legal provisions on citizenship based on residence. The 
seventh chapter also relies on the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship’s database on acquisition and loss 
of citizenship, which compares citizenship laws in Europe. The second study is the Clandestino 
project12 (2007-2009), which examined the problem of irregular migrants (data, numbers, legislation 
and trends) in twelve European states.13 The third project concerns two normative debates hosted by 
the Boston Review: ‘The Immigrants as Pariah’ (1998)14 and ‘The case for amnesty’ (2009);15
                                                 
11 Link: 
 the third 
chapter on irregular migrants heavily uses the aforementioned study and the two public discussions to 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ (last accessed: 12 August 2013). 
12 Clandestino – Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends Across Europe, 2007-2009, 
available at the following three links: (1) http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/; (2) http://research.icmpd.org/1244.html; (3) 
http://irregular-migration.hwwi.de/Country-reports.6114.0.html (last accessed: 12 March 2013). 
13 It is important to note that later the country reports of this project have been published (in a slightly modified form than 
the one presented online) in Triandafyllidou (2010). 
14 Boston Review, 23 (5) (October/November 1998), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR23.5/contents.html (last 
accessed: 5 February 2013). 
15 Boston Review, 34 (3) (May/June 2009), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/ndf_immigration.php (last accessed: 
5 February 2013). 
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support its normative claims. Other five projects are concentrated on dual citizenship and they are the 
main sources for writing the fifth chapter on multiple citizens: I am referring to an on-line normative 
debate about dual citizenship for transborder minorities (Bauböck 2010a)16
Chapter four on temporary migrants begins with a discussion of an international covenant very 
important for the rights migrant workers should enjoy, but not signed by any important immigration 
country by now. This is the 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Important authors  discussed in this chapter include 
law scholars like Linda Bosniak (Bosniak 2004) and Beth Simmons (Simmons 2009), political 
 and to other four published 
(edited) books: two are about dual citizenship in global perspective(Faist 2007a) and about dual 
citizenship in Europe (Faist and Kivisto 2007), while the last two are about rights and duties of dual 
nationals (Martin and Hailbronner 2003), and about the 2001 Hungarian Status Law which offered 
privileges to Hungarian ethnics living in the region (Kántor, Majtényi et al. 2004). The sixth chapter on 
‘external quasi-citizenship’ heavily relies on this latter study. 
Chapter two on the history of residence-based citizenship uses historical notes and clarifications 
offered by the 47 country reports on current citizenship laws published on-line by the aforementioned 
EUDO Observatory on Citizenship.  
Chapter three on irregular migrants opens the discussion by relying on two important authors 
well-known for their interest in this subject. The first is Joseph Carens, a philosopher who drew 
academic attention on this subject more than 25 years ago and introduced it in philosophical and 
political debates (Carens 1987), (Carens 2008a). The second is Linda Bosniak, a law scholar who 
continued Carens’ work and advanced a form of residence-based proposal of warranting rights to 
irregular migrants (Bosniak 2006). Other important political and social theorists with close interests on 
illegal immigration and citizenship issues are taken into account, among them Rainer Bauböck 
(Bauböck 2009a), (Bauböck 2010b), (Bauböck 2011), Michael Walzer (Walzer 1983), Veit Bader 
(Bader 2005), Andrew Altman, Christopher Wellman (Altman and Wellman 2009), Daniel A. Bell 
(Bell 2005), Ruth Rubio Marín (Rubio-Marín 2000), Kamal Sadiq (Sadiq 2009), Bill Jordan, Franck 
Düvell (Jordan and Düvell 2002), Ryan Pevnick (Pevnick 2009), Mae Ngai (Ngai 2004), and Sarah 
Fine (Fine forthcoming, 2014). As already stated, the Clandestino country reports constituted the 
empirical basis of this chapter, while the two debates hosted by the Boston Review in 1998 and 2009 
set this subject’s legal and normative framework. 
                                                 
16 This normative debate can be read online at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/RSCAS%202010_75.rev.pdf (last accessed: 
12 March 2013).  
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economists like Martin Ruhs (Ruhs 2005) or Thomas Straubhaar (Straubhaar 1986), sociologists like 
Stephen Castles (Castles 2006), political theorists like Rainer Bauböck (Bauböck 2011), Arash 
Abizadeh (Abizadeh 2010), Daniel A. Bell (Bell 2005) and Yasemin Soysal (Soysal 1994), but also 
scholars of international relations theory like Chris Reus-Smith (Reus-Smit 2011), Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner (Goldsmith and Posner 2005), Stephen Krasner (Krasner 1999), Mary Ann 
Glendon(Glendon 2002), Lynn Hunt (Hunt 2008), and Neta Crawford (Crawford 2002). Other 
important scholars who focused on temporary workers are Thomas Hammar (Hammar 1985), Rita Chin 
(Chin 2007), Ray Rist (Rist 1978), Robert Mayer (Mayer 2005), Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi 
(Ottonelli and Torresi 2012) and Edwin Reubens (Reubens 1986). Another important bibliographic 
material is the special issue of International Migration Review on ‘Temporary Worker Programs: 
Mechanisms, Conditions, Consequences’ (volume 20, issue 4, 1986). 
Chapter five on multiple citizens heavily relies, as previously stated, on five collective projects: 
the first is the 2010 on-line normative debate about dual citizenship for transborder minorities 
(Bauböck 2010a). The following four projects published as edited books refer to dual citizenship in 
Europe (Faist and Kivisto 2007), to dual citizenship in global perspective (Faist 2007a), to the rights 
and duties of dual nationals (Martin and Hailbronner 2003) and to the 2001 Hungarian Status Law 
which offered privileges to Hungarian ethnics living in the region (Kántor, Majtényi et al. 2004). An 
important contributor in the debate on dual citizenship is Rainer Bauböck, who strongly supports a 
congruence principle regarding multiple status (if dual citizenship is accepted for emigrants, then 
immigrants must also be able to access it) (Bauböck 2005a); he also supports increasing freedom of 
movement through establishing more union of states like the European Union (Bauböck 2011); in 
another article he takes into account ‘swamping’ and ‘tipping’ scenarios in external voting (Bauböck 
2007b); and finally he supports a ‘trade off’ between dual citizenship and autonomy in Eastern Europe 
(Bauböck 2007a). Other important contributions are taken into account: David Owen has an interesting 
view which differentiates between ‘dormant’ and ‘active’ citizenships of multiple citizens (Owen 
2010); David Fitzgerald considers that in some countries lack of interest (in case of emigrants) to apply 
for their former citizenship when this possibility was offered shows a low interest in both former and 
dual citizenship (Fitzgerald 2005); Constantin Iordachi discusses about the instrumental use of dual 
citizenship, which seems to be the general case all over the world (Iordachi 2004); and political theorist 
Robert Dahl has a seminal contribution in which he discusses who can qualify as member of a political 
association (Dahl 1989). 
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Chapter six on ‘external quasi-citizens’ starts with four examples of legislative measures taken 
in this sense in four different countries. I discuss favourable treatment offered to former citizens or 
‘ethnic kins’ in India, and the most important references here are Katharine Adeney and Marie Lall, 
who discuss different institutional attempts to build a national identity in this state (Adeney and Lall 
2005) and Anupama Roy, which surveys citizenship policies in the same country (Roy 2010). The 
second state under consideration is Mexico, and the most important contributions under consideration 
regarding nationality laws, migration and dual citizenship are offered by Manuel Becerra Ramirez 
(Ramirez 2000), David Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald 2005), (Fitzgerald 2006), and Pablo Lizarraga Chavez 
(Chavez 1997). Another significant input is offered by David Gutierrez on Mexico and external voting 
rights (Gutierrez, Batalova et al. 2012). The third country analysed is Turkey, and here I especially rely 
on Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu’s work on dual citizenship and transnationalism (Kadirbeyoglu 2007), 
(Kadirbeyoglu 2010) and on Ayse S. Caglar’s contribution regarding ‘external quasi-citizens’ as 
holders of the ‘pink’ card (Caglar 2004). The fourth and last country analysed is Hungary, and here I 
heavily rely on Myra A. Waterbury’s recent analysis of kin-state nationalism in Hungary (Waterbury 
2010), and on the contributions to a working paper edited by Rainer Bauböck on dual citizenship for 
transborder minorities (Bauböck 2010a). The idea of offering ‘external quasi-citizens’ ‘favourable 
treatment’ (and not ‘formal status’) has been suggested in a paper written by Nándor Bárdi (Bárdi 
2004). Other normative considerations have been offered in the extremely interesting 2004 on-line 
debate (later published as a book) on the Hungarian Status Law edited by Zoltán Kántor, Balázs 
Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs Vizi, and Iván Halász (Kántor, Majtényi et al. 2004). I have most cited 
articles written by George Schöpflin (Schöpflin 2004), Iván Halász, Balázs Majtényi and Balázs Vizi 
(Halász, Majtényi et al. 2004), Zoltán Kántor (Kántor 2004), Judit Tóth (Tóth 2004), Fernand de 
Varennes (Varennes 2004), Miroslav Kusý (Kusý 2004) and János Kis (Kis 2004). 
Chapter seven on residence-based citizenship is based on the country reports on current 
citizenship legislation in 47 European and non-European states (delivered, as already mentioned, by the 
EUDO Observatory on Citizenship); I also added citizenship legislation from three other states: 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States (whose citizenship laws are easily accessible online). 
Regarding normative discussions, the online debate on the liberal character of citizenship tests edited 
by Rainer Bauböck and Christian Joppke is an important point of reference (Bauböck and Joppke 
2010d); Costica Dumbrava’s enquiry on the liberal nature of citizenship rules in the European Union 
countries is another significant contribution (Dumbrava 2010). I also mention Bauböck’s interesting 
proposal of ‘urban citizenship’, which is very close to my suggestion of residence-based citizenship 
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(Bauböck 2003); however, I criticise his later drift from this suggestion to one that would accept non-
resident citizenship under a stakeholdership principle (Bauböck 2009a), (Bauböck 2012). Two other 
normative contributions by Rainer Bauböck are important in this chapter: the extended discussion on 
voting rights for external citizens (Bauböck 2007b), and the idea of offering political autonomy instead 
of dual citizenship to ‘ethnic kins’ in Eastern Europe (Bauböck 2007a). 
Chapter eight (conclusions) uses references only in the section dedicated to criticising 
alternative normative theories to my proposal of residence-based citizenship. In this sense, I firstly 
discuss the stakeholdership theory proposed by Rainer Bauböck (Bauböck 2009a), (Bauböck and 
Perchinig 2009). Secondly, I assess the liberal theory of permissive inclusion in the citizenry of all 
those trying to access it (both ‘citizens-minus’ and ‘citizens-plus’) advanced by David Owen (Owen 
2010), (Owen 2013). Thirdly, I take issue with the theory of automatic naturalisation by forced 
inclusion, advanced by Ruth Rubio-Marín (Rubio-Marín 2000). The fourth alternative I criticise is the 
proposal of keeping a permanent second-class citizenship status for temporary workers as a realistic 
way of reducing global poverty, supported by Daniel A. Bell (Bell 2005). Other political theorists taken 
into account here are Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012) and Thomas 
Pogge (Pogge 1997). 
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Chapter 2. A history of residence-based citizenship 
 
‘Gardens, scholars say, are the first sign of commitment to a  
community. When people plant corn they are saying, let’s 
 stay here. And by their connection to the land,  
they are connected to one another’ (Anne Raver) 
 
In this chapter I want to review the most important historical exemplars of residence-based citizenship. 
Firstly, I will survey the main provisions related to ius domicilii and residence-based citizenship, as 
they have been implemented by European countries and other states historically. Secondly, I review the 
key examples of residence-based citizenship laws: ius soli, naturalisation, and loss of citizenship. 
Finally, I will investigate some historical and regrettable instances of laws against residence-based 
citizenship, especially emphasising the internationally-sanctioned 20th century practice of ‘population 
exchange’. 
Let me begin with six preliminary observations. Firstly, I do not misinterpret these older 
instances of ius domicilii as liberal. Of course most of them were not, because they were mostly 
associated with state power to subject all territorial residents, not with a democratic status of 
citizenship. However, as I will try to show in the next chapters, these provisions can easily be 
incorporated in the most liberal citizenship theory today. It is also important to underline that the 
existence of these historical antecedents shows that residence-based citizenship rules are not 
intrinsically incompatible with the legal and political traditions of many European states and are not 
necessarily unworkable or impractical. 
Secondly, I also do not misinterpret the absence of conditions other than residence for 
naturalisation as liberal. Of course they are not, if they merely increase arbitrariness through the 
discretionary power of authorities to grant or deny nationality. What I want to argue instead is that 
arbitrariness and discretionary powers to grant citizenship are – or should be – totally dismissed when 
the only and strict condition for naturalisation is a specific number of years of residence. 
Thirdly, it is important to note the gendered character of many of the rules. For example, when 
naturalisation was granted to an individual in the past, it was also automatically extended to ‘the 
spouse’ and minor children. However, at that time usually the naturalised person was a man, and ‘the 
spouse’ was of course his wife. This is an important issue because the elimination of gender 
discrimination has historically been a major contributor to the growth of dual citizenship via ius 
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sanguinis (although an ius domicilii principle could also have been used as an essential tool against 
gender discrimination). 
Fourthly, it is essential to keep in mind that the most important mode of citizenship acquisition 
today, ius sanguinis, was reinvented by the French Civil Code (1804) and in the 19th century started to 
take the lead in European citizenship legislation. It replaced the older ius soli principle since the latter 
‘connoted feudal allegiance.’ However, according to two authors, this substitution was not ‘ethnically 
motivated:’ it simply meant that ‘family links transmitted by the pater familias had become more 
important than subjecthood’ (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 2-4). 
Fifthly, while the present historical analysis is based on a comprehensive source of 47 country 
reports delivered by the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, it is nonetheless the case that the history of 
citizenship legislation in some countries is lacking for various reasons. Some states, like Iceland and 
Cyprus, were part of empires (in this case, the Danish Kingdom and the United Kingdom, respectively) 
until recently (in our examples, until 1944 and 1960, respectively) – so legal issues up to those dates 
more or less reflect those of their former empires. Other countries existed only briefly between the two 
world wars, losing independence in 1945 when incorporated into communist federations like the Soviet 
Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine, etc.). The history of citizenship legislation in such 
states is thus brief: only two decades or so prior to the 1990s.   
Finally, other countries didn’t gain independence much before the end of the 20thcentury: this is 
the case with all members of the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (for example, Kosovo 
declared independence in 2008) but also with Moldova (which declared independence in 1991, after 
being first part of Romania, and then a socialist republic under the Soviet Union). The most important 
thing is that in such cases (of states becoming independent after 1945), citizenship legislation was 
created according to already existing examples – and for the most part, all those already existing 
examples were implementing contemporaneously the principle of ius sanguinis and (at the same time) 
terminating the application of ius soli or domicile principles. Usually (though not always) the new 
states simply copy-pasted ius sanguinis into their own legislation, without having any history of 
previous application of ius soli or domicile. 
Sixthly, two distinctions have to be made. According to the first one, ius domicilii comes in two 
different forms: it can be the default rule in case of newly established states; but, it can also be a 
subsidiary principle of naturalisation in already established states. I will discuss both forms of ius 
domicilii. The second clarification regards my choice to treat ius soli as a principle ‘subordinated’ to 
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ius domicilii (see section 2.2). I am aware that these are two quite different principles, and it may seem 
a conceptual error to think of ius soli as residence-based. This is because ius soli and ius domicilii are 
both territorially-based, but only the latter is – by definition – residence-based. Conditional ius soli is 
mostly a combination of both principles, but pure ius soli has nothing to do with residence. That said, I 
will still consider, for the purposes of this study, ius soli as ‘subordinated’ to ius domicilii in the 
following sense: in a residence-based theory of citizenship, birth in the territory allows a presupposition 
that the child (whose parents are also long-term residents, and hence citizens) will be a resident of that 
territory (at least for the following years). 
 
2.1. Historical instances of residence-based citizenship as ius domicilii 
A very interesting example of ius domicilii is the Austrian Heimatrecht (‘the right of abode in a 
municipality’), which offered to the person that enjoyed this status unconditional residence and state 
assistance if she was poor. What is even more interesting is that until 1938 acquiring Austrian 
citizenship was conditional upon acquiring the Heimatrecht (also known as ‘provincial citizenship’, or 
the citizenship of a federal province – Landesbürgerschaft) (Çınar 2010: 2-3). One finds a similar 
system (which was implemented in 1874 and is still applied today) in Switzerland, where citizenship 
has three levels: federal, cantonal and municipal. Usually the federation ‘regulates the granting of 
citizenship through descent, marriage, and adoption and enacts minimal regulations on the 
naturalizations of foreigners’ (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 4). Legally the cantons can regulate 
naturalisation ‘but rarely interfere with local naturalization politics;’ municipalities are actually in 
charge of the naturalisation of foreigners. The problem is that municipalities and cantons can amend 
federal regulations, so naturalisation requirements are different in each canton and municipality. 
Because of this, naturalisation conditions are often very harsh and this is the only example when ius 
domicilii is practiced today in a more brutal manner than other present-day naturalisation conditions: 
since 1941 the applicant has been screened (by means of a test) regarding her views, values, reputation, 
living and health circumstances, personal character, and so on (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 7). 
Another example of ius domicilii is that of Bulgaria in 1879, where all residents of the new state 
(former Ottoman subjects) were granted citizenship. It is important to underline in passing that ius 
domicilii has been used by almost every state which came into existence in the 19th and 20th centuries to 
determine the initial body of citizens – with the exception of Estonia and Latvia in 1991, which 
stripped (former Russian) residents of citizenship when determining their citizenries (Järve and 
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Poleshchuk 2010: 1). This practice of ius domicilii (as a primary rule of citizenship acquisition) 
implemented through the ‘zero option’ (which includes all residents on independence day) as 
mechanism for initially determining citizenship through residence at the moment of state formation 
(and also the additional provision that allows individuals to opt for the citizenship of another state that 
recognises them as nationals and thus opts out of the zero option) will be discussed later in chapter 
seven.  
For now, one example is sufficient: in its 2006 decision, Lithuania’s Constitutional Court 
declared that ‘the body of citizens of the restored independent state of Lithuania was formed on the 
basis of permanent residents of Lithuania, irrespective of their nationality’) (Kūris 2010: 8). In 1879 
Bulgarian residence was the only requirement for naturalisation, in the sense that having lived for at 
least three years in the country and holding a permit for permanent domicile was enough to qualify for 
citizenship status (lack of such a residence permit triggered the requirement of ten years residence 
before application) (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 5).  
In 1918, after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia came to existence and 
its citizenship question was linked to the above mentioned municipal right of domicile under the 
Habsburg monarchy: residents of the new state became Czechoslovakian citizens, but again had a right 
to opt for citizenship of another kin state (Baršová 2010: 2). The same right to opt for residence and 
citizenship (this time, Ottoman citizenship) was enjoyed by Muslim residents of Thessaly after Greece 
was defeated by the Ottomans in 1897; moreover, those who had fled Greece had the right to return 
under the ius domicilii regulation. However, this was not something new at that time. In 1869 an 
Ottoman citizenship law had already declared the transition from the millet system – which regulated 
relationships between religious communities and the state, not between individuals (Krasniqi 2012a: 1-
2), (Trimikliniotis 2010: 2) – to a citizenship system based on residency and paternal descent (Sarajlić 
2010: 2). The same law declared that all residents of the Empire were ‘nationals’ (i.e., citizens). 
Interestingly, more than 50 years later, the 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey made use of 
the same provision: all residents of the republic were declared citizens of the new state (Kadirbeyoglu 
2010: 2). 
The same principle of ius domicilii (residence) had already been used in the 19th century in Italy 
under the 1837 Codice Civile Albertino. Unlike the Napoleonic Code, which adopted a combination of 
strong ius sanguinis coupled with ius soli (the latter postponed until coming of age), the Codice 
Albertino delivered in Piedmont ‘gave priority to the stable residence of the father as the criterion for 
enjoying ius soli. As two authors argue, this happened because Piedmont’s intellectuals and lawyers 
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‘among which were Mancini and Pisanelli […] knew what it was like to be a refugee or émigré’ 
(Zincone and Basili 2010: 4-5). The same code, very liberal even in comparison with today’s 
nationality laws, offered ius conubii (spousal transfer of citizenship without any other requirement – 
presumably only for wives, not husbands) and ius soli for children of long-term residents. It is 
important to stress the significant difference between the Italian Codice Albertino (1837) and the 
French Civil Code (1804): while both were written in approximately the same period, the first offered a 
strong support to ius domicilii and ius soli, while the latter re-invented and proposed ius sanguinis. This 
clearly shows not only that not everywhere have ius soli and ius domicilii been seen as ‘connoting 
feudal allegiance’ (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 3), but also that both systems had their own supporters in 
the same period in Europe. It just happened that ius sanguinis was by far ideologically closer to the 
new and (at that time) attractive doctrine of nationalism (born in the 19th century) than ius soli: indeed, 
we can say that the rise of nationalism in Europe determined the vast diffusion of ius sanguinis on the 
continent, although ab initio ius sanguinis was invented as a new, non-ethnic system of citizenship 
acquisition to fight old feudal allegiance. 
It is also important to note that ius domicilii has not been used solely for citizenship acquisition. 
In Sweden in the 17th and 18th centuries, for example, permanent residence of a foreigner was enough 
to qualify the individual for citizenship (Bernitz 2012: 2). Moreover, it has been used recently as a 
basis for reacquisition ex lege: in Portugal for example, under the 1959 law a former citizen can 
reacquire ex lege her status by taking up residence in Portugal and expressing her intent (Piçarra and 
Gil 2012: 7). 
Finally, it is interesting to see how ius domicilii functioned in the former communist bloc. The 
former Yugoslavia is a remarkable case from many points of view. First, it is important to note that the 
1928 Citizenship Act of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes expired officially in 1941, but it 
was used again in 1945 to determine the citizenship of the individuals born in the territory between 
April 1941 and August 1945 (Rava 2010: 3). Second, Yugoslavia had two-tiers of citizenship, federal 
and the republican: according to the 1946 law, the country of residence (domicile) was ‘the main 
ground for the determination of the republican citizenship’.17
                                                 
17 Of course, this is not specific of communist states but typical in all federal states (including the United States, Canada, 
etc.). Ius domicilii is the standard rule for determining citizenship in constituent units of federations for those who are 
federal citizens. However Yugoslavia and the USSR constitute special cases since their constituent republics were 
linguistically and culturally very different: but even so, residence implied citizenship without other requirements like 
knowing the language, cultural assimilation, etc. 
 Moreover, termination of Yugoslav 
citizenship automatically implied termination of republican citizenship, but not the other way around: a 
Croat, for example, was able to move to Serbia and thus become a Serbian citizen (because of her 
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residence). This implied changing republican citizenship, but Yugoslav citizenship remained of course 
the same: for example, the 1950 Macedonian republican law on citizenship stated that ‘a foreigner 
admitted to Yugoslav citizenship acquires Macedonian republican citizenship if she or he has residency 
in the republic or by request’ (Spaskovska 2012: 4). In the same vein, the 1977 citizenship law of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘provided that an individual from another Yugoslav republic could acquire 
Bosnian republican citizenship if he or she was above eighteen and resided on [sic] the territory’ 
(Sarajlić 2010: 5). Moreover, according to an 1947 law, Yugoslavia also used the right to opt for 
residence and citizenship, which was offered to ethnic Italians and to the Slavic population from the 
borderland between the two states (Ragazzi, Štiks et al. 2010: 3). 
Ius domicilii was also applied in the USSR, where (according to the 1924 constitution) ‘every 
person in the territory of the USSR were [sic] considered as citizens of the Soviet Union, unless they 
expressly stated that they had foreign citizenship’ (Salenko 2012: 5). Moreover, a citizen of the Soviet 
Union also had the citizenship of the republic where she was a permanent resident. There was however 
a possibility to opt for another republican citizenship on specific grounds like nationality (Salenko 
2012: 5). According to a 1939 Lithuanian law, if a Lithuanian citizen moved to another republic as a 
permanent resident, she was considered to have automatically lost Lithuanian citizenship ‘and [to have] 
become a citizen of another constituent republic’ (Kūris 2010: 11). The same ius domicilii (but coupled 
this time with both ius soli and ius sanguinis) was used after the fall of the Soviet Union by some of the 
successor states. In its 1991 citizenship law, for example, Ukraine defined its nation ‘on the basis of 
territory: a person’s birth or permanent residence, or that of an ancestor, on the territory [sic] of 
Ukraine became the basis for defining the body of citizens of the Ukrainian state’ (Shevel 2010: 4-5). 
 
2.2. Historical instances of residence-based citizenship at birth through ius soli 
As we have already seen, ius soli was an extremely important provision of citizenship acquisition in the 
18th and 19th centuries. This was especially the case in the Nordic countries, where ius soli was liberally 
combined with a voluntary act. In Denmark, for example, a 1776 law determined that children of 
foreigners born in the state were to be seen as equal with all native-born citizens if they remained in the 
country; this was extremely important, since at that time only native-born citizens were able to access 
public positions (Ersbøll 2010: 4). One century later, in 1898, the law established that a child born and 
brought up in Denmark would acquire citizenship ex lege at the age of nineteen if she was without any 
other citizenship and unless she specifically declared that she did not want to become a citizen (Ersbøll 
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2010: 7). In Sweden, a 1894 law imposed a ‘socialization-based automatic acquisition of citizenship’ at 
the age of 22 for those living from birth in the state: the only requirement was that this acquisition must 
be voluntary (Bernitz 2012: 3). Later in 1950 the same provision was liberalised even further: this time, 
not only persons born in Sweden, but also those who grew up there were able to naturalise through a 
simple procedure called ‘acquisition through notification’ (Bernitz 2012: 5).  Finally, according to a 
1918 law in Iceland citizenship was open to any child born in the territory provided that she resided in 
the country until the age of nineteen, and unless she made a written declaration that she did not want to 
acquire Icelandic citizenship. However, such a declaration was not enough; as the government wanted 
to avoid statelessness, the child was also required to prove that she had citizenship in another country 
(Jóhannesson, Pétursson et al. 2010: 6). 
 The same legislation was applied in Belgium and France, where according to the 1803 
Napoleonic Code Civil a foreign child born in the territory could become a citizen (on a voluntary 
basis) at the age of 22 ‘by making a déclaration de domiciliation [declaration of domicile]’ (Foblets 
and Yanasmayan 2010: 2). In 1815 children born in the territory were able to acquire citizenship if their 
parents were residents. The same rule has been applied ever since in Belgium, under both the 1909 and 
1984 nationality laws (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 3-5). A similar declaration of domicile, known 
as option de la patrie was available for children born in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg since 1815, 
and it was strengthened in 1841 (Scuto 2010: 2-3). Another situation when only a ‘declaration of 
willingness’ to become a citizen was necessary can be found in Spain, where the 1889 Civil Code 
implemented ‘ius soli as facultas soli’: according to this provision, children born in the territory must 
declare that they want to be Spanish citizens at the age of majority (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 
5). 
The same goes for Portugal according to the 1867 Civil Code: ius soli was available for children 
of foreigners unless they refused and opted, by expression of intent, for their parents’ citizenship 
(Piçarra and Gil 2012: 4). Almost one hundred years later, in 1959, ius soli became ‘ex lege and 
automatic’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 5). Unfortunately this lasted only until 1981, after which time ius soli 
was no longer applied as the sole basis for accessing citizenship. With the intention to exclude children 
of both irregular and temporary migrants, legislators decided that in order for a child to become a 
citizen by ius soli, his ‘parents must have lived in Portugal for at least six years’ and additionally must 
have obtained a residence permit (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 9-10). 
Ius soli was also a tradition in the United Kingdom, where British people were defined by 
geography rather than descent, such that a strong ius soli principle was applied. According to two 
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authors, ius soli was ‘first codified in the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act’ of 1914; 
however, the earliest confirmation of this regulation dates back to 1608. Notwithstanding this, in 1983 
this tradition was ‘partially lost’ (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 3). Many other European countries also 
applied ius soli. For example, the 1837 Italian Civil Code provided access to citizenship for children of 
long-term resident aliens (on the condition that parents had resided in Italy for at least ten years). This 
provision was also maintained in the 1912 Nationality Act (Zincone and Basili 2010: 4-5).  The 
Netherlands applied ius soli for a rather briefer period, from1838 until 1892 (when it was replaced with 
ius sanguinis). Finally, Malta applied this mode of citizenship acquisition from independence (1964) 
until 1989 (Buttigieg 2010: 2-3).  
It is interesting to note that not only Western European countries, but also those from the East 
applied the same legislation. The 1879 Bulgarian Constitution, for example, stated that ‘persons born in 
Bulgaria who have not obtained any other citizenship […] are subjects of the Bulgarian Principality.’ 
(Smilov and Jileva 2010: 3). This provision was maintained in the 1880, 1883 and 1904 laws, which 
were ‘heavily reliant on the principle of ius soli’ (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 4). This law lasted until 
1940, when ius sanguinis replaced ius soli (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 6). In the same vein, a 1924 
Romanian law stated that foreigners born and raised in Romania could become citizens if they 
requested it upon reaching maturity (Iordachi 2010: 3). However, a communist decree in 1952 
discontinued this ius soli policy (Iordachi 2010: 5). Moreover, even outside Europe ius soli was 
commonly implemented: according to a 1869 law of the Ottoman Empire, foreign children were able to 
apply for citizenship three years after reaching adulthood (Kadirbeyoglu 2010: 1-2). 
Finally, it is important to note that another, less liberal (from the perspective of residence-based 
citizenship, as we will see in chapter seven) mode of ius soli, known as ‘double ius soli’, has also been 
in use in various places since the 19th century. According to this variation, a child born in a country 
who has at least one parent born in the same country can access citizenship status. Double ius soli has 
applied in France since 1851 (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 4), in Spain since 1954 (Rubio Marín, Sobrino 
et al. 2012: 8) and in Morocco since 1921 (Perrin 2011: 4). Additionally, it was applied in Luxembourg 
between 1878 and 1940 (Scuto 2010: 3-4), and in the Netherlands between1953 and1975 (van Oers, de 
Hart et al. 2013: 5). 
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2.3. Historical instances of residence-based citizenship in naturalisation 
Probably one of the oldest examples of naturalisation procedure comes from Russia, where starting 
with 1721 a foreigner could become a Russian subject only by swearing an oath of allegiance. In 1864 
Russia introduced a five-years residence requirement, but it is important to note that many categories 
were entitled either to skip this condition (persons employed by the state) or to the reduction of the 
number of residence years (investors, gifted persons, etc.). Interestingly, not only were  naturalised 
persons immediately granted full and equal rights; they were ‘also given special privileges, such as a 
two year exemption from Russian taxes’ (Salenko 2012: 3-4). Even in Leninist Russia, naturalisation 
was more liberal than in any other European state. According to the 1918 Constitution, local Soviet 
authorities had the power to grant citizenship to resident foreigners, especially to workers, peasants and 
to those ‘who were not using vicarious labour’. Moreover, in ‘compliance with the Soviet Constitution 
of 1918, this category of people could obtain Soviet Citizenship “without any baffling formalities” 
(Article 20)’ (Salenko 2012: 4). 
In Nordic countries also, the only important requirement for naturalisation in the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century was residence. In 1858, in order to naturalise in Finland a foreigner 
needed only to demonstrate a permanent residence of three years, be of good reputation, and have the 
ability to support herself. What is more, if granted, naturalisation was automatically extended to the 
spouse and minor children (Fagerlund and Brander 2010: 4). In Denmark, the first Nationality Act of 
1920 required five years’ previous residence, a good reputation, the ability to support oneself and one’s 
family, and renouncement of any former citizenship. The 1924 law in Norway required only five years 
of previous residence and ‘economic self-sufficiency’ (Brochmann 2010: 3). And the Swedish law of 
the same year (1924) requested that the applicant be an adult, have resided in the territory five years 
before the application, have a respectable life and have the means to support her family. Interestingly, 
the latter requirement was abolished in 1976 (Bernitz 2012: 4). 
There are also a number of interesting cases of residence-based naturalisation in Austrian 
history. In the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire, for example, the Civil Code of 1811 stipulated 
only two conditions for naturalisation as an ‘act of grace’: the individual was required to have ‘good 
manners’ and ‘sufficient income’. The same code also offered until 1833 another possibility of an 
automatic naturalisation after ten years of residence (Çınar 2010: 2). In its 1925 Citizenship Law, 
Austria had three naturalisation conditions: four years of previous residence, possession of Heimatrecht 
(the right to reside in a municipality – see supra, section 2.1), and a requirement that the applicant 
relinquish any former citizenship (Çınar 2010: 3). Finally, a rather curious right was offered by 
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Austria’s 1949 law, which imposed a legal entitlement to naturalisation after 30 years of residence, on 
the condition that the applicant had no criminal record and relinquished any former citizenship. This 
possibility of purely residence-based acquisition is still in force today (Çınar 2010: 4). 
In the same period at the beginning of the 19th century, the 1823 Greek Constitution also set for 
the first time conditions for the naturalisation of aliens. Besides discretionary naturalisation based on 
certain important services rendered to the country, ordinary conditions were five years of previous 
residence, possession of ‘immovable property’ and no criminal record (Christopoulos 2009: 4). 
Thirteen years later, in 1836, Portugal also took a liberal path, requiring only two years of previous 
residence (which could be waived for ethnic Portuguese) and the ability to acquire the means of 
subsistence (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 3). Later in 1867 Portugal changed the residency requirement to 
three years, and added two conditions: a clean criminal record and ‘having performed all military duties 
in the origin country’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 4). In 1892, naturalisation requirements were also very 
liberal in the Netherlands: being of age, five years of residence in the country or in one of its colonies, 
and renunciation of any previous citizenship. According to the authors of the report these constituted 
merely the formal/legal conditions, since in practice the authorities also imposed public order and 
financial requirements (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 3). The cost of the naturalisation procedure was 
‘fairly high’, but it is important to note that once the individual was naturalised, both her spouse and 
minor children were also automatically naturalised. 
Spain presents an interesting case, as naturalisation requirements were not very well specified in 
the 19th century laws. For example, the 1886 Civil Code introduced a facultas soli according to which a 
simple declaration of intent and giving up former citizenship seemed to be enough for qualifying for 
naturalisation. Continuous residence was also a possibility to acquire naturalisation, but there was no 
specification of what ‘residence’ meant. This also happened three years later in 1889: the naturalisation 
provision ‘simply stated that all those who had become residents of any locality in the monarchy would 
be Spanish, but added nothing as to how to define residence, the length of residence or the way of 
certifying it’ (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 5). Only in 1916 did a law introduce the requirement 
of ten years residence before qualifying for normal naturalisation (some exceptions were however set 
for people from Ibero-American countries, investors, spouses of citizens, etc.). 
The United Kingdom is also an interesting case and maybe one of the best examples of 
residence-based citizenship legislation – since, as we have already seen, until 1983 
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‘(…) residence was the key to most social provisions such as health care or education, either formally 
or as a matter of practice, the highest formal status being in any event generally not citizenship as such 
but “settlement”. Citizens, but also others, are settled (…) British people had historically been defined 
essentially by geography rather than descent, and that geography had been defined by the extent of 
political sovereignty under the Empire’ (…) The method of defining nationals was historically 
characterised by a strong ius soli principle, rooted in the common law system and referring to the 
whole of the territory of the reigning monarch’ (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 2, 8, 9) 
 
Two former communist countries with a brief period of independence before the 1990s had in fact been 
extremely liberal during that time. According to a 1919 Georgian law, the only requirement for 
naturalisation was two years of previous residence in the territory; moreover, authorities were obliged 
to offer an answer to every application within maximum period of one year (Gugushvili 2012: 2). Since 
independence in 1918, Lithuania also offered simple conditions for naturalisation: the only 
requirements were ten years of residence until 1914 and either having a permanent job, or owning real 
property (however, Russian officials were excluded) (Kūris 2010: 4). In the 1936 law conditions 
became more strict: besides ten years of previous residence and a permanent job, authorities also 
required that the applicant must have no criminal record, must renounce any former citizenship (one 
exception was made for American citizens), and must pay an application fee (this time, ethnic Germans 
and Poles were excluded). Finally, in 1939 Lithuania also required by law knowledge of the state 
language as a condition for naturalisation (Kūris 2010: 5, 8). 
Two other interesting former communist cases are Romania and Czechoslovakia. In Romania 
before communism, a 1924 law required only ten years of previous residence and a declaration of 
intent. However, foreigners born and raised in the territory were exempt from the residential 
requirement and were able to access citizenship upon reaching maturity (Iordachi 2010: 3). The 
communist regime changed this law, but naturalisation conditions curiously seemed to remain liberal at 
least in theory: according to a 1971 citizenship law, the requirements for naturalisation were: five years 
of residence (or being born in Romania and living there at the time of the request), being of age, 
providing proof of sufficient means of subsistence, renunciation of former citizenship, and ‘attachment 
to the state’. Except for the last requirement, which was of course inserted in order to leave a lot of 
administrative discretion in the naturalisation procedure, all other requirements appear as if they were 
on the liberal path, just like the facilitated naturalisation for spouses of Romanian citizens, who were 
only required to have lived in the country for at least three years (Iordachi 2010: 5-6). Also in 
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Czechoslovakia in 1948 the principal conditions for naturalisation were five years of previous 
residence and giving up previous citizenship (Kusá 2010: 5). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that one form of naturalisation based on residence was the 
automatic acquisition of citizenship upon marriage. This was probably based on the fact that, in the 19th 
and first half of the 20th centuries, married people were expected to live together, so in this case the 
residency requirement was superfluous. Such laws can be described as ‘ius connubii’ or ‘spousal 
transfer’ in Italy (1837) (Zincone and Basili 2010: 4) or ‘post-nuptial citizenship’ in Ireland (1956) 
(Handoll 2012: 4). They were also present in Austria in the 1811 Civil Code (Çınar 2010: 2) and in 
France and Belgium under the 1803 Napoleonic Civil Code (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 2). Other 
examples of automatic acquisition of citizenship upon marriage can be found in Bulgaria in 1879 
(Smilov and Jileva 2010: 5), in Denmark in 1898 (Ersbøll 2010: 8), in Iceland in 1919 (Jóhannesson, 
Pétursson et al. 2010: 6), in Portugal in 1959 (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 6), in Romania in 1924 (Iordachi 
2010: 3), in Spain in 1954 (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 8), and in Turkey in 1928 (Kadirbeyoglu 
2010: 2). 
It is important to note that ‘ius connubii’ did not usually apply in both directions. Typically only 
women acquired men’s citizenship through marriage in most countries with such provisions (the case 
of Italy, Ireland, Austria, France, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Iceland and Turkey). Of 
course, ‘ius connubii’ was applied on the condition that the couple would live in the territory, and 
usually the woman was losing her former citizenship because of the prohibition of dual status in the 
international law. Interestingly, there are two instances in which although ‘ius connubii’ was not 
automatic, it referred to foreign men marrying women citizens: in this situation, the residence 
requirement was severely reduced in comparison with the normal one for foreigners: from three years 
to one year in Bulgaria according to the 1879 law, and from ten years to two years in Spain according 
to the 1954 law. 
 
2.4. Historical instances of residence-based citizenship in case of loss 
A residence-based theory of citizenship, which simply states that individuals should be citizens of a 
specific country as long as they are permanent residents in that state, naturally implies that emigrants 
(that is, citizens who left the country in order to permanently reside in another state) should lose 
citizenship and take the citizenship of their new state of residence. This was indeed the main tendency 
in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. The Nordic countries again provide another excellent 
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example. In Finland, a 1858 law stated that simply taking up residence abroad implied losing Finnish 
citizenship (Fagerlund and Brander 2010: 4). However, the other Nordic countries imposed a somewhat 
more relaxed view. In 1894 Sweden declared citizenship lost after ten years or more residence abroad. 
Some exceptions were made for (externally resident) officials employed by the state and for those 
citizens who intended to keep Swedish citizenship, the latter being required to make a statement every 
ten years declaring such an intention. However, it is very important to underline that, as a perfect 
example of a residence-based regime of citizenship, Sweden was also prepared to re-activate full 
citizenship status to former citizens upon resumption of permanent residence in the country. 
Agreements were signed with Argentina (1885) and the United States (1869) according to which 
former Swedish citizens who returned to Sweden were considered to automatically lose their 
Argentinean or American citizenship (Bernitz 2012: 3). According to a subsequent law from 1924, ‘a 
Swedish man or unmarried woman lost Swedish citizenship at the age of 22 if he or she was born 
abroad and never had been domiciled in Sweden’. However, in some cases permission to retain 
citizenship was granted (Bernitz 2012: 4). 
Denmark also offers a good illustration of residence-based citizenship. One example was the 
ongoing battle (at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries) between Denmark and 
Germany over the regions known as Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. When Denmark ceded these 
regions to Germany in 1864, residents were allowed to retain Danish citizenship ‘if they moved to 
Denmark within a six year time limit’, and thousands of individuals did this (Ersbøll 2010: 5). Later in 
1920, when Northern Schleswig was again assigned to Denmark, all inhabitants acquired Danish 
citizenship but also had the right to opt for German citizenship within a period of two years (Ersbøll 
2010: 9). Denmark did not apply the theory of residence-based citizenship only in contested territories. 
According to a 1898 law individuals also had their citizenship suspended after continuously residing 
abroad for more than ten years (Ersbøll 2010: 8). Moreover, in 1925 it was decided that an individual 
born abroad who had never resided in the country would lose her Danish citizenship upon reaching the 
age of 22 (Ersbøll 2010: 10); the same provision was retained in the 1950 citizenship law reform and 
remains in force today (Ersbøll 2010: 13). 
The Netherlands also took the same path in 1892, when a law determined that loss of Dutch 
citizenship would occur after ten years of residence abroad ‘without expressing the wish to remain 
Dutch at the municipality of the last place of residence or at a Dutch consulate’ (van Oers, de Hart et al. 
2013: 3). It is interesting to see why a long-term emigrant was supposed to lose citizenship after ten 
years of residence abroad, but that the same individual was entitled to keep it as long as she declared 
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her intention to remain a citizen. The Lithuanian case may offer one answer: the 1938 Constitution 
stated that citizenship ‘could’ be lost if a person did not reside in Lithuania and ‘had lost a relationship 
to the “life of Lithuania”’ (Kūris 2010: 7). The assumption here seems to be that a citizen who did not 
make any effort to inform the authorities that she wanted to keep citizenship probably had no intention 
to retain it, and hence was considered to have lost her connection with the country. 
Greece offers a further interesting case; its 1856 law provided for the loss of Greek citizenship 
in cases of naturalisation (not just long-term residence) abroad. This was in line with the general trend 
in international relations at that time, but it was nevertheless more moderate than the laws adopted by 
the aforementioned countries, which imposed loss of citizenship simply for long term residence outside 
the country. However, this moderation was lost in the period between 1927 and 1998, when only 
allogenis Greeks (that is, non-ethnic Greek citizens of Greece) were deprived of citizenship if they fled 
Greek soil with no intention to return (the intention to return was investigated and decided by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Christopoulos 2009: 7-8). This strictly refers to residence, not 
naturalisation abroad – since having ‘no intention to return’ does not guarantee a successful citizenship 
application elsewhere. Other examples of laws which enforced loss of citizenship for permanent 
residents abroad include Austria in 1832 (which also imposed, again according to the general trend in 
international relations at that time, the loss of citizenship for women upon marriage to a foreigner) 
(Çınar 2010: 2) and Belgium according to the 1803 Napoleonic Code Civil (Foblets and Yanasmayan 
2010: 2). 
 
2.5. Historical instances of regulations against (a liberal theory of) residence-based citizenship 
In the 19th and early 20th century there was no consistent liberal practice of residence-based citizenship. 
This is most clearly evident in compulsory population exchanges – which appeared after the First 
World War (1918) and were practiced until 1989 – and constituted in the aforementioned period ‘a 
regrettable principle in international law’ (Christopoulos 2009: 7). The rising of nationalist feelings at 
that time coupled with the process of state formation after the war determined ‘an internationally 
regulated version of ethnic cleansing’ (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 5). The best-known and largest 
population exchange took place between Greece and Turkey in 1923 and involved approximately two 
million people. Another example is Bulgaria, which signed population exchange treaties with Greece in 
1920 and with Romania in 1940 (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 6). Finally, even though this was not the 
result of an international agreement, communist Bulgaria also expelled in 1989 more than 300,000 
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Turks to neighbouring Turkey; after a few months the communist regime collapsed, but only a 
proportion of between one-third and one-half of those expelled returned home (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 
8). 
The 1920 treaty signed by Bulgaria and Greece after the Treaty of Neuilly involved the transfer 
of some 300,000 people18 and supposed a ‘voluntary migration of minorities on either side’ 
(Christopoulos 2009: 6). Three years later, the Treaty of Lausanne (the final treaty concluding First 
World War) included a measure for population exchange between Greece and Turkey, and this was 
closely supervised by the Mixed Committee for Exchanges of the League of Nations.19
However, population exchanges continued even after the Second World War. One example is 
the several Polish-Soviet Union ‘repatriation’ agreements between 1940 and 1957. For example, 
ethnically Polish and Jewish individuals ‘who had been Polish citizens as of 17 September 1939, were 
entitled to move and resettle within Poland’s new borders’ (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 4). On the 
other hand, non-ethnic Polish citizens (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians) were entitled to move to the 
USSR and they lost at the same time their Polish citizenship. The biggest ethnic group expatriated was 
again Germans (the expatriation was based on the Potsdam agreement too, but also on the 1946 Act on 
the Exclusion of Persons of German Ethnicity from Polish Society) (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 
4). And Poland continued to expel its citizens of other ethnic backgrounds even at the end of 1960s: 
this time Jews were perceived as having dubious and ‘dual loyalty’ – in consequence they were forced 
 A further 
similar treaty was signed in 1926 between Greece and Albania (Christopoulos 2009: 6). 
The same measure of population exchange was also applied after the Second World War. For 
example, Czechoslovakia ‘exchanged’ population with both Germany and Hungary. The transfer of 
ethnic Germans was agreed to by the Allied Powers (at the 1945 Berlin Potsdam Conference), and as a 
consequence ‘more than 2,820,000 inhabitants of German ethnicity were expelled’ (Baršová 2010: 3); 
(Kovács and Tóth 2010). On the other hand, in the following years ‘more than 200,000 Czechs, 
Slovaks and members of other Slavonic nations immigrated to Czechoslovakia’ (Baršová 2010: 3). 
However the exchange of Slovak and Hungarian population was not agreed at the aforementioned 
conference, so it was subsequently decided by the two countries involved: as a consequence, on a 
‘voluntary’ basis, ‘89,660 ethnic Hungarians […] were moved into Hungary, in return for receiving 
73,273 ethnic Slovaks’ (Kusá 2010: 3-4). 
                                                 
18 Encyclopaedia Britannica, link: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/410481/Treaty-of-Neuilly (accessed 
February 2013). 
19 The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations can be read at following this link: 
http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/exchange.html (accessed February 2013). 
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to leave Poland and to sign a document ‘expressing their intention to renounce their Polish citizenship 
upon acquisition of Israeli nationality’ (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 5). 
Another example concerns Cyprus, where in 1963 (after the fall of the ‘consociational political 
system’, which presupposed an agreement according to which the state should have been governed by 
both Greek and Turkish communities) most of the Greek-Cypriots were displaced from the north, 
which later became a special republic recognised and supported by Turkey but not by the international 
community (Trimikliniotis 2010: 6). The last example of population transfer20
The second example is that of non-citizen permanent residents: for example, this was the case 
of Jews in Romania (legally until 1879, but practically until the end of the First World War). Until 
1879 ethnic Jews were excluded from Romanian citizenship, even if they were born and raised in this 
country. Because of pressures from the international community the situation changed that year, 
however naturalisations were decided on an individual basis, and very few cases were recorded until 
the First World War (Iordachi 2010: 2). A second example of non-citizen permanent residents can be 
found in Turkey between 1924 and 1936: after the first Constitution of the Republic (1924) and the first 
citizenship law (1928), although Turkish citizenship was in theory offered to ‘all residents of the 
Republic irrespective of race or religion’, some groups were explicitly excluded from citizenship. A 
1927 law excluded Armenians and Greek Orthodox who had left the territory during the independence 
war; other groups were simply forced to leave the territory since some laws excluded their employment 
in state services (1926), in medicine (1928) and other professions (1932). For example, ‘15,000 Greeks 
left the country as a result of this [latter] law’ (Kadirbeyoglu 2010: 2). A third case is that of the ‘guest 
workers’ in European states after the Second World War, who were expected to come only temporarily 
 in Europe is probably 
the already mentioned 1989 expulsion of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria.   
However, population exchanges were not the only examples of regulations that run against the 
principle of residence-based citizenship; indeed, at least three other cases can be found in the history of 
the last two centuries. The first example concerns what I will call non-resident quasi-citizens: this 
status was offered by the Netherlands in 1910 to the native population of the Dutch East Indies. A 
person able to acquire such ‘second rank’ citizenship has been called a ‘Dutch subject non-Dutch 
citizen’. As the same authors argue, ‘After Indonesia’s independence in 1949, the Dutch government 
would use the status of Dutch subject non-Dutch citizen to allocate citizens to Indonesia’ (van Oers, de 
Hart et al. 2013: 3). 
                                                 
20 ‘Collective expulsion’, ‘population transfer’ and ‘population exchange’ are related but conceptually different phenomena. 
What is important here is that all of them illustrate extreme policies that deny residence-based claims to citizenship. 
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to work but remained in the host state definitively and were not offered citizenship. Variations of this 
example can be found even in our days: for example, until the 2000 citizenship law reform Germany 
provided access to citizenship for residents who did not qualify under ius sanguinis only through a 
demanding naturalization process that many chose not to pursue.  
The third example is that of citizens without full citizenship rights. This is not necessarily a 
negative category: for example, in its 1865 Code Italy offered resident foreigners a citizenship status 
called ‘piccola cittadinanza’ (‘small citizenship’). That was a citizenship status lacking civil and 
political rights, but it was thought to pave the way to full citizenship for persons enjoying it (Zincone 
and Basili 2010: 5). However, this good intention was not always fulfilled. For example, in 1939 
Romania offered former foreigners full citizenship rights only six years after naturalisation (Iordachi 
2010) (3). Other examples (which are, unfortunately, still there in our days) include Lebanon, which 
offers equal rights to former foreigners only ten years after naturalisation (el-Khoury and Jaulin 2012: 
16), and Morocco, which offers full rights to new citizens only five years after naturalisation (Perrin 
2011: 9). 
 
2.6. History of residence-based citizenship: conclusions 
It is interesting to observe that, also in a historical perspective, we can find instances of residence-based 
citizenship even in a period where nationalist feelings were overwhelming the whole European 
continent. Bulgaria is a good example: the Constituent Assembly of Veliko Turnovo (1879) opted for a 
residence-based citizenship rather than ius sanguinis for two basic reasons. One was purely irredentist: 
keeping ethnic Bulgarians in the region (but outside the state territory) was seen as a defensive and 
strategic move to maintain legitimate reasons for further territorial expansion; on the other hand, the 
second reason was easy to understand, since a mass exodus of ethnic Bulgarians ‘coming from Eastern 
Rumelia, Macedonia, Eastern Thrace and other regions’ would have created serious problems for the 
new state. These ‘ethnic kins’ were not offered citizenship but only special privileges (for example, less 
strict conditions for naturalisation) (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 4-6). Such ‘ethnic kinship’ policies were 
also continued in 1940, and this is one of the first historical cases of what I will call later, in chapter 
six, ‘external quasi-citizenship’ (which will be defended as a better alternative to dual citizenship, since 
this status is – unlike multiple status – congruent with the principle of residence-based citizenship) 
(Bauböck 2007b: 2396), (Owen 2011a). 
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Finally, it is interesting to note one last historical example of the struggle to link citizenship to 
residence rather than to ethnicity. This happened, maybe not surprisingly, in Yugoslavia. Because of its 
many ethnic groups, this communist state tried to disentangle citizenship and ethnicity. Its 1964 Federal 
Citizenship Law insisted ‘upon the civic and supra-national (Yugoslav) dimension, cross-republican 
mobility and an ideological shift in the Yugoslav political sphere which through the doctrine of 
workers’ self-management tried to minimise the importance of the republics as bastions of ethnic and 
national belonging’ (Spaskovska 2012: 5). It was probably too late, since nationalist and ethnic feelings 
already took possession of the whole region, and later at the end of the century these feelings directly 
generated another European armed conflict. 
In conclusion we can say that in most of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century the 
principle of residence-based citizenship, or ius domicilii, was considered (alongside ius soli and ius 
sanguinis) an important standard for citizenship acquisition – through ius soli (as defined in this 
chapter) and naturalisation – and also for loss of citizenship – through long-term residence abroad. 
Historical instances which run against residence-based citizenship were population exchanges (which 
implied stripping permanent residents of citizenship and moving them to another country) and different 
cases of partial citizenship (which presupposed offering permanent residents – or even newly 
naturalised persons – fewer rights than those enjoyed by full citizens). Finally, it is important to note 
that avoiding dual citizenship was also a principle of international law.21
                                                 
21 See for example the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (link: 
 
On the other hand, starting with the French Civil Code (1803) ius sanguinis began to spread on 
the whole continent (and subsequently on the whole world). As we will see later in chapter seven, only 
a few countries still practice today a strong and liberal version of residence-based citizenship: the last 
legal instance of pure ius soli in Europe was terminated by Ireland in 2004, and naturalisation based 
exclusively on residence could be found only in Belgium until 2012, and with some other insignificant 
requirements in another small number of liberal European countries. However, the insistence on ius 
sanguinis and the opposition to naturalisation of foreigners in general (as it came to be performed lately 
in many European states) cannot be morally accepted. This study tries to rediscover, defend and 
propose the old alternative of residence-based citizenship (with its instances of conditional ius soli and 
naturalisation based on permanent residence) as a preferable option today. 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b00.html), the 1963 European Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple 
Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality (link: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/043.htm), and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality (link: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm) [all three links accessed on 27 July 2013]. 
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Chapter 3. ‘Citizens-minus’ (1): No Land’s Man – Irregular Migrants’  
Challenge To Immigration Control And Membership Policies 
 
 
‘(…) long-term undocumented aliens have become members of the society (…) 
 social membership does not depend upon the judgment of political authorities.  
People who live and work and raise their families in a society are members of  
that society regardless of their legal status’ (Carens 1989: 44) 
 
‘The illegal alien is thus an “impossible subject”, a person who  
cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved’ (Ngai 2004) 
 
‘Solo voy con mi pena / Sola va mi condena / Correr es mi destino  
/ Para burlar la ley / Perdido en el corazón / De la grande Babylon /  
Mi dicen el clandestino / Por no llevar papel’ (Manu Chao, ‘Clandestino’)22
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter I want to raise the problem of the rights irregular migrants already settled in a host 
country (that is, residents for more than one year and having the intention to say for a long period of 
time)23
In consequence, if irregular migrants cannot enjoy civil, social, economic and political rights 
while being in an illegal status, only two other options are available: deportation (triggered by their 
can enjoy before and after regularisation, with a special focus on voting rights. My claim is that 
illegal status cannot be tolerated; a first consequence of this claim is that it is not an acceptable policy 
to offer undocumented individuals a large package of rights while at the same time refusing to 
regularise them. Indeed, such a policy would simply mean that the host state tolerates illegal status. 
This goes against Joseph Carens’ firewall proposal which is meant to ensure social and economic rights 
for irregular immigrants even in the absence of a regularisation program. I also argue against Linda 
Bosniak’s suggestion of conferring rights based on territorial presence and not on status: the 
combination of territorially-based enjoyment of rights and continuous illegal status is either 
normatively defective or (since it cannot oppose offering irregulars voting rights too) renders 
citizenship status irrelevant (section two). 
                                                 
22 English translation: ‘Alone I go with my sorrow / Alone goes my sentence / To run is my destiny / To escape the law / 
Lost in the heart of the great Babylon / They call me clandestine / For not having any papers’ (source: 
http://www.loglar.com/song.php?id=19638, accessed 12 February 2013) 
23 I explain later in section 3.3. why I focus explicitly in this chapter only on this category of irregular migrants. 
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illegal status) or regularisation (supported by the fact that in time undocumented persons become 
members of the host society) (section three). However, none of the reasons for which states can 
legitimately exclude foreigners can justify irregular immigrants’ expulsion; deportation is not a solution 
to the problem of illegal migration (section four). This leaves states with only one option – that is, 
legalisation of their status. However, none of the regularisation programs until now have been able to 
eradicate the existence of illegal status because they are based on the ‘long-term residence threshold’ 
proposal. The latter is not only violating existing international and domestic legal norms; it is also 
practically ineffective. However, since this proposal cannot be altogether dismissed, I argue for a short-
term residence threshold (section five). 
The last two sections discuss the problem of irregular migrants’ franchise in both origin and 
host states, before and after regularisation. If an origin state actively supports its citizens-with-illegal-
status-abroad, then it may generate serious diplomatic conflicts: a good example is that of the 
diplomatic tensions between Romania and France regarding irregular-migrant-European-citizens’ right 
to freedom of movement. This is indicative of the serious diplomatic tensions an origin state would 
generate if it had actively supported voting by its citizens-with-illegal-status-abroad in national 
elections (in the country of origin). On the other hand, once they are regularised (let alone naturalised) 
in the host society, the origin state may not be under a moral obligation to support the franchise of its 
non-resident citizens, former irregulars included (section six). The problems raised by irregular 
migrants’ franchise in the host state are even more complicated: on the one hand, if they vote while still 
being in an illegal status (as it happens in many developing countries), they can open the path not only 
to international conflicts, but also to an insidious politics which resorts to ethnic and demographic 
manipulation in order to maintain or access political power.  
However, it is not clear that even in developed, Western countries voting rights can be accessed 
only after naturalisation. Some authors propose to disconnect local from national citizenship, and this 
suggestion could facilitate former irregulars’ access to political rights since it does not require previous 
naturalisation. However we conceive citizenship status, it is clear that voting rights can be acquired by 
irregulars only after regularisation. I conclude by claiming that after their status is legalised former 
irregulars may be treated differently than other legal immigrants by the state – in the sense that their 
franchise can be delayed for a longer period of time; however, this differential treatment understood as 
partial citizenship is acceptable only as long as it is temporary (section seven). 
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3.2. How to deal with illegal migration (a): rights without status 
Most of the (still thin) normative literature on illegal immigration considers the illegal status of 
individuals in the host countries as being morally intolerable.24
Exhausted by the endless debate between regularisation and deportation, and also aware of the 
formidable political interests in maintaining the status quo,
 Keeping them in an illegal status is 
deeply objectionable because of mainly two reasons. Firstly, they lack basic human and social rights: 
even when some of them are provided (like human rights) irregulars usually do not make use of them 
because of fear of being discovered by state’s authorities and deported. Secondly, a liberal democratic 
state that keeps a number of people in such an intolerable situation is creating a caste-like social system 
(Bosniak 2007a) that undermines its main liberal democratic ideas. Indeed, as we will see this would 
amount to have long-term residents who are ‘subjects of a band of citizen tyrants, governed without 
consent’ (Walzer 1983). In consequence I will start from the premise that there is a moral duty to 
eliminate illegality (i.e., ‘irregularity’) as a status – even though, as I explain in section four below, 
states are morally entitled to some extent to restrict entry and settlement. 
Theorists disagree, however, on the reasons offered for this moral stance. Some take 
undocumented migrants’ perspective and show that illegal status unacceptably strips individuals of 
most of their rights, human rights included. Others concentrate on the polities third country nationals 
migrate to, and they argue that toleration of illegal status subverts the liberal and democratic ideals 
these states are committed to. Both camps converge in condemning host states’ current policies, but 
they differ regarding the solutions they propose. This section analyses the proposal of disconnecting 
enjoyment of rights from immigration status (advanced by those focusing on migrants’ rights), while 
the subsequent section discusses the dilemma between amnesty and expulsion (disputed by theorists 
concerned with preserving the liberal democratic character of receiving states). 
25
                                                 
24 With the exception of Bell (2005) and Sadiq (2009). 
25 As I will show in the next section, in spite of their political rhetoric states are actually comfortable with maintaining the 
status quo – that is, they tolerate illegal migration. 
 theorists concerned with irregular 
migrants’ rights have proposed detaching immigration status from enjoyment of rights. The upshot of 
this suggestion is straightforward and deeply humanitarian: the goal seems to be to help irregulars 
actually enjoy human, civic, social, economic and even political rights, while at the same time letting 
normative theorists and politicians quarrel among themselves about designing the appropriate status for 
such individuals. 
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The case for irregular migrants’ civil and socio-economic rights has been put forward by Joseph 
Carens, according to which undocumented individuals must enjoy general human rights, work-related 
rights (like payment for work, decent conditions in the workplace, and access to work-related social 
programs concerning compensation for injuries, pension plans, and compensation for lost income), 
social and administrative rights (drivers’ license, access to libraries, subsidised tuition, etc.) and 
children’s right to education (Carens 2008a). His case is almost convincing: nobody could seriously 
deny an individual her most basic human rights (such rights depend on simply being under the 
jurisdiction of a state), so the latter can be easily detached from immigration status.  
But this example is telling enough in order to be extended to other types of rights: for example, 
work-related rights like payment for work or decent, humane conditions at the workplace seem to be 
very close to basic human rights. And even regarding rights that are usually enjoyed by citizens, such 
as access to social programs (e.g., pension plans), one can make a case for them being offered to 
undocumented migrants too: at the end of the day, if irregulars pay taxes and contribute to insurance 
schemes it is unfair to deny them the benefits these systems usually offer. Finally, minor children have 
a right to education irrespective of their status: arguments regarding their innocence related to their 
parents’ choices, the terrifying impact of lack of education on their future lives and the possibility of 
host states having to deal in the future with a class of uneducated persons are compelling, so few would 
seriously oppose children’s access to education irrespective of their status. 
In fact, some states already offer (while many others deny) some of these rights to people 
without a legal status: for example, since 1999 in France irregular foreigners can benefit from State 
Medical Aid (Courau 2009). This also happens in Spain on the condition that irregulars register with 
the local Padrón (González-Enríquez 2009). In contrast, the access of irregular migrants to health 
services is ‘highly limited’ in the UK (Vollmer 2009). Likewise, in Greece schools ‘are obliged by law 
to accept all children regardless of the regularity of their presence in the country’ (Maroukis 2009: 59), 
while in the UK some schools ‘have a policy to accept children with no status’, but this is ‘on a formal 
basis against the law’ (Vollmer 2009: 24). 
However, formally providing rights to irregular migrants is not enough, since they may choose 
not to make use of them out of fear of not being discovered by state officials and deported. So Carens 
proposes a ‘firewall’ (a ‘firm legal principle’) between immigration authorities and the various 
agencies responsible for the protection of specific rights (Carens 2008a: 167-168). In other words, 
hospitals, schools, employers and even police should not be obliged to offer information about 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
59 
 
individuals’ immigration status to immigration authorities. The firewall is meant to replace the 
‘administrative linkage’ actually in force in some host states.  
Another proposal of disconnecting enjoyment of rights from immigration status is advanced 
under the concept of ‘ethical territoriality’, according to which ‘rights and recognition should extend to 
all persons who are territorially present within the geographical space of a national state by virtue of 
that presence’ (Bosniak 2007a: 389-390). This comes as an alternative to the current practice of most 
immigration-receiving societies, where rights derive from individuals’ formal status under the law. Of 
course, ethical territoriality has its own problems: first, it has an exclusionary side, in the sense that 
those outside the territory are not covered by this egalitarian doctrine; moreover, it also justifies 
immigration control at the borders. The problem is that immigration control also functions in the 
interior (for example, immigrants already in the territory can be deported), so the splitting strategy (the 
‘hard-on-the-outside and soft-on-the-inside’ view) cannot be fully implemented (Bosniak 2007a: 395-
398). Second, ethical territoriality cannot answer two basic questions, one regarding access to territory 
(who should get in?) and one regarding territorial limits (which is the exact scope of the territory?). 
However, if we have to choose between territoriality-based rights and status-based rights, the 
former is preferable because of its promise of annihilating caste-like distinctions among co-residents. 
According to Bosniak a status-based approach has two aspects which may be seen as illegitimate under 
liberal and democratic values: first, it is differentiated (different statuses are allocated to individuals, 
which undermine the principle of equality) and it is gradual (there is an ‘incremental progress from less 
to more’) (Bosniak 2007a: 391). Basically, ethical territoriality promises to destroy the partial 
membership of resident immigrants justified by the status-based approach, thus eliminating the 
possibility of having residents who are ‘subjects of a band of citizen tyrants, governed without consent’ 
(Walzer 1983). 
Interestingly enough, neither Carens nor Bosniak go as far as supporting the extension of full 
rights to irregular migrants: political rights, especially voting rights, are missing from both proposals, 
which is rather odd. True, political rights are membership (i.e., citizenship) rights par excellence, 
whereas all the other rights may conceivably be detached from membership. However, Carens 
explicitly says that irregulars are ‘already members’ (Carens 2008a: 175) of the communities they live 
in. And Bosniak puts forward the ‘affiliation’ argument for ethical territoriality, according to which 
‘the physical sharing of national territory serves to tie people together through proximity and linkage to 
place’ (Bosniak 2007a: 404): by being ‘co-inhabitants’ and long-term residents people develop 
attachments and social ties – in other words, they become members of the social setting. The 
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recognition of this fact is most evident in some countries which offer third country nationals the right to 
vote in local elections, which is conditional on a period of legal residence and registration (Belgium 
and Estonia). Having more or less the same requirements, other countries offer them full political rights 
at the local level – i.e., the right to vote and the right to stand as candidate (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Slovakia, Sweden, UK, etc.) (Bader 1999), (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2007), (Shaw 2007), (Stavilă 
2010), (Stavilă 2011). So in order to be consistent, both proposals must also support, by way of logical 
consequence, extending political rights – or at least voting rights at the local level – to irregular 
migrants. 
One counter-argument here is that such a conclusion may be too hasty. According to Carens, it 
assumes that it is not possible to make morally defensible distinctions on the basis of immigration 
status among the rights one should have. To take just one example, it presupposes that it is morally 
wrong to distinguish between the status of citizen and the status of visitor. But if one thinks that it is 
acceptable to give citizens different rights from tourists, one is already drawing this sort of 
distinction.26
Both proposals discussed above are extremely appealing in their liberal, egalitarian flavour. 
And it is important to stress that both strongly support regularisation programs. However, they both 
have two negative and mutually contradictory consequences, which make their arguments inconsistent. 
On the one hand, disconnecting civil and social rights from immigration status does not solve the 
problem of illegal migration: it just tries to justify that individuals deserve these rights from a moral 
perspective. But irregular migrants will remain irregular, which means first that in spite of their access 
to more rights they will always be under the threat of deportation unlimited in time,
However my argument is that it is not morally defensible to draw distinctions among the 
rights enjoyed by different types of permanent residents (be they citizens or long-term residents). For 
example, it is not morally permissible to grant the right to vote in national elections to citizens but not 
to permanent residents. My claim is that every distinction between citizens and long-term residents 
(and I will propose a three years residence threshold for ‘long-term residency’) should be rejected. 
27
                                                 
26 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for raising this objection (personal communication on file with the author, November 
2013). 
27 I am not assuming here that there is something wrong with deporting people who are present without authorization. But 
this right must be limited in time and, as I will try to argue later, after one year of (illegal) residence a state loses the right to 
deport an individual and must regularise her. 
 and second that 
they will still be second-class citizens, hence the state will still be a caste-like society. On the other 
hand, if – as we have already seen – both accounts are compelled to accept extending the franchise to 
irregular migrants, then citizenship status becomes irrelevant. This consequence is indeed compatible 
with the idea that illegal status cannot be tolerated, since in this case such status does not matter 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
61 
 
anymore. But the broad outcome of such irrelevancy – like the impossibility of distinguishing between 
members and non-members, or at least the impossibility of having a stable demos (Bauböck 2012) – 
would be catastrophic for the liberal democratic societies as we know them (Bauböck 2011). If this is 
correct, then detaching enjoyment of rights (other than basic human rights) from immigration status 
cannot be a way to deal with illegal migration. 
 
3.3. How to deal with illegal migration (b): deportation versus regularisation 
The following two proposals for solving the problem of illegal status (deportation and regularisation) 
are mainly based on irregular migrants’ two special features. The first feature is illegality itself, a more 
complex status than it might seem at a first look. It is generally believed that immigrants are the only 
agents responsible for their illegal status, by the simple fact that they broke the law (either by entering 
illegally, or by overstaying their visa). However, a closer look reveals that the receiving country’s 
national and local authorities also share a great deal of responsibility for the existence and perpetuation 
of this phenomenon. They may tolerate illegal migration in order to fulfil demands for ‘4D’ (dirty, 
dangerous, demeaning, and demanding) jobs (Carens 2008b), or even the demands of an extended 
underground economy. Additionally, they may pass alien or residence laws and other directives that 
leave a lot of people in an illegal status overnight, sometimes without the latter even being aware 
(Sawyer and Wray 2012). Finally,  the bureaucracy in the receiving state may be so slow in processing 
visa renewal applications, such that foreigners may become irregular without intending to (González-
Enríquez 2009). The point is that if the receiving state has a responsibility in creating or tolerating 
irregular migrants, then the latter (or at least some of them who are long-term residents – for example, 
over one year) may acquire some moral claims against expulsion or detention. 
The second feature of irregular migrants is the fact that many of them settle in the receiving 
state: that is to say, they not only transit states, but remain within the host country for more brief (in the 
case of circular illegal migration) or longer periods of time. This chapter focuses on irregular migrants 
already settled in the receiving country. This is not to say that there is no normatively interesting case 
concerning the relation between irregular migrants and transit (or origin) states’ authorities. However, 
for the purposes of this paper I will take it for granted that, besides common problems that both transit 
and receiving states must face (like maintaining public order and health, respecting general human 
rights, etc.) receiving countries also have to tackle specific situations, such as the possibility of offering 
irregular migrants civil, social and political rights which are commonly conferred to citizens. 
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From the normative point of view, the most interesting problem is that the two crucial features 
of illegal migration seem to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, by illegally entering or 
choosing to remain in the host state undocumented migrants break the law. Although this trespassing is 
usually considered an administrative, not a criminal offence,28 irregular migrants still have to be 
punished (Swain 2009) and sent back to their origin countries. However, legal considerations are not 
the only ones used to justify irregulars’ removal: theorists also add reasons connected to the state’s 
capacity to maintain public order and to preserve the welfare state, the protection of public culture from 
rapid cultural change, and the polity’s alleged right to control both entry and membership29
                                                 
28 With the exception of Italy, whose government passed a law in 2009, making illegal residence a criminal offence. 
29 The state’s rights to control entry into the territory and access to membership is highly debated: some authors who define 
the society as a voluntary association believe that the state has an unrestricted right to control entry and an almost 
unrestricted right to control membership (Altman 2009); some communitarians believe that the state has an unrestricted 
right to control entry but no right to deny full citizenship rights to the immigrants it has taken in (Walzer 1983). Others think 
that states have no right to control entry (Carens 1987). Finally, there are authors who believe that the state has a very 
limited right to control entry (it can restrict immigration only if unrestricted freedom of movement threatens its capacity of 
maintaining democratic self-government, public order, public health, the welfare state, and in case of natural disasters) and 
no right to control membership (Bauböck 2012), (Fine 2014, fortcoming). 
 (according 
to the latter, the view is that irregular migrants may be removed simply because ‘they are here against 
our will’). I will discuss at length all legitimate motives for exclusion of aliens and immigration control 
in the next section. 
On the other hand, the time of residence – even if illegal – does matter morally. Most political 
philosophers accept the idea that long-term residence can support a legitimate claim to membership; 
however, they disagree when it comes to the nature of this membership. At a minimal level, what 
seems clear even from the beginning is that irregular migrants create social ties: they usually come to 
the host country to work, so they have fellow colleagues. Many of them get to know their neighbours 
and meet other people with which they become friends. Some go to local churches, and integrate in 
religious (and other types of) communities. Others find a partner and fall in love, and get married. To 
have a family, friends, colleagues, and to be a member of various groups and communities means, for 
most of us, to be a part of the social setting. In some countries (e.g. Spain) this membership of irregular 
migrants is officially recognised: they are obliged to register with the local Padrón and the registration 
is the base of some benefits such as access to education and the health care system. Save for their 
illegal status, undocumented persons seem to be like any other citizen or legal resident of a state. This 
fact has led some normative theorists to contend that irregular migrants acquire in time a legitimate 
claim to social membership in the host country (Carens 1987), (Carens 2009) and this becomes a strong 
argument for their regularisation. 
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The crucial problem is that from a moral point of view the social membership status cannot be 
permanent.30
3.4. Empirical obstacles and normative objections to deportation 
 In other words, once irregulars become long-time residents and so a time threshold is met, 
the host state automatically acquires some duties towards them; and the most important obligations are 
first to regularise them, and second (after a second time threshold is met) to open the path to full 
citizenship for former irregular migrants. In other words, the host society must not keep individuals in a 
permanent status which implies enjoying no rights (illegal status) or enjoying only civil and social, but 
not political rights (permanent partial citizenship, or permanent residency without the possibility to 
acquire full citizenship rights). The argument for this requirement is a strong one: a permanent status of 
‘in-betweenness’ (Schuck 1998) would transform them into ‘second-class citizens’ (Bosniak 2006), 
since they would be subjects to the coercion of a political decision-making system in which they have 
no stake (in which they have not been represented) (Walzer 1983), (Brubaker 1989), (Bauböck 2010b). 
However, if long-term legal residence automatically implies access to political membership, then this is 
a reason for the state not to regularise undocumented migrants in the first place: their presence on the 
territory is not legal, so the best policy would be to deport irregulars before the length of stay would 
qualify them to acquire citizenship. 
In consequence the policy alternatives prompted by these two features of irregular migrants 
(their illegality and their stay) are different: illegality triggers sanctions and expulsion (even when their 
basic human rights are secured), while residence for a long enough period of time supports some form 
of regularisation. In other words, illegality seems to require tighter immigration control and 
deportation, whereas residence-based social membership is a good argument for affording amnesty to 
at least long-term resident irregular migrants, for extending civil, social and economic rights and, 
finally, after another time threshold is met, for offering irregular migrants full political rights, the 
franchise included. 
 
Some theorists accept that foreigners can legitimately be excluded from a state’s territory, and from 
membership of its citizenry. Four principal clusters of reasons are presented. The first concerns the 
state’s capacity to ensure civil and political rights to all members within its territory, and its capacity to 
maintain public order (Fine 2014, forthcoming). The second cluster refers to the protection of the 
                                                 
30 With the exception of permanent voluntary denizens who choose not to naturalise. Some theorists think that they should 
not have this right to choose: long-term residence simply triggers automatic acquisition of citizenship (Rubio-Marín 2000). I 
argue however against this proposal and accept that it raises a problem for a residence-based theory of citizenship (see 
section 8.1.). 
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ethno-national culture from compelled and rapid change (Bader 2005). The third has to do with 
economic considerations: restrictions are permitted if immigration threatens the state’s ability to 
guarantee social rights and to maintain the welfare system (Bauböck 2009a), (Bauböck 2010b). Finally, 
border and membership controls are legitimate for reasons connected to national sovereignty, 
democratic self-determination, and the priority citizens owe to their compatriots (Bader 2005), (Altman 
and Wellman 2009). Indeed, unlimited immigration over a brief period of time can seriously threaten 
public order, produce extreme cultural disruption, damage the welfare state, and allegedly deny a 
community’s right to self-determination. In other words, sheer weight of numbers legitimises 
exclusion. 
The question is whether all these reasons for exclusion of would-be immigrants in general can 
also be legitimately used to exclude irregular migrants already living in the receiving country. In other 
words, can we use the motives for restriction of freedom of movement in general as reasons for 
expelling individuals whom the state did not accept in the first place?  
To my knowledge, to date no political theorist has ever used empirical findings in order to 
support a proposed solution to the problem of illegal migration. If the difficulty is linked with sheer 
numbers, then before deciding what threats irregular migrants present we must first determine what the 
numbers of irregular migrants actually are. The Clandestino project31
Let us discuss now the above mentioned reasons for deportation /exclusion. The first concerns 
the state’s capacity to maintain public order. The number of irregulars seems to be too small in order to 
be a real threat from this point of view.
 has produced country reports of 
twelve European states; in a comparative perspective, the findings regarding estimated numbers are 
summarised in table 1 (see the Annex). As we can see in this table, in the twelve European countries 
considered, the estimated number of irregular migrants ranges between 0.1 per cent out of the total 
population (minimum estimate for Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and 2.8 percent 
(maximum estimate for the Czech Republic); for the United States, the maximum estimate of irregular 
migrants is 3.9 per cent.  
32
                                                 
31 Clandestino – Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends Across Europe, 2007-2009, 
 Moreover, most undocumented migrants commit 
administrative offenses rather than serious crimes (Farrant, Grieve et al. 2006). To my knowledge, no 
study has been able to show that the percentage of criminal offences performed by irregular migrants is 
http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/; http://research.icmpd.org/1244.html; http://irregular-migration.hwwi.de/Country-
reports.6114.0.html (accessed 12 March 2013). 
32 One may object that the number of irregular migrants may be small, but if the undocumented are concentrated in specific 
places they can still raise security concerns. This may be true, but it still does not show that a state’s capacity of keeping 
public order is thereby undermined.  
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greater than that carried out by native citizens and legal residents. Finally, irregulars usually want to 
avoid any contact with authorities in order to be able to continue to work in the host country. All these 
considerations support the conclusion that individuals with illegal status are not a threat to public order; 
hence this reason cannot be invoked in order to exclude those already present in the receiving state.  
One exception here is when one considers the breaking of immigration laws on a massive scale 
as itself a threat to public order. The plausible version of this argument is that only pervasive violation 
of laws is a threat to public order, which could be regarded as analogous to the difference between 
(individual) theft, which is not a threat to public order although a crime, and (collective) looting, which 
is a threat to the public order. But firstly, as I will show later in this chapter, the number of irregular 
migrants in European states is so small that we cannot talk about ‘pervasive’ violation of immigration 
laws. Secondly, remember that we are discussing about administrative, not criminal laws: in 
consequence there is no reason to believe that irregulars who violate immigration laws are posing a 
greater threat to state security than citizens breaking driving laws (Carens 2008a: 167).33
Two other considerations are also important here. First, irregulars (unlike asylum seekers) are 
economic migrants: they usually come in the host country to work and, more often than not, to send 
remittances back home; but they would not be able to do this if they stay unemployed for too long, or if 
they live only on social security subsidies. Some Clandestino country reports found that the percentage 
 
The second reason for exclusion was the community’s protection from externally forced and 
rapid cultural change. However, if the percentage of irregular migrants is even smaller than that of legal 
immigrants (whose entry was accepted and arguably welcomed by the host state), it is hard to 
understand how the former could determine such a dramatic transformation. Again, the conclusion 
seems to be that rapid and forced alteration of ethnic and national culture cannot be a reason for 
excluding irregular migrants already present in the receiving state. 
The third reason is socio-economic, and it concerns the state’s capacity to ensure social rights 
and the stability of the welfare system. Here, the percentage of irregular migrants, however small, may 
constitute a problem: if the majority of the undocumented is unemployed, retired or too young to work, 
then the pressure on the welfare system can be quite significant. However, this possibility is not 
consistent with the findings of the Clandestino country reports. In table 3 (see the Annex) we observe 
that the vast majority of irregular migrants (80-90 per cent) is of working age (16-50 years), so 
irregulars do not put pressure on the pensions system.  
                                                 
33 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, June 2012. 
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of unemployment among irregulars is much smaller than that of regular migrants and citizens. In 
Poland, for example, ‘periods of unemployment in the case of Ukrainian immigrants are very short or 
do not exist at all’ (Iglicka and Gmaj 2008: 16). Second, usually irregulars work in the underground 
and ‘grey’ sectors of economy, doing dirty, demeaning, demanding and dangerous (4D) jobs: because 
there is a constant need for people to fill these jobs, and because citizens and regular migrants usually 
reject them, the percentage of unemployment among irregulars is rather small. 
Of course, unemployment is not the only factor putting pressure on the welfare system. One 
could argue that unregistered employment reduces the insurance payments financing pensions. 
However, there is no conceptual connection between illegal employment and illegal migration: thus, 
while in the United States some irregular migrants do pay taxes and contribute to social funds (Carens 
2008a), in most European countries with robust underground economies there are also high percentages 
of illegal employment among citizens.34
An interesting counter-argument claims that welfare states may be interested in reducing the 
occupational gap left by natives rather than filling it. As Carens argues, ‘there are no jobs for which 
workers cannot be found if the pay is high enough, even in rich states’ (Carens 2008b: 432). According 
to this line of argument, accepting that 4D jobs are filled by irregular migrants means accepting the 
 
However, another socio-economic argument for the exclusion of undocumented individuals 
claims that social citizenship is not only about transfer payments, but also about regulation of labour 
markets and that, by definition, illegal work undermines this feature by destabilising the regulation of 
working conditions and wages in significant sectors of the labour market. Moreover, irregular migrants 
‘take citizens’ jobs’, raising the unemployment rate among (poor) citizens. However, the evidence 
revealed by the Clandestino project shows a different reality: as already indicated, far from taking 
citizens’ jobs, irregulars and immigrants in general fill an ‘occupational gap’ left by native citizens in 
the host countries (González-Enríquez 2009), (Drbohlav and Medová 2009); in the United Kingdom, 
regular and irregular migrants constitute 90 per cent ‘of all low-paid workers in the industry sectors of 
cleaning, hospitality, home care and food processing’ (Vollmer 2009: 42). Asian irregular migrants are 
a case in point. In some European countries they more often than not work within their own ethnic 
communities, which are ‘rather isolated and their contacts with majority society are limited’ (Divinský 
2008: 11).Or, like Chinese and Vietnamese irregular migrants in Hungary and Slovakia, they are 
retailers and vendors of cheap goods from China; interestingly enough, Chinese immigrants are ‘not 
seeking jobs with Hungarian employers but [are] rather employing Hungarians’ (Futo 2008: 41). 
                                                 
34 See Clandestino country reports. 
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preservation of exploitative working conditions and wages for the worst kind of jobs. However, the 
economic reality is that increasing wages to make 4D jobs more attractive to natives also implies 
increasing prices: indeed, the absence of immigrants in low-paid economic sectors ‘may push prices up 
dramatically or lead to some jobs not being done at all’ (Farrant, Grieve et al. 2006: 12).  
As far as working conditions are concerned, it is true that illegal work has an undermining 
influence. However, as we have already seen, in Europe illegal work is also done by natives and even 
by citizens from other EU Member States. Moreover, in countries like Austria irregular immigrants are 
involved in ‘semi-legal, i.e. non-compliant forms of employment’ (pseudo self-employment, 
undeclared work, under declared work, etc.) rather than in illegal employment (Kraler, Reichel et al. 
2009: 4). And even if irregular migrants accept diminished working conditions, the latter cannot 
become exploitative unless the state fails to enforce its own laws. As long as they are consistently 
enforced, minimal working conditions accepted in a liberal democracy are not identical with 
exploitative working conditions. 
Moreover, far from putting pressure on the welfare system, even irregular migrants contribute 
(or may contribute, if regularised) to it. The problem is that they contribute far less than legal 
immigrants, which is yet another argument (based on fiscal public interest) for regularisation. In France 
irregulars pay taxes (Courau 2009), and this was also the case in the Netherlands until 1998, where 
‘white illegals’ were able to register with the population registry and thus obtain a social security 
number (van der Leun and Ilies 2008: 12). In UK, the Institute for Public Policy Research released a 
study in 2006 according to which the regularisation of undocumented migrants would add to the state 
budget about £1billion a year (as income taxes and national insurance contributions paid by the 
amnestied individuals); and the Spanish government estimated that its last regularisation ‘has increased 
revenue by €750 million in 2005, and [was] set to add a further €1,350 million in 2006’ (Farrant, 
Grieve et al. 2006: 20). 
Finally, I argue that it is in fact deportation, rather than regularisation, that exerts real pressure 
on the receiving state’s budget. The farther the irregular migrant’s origin country is, the higher the cost 
of expulsion: in Spain, ‘the repatriation of a Chinese citizen costs €6,750, that of an Ecuadorian €3,834 
and that of a Senegalese €2,000’ (González-Enríquez 2009: 18). Other costs amount to a minimum of 
€1,800 in France (Courau 2009: 56), €5-6,000 in Greece (Maroukis 2009: 30), £11,000 in UK, $6,000 
in the USA and €4-6,000 in Italy (Fasani 2009: 73). The cost of deportation of all irregular migrants 
would be ‘around £4.7 billion’ in the UK and ‘a much larger total of $206 billion’ in the USA (Farrant, 
Grieve et al. 2006: 12). The conclusion of all the above socio-economic considerations is that 
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threatening the state’s ability to guarantee social rights and to maintain the welfare system cannot be a 
serious reason to exclude irregular migrants already living in the host society. 
The last reason for exclusion is connected to national sovereignty and the alleged polity’s right 
to democratic self-determination. But the reality is that, in spite of the violent rhetoric of ‘fighting 
against illegal migration’; quite often states unofficially tolerate this phenomenon, especially during the 
harvest season in agriculture (Maroukis 2009: 36). Indeed, states themselves are sometimes the 
employers of irregular migrants (Courau 2009). If this is correct, then the ‘they are here against our 
will’ argument simply fails. Of course, the pattern I am describing here may be more characteristic of 
some states than others, but at the end of the day some form of toleration still occurs: as one author 
claims,‘[i]f no government wants to admit foreign workers, no international labor migration will occur’ 
(Straubhaar 1986: 853). 
But even if the host state did not tolerate illegal status, this last reason would still not have more 
weight than the others in supporting the exclusion of irregulars. This is because not even the greatest 
supporters of state sovereignty believe that polities have an unconditional right to control entry and 
also an unconditional right to control membership. For example Altman and Wellman define society as 
a voluntary association and thus support these two sovereign rights. However they consider that 
admission into territory and citizenship acquisition should not be informed by ethnic or racial 
considerations. The justification here need not rest on claims of a duty states may have to foreigners, 
but of a duty of non-discrimination states have towards their own members of different ethnic groups, 
since the overwhelming majority of them are now multicultural (Altman and Wellman 2009). Walzer 
also believes that controlling entry is not an absolute right: a ‘White Australia’ can only be accepted as 
a ‘Little Australia’ – i.e., enough land must be left for other ethnic groups, natives included (Walzer 
1983: 47). Regarding citizenship acquisition, Walzer believes that a polity has no right to control 
access to membership for long-term residents. In fact, there is a growing tendency in the literature on 
citizenship and immigration to claim that states have only a very restricted, conditional right to control 
borders (not as a right to self-determination, but only to protect domestic citizenship institutions) and 
no right to control access to membership for long-term residents (Bauböck 2012), (Fine 2014, 
forthcoming). If this is true, then according to the membership argument the (alleged) right of a polity 
to control both entry into territory and access to membership cannot be a reason to deport already 
settled irregular migrants (that is, those who are residents for more than one year and also have the 
intention to stay for a long period of time) or to refuse setting them on the path to full citizenship status. 
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One last problem must be discussed in connection with the above considerations, and this is the 
‘call effect’ a residence-based citizenship would have on other would-be immigrants. The question 
about regularisation is often not so much whether one state accepts those who violated the law in the 
first place but also whether it will give a signal to other individuals that if they come unauthorised, 
sooner or later they will be regularised. If a very liberal residence-based theory sets the time threshold 
to one year for the regularisation of a migrant and also to three years of legal residence for citizenship 
acquisition, then it can have such an effect. Unfortunately, the ‘call effect’ is not something much 
discussed in migration theory, and we still do not know much about it. On the one hand, in the case of 
migration from Mexico to the USA we have the consequences of something similar to a ‘call effect’ 
even before the 1986 regularisation, the only one implemented by the state. So the call effect seems not 
to be directly related with the promise of regularisation in this case but with personal desire to find a 
job or probably with having a relative already working in the host state. 
On the other hand, regularisations in European states do not necessarily show a clear call effect. 
While the numbers in Italy and Spain could support the view (from around 100,000 individuals in 1985 
to around 600,000-700,000 in 2002 and 2005), the number in other countries show the opposite 
(France: 150,000 in 1982 but only 6,000 in 2006; Poland: 2,747 in 2003 but only 554 in 2007; the 
Netherlands: 15,000 in 1975 but only 1,800 in 1999 and then again 27,500 in 2007) (see table 2 in the 
Annex). Of course, the numbers depend on different considerations like the type of regularisation, 
conditions that have to be met, the target individuals, the way information is disseminated by the 
government, etc. But it doesn’t seem clear that regularisations have by themselves a clear call effect. 
My intuition is that the call effect is a consequence that must be taken into account. However further 
studies should investigate whether it is directly related with states’ policies regarding regularisation, or 
rather with irregular migrants’ view on life possibilities in specific immigration states and with their 
opinions being transmitted to relative and friends in the host states. Even these latter considerations 
may be related with host states’ general policies regarding immigration, but they are not necessarily 
strictly related to regularisation programs. 
 
3.5. Regularisation and the residence threshold 
Because of the fact that irregulars become in time social members (as discussed in the third section 
above) and because of the already mentioned legal and practical difficulties concerning expulsion, two 
general forms of regularising undocumented migrants have been considered: individual rolling 
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regularisations, and collective amnesties. Common to both are (a) a focus on the long-term residence 
threshold as a special requirement for eligibility; and (b) additional conditions difficult to meet, such as 
proof of successful integration in the society, proof of having accommodation, health insurance, 
employment, a sufficient income or a sponsor that takes over the legal responsibility to bear all costs 
for several years, and no criminal record (Kraler, Reichel et al. 2009). 
Regarding such supplementary conditions, I believe they should be dismissed as discriminatory: 
the legal status of irregulars should not depend on conditions not required of other immigrants, such as 
‘successful integration in the society’ or ‘sufficient income’. Moreover, such conditions target only 
specific categories of individuals like workers (i.e. people who have a job offer), but not inactive or 
unemployed family members. In any event, in the former case some employers refuse to officially offer 
their workers a job because they want to avoid paying social security contributions, so not all workers 
can be legalised.  
But what about the criminal record? If someone arrives and acquires a criminal record within a 
short time, is that a sufficient justification to deport him?35
We are thus left with the former requirement. Building the argument on two premises (that 
illegal immigration cannot be acceptable and that long-term residence matters morally), the threshold 
solution holds that if the irregular qualifies, then she is automatically granted residence. If she does not 
qualify, then the appropriate state action is deportation (Bauböck 2011). In what follows I want to 
My view here is that if the criminal record is 
acquired within a period of time less than one year, then it makes no difference since the state is 
anyway allowed to deport irregulars who resided on its territory for less than one year. If the criminal 
record is acquired after one year (that is, after the person has been regularised, according to my 
proposal) then the person should be treated as any other criminal resident. This is an important point, 
because we have to take into account the fact that a criminal record has no conceptual link with 
immigration status. As I will try to argue later in section 7.3.2. regarding the lack of criminal record as 
a requirement for a complete citizenship application, criminal law transgression does not have anything 
in common with citizenship and migration laws: as Orgad put it, ‘[i]f an immigrant violates the law, 
civic and criminal sanctions exist’ (Orgad 2010: 22). In consequence, if the absence of a criminal 
record should be dismissed as a condition for citizenship acquisition, then it should be also dismissed 
as a reason to deport an already legal resident. If all of these considerations are correct, the period of 
residence should be the only requirement for regularisation. 
                                                 
35 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this case (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
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critically analyse this proposal, by showing that (a) it violates existing national and international legal 
norms; and (b) it is practically inefficient. However, dismissing it altogether has perplexing 
consequences. After investigating various options supported by the residence threshold, I argue for the 
short-term residence alternative. 
According to the perspective under scrutiny, irregulars who do not meet the threshold may be 
removed. However, such an action meets strong legal obstacles: first, a complete removal of all 
individuals not qualified is not acceptable under international treaties. For example, mass deportations 
are prohibited by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,36 and deportation of groups who are identified 
by something other than their unauthorised immigration status (for example, their skin colour) infringe 
basic human rights. Second, in several cases national laws also forbid deportation. With the exception 
of the UK and the Netherlands (van der Leun and Ilies 2008), in most European countries the detention 
period of an unidentified irregular migrant was strictly limited until 2008 usually to a maximum of 
three months. If the individual was not identified within this period, she had to be released. However, 
the 2008 Directive 1008/115/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council established that 
Members States must set a period of detention ‘which may not exceed six months’ (chapter IV, art. 15, 
para. 5); and that this period may be extended to a maximum of another twelve months ‘in cases where 
regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last longer’ because the-third 
country concerned does not cooperate or because delays in obtaining documentation from the third 
countries (chapter IV, art. 15, para. 6).37 Third, in some states a non-qualification verdict does not 
automatically lead to deportation: the administrative or court decision regarding deportation may be 
appealed, and the whole process may take several years, a period in which individuals remain irregular, 
or at best regulars ‘in limbo’ (Maroukis 2009). This category of persons is also known as ‘non-
removables’ or ‘non-returnables’.38
                                                 
36 Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 49, source: 
 Their situation is of course not acceptable under a residence-based 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5 (accessed 13 
January 2011). 
37 ‘Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals’(also known as the ‘Return directive’), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF (last accessed 16 
November 2013). 
38 There is an increased interest lately about the so called ‘non-returnables’ or ‘non-removables’ – that is, individuals who 
are undocumented but for various reasons cannot be sent back to their home states. See for example the study released by 
Ramboll and EurAsylum for the European Commission in 2013, Home/2010/RFXX/PR/1001, called ‘Study on the situation 
of third-country nationals pending return/removal in the EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries’ – 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/return-
readmission/docs/11032013_sudy_report_on_immigration_return-removal_en.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2013). There 
are current plans for reforming the ‘Return directive’(see the previous note) to create avenues for the regularisation (and re-
entry to the ‘normal’ system) of the so-called ‘non-removables’ after a specific number of years that they are left in limbo. I 
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theory, and if migrants cannot be sent back in the first year since arrival they must receive a legal 
status. Even if after a number of years there is a final court decision against one’s migrant intention to 
live in the territory, as Carens puts it time matters morally, and after a specific period of time 
deportation should not be considered an acceptable solution. 
But even when an irregular is identified and the expulsion decision is definitive, deportation is 
not a viable solution. Indeed, it is practically inefficient: sometimes the origin country refuses to 
cooperate, and moreover as we have already seen the cost of expulsion is generally too high. For 
example in France, in 2004, ‘out of 64,221 pronounced’ deportation orders, ‘12,729 were effectively 
executed and more than 50,000 people remained on the French territory irregularly. This number has 
been a yearly average since 2004’ (Courau 2009: 46). One exception may be the United States, which 
easily deports hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants39
Since deportation and the time threshold do not even come close to solving the problem of 
illegal status (indeed, they cannot even diminish the phenomenon on the long term), it seems that both 
of them must be discarded as major policies meant to deal with illegal migration. The perplexing 
consequence is that, taking into consideration all the relevant conclusions of the Clandestino project, 
the only feasible solution seems to be a variation of the ‘hard on the outside, soft on the inside’ 
perspective (Bosniak 2006), according to which tough immigration control applies at the border, but 
because most of them come from 
neighbouring Mexico; and we also have to take into account the people who leave on their own 
precisely because they are threatened with deportation. However in spite of these exceptions the 
number of irregulars does not seem to decrease. Overall, such experiences reveal that, by itself, 
expulsion cannot significantly decrease the number of irregular migrants. 
In consequence, the most important problem with the long-term residence threshold is that it 
leaves many irregulars out even in the case of collective amnesties, which significantly reduce the 
number of irregular migrants (see table 2 in the Annex). Moreover since deportation, as we have 
already seen, is neither a legal nor a feasible policy for all those that cannot be regularised, large 
numbers will continue to remain irregular. This may not be morally unacceptable in the case of newly 
arrived migrants. But for long-term irregular migrants who become social members such a status 
cannot be accepted. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
would like to thank Anna Triandafyllidou for drawing me attention on this study (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
39 For example 396,906 individuals were deported in 2011, according to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’ website: 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm (last accessed 14 November 2013). 
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once inside individuals enjoy almost all citizens’ rights. More concretely, the alternative looks like a 
collective40 rolling amnesty regardless of the length of stay, coupled with an increased immigration 
control.41
On the one hand, it is very important to be aware that the number of irregular migrants in the 
European Union has sharply declined in the recent past (Drbohlav and Medová 2009).
 A couple of factors support this unexpected solution.  
42 A number of 
important factors have contributed to this reality. First, the two waves of European Union enlargement 
(2004 and 2007) and the ‘visa waiver’ program for countries like Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and 
Albania have been important ‘pathways into legality’ for many eastern and south-eastern European 
irregular immigrants. Second, immigration laws (including those regulating legal labour migration, 
family reunification and asylum procedure) have been tightened, and readmission agreements with 
origin and transit countries have been signed. Finally, the technological advance and the creation of 
Frontex, the European agency tasked to increase European border security, made border control more 
successful than ever before – a phenomenon called now ‘Fortress Europe’. In general, we could 
confidently say that illegal migration has been reduced by transforming former irregulars into European 
citizens, by setting other nationals on the path of becoming European citizens, and by further tightening 
immigration laws and border control.43
On the other hand, while collective amnesties implemented by different European states may 
have been quite problematic,  in some countries these amnesties are the direct cause of ‘the decrease of 
irregular migration over the years.’ (Maroukis 2009). Table 2 in the Annex reveals some interesting 
figures: for example, over 1.1 million irregular migrants have been regularised in Spain over five 
collective amnesties in the last 25 years (González-Enríquez 2009: 11). Consequently, in 2008 the 
 
                                                 
40 A ‘collective’ rolling amnesty here means a rolling amnesty which would legalise continuously all irregulars irrespective 
of their individual circumstances like long or short-time presence on the territory, etc. 
41 The Clandestino project revealed that contrary to what one might have expected, more than half of irregular migrants in 
Europe did not illegally cross the border, but overstayed their visas. In consequence, by ‘an increased immigration control’ I 
understand not only an amplified border control, but also a tougher visa system. Of course, I am not directly supporting for 
the time being an increased immigration control and a tougher visa system: there are obvious important moral objections to 
them. At this point I just want to explore all directions that must be taken into account when discussing the phenomenon of 
illegal immigration. 
42 It is important to note that this does not imply that the trend cannot be reversed in the years to follow. This claim was 
made by sociological studies at the time they were published (like that of Drbohlav and Medová published in 2009). But we 
have to take into account that the 2008 crisis ‘has led to de-regularisation of many immigrants in the crisis ridden countries. 
Asylum systems are under pressure and many potential asylum seekers prefer to remain undocumented migrants instead of 
registering as asylum seekers’ (Anna Triandafyllidou, personal communication on file with the author, November 2013). So 
whether reducing illegal migration will continue to be a trend in European Union or not remains to be proven in the years to 
come. 
43 I am not assuming that all these restrictive measures like tightening immigration laws and borders are morally defensible. 
For example, some theorists like Joseph Carens (1987) convincingly support a case for open borders. Even though I am 
sympathetic to his view, just like him I am bracketing for the moment this problem and I am developing my argument from 
the presupposition that borders and especially border and immigration controls are legitimate. 
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estimated number of irregulars was only 349,000. This compares favourably to the UK, which has no 
collective amnesty (if we set aside three very small and specifically focused regularisation programs) 
and where the estimated number of irregulars has been as high as one million (Vollmer 2009). 
If we accept that, on the one hand, tougher immigration laws and border controls are 
increasingly successful in keeping irregulars out and that, on the other hand, regularisations are the 
only successful means to ‘legalise’ large numbers of undocumented individuals, then the ‘hard on the 
outside, soft on the inside’ perspective seems to support, along with tougher immigration control, a 
specific interpretation of the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view (Bosniak 2007a). That is, a 
collective amnesty that would regularise all irregular migrants regardless of the length of their stay in 
the host country. What is more, the amnesty must be a rolling program if the phenomenon of illegal 
status is to be eradicated. It seems then that a collective rolling amnesty coupled with stronger 
immigration control may solve the problem of illegal status while at the same time avoiding the two big 
problems the residence threshold faced: illegality and practical inefficiency. 
However, as we have already seen in section 3 above, the strongest argument for regularisation 
of undocumented migrants is the fact that they become in time social members of the host polity. 
Indeed, they start to hold a stake in it. In spite of its shortcomings, the residence threshold was a strong 
supporter of long-term irregular residents’ regularisation. I have explained that this proposal may be 
dismissed because of consequences it has on those who do not qualify – that is, on short-term irregular 
residents. But the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view, by superseding the residence threshold 
requirement, also destroys the strongest argument for regularisation; namely, the fact that in time 
irregulars become social members. No or not enough time spent in the host country implies no 
membership claim for irregular migrants; they hold no stake in the receiving polity. 
This self-defeating proposal shows that the residence threshold cannot be dismissed 
altogether.44
                                                 
44 Of course, it can be easily dismissed by those who support an open borders regime (see the previous note). 
 In fact, there is a whole range of alternatives it can offer, as shown in the figure below. All 
we can do is to pick the best alternative solution – or, as may be the case, the lesser evil. 
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Figure 1. Different views of an appropriate residence threshold for regularisation 
 
In the above figure the horizontal arrow represents time and the vertical arrows represent various 
residence threshold alternatives. One extreme position is ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view which, 
as we have seen, can eradicate the illegal status only at the expense of dismissing the best argument for 
regularisation in the first place. The ‘ethical territoriality’ view on migrants’ rights (discussed in section 
2 above) directly supports such a proposal (Bosniak 2007a). But this idea is also implemented in some 
countries’ national laws: in Spain, for example, an irregular migrant who registers herself with local 
authorities can access public education and the health care system (González-Enríquez 2009) 
irrespective of her length of residence. And the recent (and generous) Immigration Act unanimously 
approved by the Mexican Senate on 24 February 2011 not only decriminalises irregular migrants, but 
also offers the option of presenting in person without penalty at the immigration office in order to 
regularise their status. Authorities promise an answer within 24 hours, and if it is positive then we 
observe an instance of a ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ policy.45
The other extreme position is the ‘irregulars for ever’ view. One version claims that there 
should be no prospect for irregular immigrants to regularise, and that they must be deported as soon as 
the authorities discover them (Swain 2009). This position indirectly accepts an ongoing illegality since 
it cannot extinguish this status. Another account of the same view directly supports continuous illegal 
status by claiming that, if there is a trade-off between tolerating irregulars coupled with no prospect for 
 This liberal position can be 
implemented since it does not depend on the residence argument: indeed, it can be based on other 
grounds like humanitarian concern or commitment to increased freedom of movement. Few 
governments, however, would be inclined to embrace such a policy. 
                                                 
45 ‘Con la nueva ley, ningún illegal sera considerado delincuente’ [According to the new law, no illegal will be considered 
criminal], Informador.com.mx, 25 February 2011, available at http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2011/273557/6/con-
nueva-ley-ningun-ilegal-sera-considerado-delincuente.htm (accessed 5 August 2011). The text of the new law (in Spanish) 
can be found at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LMigra.pdf (accessed 5 August 2011). I am indebted to 
Luicy Pedroza for drawing me attention on this law and for providing these sources. 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
76 
 
regularisation and not tolerating irregulars coupled with tougher border control and deportation, then 
the first alternative is better since it is both supported by irregulars themselves and justified by a 
normative argument requiring the reduction of world’s poverty through relocating people instead of 
money (Bell 2005). However such extreme views and their consequences (mass deportations, the 
creation of a class of permanent partial citizens, etc.) cannot be accepted in a liberal democracy. 
Between these two extremes, various positions can be found according to the length of the 
period the migrant is required to live in illegality or, at best, in limbo. In France, for example, until 
2006 a difficult requirement obtained, according to which automatic regularisation of irregular 
migrants occurred only following10 years of residence. However, in 2006 the Sarkozy Government 
passed a new law on immigration which eliminated automatic regularisation altogether, irrespective of 
the length of stay, thus making irregulars’ condition even worse (Courau 2009). In the same vein, in the 
UK an indefinite leave to remain is not automatic, but may be granted on discretion by the Home 
Secretary after 14 years of (legal or illegal) residence (Vollmer 2009 : 17). Such perspective is better 
than the illiberal extreme since it does not create permanent second-class citizens, but it still allows for 
mass deportations and it keeps large numbers of immigrants in a position in which they cannot make 
use of their formal rights for an unreasonable period of time. 
We are left then with the last option, a version of the time-threshold proposal which would 
require a shorter period of residence before regularisation. To be sure, this is not an ideal resolution.46
                                                 
46 The ‘short term residence’ solution can be seen as falling between two horns of a dilemma: the ‘touch the territory and 
you’re in’ view (i.e., ‘zero time of residence’, which would also include those who have never entered or attempted to do so 
– Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, September 2013) minimises illiberal consequences of 
enforcement (non-toleration of illegal status), while the ‘long-term residence’ solution optimises positive reasons for 
regularisation (according to the ‘membership’ argument). The short-term residence solution strikes a balance, but it is not 
clear whether it is an ideal solution, since the answer depends on the view one takes on the trade-off. 
 
On the one hand, if the period is too short, then it has the drawbacks of the ‘touch the territory and 
you’re in’ view; on the other, if it is longer, then there is enough time for governments to organise mass 
deportations. Additionally, illegal status is not fully eradicated. It may be the case that the latter is an 
impossible task; but it seems to be clear that if individual rolling regularisations or collective amnesties 
are to be effective, the residency requirement should be (a) the only condition, if discrimination is to be 
avoided; and (b) based on a rather short-term threshold, if the phenomenon of illegal status is to be kept 
to a low level. How short the residence period should be is not a question that can be answered within 
political theory; it should be decided according to the practical context and political values of each host 
country. However, we will see later in chapter seven that liberal countries like Canada, Serbia, and 
New Zealand require only three years of residence before a legal migrant could qualify for 
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naturalisation. In a case like this, the residency requirement in order to qualify for legal status should 
be even shorter, maybe under one year. It is important to note here that (as I will explain fully in 
chapter seven) I consider simple residence (and not residence under a specific legal status) as being 
enough to support one’s claim to citizenship. In consequence, simple residence should qualify an 
immigrant for legal status after one year of illegal presence, and simple residence should also qualify 
the former irregular, after three more years of legal residence, to full citizenship status. 
 
3.6. Voting rights for irregular migrants: origin states 
At first glance, if we take into consideration irregular migrants’ status we might be tempted by the 
claim that their origin state is morally obliged to secure irregulars’ full citizenship rights at home, by 
actively supporting and encouraging irregulars to use their external vote in national elections.47 
However, by doing so the origin state and its embassies may face a dilemma between enfranchising 
their citizens-with-illegal-status-abroad and collaborating with host state’s immigration authorities in 
order to fight illegal migration (for example, such collaboration might be prompted by good bilateral 
relations). But after regularisation it is not obvious that the origin state has the same moral obligations: 
as in the case of other non-resident citizens, we may still ask whether it is morally acceptable to deny 
voting rights to individuals who are residents abroad after they pass a time threshold. Since the latter 
discussion is specific not only to irregular migrants but also to long-term non-resident citizens in 
general, this section focuses on the former point.48
In international relations, one’s citizenship proves one’s identity, and it behaves as an 
international treaty, or institution: it works ‘on trust and reciprocity and [is] grounded in international 
norms’ (Sadiq 2009). This is because citizenship (and the documents that prove it) is a ‘threat 
neutraliser’: the person that possess the citizenship of a state can easily be identified, verified and 
assessed as regarding her eligibility to enter the host state. In this way, the latter is confident that the 
individual in question will cause no harm while on its territory: its security concerns are satisfied, and 
the safety of its citizens guaranteed (Sadiq 2009). This safety is challenged when irregular migrants are 
either undocumented or documented but their origin state actively supports their illegal status abroad. 
 
                                                 
47 I am not assuming here that the state of origin would or should know anything about the immigration or legal status of its 
citizens who live abroad. However, a government may generally know (through diplomatic communication, for example) 
that some of its citizens have an illegal status abroad, and may advertise its support offered to these individuals. 
48 Chapter five on multiple citizens openly discusses this problem and tries to argue against both external voting and dual 
citizenship. 
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In such cases the international treaty which is embodied in citizenship (Sadiq 2009) is broken, and a 
conflict arises between the origin and the host state. 
Indeed, helping its citizens with illegal status abroad may generate strong diplomatic tensions 
between the origin country and the immigrant-receiving state. I have no knowledge of such a 
conflictual situation created by irregular migrants voting abroad in their own national elections. 
However, a close example regards the most important feature of European citizenship – that is, 
freedom of movement. Protecting its citizens’ right to freedom of movement as European citizens 
opened up a conflict between a new EU Member State and a major immigrant-receiving country, which 
saw that state’s nationals not as European citizens but as irregular migrants. 
In August 2010 France started deporting what it considered ‘irregular’ Roma people back to 
Romania and Bulgaria. Although just one year earlier France had sent back around 10,000 Roma to 
both countries,49 this time the decision generated Europe-wide outrage. The situation was also 
complicated by confusion within European legislation. In the first place, France accepted that 
Romanian and Bulgarian Roma were European citizens and that they had the right to enter without a 
visa. Yet, according to existing French law, Romanian citizens cannot stay longer than three months 
without residency or work permits until more open rules on freedom of movement come into effect in 
January 2014. At present, if they ignore this law, they automatically become irregular immigrants.50
There is recognition from both French officials’ declarations and the reactions of European 
institutions and NGOs that the legal situation is not that clear. Firstly, France was warned that it could 
face an EU infringement procedure if it fails to implement the 2004 EU directive on freedom of 
 
                                                 
49 ‘Q&A: France Roma expulsions’, BBC News, 19 October 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
11027288, accessed 17 May 2011. 
50 The relevant law here is Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (‘The Code of entry and residence 
of foreigners and of right to asylum’), articles L511-3-1 (link: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=30285D50FE18F1141F8C363D2DEDD28B.tpdjo01v_3?id
Article=LEGIARTI000024195750&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20130719) and L521-5 (link: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=30285D50FE18F1141F8C363D2DEDD28B.tpdjo01v_3?id
Article=LEGIARTI000024196820&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20130719) (accessed: 23 July 2013). 
Article L511-3-1 offers three cases in which a citizen of another Member State can be subjected to expulsion: (a) he doesn’t 
justify any right of residence as provided by articles L121-1 (conditions for the right to stay for more than three months: 
having a professional activity in France or being a student, having sufficient resources, etc.), L121-3 (conditions for children 
of immigrants and other family members) and L121-4-1 (the right of an EU citizen to reside in France for three months as 
long as he does not become ‘an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system’); (b) the stay constitutes an abuse of 
rights (renewal of the three-months stay permit without meeting the conditions, or staying in France ‘with the primary aim 
to benefit from the social welfare system’); (c) during the period of three months an EU citizen’s behaviour ‘constitutes a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the French society’. Article 521-5 states that a 
citizen of another Member State can be subject to expulsion if his personal conduct ‘constitutes a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’ (translations are mine). I would like to thank legal scholar 
Pierre Stéphane Cazenave for clarifying the relevant articles of law. 
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movement.51 Secondly, the French government offered each Roma immigrant 300 Euros in order to 
leave the country,52 giving the then Minister of Immigration Eric Besson the opportunity to claim that 
repatriation of Roma people was ‘voluntary’. But if deportations were perfectly legal and Roma 
individuals were ‘irregular immigrants’, it is not clear why France both offered money for return and 
insisted on the voluntary character of repatriation. Thirdly, Roma are European citizens, and ‘while it’s 
true that most Gypsies are in the country unlawfully, France can’t prove that it’s expelling the right 
people unless it checks the paperwork of every single person it deports’53 – which of course was not the 
case. Finally, European Commissioner of Justice Viviane Reding declared that she was ‘appalled’ by 
the French government’s actions, expressed doubts regarding their legality and threatened France with 
an infringement procedure.54 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance concurred and 
warned ‘the government against stigmatising Roma immigrants’.55
The important thing is that diplomatic tensions appeared between Romania (rhetorically 
supporting the rights of its Roma citizens as European citizens) and France (playing the illegal 
immigration card). Bogdan Aurescu, state secretary in Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared 
that ‘to repatriate foreign nationals, France needed to prove that they were guilty of crimes and 
offences, which apparently was not the case’;
 
56 in consequence, France’s decision was based on the 
suspicion of future crimes, which was against the presumption of innocence. Romanian President 
Traian Băsescu asked French President to ‘try to stop’ Roma expulsions and the Romanian Parliament 
condemned France for ‘serious violations’ of its citizens’ rights and for ‘discriminatory actions’.57
                                                 
51 ‘Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, available at 
 
Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Baconschi said expelled Roma will probably go back to 
France soon, since Romania ‘cannot block at the border any citizens unless they have been found guilty 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:EN:PDF (accessed 23 July 2013). 
52Claire Suddath, ‘Who Are Gypsies, and Why Is France Deporting Them?’, Time, Thursday, 26 August 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2013917,00.html, accessed 17 May 2011.  
53 Ibidem. 
54 Constant Brand & Jim Brunsden, ‘Reding Slams France on Roma expulsions’, EuropeanVoice.com, 14 September 2010, 
available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/09/reding-slams-france-on-roma-expulsions/68855.aspx, accessed 
17 May 2011. 
55 ‘Romanian officials in Paris to discuss deportation of Roma’, France 24, 25 August 2010, available at 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100825-romania-officials-france-ministers-roma-meeting-deportations, accessed 17 May 
2011. 
56 ‘France accuses Romania of dumping its Roma’, EurActiv.com, 2 September 2010, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/france-accuses-romania-dumping-its-roma-news-497324, accessed 17 May 2011. 
57 Valentina Pop, ‘Romania wants France to stop Roma expulsions’, EUobserver.com, 23 September 2010, available at 
http://euobserver.com/9/30873, accessed 17 May 2011. 
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of a crime’.58 French officials retaliated and Prime Minister François Fillon went so far as to threaten to 
block the accession of Romania to the Schengen zone (which was supposed to take place only seven 
months later, in March 2011) ‘unless it does more to stop Gypsies leaving the country’: ‘The Romanian 
government must make this a national priority and if it doesn’t, certain things will happen – notably 
concerning adhesion of Romania to Schengen’.59 French State Secretary Pierre Lellouche reiterated the 
threat.60
In response, Matthew Newman (spokesperson for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
of Commissioner Viviane Reding) ‘urged France not to mix Roma issue with Schengen.’
 
61 However, 
France suddenly declared that it will oppose Romania’s accession to Schengen and started to offer 
curious motivations for its position,62 such as judicial problems and internal corruption (which – as 
integration of ethnic minorities – were not part of the Schengen acquis). Pierre Lellouche also declared 
that ‘the technical evaluations, which so far have all been positive, are not enough’.63 However, 
European Affairs Minister Laurent Wauquiez, ignoring the same ‘technical evaluations’, declared that 
France would not get involved in ‘weakening our borders and the capacity of Europe to manage and 
control its flow of migrants.’64
Romania’s response did its cause little favours [sic]. First Mr Baconschi threatened to impose extra 
obligations on Croatia, the EU candidate country closest to accession. He then said that Romania 
could leave the ‘co-operation and verification mechanism,’ a set of rules on tackling corruption to 
which Romania and Bulgaria signed up when they joined the EU. Separately, a group of Romanian 
 
Romania responded in a very odd, unexpectedly rough and undiplomatic manner. The 
Economist summarises this retaliation as follows:  
 
                                                 
58 Lizzy Davies, ‘France’s Roma crackdown could spark xenophobia, says Romanian minister’, The Guardian, 18 August 
2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/18/france-xenophobia-roma-flights, accessed 17 May 2011. 
59 ‘France warns Romania as Gypsy expulsion continue’, Irish Times, 28 August 2010, available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0828/1224277778389.html, accessed 17 May 2011. 
60 ‘EU urges France not to mix Roma issue with Schengen’, EurActiv.com, 24 August 2010, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/eu-urges-france-mix-roma-issue-schengen-news-497080, accessed 17 May 2011. 
61 Ibidem. 
62 The Romanian Centre for European Policies, a think-tank usually critical regarding Romanian authorities, refuted 
Frances’s allegations. See Cristian Ghinea, ‘Refuting France’s claims regarding Romania’s Schengen accession’, 
EurActiv.com, 13 December 2010, available at http://euractiv.blogactiv.eu/2010/12/13/12160/, accessed 17 May 2011. 
63 Valentina Pop, ‘France wants to delay Schengen accession for Bulgaria and Romania’, EUobserver.com, 11 November 
2010, available at http://euobserver.com/9/31246, accessed 17 May 2011. 
64 ‘France blocks Romania, Bulgaria’s Schengen bids’, EurActiv.com, 14 December 2010, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/france-blocks-romania-bulgarias-schengen-bids-news-500445, accessed 17 May 
2011. 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
81 
 
MPs said they would delay ratification of a Lisbon Treaty protocol that would add 18 MEPs to the 
European Parliament.65
The result was that, in spite of passing the technical evaluation of Schengen officials on 14 January 
2011, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to Schengen in March 2011 was vetoed by France and 
Germany and it was delayed without any further date being mentioned at which this accession may take 
place. At the date of writing this study, France continues to deport Roma individuals (who are 
considered both European citizens but also as belonging to a category of ‘irregular migrants’) en 
masse.
 
 
66
3.7. Voting rights for irregular migrants: host states 
 
 
Just as in the case of irregular migrants’ franchise in the origin country’s national elections, their access 
to voting rights in the host state can take place before or after regularisation. I have already argued in 
section two above that since toleration of illegality is unacceptable, voting rights cannot be offered to 
irregular immigrants, just like many of the  social and economic rights Carens (Carens 2008a) argues 
for. This would actually amount to tolerating illegal status. I believe that all rights (voting rights 
included) except basic human rights can be offered only after regularisation (which according to my 
proposal should be accessible after one year of residence in the territory). Carens disagrees and believe 
that ‘not all rights are rights of citizenship or even rights of membership’, and thus ‘there is no 
contradiction in granting rights that are not rights of citizenship or membership to people who are not 
citizens or members, including recently arrived irregular migrants’.67
However, the fact that most rights must be offered only after regularisation is not as obvious as 
it may seem at a first look. In fact, in many developing countries irregulars use their voting rights while 
still being in an illegal status. Against the traditional immigration and citizenship theories (according to 
which citizenship rights are consequential to citizenship status), Sadiq claims that in developing 
countries the situation is exactly the opposite: irregular migrants first exercise citizenship rights and 
I believe this is correct, but (a) 
offering a large range of rights (excepting voting rights probably) to people who are present against a 
polity’s consent, and (b) still considering those individuals as ‘irregular’ is a contradictory standpoint. 
                                                 
65 T.N. & R.W-M., ‘Let us in’, The Economist, 19 January 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/01/romania_v_france, accessed 17 May 2011. 
66 ‘France resumes deportations of Roma people from Romania’, Romea.cz, 13 April 2011, available at 
http://romea.cz/english/index.php?id=detail&detail=2007_2336, accessed 17 May 2011. 
67 Joseph Carens, personal communication on file with the author, November 2013. 
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they acquire documents for making use of these rights (Sadiq 2009). Only then do they use these 
(whether false or genuine, always illegally acquired) documents for acquiring citizenship status. They 
can do this because in developing countries there is a phenomenon called ‘blurred membership’ (the 
absence of documents proving the citizenship of nationals in poor and remote areas) and because of 
‘networks of complicity’ (groups within various institutions of the state, immigration authorities 
included), which illegally facilitate irregulars’ acquiring documents to entry, settle and participate in 
the social, economic and political life (Sadiq 2009: 111). Irregular migrants’ citizenship is thus called 
‘documentary citizenship’. The proof for their citizenship is that irregulars vote in their host states, 
sometimes hold public offices and travel across borders using these documents. This way, the 
‘distinguishability assumption’ of traditional immigration and citizenship theories (the clear distinction 
between immigrants and citizens) is blurred. 
The fact that individuals with illegal status can vote in their host societies is used by both origin 
states and parties across the political spectrum in the receiving polity, thus creating dangerous conflicts. 
Origin states may use the franchise of their citizens-with-illegal-status-abroad in order to support their 
claims to territories currently belonging to the immigrant-receiving country. For example, in the Indian 
province of Assam, Muslim illegal immigration from Bangladesh is changing the national and ethnic 
make-up, which is used by Islamic extremists to support their dream of a ‘greater Bangladesh’(Sadiq 
2009). This situation has triggered the escalation of already existent tensions between India and 
Bangladesh. 
But such pernicious politics are also practiced within immigrant-receiving states. On the one 
hand, political parties which dominate the government in some developing countries encourage illegal 
immigration of certain religious or ethnic groups’ members in order to maintain political power. In 
Malaysia such a ‘demographic manipulation’ is used by Malays, who dominate the government. They 
support Filipino and Indonesian Muslim illegal immigration, in order to change the ethnic and political 
profile of Sabah province, originally dominated by non-Muslim natives (Sadiq 2009). On the other 
hand, opposition parties opportunistically exploit governmental policies with the intention of raising 
nationalist and xenophobic feelings among natives to obtain more votes. Situations such as these 
sometimes degenerate into violent conflicts and civil wars. 
One could argue that irregular migrants’ franchise before regularisation (let alone 
naturalisation) is an anomalous and temporary situation that can be found only in developing countries 
because of their ‘weak infrastructure of citizenship’ (Sadiq 2009: 74). It is anomalous because from the 
normative point of view it is not acceptable, and it is temporary because as new technologies will 
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become available to poor countries and as the fight against corruption progresses, the infrastructure of 
citizenship will become stronger. If this is so, irregulars in developing countries will find it increasingly 
difficult to access citizenship rights (the franchise included) without passing first through the whole 
process of status regularisation. However, it is not clear that voting rights should be accessed only after 
naturalisation. On the one hand, as we have already seen above in section two, some countries offer 
local voting rights to third country nationals if they meet some requirements regarding the period of 
legal residence and registration.68
This is an extremely interesting account and it can easily be used in order to facilitate the 
extension of some version of citizenship rights to irregular immigrants. However, we have to pay 
attention to the distinction between regularisation and naturalisation. Bauböck argues for 
enfranchising non-citizen residents at the local level without also requiring previous naturalisation in 
the larger polity – but there is no place in which he claims that immigrants should be enfranchised at 
the city level without also having a regular status at the same time. Skipping naturalisation does not 
imply skipping regularisation. In other words, for Bauböck too, illegal status cannot be tolerated. 
 
On the other hand, some theorists take further the idea of local voting rights and propose the 
disconnection of local from national citizenship. Exploring the way urban democracy can be 
strengthened, Bauböck argues that ‘cities should enjoy greater autonomy vis-à-vis national and 
provincial governments,’ and this can happen by exempting municipalities ‘from certain aspects of 
national government monopolies in immigration, trade and foreign policy’ (Bauböck 2003: 148). 
According to this scholar, cities can add an ‘automatic ius domicilii’ mechanism for citizenship 
acquisition, besides the three ‘national’ mechanisms of ius sanguinis, ius soli and naturalisation. Unlike 
national citizenship, local citizenship not only allows horizontally overlapping membership in several 
cities, but it also suspends ‘the requirement of vertically nested membership’ (Bauböck 2003: 151) for 
immigrants (that is, possessing national citizenship is thereby not a sine qua non condition for 
acquiring local citizenship). Thus local and national citizenship are disconnected, and the most 
important sign of this detachment is the fact that non-citizen residents are able to vote in local 
elections: ‘extending the franchise to foreign nationals merely abolishes an artificial restriction imposed 
by national authorities that does not make sense from a local perspective’ (Bauböck 2003: 152). 
                                                 
68 I consider this policy as a ‘legitimate option’ rather than a ‘moral requirement’. Not every democratic state is morally 
obliged to extend local voting rights in this way. According to the residence-based theory I am supporting, after three years 
of residence a legal migrant should be put on the path to citizenship, and only afterwards he can enjoy full citizenship rights. 
However, if some very liberal states offer some (local) voting rights before naturalization, I would say that such policies are 
rather welcome. I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file 
with the author, November 2013). 
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Irregular immigrants’ franchise is a contradiction in terms: they can – and they must – be enfranchised 
only after regularisation. But after this process individuals are not ‘irregular’ anymore. We can 
consistently discuss only about the voting rights of ‘former irregular migrants’. 
So what can one say about the voting rights of those already granted amnesty? For some 
theorists, once regularised former irregular migrants should be treated exactly as any other legal 
migrant and, after the residence requirement is met, they should be given the opportunity to naturalise 
(Bauböck 2011). Not everyone agrees: the undocumented are economic migrants and what they are 
looking for is access to residence and the labour market, not access to citizenship: ‘the rights to enter 
and stay in a country are increasingly more significant than the rights to settle permanently or take 
citizenship’ (Jordan and Düvell 2002: 245). If this is true, then why shouldn’t states be allowed to offer 
immigrants ‘residence without citizenship’ (Pevnick 2009)? If there is a dilemma or a trade-off 
between rights and numbers – that is, between accepting large numbers of immigrants but restricting 
the rights they can access and accepting small numbers of individuals but opening them the path to full 
citizenship rights (Bell 2005), (Chang 2011), (Castles 2006), (Ruhs 2005) – then maybe helping large 
numbers is a better moral option, or at least the lesser of two evils. 
The celebrated argument against this view belongs to Walzer who warns that tolerating second-
class citizens (that is, permanent residents who have no possibility of upgrading their status to full 
citizenship rights), a group of citizens that do not have a say in the making of the laws and policies that 
affect them, is extremely damaging for a state. It turns the liberal democratic polity into a caste-like 
society (Walzer 1983). Not everyone agrees. Pevnick argues that Walzer’s argument does not work 
since it fails to disaggregate the power of the state over immigrants’ lives (Pevnick 2009). According to 
this objection, immigrants who do not have access to naturalisation are thus exempted from many laws 
that apply only to citizens, so there is no point in insisting that they should have a say in making those 
laws. What Walzer’s argument implies, according to Pevnick, is not excluding non-citizenship status 
altogether, but redesigning it. 
However, the author does not explain exactly how to redesign this status. One option suggested 
only in passing is to associate the status of immigrants with that of tourists or of asylum seekers until 
their situation is settled. In the latter case the state’s authority over them is limited and is connected to 
residence, not membership. But this cannot work: the case of tourists and asylum seekers is acceptable 
exactly because it is temporary. Temporary partial citizenship may be morally acceptable in some 
circumstances, but this is because it is not permanent, hence it does not create a society with castes 
whose membership borders are impenetrable ad infinitum. Maybe another option of disaggregating the 
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state’s power could be to devise the immigrant status such that non-citizen residents have a say only in 
those laws that apply to them. The problem with this interpretation is that there are so many laws that 
do apply to non-citizen residents (from driving laws to labour market laws to tax laws) that the state has 
only two options. It can deny residents a say in the making of these laws just as it denies tourists a say 
(but on a permanent basis, which relegates them to second-class citizenship), or it can offer them a say 
in designing these laws, which is similar to opening the path to naturalisation and enjoyment of full 
citizenship rights. I believe therefore that Pevnick’s objection against Walzer fails. 
Another objection against Pevnick is that the principle of enfranchising only those affected by 
particular laws is the wrong one when determining voting rights in representative democracies.69
                                                 
69 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
 
According to Bauböck, the ‘all affected principle’ (a) implausibly derives from a duty to justify 
decisions to those who are affected by them a criterion for participation; (b) each decision would create 
in this case a different demos; moreover, it is impossible to know ‘who will be affected before the 
decision has been taken’; (c) not all decisions affect people in the jurisdiction equally, and some affect 
non-citizens who live in other states; (d) at the end of the day, such a principle would require an all-
inclusive global demos (Bauböck 2009a: 12-16). 
The upshot of this discussion is that it is not permissible to deny non-citizen residents (that is, 
legal immigrants) access to naturalisation and full citizenship rights on a permanent basis. But if this is 
so, then an important question arises regarding former irregular migrants: is it acceptable to make a 
distinction within the class of legal immigrants between those who waited in the line (‘continuously’ 
legal migrants) and those who in the past illegally crossed the border or overstayed their visa (former 
irregular migrants)? 
Some theorists believe the answer is negative: once given amnesty, former irregulars should be 
subjected to the same laws and enjoy the same rights as all the other legal migrants (Bauböck 2011). 
But this may not be the only solution. I believe that treating all legal migrants on an equal basis is the 
best moral policy a liberal democratic state can implement, but at the same time I claim that a particular 
distinction is also morally acceptable (that is, not necessarily required). The distinction I have in mind 
regards the time threshold an immigrant must meet in order to have access to naturalisation and full 
citizenship rights. In the case of former irregulars, access to full political rights can be delayed for a 
longer period of time than in the case of ‘continuously’ legal immigrants.  
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I believe that this longer period of partial citizenship status is morally permissible on three key 
grounds. First, this delay can be based on individuals’ consent: one can argue that by illegally 
migrating individuals have implicitly consented that social and economic rights are more important to 
them than political rights. Second, this may be seen as a punishment for violating immigration laws. 
However, just like any punishment, this should be proportionate with the trespassing so voting rights 
cannot be delayed indefinitely. Finally, the postponement can be a symbolic statement of the receiving 
society aimed at would-be immigrants, according to which illegal entry and stay are not tolerated.  
But what does ‘delay of full political rights’ mean? Political rights cannot be reduced only to 
voting rights. They also include the right to membership in political associations, the right to 
membership in political parties, the right to public manifestation and protest, the right to strike, and so 
on. Some of these rights cannot be denied to regularised individuals, and laws that do deny them – like 
the 2000 Spanish immigration law, which applied limitations to irregulars of the right of association, 
strike and demonstration (González-Enríquez 2009) – cannot be morally justified. Arguably, even 
voting rights at the local level must be offered to newly regularised persons after a specific period of 
residence.70
3.8. Conclusions 
 But some rights which can be denied on a temporary basis to legal immigrants, such as the 
right to membership in political parties (Owen 2013) and the right to vote in national or federal 
elections can also be denied for a longer period to former irregulars. 
Two caveats must be made here. First, as I have already mentioned, the denial of full political 
rights is not a normative requirement, but rather an acceptable policy a polity might pursue. There is 
nothing in my argument that would deter a more liberal state to offer full political rights to individuals 
immediately after regularisation (i.e. post-amnesty). Second, this limitation is acceptable only as long 
as the percentage of such ‘partial citizens’ is rather small: a polity in which most residents were only 
‘partial citizens’ in this sense (even for a limited period of time of, say, five years) would no longer be 
recognisable as a liberal democracy (Bauböck 2011). 
 
Ngai claimed that irregular migrants are ‘impossible subjects’, because ‘It is their territorial hereness 
that brings them within the circle of national normative concern, but it is also their territorial hereness 
that is objected to, that subjects them to potential territorial removal and renders them vulnerable to 
subordination in the process’ (Ngai 2004), (Bosniak 2006: 139). This chapter has tried to show that 
                                                 
70 The long-term residence threshold, which was both inefficient and unacceptable as a criterion for regularization, may be a 
good tool for deciding when naturalisation and full citizenship rights can be accessed by long-term residents.  
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irregulars are far from being ‘impossible subjects,’ once we understand that illegal status cannot be 
tolerated by the state and that deportation violates national and international legal norms and is also 
practically inefficient. The only solution is an individual rolling regularisation or a collective amnesty 
with only a short-term residence threshold as a valid qualifying condition. Such a program should offer 
the enjoyment of civil, social, economic and political rights to newly regularised individuals. After 
regularisation former irregulars may still be treated differently than other legal migrants by the state: 
their path to naturalisation and their access to voting rights may be delayed for a longer period of time. 
However, this is acceptable only as long as it is a temporary measure: former irregulars cannot be 
permanent partial citizens. 
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Chapter 4. ‘Citizens-minus’ (2):  
The Rights of Temporary Workers 
 
‘there is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers’  
[popular slogan, cited in (Ruhs 2005: 1)] 
 
‘The fact that the use of the word “race” waned, however, did not  
mean that assumptions of racial difference were concomitantly eliminated  
from public discourse. The very category of guest worker, for instance, presumed  
clear, immutable distinctions between native and foreigner’ (Chin 2007: 16) 
 
‘The workers of the South were brought to the North as if they were an abstraction  
or an image. Behind the term guestworker was a belief that such workers were like replaceable  
parts […] Behind the abstraction, however, lay, of course, a human being who was  
more than simply the sum total of his working hours per week. Beyond the role  
of worker were other roles that each migrant filled, and each role had its own implications  
for the host societies. The worker was father, husband, friend, countryman, neighbor,  
consumer, believer, and carrier of language, to name but a few. Midst it all remained the  
unresolved ambiguity that encompassed his existence – whether in fact he  
was a “guest” or, more likely, an unwanted but tolerated intruder’ (Rist 1978: 27) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The second category of ‘citizens-minus’ I want to discuss is represented by temporary workers. Usually 
they are foreign citizens officially accepted by the host country on a provisional basis, in order to be 
employed in economic sectors where the native population cannot or does not want to fill the market 
demand. This chapter concentrates on the rights of this category of migrants and discusses five 
important normative issues. 
Firstly, since these workers are ‘temporarily’ present in the host state, their rights are restricted 
compared to native citizens or other types of migrants. They may be able to apply for jobs only in some 
economic sectors but not in others, they may not be able to bring their families into the host state, they 
may have only a strictly time-limited contract and afterwards they must leave the host state, and so on. 
How can we normatively design the range of rights a temporary worker should enjoy irrespective of her 
host country? The second part of this chapter asks whether temporary migrants’ rights can be 
adequately met through a progressive development in international law. My answer is negative, since at 
the present moment it is impossible to accommodate international institutions with the doctrine of state 
sovereignty when other concerns than general basic human rights are taken into account. I offer the 
example of the Migrant Workers Convention, which has not been signed up to date by any OECD 
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immigration country, and following Bosniak I claim that the main reason for this is its incompatibility 
with the generally accepted principle of state sovereignty. In the following step I answer the obvious 
objection according to which in practice states did sign many international conventions that actually 
limit their sovereignty. Why should the case of Migrant Worker Convention be seen differently? My 
rejoinder explores the conditions emphasised by the international relations theory under which states 
sign international covenants that limit their sovereignty and show that none of these conditions obtains 
in the case of the convention under scrutiny. 
If we accept that a positive development in international law is not foreseeable in the near 
future, then how can we approach the problem of temporary workers’ rights nowadays? Two points of 
view must be taken into account here: that of migrants and that of host states. The third section 
discusses host states’ point of view, which is usually based on the rights versus numbers problem. 
Basically, this dilemma’s horns are whether states should accept a great number of migrant workers 
without also offering them a large number of rights (especially the right to access full citizenship after a 
number of years of residence), or if they should accept only a small number of migrants that must be 
put on the path to citizenship after the same residence threshold is met. I claim that this dilemma cannot 
be solved as long host states do not also take into account temporary migrants’ interests. 
In consequence, the fourth part of this chapter discusses the aforementioned migrants’ 
perspective and asks whether their rights should depend on migrants’ own preferences for (a) a higher 
income over stronger rights or for (b) their social spaces of reference. Regarding the first type of 
preferences, I discuss Daniel A. Bell’s account of foreign domestic workers’ rights and the treatment 
they are subjected to in Hong Kong and Singapore. Regarding the second type of preference, I examine 
Ottonelli and Torresi’s proposal of negotiating an ‘equality based on special status’ which is meant to 
take into account migrants’ needs and choices even when they do not easily come to terms with 
democratic ideals. I support a general claim made by these authors according to which democracy’s 
concerns with formal equality should be balanced against migrant workers’ needs – however, I claim 
that this balance should be accepted only as long as the trade-off is temporarily limited, is respecting 
basic human rights, and is acceptable in migrants’ own view. 
The fifth section tries to pinpoint to the direction we have to look towards in order to find an 
answer to the question regarding legitimate limits of states’ and migrants’ bargaining capacities 
concerning temporary workers’ rights. I use Soysal’s distinction between human rights and citizenship 
rights and claim that (a) human rights must be observed by immigration states (irrespective of local 
practices in undemocratic countries), and (b) under strict conditions, some citizenship rights may be 
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traded off in order to support migrant workers’ projects. I stop short of offering a detailed basket of 
rights that can be negotiated, since there may be differences in design according to local customs and 
traditions. However, I claim that supporting migrants’ agency and their freedom to negotiate an 
‘equality based on special status’ (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012) may become the most urgent thing to do 
as long as international conventions on this topic are not going to be observed in the foreseeable future. 
The final section hints at a problem in political philosophy situated beyond the subject of this 
study. If temporary workers’ own perspective is acceptable and if we should take into account 
migrants’ agency, then this argument has broader implications that take us beyond migration theory. I 
enquire what the chances are of reviving the consent theory as a serious contender in the philosophical 
field of political obligation. I claim that we need a broader theory with several principles of political 
obligation in order to support different individuals’ duty to obey the law – which is a new direction in 
political obligation today, running against most accounts based on different singular, exclusive 
principles. If we accept this view then we might have a case where consent theory may well support 
political obligations of a specific category of individuals – that is, temporary workers (but also irregular 
migrants and ‘external quasi-citizens’).This way, the consent theory could become a serious principle 
supporting migrants’ duties and thus could be a part of a general theory of political obligation, among 
other principles. 
 
4.2. Can temporary migrants’ rights be adequately met through a progressive development in 
international law? 
This section argues that in some legal and political areas today, it is difficult to accommodate state 
sovereignty with international institutions and documents regarding specific categories of rights. Such 
an accommodation may be possible on the topic of serious criminal state practices such as genocide, 
but when it comes to lesser human rights violations sovereignty still carries the day and makes 
international conventions irrelevant. Take the example of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,71
                                                 
71 Henceforth Migrant Workers Convention, MWC. 
which was adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1990. Motivated by the increasing 
phenomenon of labour migration and by the weaker status – as compared with native workers – 
enjoyed by permanent resident workers, temporary workers and irregular migrants in the host societies 
all over the world, the Convention promised to become a major human rights instrument whose 
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importance would equal that of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent 
1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  The Migrant Workers Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003, but by 2013 it had not 
been signed or ratified by any OECD immigration country.72
In international relations theory there are different explanations for the reasons states sign 
international human rights laws. Goldsmith and Posner offer three possible motives. The first is 
coincidence of interests: governments are rarely interested in committing crimes against humanity.
 
The justification of this failure is related to the principle of national sovereignty. As Bosniak 
remarks, although the MWC tried to accommodate competing concerns regarding both sovereignty and 
human rights, the former seems to have won the debates surrounding the drafting of this document. In 
the first place, states may ratify it with reservations. Secondly, the ‘Convention permits state parties to 
pursue the immigration control policies that they see fit’ (Bosniak 2004: 316). If this is the case, then 
why has no immigrant country signed the MWC? The answer lies, I believe, in the fact that fears 
regarding loss of sovereignty still carry the day. The extensive human rights protections afforded by the 
document are seen to infringe both states’ right to control immigration and their alleged right to treat 
citizens and resident aliens differently. 
The obvious objection to this view is that states have often signed conventions that largely limit 
their sovereignty, even in the field of immigration. A good example is the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
under which every country must respect the non-refoulement principle, which denies states the right to 
expel aliens in countries where their lives or basic rights might be threatened. So in fact states do sign 
treaties which limit their sovereignty. We might ask, then why the case of the MWC is so different. 
73
                                                 
72 Many authors have pointed out that no major immigration country has yet signed this Convention. However, this is 
wrong, since some signatory states (such as Mexico) have now become major immigration countries. Moreover, Argentina 
and Turkey are today also significant countries of immigration. This is why I refer only to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
73 On the other hand, it is true that governments may have an interest in keeping control over judgments about what 
constitutes a crime against humanity (Joseph Carens, personal communication on file with the author, October 2013). 
 
The second is cooperation: multilateral agreements regarding reciprocal treatment of ethnic minorities. 
The third is coercion: signing under the threat of force (Goldsmith and Posner 2005). The problem is 
that multilateral human rights treaties are not based on cooperation, be it symmetric – like the 
protection of Protestant and Catholic minorities in the post-Westphalian world – or asymmetric – like 
the UK’s ‘carrot and stick’ strategy for ending the slave trade in the 19th century. Moreover, since there 
is no ‘effective coercive enforcement mechanism’ – usually non-liberal non-democratic states can sign 
them without any problem, since they incur no or little cost by violating those norms – the benefits of 
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signing, economic benefits included, can be rather substantive. On the other hand, liberal democratic 
states can easily sign the treaties because they already comply with their terms; and where they do not 
comply, RUDs (reservations, understandings, declarations) are tools that are easily available. 
The same conclusion is supported by other researchers in international relations theory. Krasner 
explores Western states’ compliance with treaties concerning respect for minority rights in Europe in 
the last 500 years, and his conclusion is that rights are respected only as long as great powers have (a) 
an interest in, and (b) enough capabilities for upholding and enforcing them on non-observant states 
(Krasner 1999). Even scholars outside the realist school seem to support, even if half-heartedly, these 
ideas. In her study on the importance of moral arguments in changes in world politics, Crawford argues 
that the slave trade ended principally for two reasons. Firstly, normative arguments had convinced 
public opinion about the immoral character of slavery and about the ‘greater profitability and moral 
virtues of free labour’ (Crawford 2002: 171). Secondly, after abolition the demand for slaves collapsed. 
It is not clear whether Crawford would support moral arguments alone as causing the end of slave trade 
even in the context of a growing demand for slave labour. However, lack of demand seems to be in any 
case to have been a contributing factor. 
Finally, there is another possibility to change states’ behaviour towards human rights, both 
domestically and at the international level. According to constructivist approaches in international 
relations, when people adopt new understandings and ideas about individual rights, and in the process 
challenge ‘traditional definitions and allocations of entitlements’, the political system can either try to 
accommodate the new rights claims or, if it fails to do this, it can collapse under such struggles. A good 
example is the disintegration of imperial systems, which came about when subject peoples, unsatisfied 
with the metropole’s way of addressing its crisis of legitimacy, turned from ‘voice’ to ‘exit’ (Reus-Smit 
2011). On the other hand, some liberal theorists underline that the position of states concerning human 
rights can be changed through negotiations at the international level: a growing body of literature 
explains that references to human rights in the Charter of the United Nations were not intended by the 
great powers. On the contrary, this came about as a consequence of the diplomatic efforts of smaller, 
non-Western states’ (former colonies, Latin-American and Asian countries, etc.) (Hunt 2008), and as a 
consequence of the influence of some providential personalities (Glendon 2002). 
Without the intention of exhausting the entire possible range of causes, we can thus conclude 
that generally a great power signs a human rights treaty if at least one of the following conditions 
obtains: (a) its domestic practices are already similar to the norms promoted by the international 
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document; (b) it is in the state’s interest to take this course of action;74
Now let us apply this to the case of temporary workers, in order to find the answer to the 
question raised above: why has no immigration country signed the MWC? The reason seems obvious. 
Emigration countries, which are usually underdeveloped, have signed it because most of them are not 
immigrant-receiving countries (even if they may have small immigrant communities).
 (c) it is the best thing the state 
can do given the moral and material context within international relations at a specific moment; and (d) 
changes in people’s paradigms of moral thinking occur, public opinion is gradually convinced by the 
new perspective, and the struggles for individual rights become powerful enough to change states’ 
behaviour. On the other hand, smaller and/or non-liberal democratic states sign international human 
rights treaties because: (a) they are not affected by them (Järve and Poleshchuk 2010), and even if they 
are affected, there is no cost of violating signed treatises, or the cost is extremely small; (b) the benefits 
of signing them can be substantive; (c) there is some threat of force from great powers. 
75
On the other hand, immigration states don’t sign for five principal reasons. Firstly, they do not 
already comply with most of the terms set by the MWC. In spite of publicly condemning infamous 
temporary worker programs like the Gastarbeiter
 Moreover, the 
document does not infringe their sovereignty: violating the treaty bears no costs since there is no 
control mechanism. Moreover, their image on the international arena is improved by signing yet 
another human rights instrument. 
76 program in Europe or the Bracero77 program in the 
United States, and in spite of a general acceptance that past policies regarding migrant workers’ rights 
cannot be accepted anymore, immigrant democratic states are not ready to receive large numbers of 
people who can easily qualify, sooner or later, for almost all citizenship rights. The second motive is 
closely connected with immigrant countries’ interests. According to Martin Ruhs and Stephen Castles 
many Western states contemplated before the 2008 global economic crisis the possibility of 
reintroducing migrant worker programs. In times of crisis the attractiveness of such programs may be 
indeed lower,78
                                                 
74 A broader definition of ‘interest,’ which includes the interest to be seen as creating ‘codes of conduct’ and promoting 
‘standards of civilization’(Goldsmith and Posner 2005: 128), would need to be drawn on here. 
75 As I have pointed out above in note 72, it is true that some of them, as Mexico, Argentina and Turkey have already 
become (and others are on the way of becoming) countries of immigration. But it is interesting to see how they would fulfil 
their international duties once immigration becomes a serious political domestic issue. 
76 For a general discussion of the Gastarbeiter program see Rist (1978) and Chin (2007).  
77 For a general discussion of the Bracero program see Reubens (1986). 
78 I would like to thank Anna Triandafyllidou for drawing me attention on the potential changes at the international level 
regarding temporary migrant programs in times of economic crisis (personal communication on file with the author, 
November 2013). 
 but even in such situation high-income states still need temporary workers for the 
reasons quoted in the last chapter, like dirty and demeaning jobs that are refused by natives. So as long 
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as there is a strong demand for them, temporary migrant workers may continue to come even if 
governmental-sanctioned temporary worker programs are terminated for political and economic 
reasons. Since these countries’ governments are very much aware of the slogan ‘there is nothing more 
permanent than temporary foreign workers’, signing a convention that severely restricts their policies 
regarding the treatment of non-citizen residents is something that states are not ready to engage in 
(Ruhs 2005), (Castles 2006). The third reason is that there is an increase rather than a decrease in 
demand at the international level not only for foreign workers (within immigration states) but also for 
more temporary worker programs (within emigration states). Another reason is that in spite of many 
NGOs activities, there are no conditions yet for a major shift in our moral thinking, and the struggles 
for migrant workers’ rights are not powerful enough in order to be able to change immigrant states’ 
behaviour. And finally, there is no pressure – regarding migrant workers’ rights – at the international 
level similar to that raised immediately after the Second World War regarding general human rights, 
which resulted in the proclamation of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In conclusion, I claim that migrant workers’ rights are probably not going to be enhanced at the 
international level in the foreseeable future because of the impossibility of accommodating in this 
specific case state sovereignty and international institutions. Even if most countries accepted some 
limits on their sovereignty, as the general observance of the non-refoulement principle shows, there are 
specific reasons – some of them discussed above in detail – for which further limits on sovereignty are 
not likely to be welcomed. True, today ‘it is no longer acceptable for a government to make 
sovereignty claims in defence of egregious [my emphasis] rights abuses’ (Simmons 2009: 3). But short 
of being ‘egregious,’ any rights abuse which is not gross enough can be defended by making such 
claims. The fact that the Migrant Worker Convention has not been signed yet by any major 
immigration country fits well in this logic. 
 
4.3. The ‘rights versus numbers’ dilemma 
If in the international legal system it is difficult to predict a change in migrant workers’ rights in the 
foreseeable future, maybe we should turn our attention to the main actors’ perspectives. The present 
section discusses the host states’ viewpoint, while the next one takes into account temporary workers’ 
specific point of view. From the immigration countries’ perspective there are moral dilemmas that can 
appear irrespective of the social and temporal context. Generally, all these dilemmas are more or less 
instances of one major conundrum: when a receiving polity’s interests and migrants’ interests clash, 
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which one should take precedence? Is it morally acceptable to restrict individual persons’ opportunities 
because of a liberal democracy’s legitimate concern with formal equality?  
An instance of this major conundrum, called the rights versus numbers dilemma, is based on the 
claim that integration of immigrants involves economic, social and cultural costs.79 If these costs are 
too high, immigration can put pressure on the welfare state, on states’ capacity to maintain public 
order, and it may in principle lead to rapid cultural disruption (Bader 2005), (Fine 2014, forthcoming). 
Of course, this claim has been challenged from many points of view. For example, Jordan and Düvell 
argue that from the economy’s perspective in the case of migration, benefits outweigh costs both in the 
case of host and in that of origin countries. According to them, if we presuppose that the migrant 
herself fulfils her goals, then immigration can be a win-win-win situation (Jordan and Düvell 2002). 
However, things may not be that simple. It is not easy to measure, let alone compare, the real economic 
costs of world migration. True, remittances can be an engine for development, but they can also cause 
inflation and can increase the developmental gap between sending and receiving countries (Miller 
1986).80
Let us then return to the argument that unrestricted immigration can jeopardise states’ capacity 
to maintain viable social institutions and programs, public order, and protection against rapid cultural 
change.
 Even if remittances have no negative effect, it is still difficult to weight them against the 
negative effects of brain drain. It is not my intention here to make a definitive argument that migration 
has costs, hence immigration controls are acceptable, and the dilemma between rights and numbers is 
valid. I rather want to argue that the costs are reasonable enough in order to make this dilemma a real 
subject of concern. 
81 If this is correct, then some immigration restrictions based on consequentialist arguments 
(taking into account immigration’s effects on the host states) are justified.82
                                                 
79 The major statement of this conundrum is by Martin Ruhs, according to whom the dilemma is not a trade-off for receiving 
states, but for migrants themselves: either many can get admission to weak rights positions or few to strong rights positions 
(Ruhs2005). I decided to discuss this dilemma in Bader’s and Fine’s formulation, since the decision is always taken by 
governments. 
80 For the counter-argument which emphasizes that there is no evidence that remittances have created inflationary pressure 
in the development of Asian countries see Stahl (1986). 
81 For a discussion about reasonable motives for immigration control see above section 3.4. 
82 This implies of course that other immigration restrictions based on non-consequentialist grounds like ethnic or nationalist 
homogeneity are unacceptable. 
 For example, restrictions 
can refer to already over-populated areas, and temporary migrants can receive work permits only for 
those economic sectors where demand for labour exists – and not for those characterised by high rates 
of unemployment. Restrictions can be made on other reasonable grounds like housing capacities or, as 
we have already seen in the last chapter, general welfare state capacities. One standard counter-
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argument here is that temporary workers and immigrants in general do not put pressure on the welfare 
system since they – just like native workers – pay all their taxes. This may be true, but we also have to 
take into consideration migrant workers’ dependants – their spouses, and children. If the spouse cannot 
be employed, or simply cannot find work, she needs social services. Furthermore, children must go to 
school. If immigration is unrestricted, then it is reasonable that situations like these will put pressure on 
the welfare system. This is especially the case when migrant workers earn less than natives – or less 
than the alleged native worker would have earned, had she accepted the job. 
Another standard argument here is that in order to solve this welfare state problem the 
government should guarantee equal pay for equal work to both native and migrant workers. The 
argument can also be made for equal working conditions, equal social housing, and so on (Carens 
2008b), (Mayer 2005). The argument has of course not been used in order to restrict immigration, but 
to support equal rights for native and migrant workers. But the claim misses the point, since making 
migrants’ wages identical to those of native workers would not solve the problem, because of two 
principal reasons. Firstly, such a policy would undermine the very reasons for implementing a 
temporary foreign worker program: had the employers been obliged to hire migrant workers on 
contractual terms identical to those they must offer to natives, they wouldn’t have demanded migrant 
workers in the first place. Some may be very happy with this proposal, which would terminate the need 
for such programs, but the scholars who support labour migration as a way of alleviating at least a 
small part of global poverty might disagree. The second reason for which the above rejoinder does not 
bite is that the presupposition according to which ‘there are no jobs for which [native] workers cannot 
be found if the pay is high enough’ (Carens 2008b: 432) is at best unfounded. Even if salaries are 
significantly – but also reasonably83
So it is clear that if states want to accept migrant workers, they must be ready not only to enjoy 
the benefits, but also to pay the costs. And these costs may be quite high for a host country committed 
to liberal-democratic values. If such a state accepts migrants, it must be able to set them on the path to 
 – increased for 4D (dirty, dangerous, demeaning and demanding) 
jobs, it is doubtful that native workers would necessarily agree to do them. This is because, from the 
conceptual point of view, dirty, dangerous, demeaning and demanding jobs are not necessarily identical 
with low-paid jobs. Even increasing significantly wages for current 4D jobs, they will still remain at 
least dirty, dangerous and demanding (if not also demeaning), since more money does not necessarily 
means added social and cultural value, and many native workers may still refuse to accept them. 
                                                 
83 This is an important caveat. Of course it may be the case that even a celebrated university professor would quit her job 
and prefer to wash dishes in a restaurant for three million US dollars per month, but the example is not only too far-fetched, 
but also ridiculous. 
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full citizenship rights, if the residence threshold is reached. However, non-liberal democracies do not 
have such a problem. As we will see in the next section, when a state is not committed to the idea of 
equality of individuals as human beings – and maybe not even to the idea of equality of citizens – then 
it can accept large numbers of migrant workers. The latter will not put pressure on states’ capabilities 
as long as their rights are severely restricted. For example, they may not have the right to bring their 
families to the receiving country, they may have restricted access to social services, etc. But this 
amounts to creating a caste-like system. Indeed, permanent partial citizenship without the possibility of 
acquiring full citizenship rights amounts to establishing such a scheme (Bosniak 2006). We could 
confidently say about temporary workers in these polities that ‘[while] they are guests, they are also 
subjects. They are ruled, like the Athenian metics, by a band of citizen-tyrants’ (Walzer 1983: 58). 
As a consequence, it seems that the choice a polity faces is between restricting numbers in order 
to offer more rights – an option usually selected by Western countries – and, as we will see in the next 
section, restricting rights in order to admit more temporary workers – preferred by immigrant-receiving 
polities like Hong Kong and Singapore. The crucial point I want to underline here is that it is not 
obvious that the moral, liberal-democratic solution is either better or more desirable than the non-
liberal, undemocratic one. Firstly, to use Bell’s realist assessment, the Asian example demonstrates that 
migrant workers leave poor but fairly democratic states in order to work in wealthier, undemocratic 
countries – and it seems they fare better in the latter. A lack of democracy seems beneficial for foreign 
domestic workers also for another reason: had natives, especially employers, the chance to vote for 
their representatives, they would have favoured policies more disadvantageous for temporary workers’ 
interests. Conversely, as long as politicians are not compelled by a democratic decision-making process 
to satisfy the general public’s preferences, foreign domestic workers enjoy some level of protection, 
low as it may be (Bell 2005). 
Secondly, what seems the right thing to do prima facie, at a closer look may not necessarily 
represent the right action required by justice. Howard Chang formulates the same dilemma between 
rights and numbers as ‘the immigration paradox:’ liberal democratic states take for granted the moral 
principle that, once accepted, guest workers must be given equal rights. But the impossibility of 
offering equal rights to large numbers is the reason that guest workers are not accepted in the first 
place. In other words, concern for the well-being of temporary migrants makes liberal democracies 
accept fewer migrants, thus rendering their situation worse than it would have been, had host states 
accepted them and offered them fewer rights. But ‘this moral stance is unsatisfactory from the 
standpoint of human welfare. The liberal who prevents a poor alien from escaping poverty while citing 
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principles of justice and equality for that alien seems vulnerable to the charge of “superstitious «rule 
worship»”’ (Chang 2011: 97). 
If this is the case, then the choice is between two evils, guest-worker programs being one evil 
and exclusion the other. Both Bell and Chang consider that accepting more temporary migrant workers 
while restricting their rights is clearly a better alternative than largely closing borders to immigrant 
labour. This alternative is ‘better’ because immigration states may have to somehow solve a dilemma 
between their commitment to equality and the moral duty to alleviate the world’s poverty. Since 
according to the quoted authors the last quest is more important, the problem of rights versus numbers 
should be solved by immigration states in favour of numbers, and temporary migrants’ rights may thus 
be restricted. However, none of these scholars offers guidelines regarding the extent of such 
restrictions. 
 
4.4. Should migrant workers’ rights depend on their own preferences? 
Let us turn our attention now to temporary migrants’ own preferences. From this point of view the 
solution may be to design different system of rights that depend either on their own predilection for 
higher income over stronger rights, or on their social spaces of references. This section intends to 
investigate both proposals. 
According to the first suggestion, there is no moral problem in having different practices 
regarding temporary migrants’ access to rights in different parts of the world. Bell argues that Canada 
may legitimately accept few temporary workers while setting them on the path to full citizenship, and 
Hong Kong may also legitimately admit large numbers of temporary workers while denying them 
many social, economic and political rights (Bell 2005). Bell makes his argument in four steps. Firstly, 
he takes into account the personal concerns of temporary workers and reveals that in some Asian 
countries they do not see the problem of equal rights as their most pressing issue. Quite the contrary, 
they are usually worried about other, more pressing subjects: they fight against the idea of limiting their 
work to eight hours a day, against cutting wages in time of crisis, and against the ‘two-week rule’, 
according to which if they lose their job they must go home as long as they don’t find employment in 
two weeks. Secondly, Bell claims that in some parts of the Asian continent lack of democracy benefits 
temporary workers: some of them leave democratic countries in order to work in autocratic but 
wealthier states; in some minimal democratic countries temporary workers fare worse than in 
dictatorial regimes; and, finally, lack of democracy may be beneficial for temporary workers since in 
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some states if employers would have the chance to vote for their decision makers, they would prefer 
policies that go against migrant workers interests, and politicians would also favour their constituency 
and not migrant workers’ concerns.  
In the third step Bell accepts that ideally migrant workers should be given equal rights, but still 
claims that some counter-arguments have their own merit. Migrants consented to come to the host state 
(and such a consent cannot be compared with selling oneself into slavery); in some undemocratic states 
citizens would not agree with extending migrant workers’ rights as long as their own rights are 
restricted; sometimes, as we have already seen, it is not clear that the rights versus numbers dilemma 
should be solved in favour of rights; and finally global poverty reduction may be better served through 
migrant workers programs than through idealistic arguments like increasing foreign aid. Finally, Bell 
argues that cultural characteristics must also be taken into account. Unlike citizens in the western 
states, Asians consider domestic workers as ‘extended family members.’ This is the explanation of a 
lack of demand for day-care centres in Asia: given ‘the choice between at-home care for children and 
day-care, most people seem to prefer the former’ (Bell 2005: 57). 
A second proposal of taking migrants’ interests into account is connected to their social spaces 
of reference, and is usually referred to as the ‘bases of self-respect’ puzzle. As we have already seen, 
migrants are ready to trade off some of their rights for material gains, thereby making vulnerable not 
only their own position within the host country, but also their prospects regarding savings, possibility 
of return, family reunification, and so on. The interesting question here is why they are so ready to 
undertake this bargain. Additionally, we may ask what the normative grounds which make such a trade 
possible are. 
Ottonelli and Torresi make an interesting argument according to which temporary migrants’ 
self-assumed vulnerability undermines liberal egalitarian ideals (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). The 
problem is complicated by the fact that the standard solution (i.e., offering them more rights) fails. 
Interestingly enough, this shows that even if the dilemma discussed above between rights and numbers 
can be solved, this does not necessarily imply a solution to the problem of migrant workers’ 
vulnerability. And the standard solution fails because even if these individuals formally enjoy equal 
rights, they would still be ready to trade them off (as shown by the case of EU citizens from new 
member states who trade off their rights under pressure to secure employment in the ‘old’ member 
states’ segmented labour markets).84
                                                 
84 I would like to thank Anna Triandafyllidou for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with 
the author, November 2013). 
 This is because liberal democracies presuppose an identity 
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between the political space of rights and the social space of self-respect: for their citizens, equal 
political rights represent the sine qua non condition for their ‘right to pursue their own happiness and 
life plans’ (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). However, this is not the case of temporary migrants. In their 
situation, there is no match between the social and political spaces. Their bases of self-respect are 
situated in the origin country: their migration project is intended to improve their life plans at home. 
However, the political space of equal rights is situated in the host state. Since these two spaces are 
disconnected, the trade-off becomes possible. Migrants are simply ready to trade temporarily some – 
arguably, many – of their rights in order to improve their future condition at home. 
However, this creates a problem for any liberal democracy dedicated to the principle of 
individuals’ equal standing. The choice is between letting temporary workers pursue their plans and 
thereby abdicating the principle of equal standing, on the one hand, and upholding this principle which 
means to disregard migrants’ life plans, on the other (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). We face again the 
conflict between the public interest and migrant workers’ interests. Like Bell and Chang, Ottonelli and 
Torresi support a solution which gives more weight to temporary workers’ concerns. In this case, ‘the 
more ambitious goals of social equality’ should be given up in order to make room for a more complex 
notion of ‘equality based on special status’ which is supposed to be more sympathetic to migrant 
workers’ plans. 
However, neither of these authors further develop their normative solution for this unresolved 
dilemma in the standard liberal approach: which rights can be traded off, and for how long such a 
bargain is acceptable? What rights could be lowered for the sake of better immigration opportunities 
and higher remittances for country of origin populations? No author seems able to provide the 
necessary tools to impose limits on what can be traded off by foreign temporary workers when their 
interests collide with those of a liberal democratic host country. 
 
4.5. What can be negotiated and what cannot be traded off? 
We have thus to know what can be negotiated and what cannot be traded off. In her book on Limits of 
Citizenship, Soysal makes a useful distinction between citizen rights – based on state sovereignty and 
on the view of the individual as a member – and human rights – based on transnational society and on 
the view of the individual as a person (Soysal 1994). Against Bell’s proposal one could argue that 
human rights should be imposed on states irrespective of local practices. The prohibition of genocide 
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may be a good example that such top-down impositions are feasible at the international level in spite of 
the sovereignty doctrine. 
However, one could also reasonably argue that it is permissible for states to tolerate temporary 
workers as ‘partial citizens’ and to allow them a ‘margin of trading off’ their rights as residents, as long 
as their consent is acknowledged, the possibility to leave is not only formal but also substantive, and 
their human rights – and possibly other crucial social and economic rights – are safeguarded. 
Bargaining some social or political rights (if we look at the problem from a migrant workers’ 
perspective) or denying such rights to a class of residents (taking the host country’s point of view) is 
permissible only as long as human rights are not affected by the trade-off and as long as this bargain or 
denial is temporary. Since the resident-based theory of citizenship I am defending claims that 
citizenship should be accessed after three years of residence in the host state’s territory, the logical 
consequence is that such a bargain cannot be accepted for a period of time longer than three years. The 
host state is thus responsible to either limit temporary workers’ contracts to less than three years, or to 
put them on the path to citizenship once the requirement of three years of residence is fulfilled. 
The temporary character of this transaction is important not only for immigrants themselves, 
who otherwise would be transformed in a class of ‘metics’ ruled by a ‘band of citizen-tyrants’ (Walzer 
1983), but also for the immigrant-receiving polity, for two main reasons. First, by accepting only short-
term departures from its liberal-democratic values based on foreign workers’ special status and taking 
seriously into consideration their own projects, such a polity can consistently uphold its values and, at 
the same time, recognise that it may temporarily bypass them when other more important moral values 
are at stake. Secondly, even such a temporary bypassing can be tolerated only as long as the number of 
partial citizens is low: if sidestepping political rights were permanent and the numbers of long-term 
partial citizens large, a liberal democracy accepting this situation would face dramatic decline. Indeed, 
as Bauböck argues using his ‘hypermigration’ model, in a world in which ‘in most countries a majority 
of citizens would be non-residents and a majority of residents would be non-citizens […] the impact on 
democracy would be quite dramatic’ (Bauböck 2011: 684). 
However, the most difficult questions here are: what are the limits to individuals’ free choice? 
How much can they bargain? Which rights can be traded off for material benefits, and for how long? It 
is probably difficult to say at this moment (so further normative work is needed) who decides what 
these other crucial social and economic rights are and on what basis one decides that.85
                                                 
85 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the 
author, October 2013). 
 For example, 
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one may argue that an international convention or maybe even each state may decide minimum 
standards that must be acknowledged besides human rights, and may set a limited package of rights 
that can be negotiated by employers and employees. It is difficult to outline here such a project. 
However, one thing is clear. Ever since John Locke (Locke 1690),86 Immanuel Kant (Kant 1785) and 
John Stuart Mill (Mill 1859),87
This view is also embedded in international human rights instruments. For example, art. 3 para. 
a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and 
Children lists slavery as one category within the broader term of ‘exploitation,’ while the latter notion 
is defined as the purpose of trafficking. Further, art.3 para. b) clearly states that the consent of a victim 
is irrelevant even if – as stated in the preceding paragraph – the consent was achieved as a consequence 
of receiving of payments or benefits.
 it is obvious that freedom of will cannot justify unlimited power to 
negotiate a contract. Selling oneself into slavery cannot be a morally valid action even if one freely 
consents to it.  
88
The threshold problem brings us back to migrants’ agency and interests. Because Bell, Chang, 
Ottonelli and Torresi support locally-negotiated practices regarding migrant workers’ rights, their 
perspectives  avoid the line of criticism according to which foreign workers are presented with an 
 However, it is extremely difficult to define what slavery is: 
when can a practice be considered as slavery? In a paper exploring the anti-slavery project, Quirk notes 
that 
 
‘[…] it can often be difficult to say whether the term is being invoked literally or rhetorically. Behind this 
conceptual ambiguity is an underlying model, which maintains that particular practices can be equated with 
slavery when they cross a certain threshold and are sufficiently horrendous and/or analogous to be classified 
as such. This model is at the heart of contemporary slavery, but it is not always clear where this threshold 
applies, or whether it should apply in one case but not another […]’ (Quirk 2006: 578) 
 
Indeed, it is difficult to say where the threshold lies between trafficking and forced labour, on the one 
hand, and smuggling and indentured migration, on the other. While the former always imply overt 
coercion and can be easily termed as slavery, the latter examples may or may not imply such practices. 
                                                 
86 See Chapter IV. Of slavery. 
87 See Chapter V. Applications. 
88 United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 2000, 
available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf 
(accessed 14 April 2011). 
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already-designed contract offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ condition (Bauböck 2011). In practice, this 
happens in many Western immigrant-receiving countries but not, as Bell emphasised, in some Asian 
polities like Hong Kong where many associations for the protection of foreign workers’ rights are 
constantly negotiating wages, immigration laws such as the two-week rule,89 and so on. Of course, I am 
suggesting neither that the organisational support for migrant workers is stronger in Asian polities like 
Hong Kong than in Western states, nor that the presence of NGOs renders legitimate the polices against 
which they are protesting. I am only trying to show that in some Asian states, migrants’ agency may be 
(for better or for worse) exhibited in ways it is not in the Western states, and incidentally this does not 
go against migrants’ own plans.90
4.6. Temporary workers and the consent theory of political obligation 
 The attractiveness of such a perspective is given by its capacity to 
account for both migrants’ and governments’ agency, thus not only resurrecting the consent theory in 
political philosophy, as we will see in the next section, but also – and more importantly – turning 
attention from liberal democracies’ own concerns regarding equal rights to temporary foreign workers’ 
interests. 
 
The argument regarding migrants’ bargaining capacity has an implication not entirely made obvious by 
its proponents: by turning our attention from the public interest of host countries to temporary 
migrants’ projects, we cannot avoid the latter’s agency. Usually concerned with liberal and democratic 
values in Western liberal democracies, political philosophers tend to forget, or at least to minimise, the 
choices individuals make within a polity. This attitude is not necessarily odd, since apart from Locke 
few major liberal theorists really took seriously the consent theory of political obligation. In this 
philosophical domain the main questions are what exactly grounds a moral duty to obey the laws of 
one’s state and how a person acquires such an obligation. According to the consent theory (and 
contrary to other contemporary theories of political obligation based on other singular principles like 
gratitude, fair play, association, or natural duty), citizens must obey a polity’s laws because they 
accepted to live on that polity’s territory. However, since no citizen ever ‘actually’ (i.e., 
conscientiously and formally) consents to her state’s laws, today political philosophers generally agree 
that consent can be neither a principle for individuals justifying their duty to obey political authority’s 
                                                 
89 See above, section 4.4. 
90 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the 
author, October 2013). 
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laws(Simmons 1979), (Klosko 1991), nor a principle for political associations justifying their character 
as voluntary associations (Fine 2010).91
However, new developments which have taken place both in the real world and in immigration 
theory and citizenship studies may offer new grounds for reviving the consent theory. The increase in 
the number and the speed of means of transportation, low fares, greater accessibility, the development 
of tourism and structural needs of various labour markets and economic systems have allowed people 
to move faster and more often. According to some estimates, in 2008 there were over 200 million inter-
state migrants worldwide; that is, over 3 percent of the world’s population.
 
92
What these developments show is that people are increasingly choosing their country of 
residence and they are doing this intentionally, knowingly, more or less voluntarily, and in spite of all 
the difficulties generally associated with the act of emigrating or of those linked with the reality of 
competing loyalties. All individuals who emigrate and apply for another country’s citizenship can thus 
be seen as consenting to the authority of the political power of the host society. If this view is correct, 
then two consequences need to be taken into account. First, the consent theory of political obligation is 
back in philosophical business. True, it cannot justify the obligation of all citizens of a state – 
especially of those who did not openly consent – to comply with that state’s laws. However, it is not 
clear why a single principle should account for political obligations of all types of members: the 
compliance with a state’s laws may be justified by different principles for different categories of 
citizens. If this is true, consent theory can account for political obligations of at least three large groups 
of individuals: irregular immigrants, temporary workers and dual citizens.
 In some Western 
European countries the share of immigrants is between five and ten percent of the total number of 
citizens, and in Germany more than fifteen million people have an ‘immigration background’. 
93
Some people disagree on this point. Joseph Carens, for example, believes that this is not self-
evident and offers the usual example used against the consent theory: ‘if a robber says “your money or 
your life” and you give him your money, have you consented?’
 
94
                                                 
91 The most important recent defences of consent theory are offered by Beran (1987) and Altman (2009). 
 Carens is thus worried about the 
underlying legitimacy of the political and social orders within which individuals have to make choices. 
However, unlike native citizens, a migrant’s situation is not best explained by the robbery example. 
92 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 'International Migration Report 2006: 
A Global Assessment ', <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/report.htm> (accessed 30 June 
2013). See also Abizadeh (2010). 
93 Of course this is not true for dual citizens by birth who never consented to either of their citizenships. However, in the 
next chapter I support the view that, according to the residence-based theory of citizenship I am defending, dual citizenship 
should not be accepted since citizenship must be linked to residence. 
94 Personal communication on file with the author, October 2013. 
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Any migrant makes plans before leaving her origin state, and she also reflects on which country she 
would like to move to. Unlike a native-born citizen, the migrant has a list of options regarding 
accessible host countries, and this makes her choice valid. It may not be a perfectly unconstrained 
choice, but it is still an authentic one. And what Carens calls the ‘underlying legitimacy of the political 
and social orders within which individuals have to make choices’ is a problem for the home country 
(the country where the migrant usually makes her choice), not for the host country where the migrants 
want to arrive. 
The second consequence is that consent is not only a principle justifying some categories of 
citizens’ duties to obey the law; it also becomes a principle of inclusion into the demos. As one author 
puts it trying to make a stand against the idea of automatic / mandatory acquisition of citizenship 
(Rubio-Marín 2000), ‘naturalization can be either discretionary or an entitlement, but it always depends 
on the active consent [my emphasis] of the person to be admitted’ (Bauböck 2003: 150). Indeed, for 
both temporary and permanent migrants the contract theory and the consent it presupposes – the 
consent of both the migrant and the host state – can be seen as principles of membership. For example, 
a sociologist observes that ‘every foreigner that is admitted to reside in France for the first time or that 
has entered France regularly between the age of 16 and 18 needs to sign a “reception and integration 
contract”. This contract makes provisions for civic training and, if necessary, language education’ 
(Courau 2009: 14). 
Sociologists as well as economists have supported the link between migration and consent, even 
as philosophers have rejected it. Criticizing the neoclassical approach, which tries to explain labour 
migration using ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, or ‘in terms of wage-rate-differentials and unemployment-
rate-differentials’ (Straubhaar 1986: 852), one author proposes a demand-determined approach which 
takes demand for foreign labour in the host country as the sufficient condition, and the ‘migration-
willing workers’ as the necessary condition for labour migration (Straubhaar 1986: 835). Taking a 
‘migrant’s projects’ point of view, like Ottonelli and Torresi, and connecting it with the rational choice 
theory, Straubhaar enlists some elements which are involved in an individual’s decision to migrate to 
work in another country: the costs related to migration abroad; profession-specific factors (sometimes 
subjective evaluation of the job can override higher salaries); expectations regarding return and 
employment in the origin country; availability or lack of information regarding conditions in the host 
country; the personal degree of risk-aversion; the evaluated risk of remaining unemployed in the 
receiving state; and so on (Straubhaar 1986: 838-839). Migrants’ agency in explaining the causes of 
labour migration is crucial: it elucidates why labour migration does not occur at a much higher scale, as 
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the neoclassical approach emphasizing only push and pull factors or differences in wages and 
unemployment rates between wealthy and poor countries would seem to imply. 
What is important to stress is the fact that Straubhaar lays emphasis not only on migrant 
workers’ consent, but also on the receiving polity’s will. The author explicitly says that ‘if no 
government wants to admit foreign workers, no international labor migration will occur’ (Straubhaar 
1986: 853). The host country’s consent plays an important role for other scholars too. Although he 
accepts the ‘free choice of the migrant’, Penninx quotes Bohning (Bohning 1981) and considers that 
 
‘we do not start from the assumption that the “free choice of the migrant” explains all migration 
phenomenon: in the context of international (labor) migration the “free choice” of the migrant is largely 
determined by and dependent on regulations set by the receiving industrial nations, which draw a borderline 
around themselves over which non-belongers may not step without explicit or tacit consent’ (Penninx 1986: 
961). 
 
All of the above seem to imply that both host polity’s consent and temporary foreign workers’ free 
choice play a crucial role in explaining both international labour migration and migrants’ inclusion in 
the receiving society. If this is correct, then further normative work is needed in order to fully develop a 
new role for consent theory in the field of political obligation. This section only tried to illustrate the 
main directions of such a development and how could one get together migration theory and political 
obligation. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The importance of these considerations on migrants’ agency is crucial especially in our time. In 1978 
Ray C. Rist wrote in his book on Guestworkers in Germany: ‘To build and firmly establish the 
legitimacy of a multicultural society stands as perhaps the preeminent challenge to Germany today’ 
(Rist 1978: xiii). On October 2010, 32 years later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that 
‘attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have “utterly failed,”’95
                                                 
95 ‘Merkel says German multicultural society has failed’, BBC news, 17 October 2010, available at 
 and that ‘immigrants 
needed to do more to integrate – including learning German.’ Other European leaders followed suit. In 
Munich on 5 February 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron declared that in the UK ‘state 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 2 April 2011). 
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multiculturalism has failed;’96 five days later French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that 
multiculturalism was a “failure,” warning that such a concept fostered extremism.97
 
 
Rists’s call for multicultural policies was meant to come as an appropriate answer to the fact 
that Germany became a multicultural polity as a result of its ‘guest worker program.’ In this author’s 
view, since so-called temporary workers had already permanently settled and were economically 
perfectly integrated, denying social and cultural integration would be an unacceptable policy. A few 
years later, exploring the case of Sweden as a happy exception from the European Gastarbeiter 
program, Thomas Hammar went even further and warned that ‘[i]f many foreign workers are excluded 
from political participation over a long period of time, the legitimacy of the political system is 
endangered’ (Hammar 1985).  
In the context in which all high-income countries openly or tacitly accept migrant labour and if 
after the economic crisis which began in 2008 some of these countries will consider to reintroduce 
state-sanctioned temporary foreign worker programs, the above declarations of the German Chancellor, 
French President and British Prime Minister are not only detrimental to multicultural policies per se. 
By moving from one extreme (accepting permanent second-class citizenship of migrant workers in the 
1970s and beyond) to the other one (forced assimilation and integration) they are also detrimental to 
every future migrant because they destroy the most important insight revealed by authors like Bell, 
Chang, Ottonelli and Torresi; namely, temporary migrants’ agency, and their freedom to negotiate an 
equality based on special status (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 ‘State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron’, BBC news, 5 February 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 2 April 2011). 
97 ‘France’s Sarkozy: Multiculturalism Has Failed’, CBNNews.com, 11 February 2011, available at 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/February/Frances-Sarkozy-Multiculturalism-Has-Failed/ (accessed 2 April 2011). 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
108 
 
Chapter 5. ‘Citizens-Plus’ (1): Multiple Citizens 
 
‘Perhaps the most clearly justifiable restriction on naturalisation  
from a liberal democratic perspective is the requirement that those applying  
for naturalisation renounce any other citizenship they possess. It is justifiable  
because it fits with a vision of a democratic community as one in which  
the citizens have a mutual and exclusive commitment to one another, and  
it does not violate any liberal democratic principles’ (Carens 1989: 47)98
5.1. Introduction 
 
 
‘… despite academics’ interest in – and, in some cases, concern with – dual  
citizenship, the vast majority of immigrants care little about their access 
to multiple political memberships’ (Bloemraad 2007: 174-175) 
 
‘… [r]ecent events and trends have led me to think that plural citizenship  
is not as unproblematic as I once thought it was’ (Liebich 2010: 29) 
 
The majority of states acknowledge today one form of multiple citizenship99
 The second section briefly surveys the causes of multiple citizenship and the developments that 
have triggered its wide acceptance at the international level. After understanding how such a status 
occurs and why it is accepted, I ask why plural citizenship is supposed to be so desirable in the first 
place. My claim here is that at all the levels implied – the sending state, the receiving polity, and the 
individual – advantages are either rather more imagined than real, or they can be achieved through 
more convenient means. Moreover, when assessed against the practical, legal and political difficulties it 
raises, multiple citizenship does not seem to be justified. However, since such shortcomings can be – 
and some of them already have been – corrected through international treaties, plural citizenship might 
be accepted if it can also be normatively defensible. 
 or another (Faist 2007d). 
This liberal trend is remarkable, given the fact that just a few decades ago the international community 
was struggling to limit the incidence of membership in more than one political community. Although 
many theorists welcome and celebrate this development both as a big step on the road towards a post-
national world and as an increasing acceptance of liberal values by the international community 
(Benhabib 2007), this chapter intends to stop the cheering for a minute and ask in a sceptical tone about 
both normative justifications and practical advantages of multiple citizenship. 
                                                 
98 Meanwhile Carens has changed his view on dual citizenship and now claims that toleration is a matter of justice – see for 
example Carens (2014, forthcoming). 
99 For the purposes of this chapter I use the expressions ‘multiple citizenship’, ‘plural citizenship’, ‘(formal) plural/multiple 
membership’ and ‘dual citizenship’ interchangeably. However, as I explain later in section three, I consider these notions as 
being distinct from the notion of ‘multiple/plural/dual nationality’. 
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 The third section discusses the most important moral objection against multiple citizenships: 
that it violates the democratic principle of citizenship equality. I claim that the nature of such 
infringement is both economic – enjoying social benefits without contributing to the welfare scheme – 
and political – multiple voting, external voting, and the availability of an exit option that mono-citizens 
do not have. The conclusion is that plural citizenship as such goes against the democratic principle of 
citizenship equality and thereby is not normatively justified. But if this is the case, then how can we 
account for the official recognition of individuals’ ties to multiple communities? 
 The fourth and final section asks who has a claim to membership in a polity in the first place. I 
discuss the principle of genuine link and support a radical interpretation of the ‘stakeholdership’ 
principle, according to which ‘genuine link’ must be understood in the restricted sense of residence. If 
this is correct, then the need for dual or plural citizenship disappears. However, I accept that 
individuals may have cultural, ethnic and affective ties to more than one polity. But the question is 
whether such ties must necessarily be officially recognised through citizenship. My answer is negative. 
I finally make a distinction between citizenship and nationality and claim that while citizenship should 
be exclusive and restricted only to the state of residence, multiple nationality is non-exclusive and 
‘ethnic’ and / or ‘cultural kins’ may enjoy preferential treatment by their kin states but should not be 
offered access to kin states’ citizenship status. 
 
5.2. How multiple citizenship occurs and why is it desirable 
 
5.2.1. How multiple citizenship occurs 
Let me begin by asking first how dual citizenship status occurs. This has yet to be explained, since the 
fact that multiple citizenship has flourished is rather a puzzle as long as several elements of 
international law clearly express a norm against it. During the second half of the 19th century (see, for 
example, the Bancroft Treaties)100
                                                 
100 The Bancroft treaties are contracts signed in the 19th and 20th centuries between the United States and other countries, 
which ‘recognized the right of each party’s nationals to become naturalised citizens of the other; and defined circumstances 
in which naturalised persons were legally presumed to have abandoned their new citizenship and resumed their old one’ 
(source: Wikipedia, 
 and almost the entire 20th century states struggled to stick to the 
principle of ‘one citizen, one state’ (Triadafilopoulos 2007). International conventions against multiple 
citizenship include, among others, the 1930 Hague ‘Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bancroft_Treaties). According to Spiro, under ‘the Bancroft agreements 
(…) individuals returning to reside permanently in their countries of origin would revert to their original nationalities’ 
(Spiro 2011: 708). 
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Conflict of Nationality Laws’, the 1930 League of Nations’ three conventions (on ‘Military Obligations 
in Certain Cases of Double Nationality’, on ‘Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness’ and on 
‘Certain Case of Statelessness’), and the 1963 Council of Europe’s ‘Convention on the Reduction of 
Cases of Multiple Nationality’. At the national level, the 1978 decision of the German Constitutional 
Court which affirmed multiple citizenship is an ‘evil’ for both states and individuals (Gerdes and Faist 
2007a: 151) is a famous example. Briefly put, from the perspective of international relations theory, 
two points of view can explain this development from a total rejection of multiple citizenship to today's 
general toleration or even acceptance. 
The liberal standpoint would probably emphasise the increasing cooperation between states, the 
development of international institutions and the wide compliance with human rights norms. Indeed, 
the fact that democracies do not wage war against each other has rendered military conscription 
obsolete and opened the path to building professional armies. For this reason, citizens’ loyalty to the 
state has increasingly been seen as non-exclusive (Triadafilopoulos 2007: 28), (Faist 2007b: 172). The 
development of international human rights norms such as gender equality has also been another 
important factor. On the one hand, by disconnecting women’s citizenship from that of men and 
allowing women also to pass their citizenship on to their children, an increasing number of children 
have been born with dual citizenship. On the other hand, the possibility of citizenship acquisition by 
marriage allowed the naturalising spouses of either sex to become dual citizens (Faist 2007d: 4), 
(Koslowski 2003: 160-162). 
 By contrast, the (neo-)realist school of thought in international relations would instead 
emphasise the lack of coordination among states regarding citizenship policies. Since in its view the 
world is a stage where the state-actors are competing for power, multiple citizenship is the consequence 
of this international chaos generated by states blindly and boldly following their own interests. Thus, 
according to a legal theorist the cause of plural citizenship is ‘the interaction of three fundamental 
maxims:’ (a) ‘each state decides who its own nationals are;’ (b) ‘in making those decisions, a given 
state typically provides alternative, multiple routes to nationality’ – i.e., ius soli, ius sanguinis, and 
naturalisation; and (c) ‘the rules vary from state to state’ (Legomsky 2003: 81). But states wanted to 
further other interests too. On the one hand, new sending countries started to strengthen ties with their 
emigrants for economic and political reasons (Faist 2007d: 4), (Triadafilopoulos 2007: 28) while 
historical sending states wanted to maintain post-colonial ties (Koslowski 2003). On the other hand, 
immigration countries not only came to accept that residence gave rise to a membership claim (Kivisto 
2007: 274), (Martin 2003: 5), but they were also interested in sticking to the principle of congruence 
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between the resident population and the demos (Koslowski 2003: 160-162). Finally, dual citizenship 
has been considered in some receiving states as an alternative to expanding voting rights to denizens 
(Faist 2007c: 12-13). 
 
5.2.2. Why dual citizenship is desirable: sending states 
The increasing tolerance of multiple citizenship might make one think that this status is some sort of 
good.101 But what kind of good? And, more importantly, for whom? There are three actors that have to 
be taken into account here: sending states, receiving countries, and individuals, i.e. the dual citizens 
themselves. Let me call the ‘traditional view’ the theory which holds that plural political membership is 
a win-win-win situation – that is, a state of affairs that benefits all the actors involved. Let’s test this 
perspective. Concerning emigration states, the most cited argument is that dual citizenship can augment 
their political and economic power (Faist 2007d: 7). In fact, one of the most important reasons for 
which sending countries have officially accepted or at least tolerated multiple citizenship is that such a 
move  is seen to strengthen ties with their diasporas, guaranteeing thereby the flow of remittances 
(Faist 2007d: 13), (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 127). However, studies have demonstrated that this is wishful 
thinking rather than what actually happens. On the one hand, the flow of remittances decreases as the 
length of time the immigrant spends abroad increases. On the other hand, multiple citizenship has a 
perverse influence on remittance flows in the long term, since once the immigrant acquires also the 
citizenship of the state of residence she can apply for family reunification;102
 Another reason for which sending polities accept dual citizenship is the hope that, once 
integrated in the host state, emigrants will lobby for their origin country in the new state of residence 
(Jones-Correa 2003: 312). But this may prove to be either a non-sequitur, or another example of 
wishful thinking. On the one hand, it is not clear why multiple formal ties are necessary for emigrants 
to lobby. Indeed, an immigrant – say, in the Unites States or in Germany – who acquires the citizenship 
of the state of residence may nevertheless lobby for her origin country, even though she had to 
 and once the family 
establishes itself in the host state the reason for sending remittances in the first place vanishes 
(Itzigsohn 2007: 128). 
                                                 
101 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, ‘International Migration Report 2006: 
A Global Assessment’, accessible at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/exec_sum.pdf (last 
accessed 18 August 2013). 
102 The EU law provides for family reunification rights for Third Country Nationals (TCNs) – since the 2003 family 
reunification and long-term resident directives – so it is not true that naturalisation is strictly required here. But even in this 
case, naturalisation often leads to stronger reunification rights. 
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relinquish her former citizenship. Such an action would depend on purely affective ties rather than on 
formal status. According to Spiro, there is no evidence that multiple citizenship ‘reinforces state ties’, 
or that affective ties necessarily depend on formal plural membership (Spiro 2007: 193).103 On the 
other hand, the evidence concerning immigrants’ desire to keep ties with the origin country is rather 
inconclusive. If for some immigrants the strength of these ties do not diminishes with time – for 
example, for Hong Kong immigrants in Canada (Preston, Siemiatycki et al. 2007: 213) – for others 
they do, or at least strong affective ties do not translate into the need for formal dual citizenship status. 
For example, when Mexico allowed retention of its nationality upon naturalisation in another state and 
restitution of nationality for those who were required to relinquish it, few former citizens applied for 
restoration (Spiro 2007: 193). Some authors claim that only 0.5 per cent of the eligible non-resident 
former citizens applied for re-acquisition of Mexican citizenship and even less for voting abroad 
(Jones-Correa 2003: 330). According to Rainer Bauböck, the fact that few apply for reacquisition does 
not imply that few are interested in preventing citizenship loss in the first place.104
 Finally, the last argument maintains that plural citizenship helps spreading liberal and 
democratic norms, thus improving bilateral relations between sending and receiving countries 
(Bloemraad 2007: 182). Both claims are contestable on empirical grounds. There is no evidence that 
liberal and democratic norms are better pursued through dual citizenship than through immigration – 
and freedom of movement in general – mass-media, or the internet.
 This is of course 
true, but we have to make a distinction between those who ‘had an interest in preventing the loss’ and 
those that simply didn’t care whether they keep or lose the citizenship of the former country of 
residence. It is pretty plausible that those who really had this interest applied for reacquisition, but, as 
Jones-Correa demonstrated, the percentage is only 0.5. Moreover, this shows again that affective ties 
do not depend on formal citizenship. 
105
                                                 
103 Some scholars disagree. According to Rainer Bauböck (personal communication on file with the author, 23 April 2013) 
there is a case when formal citizenship may reinforce emigrants’ ties: for countries of origin the choice is only between 
granting dual citizenship to those who naturalise abroad or withdrawing their citizenship in this case. It is pretty plausible 
that the former option will strengthen ties to emigrants compared to the latter option. I disagree with this point, since I still 
find it difficult to understand how a formal status (or the lack of it) would strengthen (or weaken) my affective ties with my 
place of birth or the people living there (hence, with my former country of citizenship). 
104 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
105 Of course, someone may object that different factors have different and relative strengths. Toleration of multiple 
citizenship may be both a result of peaceful international relations, and may also contribute in turn to these. My interest here 
is only to underline the fact that some believe that dual citizenship is just one – hence not a sine qua non – factor that can 
contribute to improve bilateral relations. 
 Moreover, there are many cases 
of individuals holding both Canadian and Afghan citizenship that have chosen to fight against the 
Canadian army in Afghanistan (Macklin 2007: 54-57), and of individuals holding both German and 
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Yugoslav citizenship who fought against the Western coalition – of which Germany was a member – in 
Kosovo (Legomsky 2003: 117), (Koslowski 2003: 168-169).  
As for the supposed improvement of bilateral relations between countries through dual 
citizenship, the facts reveal quite an opposite state of affairs: plural formal status has rather worsened 
bilateral relations even in a time when the phenomenon was already largely accepted, as can be seen in 
the conflicts between Germany and Turkey,106 Romania and Moldova (Horváth 2010: 34), Hungary 
and Romania (Varga 2004), and Hungary and Slovakia (Bauböck 2010a), to name only a few cases.107 
It is true that there is little potential for interstate conflict in two constellations where both states 
involved tolerate dual citizenship or where both don’t tolerate it. As a consequence all major conflicts 
emerge from one state tolerating and the other state rejecting dual citizenship. The question here is 
whether toleration or non-toleration is the source of conflict in these cases,108
5.2.3. Why dual citizenship is desirable: host states 
 and the answer probably 
depends on each case, since the reason for accepting or not accepting this status is linked to historical, 
political and other types of considerations. For example, as we will see further in chapter seven, in 
Montenegro dual citizenship is not accepted because of the fear that ‘dual citizenship from among the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia (most likely Serbia) would have […] a high impact on the 
voting population of the country and their electoral choices’ (Džankic 2012: 8). 
 
But maybe formal plural membership fares better in relation to receiving countries. The best argument 
here is that dual citizenship encourages naturalisation of long-term residents, thereby promoting the 
democratic principle of congruence between resident population and the demos (Faist 2007d: 1) , 
(Gerdes, Faist et al. 2007b: 57). The assumption here is that integration in the country of residence is 
best promoted if the host polity does not request the potential candidate to relinquish the citizenship of 
her country of origin. Two remarks are appropriate here: on the one hand, if dual citizenship is to be 
formally accepted then this cannot be implemented only for immigrants, but also for emigrants. Indeed, 
countries that accept dual citizenship for one category of migrants but not for the other violate the 
                                                 
106 Some might consider that this case does not fit, since Germany does not accept dual citizenship. But acceptance (or non-
acceptance) of dual citizenship is exactly the issue here. The conflict started because one country (Germany) does not 
accept, while the other country (Turkey) does accept dual citizenship. 
107 It is true that the last three cases are all kin-state conflicts, so they cannot be generalized to migration-context cases. 
However, together with the other conflict between Germany and Turkey, they create an important set of cases where 
conflicts have been generated by double citizenship. 
108 I would like to thank Rainer Bauböck for raising this objection (personal communication on file with the author, 
September 2013). 
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symmetry principle of (non-)toleration of dual citizenship for both immigrants and emigrants. As one 
scholar puts it, ‘strongly asymmetric policies towards foreign residents in the country and towards a 
state’s own nationals living abroad’ (Bauböck 2005a: 18) violate the ‘generalizability of policies’ 
principle for citizenship policies in the international community arena. But if this is the case, then it is 
hard to understand how dual citizenship is supposed to support the congruence principle109 – between 
the resident population and the demos – as long as dual citizenship also implies the existence of non-
resident citizens.110 On the other hand, some claim that dual citizenship is quite the opposite of 
integration: it delays ‘immigrant adoption of citizenship’111
Be that as it may, the relationship between citizenship and integration is heavily debated 
between the liberal camp – according to which acquiring full citizenship rights helps integration in the 
state of residence – and the republican camp – claiming that citizenship should be awarded only after 
the process of integration in the host society is already complete (Gerdes, Faist et al. 2007b), (Hart 
2007), (Spång 2007: 114). A study on immigrants in Canada demonstrated that there is no relation 
between integration and dual citizenship; quite the contrary, ‘the propensity to claim dual citizenship 
decreases as length of residence in Canada increases’ (Bloemraad 2007: 174).
 (Jones-Correa 2003: 312), it transforms 
‘immigrant groups into national minorities’ (Gerdes, Faist et al. 2007b: 61), and it may amount to a 
‘balkanisation of a nation’ (Kivisto 2007: 278). 
112
                                                 
109 Bauböck believes that it is not impossible to accept this, if the congruence principle is seen as maximising the inclusion 
of residents as citizens. This seems to depend on what version of the principle one defends: it could be perfectly possible to 
say that all one cares about is the maximum inclusion of residents – and this is enhanced by facilitating naturalisation 
through abandoning a renunciation requirement (personal communication on file with the author, 23 April 2013). However, 
I understand the congruence principle – between the resident population and the demos – as also having the flip side which 
requires the exclusion of emigrants. 
110 For the purposes of this chapter, by ‘non-resident citizens’ I mean ‘long-term non-resident citizens.’ Moreover, from the 
latter expression I exclude diplomats and soldiers, whose residency status comes from actively serving their countries 
abroad. I further assume that long-term non-resident citizens have also the citizenship of the country of residence, thereby 
being dual citizens. This is obviously not necessarily the case, so my arguments are not meant to apply to either short-term 
non-resident citizens or long-term non-resident mono-citizens. 
111 According to Correa, the argument here is that dual citizenship ‘encourages immigrants to retain their ties to their home 
countries at the expense of deepening their new ties to the country in which they now reside’ (Jones-Correa 2003: 319). 
Correa also quotes Yang, according to whom dual nationality discourages naturalisation in the United States (Yang 1994: 
449): ‘The odds of naturalization of immigrants from countries that recognize dual nationality, he calculated, were about 20 
percent lower than those from countries without provisions for dual nationality’ (Jones-Correa 2003: 321) . 
112 Some may object here by saying that this is perfectly consistent with the assumption that toleration of dual citizenship 
leads to earlier naturalisation. Since Canada is the country with the highest naturalisation rates early after immigration, non-
toleration of dual citizenship would be very likely to lead to much longer residence periods and those who apply after very 
long-term residence indeed may care less about retaining a previously held citizenship. This objection can be answered in 
two ways. On the one hand, if usually long-term residents become indifferent to a previously held citizenship after a number 
of years, then it is not obvious why they should retain it in the first place. On the other hand, by implementing my proposal 
of linking citizenship with residence, the danger that non-toleration of dual citizenship could lead to much longer residence 
periods simply disappears. 
 Even a supporter of 
dual citizenship admits in a study on immigrants in the United States that dual citizenship has ‘positive’ 
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but ‘relatively small’ effects on naturalisation (Jones-Correa 2003: 330). Whatever the relation between 
citizenship and integration, it is important to note that dual citizenship has nothing to do with it. On the 
one hand, it is true that sometimes immigrants – like some Mexicans in the US – prefer not to apply for 
the citizenship of the state of residence if this also implies relinquishing the citizenship of the home 
country.  But on the other hand, when Mexico offered in 1997 the possibility of reacquisition of 
nationality for those who had renounce it in order to naturalise in the Unites States, few really took this 
possibility (Fitzgerald 2005: 99-100). So the evidence is at best inconclusive. 
But this is not unusual. It is interesting to note that there is only one argument which fully 
supports dual citizenship, and that is the argument from freedom of movement. All the other arguments 
can be reduced to support either immigration or one citizenship in the country of residence. For 
example, the argument that dual citizenship is an alternative to denizen voting (Hammar 1990), (Gerdes 
and Faist 2007a: 142), (Spång 2007: 106) is not actually an argument for dual citizenship, but simply 
one for citizenship acquisition in the country of residence, which may or may not be offered together 
with the option of retaining the original citizenship. Of course, this claim is valid only from a 
residence-based point of view; it may not be accepted under other approaches. For example, one may 
argue that it is not true since ‘denizenship’ is combined with ‘external citizenship’, just as dual 
citizenship is. In this case, naturalisation under condition of renunciation is not an alternative to 
denizen voting, since it requires abandoning a core element of denizen status.113
Far from promoting integration, many academics agree that plural citizenship is desired rather 
for its instrumental value. Some countries actively promote what has been called ‘economic 
citizenship,’ such as the ‘highly commodified regime of citizenship in Canada’ (Preston, Siemiatycki et 
al. 2007: 205). Usually, however, this ‘citizenship of convenience’ is a subject of concern in the host 
states. Citizens in the Netherlands, for example, fear that ‘immigrants [make] instrumental use of dual 
citizenship’ (Hart 2007: 91). In Sweden the term ‘citizenship shopping’ was coined (Spång 2007: 113), 
while similar concerns have been expressed about Moldovans taking Romanian citizenship (Iordachi 
2004: 250), and about Macedonians taking Bulgarian citizenship (Bieber 2010: 20). Usually, 
citizenship is seen in utilitarian terms also by ‘a global economic elite, some of whom obtain second 
 However, if we 
understand the citizenship status as residence-based, then the whole concept of ‘denizenship’ loses its 
meaning. 
                                                 
113 I would like to thank Rainer Bauböck for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the 
author, April 2013). 
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nationalities in order to avoid taxes, conceal international movement, and ease travel’ (Koslowski 
2003: 170). 
Whether it is used in an instrumental manner or not, some authors hold that dual citizenship 
undermines solidarity in the host state. A person not willing to relinquish her former citizenship is seen 
as downgrading the country of residence to a ‘second choice’ option (Spiro 2007: 195), which devalues 
the meaning of citizenship (Jones-Correa 2003: 312). Finally, multiple citizenship is seen in residence 
states as not only dividing citizens’ loyalty, but also as implying a loss of sovereignty through ‘the 
meddling of other countries in the domestic affairs’ of the host state (Jones-Correa 2003: 320). 
 
5.2.4. Why dual citizenship is desirable: immigrants 
Since multiple citizenship is not much of a good either for emigration or for immigration countries, 
could it still be an asset for individuals? That is, could it benefit those who enjoy formal plural 
membership? The strongest argument here is that dual citizenship enhances freedom of movement in a 
world in which security concerns greatly constrain immigration and free movement of people. I admit 
this is the strongest argument. I also believe, however, that there are better and more egalitarian ways 
of enhancing freedom of movement. One of them is the ‘further enlargement of the European space of 
free movement and the creation of similar unions in other parts of the world’ (Bauböck 2011: 681). The 
latter strategy is more egalitarian since it terminates ‘the modern equivalent of feudal privilege’ (Carens 
2010a: 252) that dual citizens seem to enjoy over mono-citizens. True, this is politically hard to achieve 
– but normatively it is indeed more attractive and a better way to promote freedom of movement than 
dual citizenship. 
One could object here that if dual citizenship tracks multiple individual stakes in polities, then 
the allocation of scarce free movement rights through dual citizenship is more just, because less 
dependent on morally arbitrary circumstances than the allocation through regional unions of states 
(Bauböck 2009a: 17). However such an objection seems to be based on several undefined notions and 
claims. Firstly, there is no definition of what an ‘individual stake’ means. Claiming that 
 
‘all those and only those individuals have a claim to membership in a particular polity who can be 
seen as stakeholders because their individual flourishing is linked to the future of that polity. 
Individuals hold a stake if the polity is collectively responsible for securing the political conditions for 
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their well-being and enjoyment of basic rights and liberties’ (the dependency criterion) (Bauböck 
2009a: 15) 
 
does not offer an explanation under what explicit circumstances an individual’s flourishing is linked to 
the future of a specific polity or under what precise conditions the polity is ‘collectively responsible for 
securing the political conditions for their well-being and enjoyment of basic rights and liberties.’ 
Secondly, this objection offers no explanation as to why free movement rights should be ‘scarce.’ If 
immigration can be legitimately restricted only as long as it does not threaten a state’s capacity to 
maintain public order and the welfare system (as we have seen above in section 3.4), then it is not clear 
why free movement rights should be ‘scarce.’ Finally, this objection offers no explanation as to why all 
other circumstances except the undefined ‘individual stakes’ are supposed to be morally arbitrary. At 
the end of the day, the allocation of free movement rights through regional union of states may be less 
morally arbitrary and more egalitarian than an allocation based on multiple citizenship status. 
Other advantages for individuals that can be offered by multiple status are not that obvious. A 
second argument is that multiple citizenship promotes integration (Bloemraad 2007: 160). Two 
remarks are in order here. First, as we have already seen, some claim that the status is an obstacle to 
integration since sometimes it hinders immigrants to develop certain capacities deemed to be necessary 
for incorporation in the host society, like ‘self-reliance, individual autonomy, personal responsibility 
and primary identification with the respective nation-state’ (Gerdes and Faist 2007a: 153). However, 
even if we set aside such a republican perspective and take a more liberal view, the relationship 
between formal multiple status and integration is at best inconclusive. But we can probably agree that 
‘with the passage of time, the salience of the citizenship of the nation of origin progressively declines’, 
so ‘dual citizenship is in some sense a temporary phenomenon’ (Kivisto 2007: 282). 
Another possible advantage of dual citizenship is that it provides an extra entry option in 
another state (and this is often seen as indirectly enhancing their effective exit options). In other words, 
whenever something goes wrong, an individual enjoying this status can immediately leave her state of 
residence.114
                                                 
114 It could be said that additional entry options are much more widely available for EU citizens in the EU (26 additional 
entry options) or for citizens whose states conclude visa-waiver agreements with other states than for dual citizens (Rainer 
Baubock, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013). But this is exactly why such inter-state agreements 
are more egalitarian than dual citizenship: such advantages are not offered to individuals because of their particular 
circumstances like dual citizenship (e.g., having parents with different citizenships) but because of being citizens of the 
signatory states. 
 Beside the equality problem such an extra option raises – to which I will return in section 
three below – this advantage is counterbalanced by other drawbacks. Far from enhancing an 
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individual’s security, dual citizenship can be used by the country of residence to get rid of unwanted 
persons by stripping them of their citizenship. States bound by international legal norms, such as the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, cannot do this with their mono-citizens since this 
Convention prohibits citizenship withdrawal if the result would be statelessness;115
5.2.5. Disadvantages and problems created by dual citizenship 
 however, this is 
obviously not the case with plural citizens – in consequence, ‘the ironic outcome is that among those 
citizens likely to arouse the state’s suspicion, two citizenships provide less security than one’ (Macklin 
2007: 61-62). 
Finally, it is important to note that I have discussed until now only instrumental reasons why 
individuals may be interested in dual citizenship. It is plausible that, depending on the conditions 
offered by states of origin and immigration, immigrants’ naturalisation choices are not only driven by 
instrumental reasons but also by non-instrumental ones. According to Bauböck, the conditions under 
which non-instrumental reasons might prevail are near equality of rights between ‘denizens’ and 
naturalised citizens, individual entitlements to naturalisation without high material and procedural 
obstacles, and toleration of dual citizenship by both the states of origin and of immigration. In the 
absence of any of these conditions, naturalisation choices are likely to be more instrumentally 
motivated (Bauböck 1994a: 105-106). Another non-instrumental reason is that immigrants regard 
renouncing their citizenship of origin as giving in to demands for assimilation: a formal act of 
renouncing a previous citizenship thus also implies an emotional (and probably also material) loss. I 
will discuss later this problem and I will claim that nationality rather than citizenship satisfies this 
emotional (and other types of) interests since according to the theory I am defending nationality need 
not be renounced when acquiring a new citizenship. 
 
There are other disadvantages that come with multiple citizenship. Some of them, such as dual military 
service or dual tax payments, have already been dealt with more or less through international, regional 
or bilateral treaties (Jones-Correa 2003: 314). Although such problems still appear, the trend toward 
solving them through inter-state agreements seems promising. But other disadvantages still remain. For 
example, Mexico does not accept dual citizens for voluntary enlistment in the army, and in the United 
States dual citizenship ‘can be an obstacle to security clearance, which is a requirement for officer 
status’ (Legomsky 2003: 87). As I discuss later in this chapter, some countries also prohibit office-
                                                 
115 However, not even all democratic states have signed this convention and it is just one among several international 
treaties on statelessness. 
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holding by dual citizens (Spiro 2003). And finally, it seems that not even dual citizens themselves 
know exactly why they choose to keep this status. Some of them claim that it enhances their political 
participation in the host state – which is not exactly accurate, since participation is achieved not 
through dual citizenship per se, but through citizenship acquisition in the state of residence 
independently of toleration of dual citizenship. Others believe that dual citizenship helps to keep open 
the option to return to the home country (Jones-Correa 2003: 312-313). This is indeed done by multiple 
status, but it raises problems regarding integration and instrumental uses of citizenship that have been 
already treated above. 
In consequence, it seems that at all the levels analysed – the sending state, the receiving polity, 
and the individual – the advantages are either more imagined than real, or they can be achieved through 
more convenient means. But what about the disadvantages? Some of these, such as the claim that 
multiple citizenship undermines integration, have been already discussed. Others, such as the objection 
according to which such a status raises serious concerns about state security, will be discussed in 
chapter seven. For now it is enough to stress that the transformation of military conflicts – from classic 
war to modern forms of state and non-state terrorism – brings back on the agenda the problem of 
citizen’s loyalty to the state. Kivisto even considers that in the context of terrorist threats the trend 
towards a professional military and hence tolerance of multiple loyalties is not irreversible (Kivisto 
2007: 280).116
                                                 
116 Not everyone agrees. Some believe that the changing nature of war and especially the increasing salience of terrorist 
threats make the trend towards professional security forces irreversible. What is reversible, according to this point of view, 
is the diminishing of loyalty requirements imposed on citizens – and these are two separate issues (Rainer Bauböck, 
personal communication, April 2013, on file with the author).  
 But even in the context of classic wars the problem of loyalty still arises, as we have 
already seen above regarding the military conflicts in Afghanistan and former Yugoslavia. 
Another worry about dual citizenship expressed in rather republican or communitarian terms is 
that it causes an ‘identity dilution’ (Faist 2007d: 16). In other words, having more ‘state-based 
identities’ (Spiro 2007: 189) downgrades the importance of any national identity by reducing it to a 
type of ‘voluntary association’ (Spång 2007: 113). Except for the supporters of the aforementioned 
ideologies, probably few people really believe that this is necessarily a bad thing in itself; nevertheless, 
it could have at least two undesirable consequences. On the one hand, it could diminish the level of 
solidarity needed for a normal functioning of democratic institutions and the welfare scheme. On the 
other hand, the diluted state-based identity could be replaced by other (religious, ethnic or racist) forms 
of identity which are less tolerant of multiple affiliations (Spiro 2007: 201). 
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An additional worry is related to immoral and even dangerous ways a state can use dual 
citizenship to further its own interests. I have already mentioned that states make use of this status in 
order to get rid of unwanted citizens, but formal plural membership can also be employed as a means to 
promote irredentist politics (Faist 2007d: 11),117 as has often been the case in Central and Eastern 
Europe. A good example of this is the recent conflict between Hungary and Slovakia on the new 
Hungarian Citizenship Law (2010) which offered Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in 
neighbouring states (Bauböck 2010a). Finally, usually states use dual citizenship in a very inconsistent 
and morally dubious manner to promote specific national policies. Thus, they accept or tolerate a 
formal multiple status for their emigrants, but deny it to immigrants or minority nationalities. This 
‘selective tolerance’ or ‘differentialist transnationalism’ (Faist 2007c: 5) is practiced, among others, by 
the Netherlands118
Finally, there are some other specific difficulties raised by dual citizenship. Some of them 
concern diplomatic protection. While since the Nottebohm case
 (Hart 2007: 91-92), (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 43, 46), by Germany (Kreuzer 
2003: 358), Turkey (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 137), Poland (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2007) and 
Romania (Iordachi 2004: 268). 
119 the concept of genuine link is 
interpreted through the principle of habitual residence,120 there has been a trend in international courts 
to accept claims of states regarding personal jurisdiction based on ‘passive personality’ (‘the nationality 
of the victim of the crime’) – that is, on formal citizenship when the genuine link is missing – as the 
Pinochet case revealed (Oeter 2003: 61-62).121
                                                 
117 Some authors believe that such conflicts can be labelled ‘post-irredentist’ in some parts of the world: for example, some 
states that had to renounce claims to territorial revisions in order to access the European Union tried to reunite the nation 
through inventive legislation while still accepting the current borders – for Hungary, see Waterbury (2010). 
 There are also problems regarding judicial cooperation 
118 However in the Netherlands (in 2012) there was a pending amendment that would introduce symmetry by depriving 
Dutch ‘external’ citizens of Dutch citizenship if they naturalise abroad. See Maarten Vink, Dutch government agrees to get 
tough on dual citizenship, also for the Dutch, EUDO Citizenship News, 5 March 2012, http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/599-dutch-government-agrees-to-get-tough-on-dual-citizenship-also-for-the-dutch 
(accessed 16 May 2012). 
119 Nottebohm, ICJ Reports 1955, 4 (23). 
120 However some consider that the genuine link has not been accepted as a general principle for determining effective 
citizenship in international law (Sloane 2009); the latter is also true for EU law, see the Micheletti case (Case C-369/90 
Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, Italy, Spain, European Court of Justice, 
07/07/1992). For an overview of the case, see alsohttp://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-case-
law/?search=1&name=&year=&country=Italy&european=1 (last accessed 15 September 2013). 
121 According to Oeter, such theoretical conflicts may be solved easily: ‘The usual case of conflicting requests, as in the 
Pinochet case, will be linked to the existence of victims with different nationalities. The case of one or more victims having 
dual nationality with both states of nationality requesting extradition seems to be rather academic, although possible in 
principle. The difficulties in choosing between the various requests, however, will not differ from other cases of conflicting 
requests based on passive personality. The only real problem that has already arisen in practice - again in the Pinochet case - 
is the conflict which may evolve between the state where the acts were committed, and which is also the state of effective 
nationality of the victims holding dual nationality, and the other state whose nationality the victims possessed. If the state 
where the crime was committed has decreed an amnesty, for any political reasons whatsoever, it will protest against 
prosecution of the offender by a third state basing its jurisdiction on a purely formal or ineffective nationality. Personal 
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in civil matters: for example, court decisions regarding cases of divorce, maintenance obligations or 
inheritance may differ according to each national civil code and this constitutes an incentive for the 
dual citizen to engage in ‘forum shopping’ – that is, he or she can ‘choose the place of adjudication 
most favourable to his or her interests’ (Oeter 2003: 69).122
5.3. Multiple citizenship and the democratic principle of citizenship equality 
 
As a conclusion derived from the above discussion we may confidently claim that there are 
rather few evident benefits of formal dual citizenship, and when such advantages exist, they may be 
better promoted by other means than plural membership status.  The win-win-win situation is a state of 
affairs than can be found in the eye of the beholder rather than in the real world. Last but not least, 
when compared to numerous concerns raised by such a status, the supposed benefits seem to become 
even thinner. This may be a good reason to take the first proposition of this chapter – ‘The majority of 
states acknowledge today one form of multiple citizenship or another’ – with a grain of salt, since 
toleration does not necessarily means acceptance. As Spång has observed: ‘the German and Dutch 
cases show [that] extensive de facto toleration does not necessarily lead to acceptance of dual 
citizenship in principle’ (Spång 2007: 120). However, even if multiple citizenship doesn’t have much 
to offer in terms of benefits, it can still be accepted on the condition that it does not violate the concept 
of equality. As one scholar put it, ‘The thrust of modern citizenship, indeed what makes it modern, is 
the notion of equality’ (Liebich 2010: 29-30). The following section explains the various ways the 
democratic principle of citizenship equality is infringed by formal multiple membership. 
 
There are four ways in which formal multiple membership violates the democratic principle of 
citizenship equality .The first is related to the welfare state, the second to the exit option that it provides 
to the dual citizen, the third concerns some military and judicial considerations, and the last one is 
linked to political rights. Let me address them in turn. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction based on passive personality tends to override in these cases the primary responsibility of the territorial state 
where offenders and victims resided and where the acts were committed. State practice, however, seems to be in a process 
of change and to accept in principle claims of states like Spain and Switzerland, which in the Pinochet case based its 
jurisdiction purely on passive personality arguments concerning mainly victims who also held Chilean nationality’ (Oeter 
2003: 61-62). 
122 For other interesting examples where laws of different countries of nationality conflict on cases of marriage and divorce 
and for the consequences such a conflict have on dual citizens see Rumpf (2003: 370). 
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5.3.1. First violation: the welfare state 
The first way in which multiple citizenship violates the principle of equality is related to the welfare 
state. Let me first define the relevant scope of welfare benefit equality. For contribution-based systems, 
the scope includes all contributors (although the relevant standard of equality may require that benefits 
are not proportional to contributions but reflect needs or deserts), e.g. social insurance. For residence-
based systems, it is all residents (e.g. in public education). There are hardly any citizenship-based 
systems in liberal welfare states. In the past, citizenship was more widely used as a discriminatory 
criterion that excluded non-citizen residents from some non-contributory needs based benefits (e.g. 
social assistance). What I am concerned about are systems that are residence-based but do not require 
long-term residence, so that dual citizens can easily access them because of their immigration 
privileges. It is true that non-contributory benefits that do not depend on long-term residence are 
comparatively rare and small in terms of the overall share of welfare state expenditures. However, 
some examples do exist – see for example the Hungarian dual citizenship offer for Hungarian 
‘ethnizens’ (which will be discussed below and also in chapter six).123
Suppose now than an individual (a dual citizen by birth or a naturalised immigrant) has lived for 
an extended period of her life in one country of nationality, to which she is also genuinely linked, and 
suddenly decides to move to the second country of nationality. She knows this language and culture 
well, of course, but has never lived there nor contributed to the social system. If dual citizenship makes 
her eligible to access welfare benefits in the second state,
 
124
                                                 
123 Someone may reply that exactly the same objection (the violation regarding the welfare state) applies to EU citizenship, 
which is in this regard like a 27-fold citizenship (Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 
2013). This is actually happening in some Member States – where some governments are trying to restrict access to 
different types of welfare benefits to the new EU citizens from Bulgaria and Romania – see, for example, the concerns 
raised (among others) by Migration Watch UK (
 this could be an obvious case of equality 
infringement. The situation is even worse when dual citizenship is offered en masse to large number of 
individuals. On 5 December 2004 Hungary organised a referendum on offering ‘extraterritorial, non-
resident citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary by lifting all residency requirements 
from among the preconditions for obtaining a second, Hungarian citizenship’ (Kovács 2007: 92).  The 
http://news.migrationwatch.org.uk/welfare_benefits/). Even the UK 
government planned in 2013 to fight EU over access to benefits (see Nicholas Winning and Frances Robinson, ‘U.K. Plans 
to Fight EU Over Access to Benefits’, The Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324412604578514921248129106.html), and thus the EU took Britain to 
the ECJ over immigrant benefits. However, the situation is even more complicated since other EU member states (Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands) support the United Kingdom (see Rowena Mason, ‘Brussels takes Britain to EU court over 
immigrant benefits’, The Telegraph, 30 May 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10088297/Brussels-takes-Britain-to-EU-court-over-immigrant-
benefits.html). 
124 This may seem a problematic assumption, but in what follows I offer the Hungarian example which shows that such 
cases are not imaginary. 
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referendum was declared invalid because of the low number of participants, and more than 48 per cent 
of those who participated voted against this proposal. As Kovács acknowledges, one of the main 
arguments that motivated the voters either to not participate or to vote against was ‘welfare 
protectionism’ (Kovács 2007: 98). 
Another variation of this type of equality violation is when for whatever motive the new citizen 
– or the citizen who just took residence in the country – does not contribute to the social scheme. 
Probably this is one reason why republican opponents to formal multiple status frame their arguments 
not in terms of ascriptive features like ethnicity but in terms of ‘the contributions immigrants are 
expected to make to economic development and to social welfare systems’ (Faist 2007d: 15). Indeed, 
supporters of the performative aspect of citizenship underscore the importance of the ‘principle of 
subsidiarity’, as Gerdes and Faist (2007a) call it: in the Netherlands and Germany, for example, full 
citizens are expected to be active, to provide for themselves and for their families without relying on 
social security funds, and to develop ‘civil capacities such as tolerance and respect for gender equality’ 
(Gerdes and Faist 2007a: 148). 
 
5.3.2. Second violation: the substantive exit option 
The second infringement of the principle of equality by plural membership concerns the substantive 
exit option it provides to the bearer of the status – an option which a mono-citizen does not have. In 
other words, every citizen of every state has the human right to leave her country, but there is a 
difference between the mono- and dual citizenship status with regard to unconditional admission rights, 
since dual citizens have two and mono-citizens have one.125
For example, in post-conflict countries ‘the extra citizenship is also a sort of insurance policy, 
combined with an exit ticket’ (Bieber 2010: 20). Even though the dual citizen is entitled to her status 
according to both rules of citizenship acquisition of her countries of nationality and international laws, 
the moral problem of equality still remains. A second concern raised by the exit option regards the 
viability of a political community where citizens can leave if they do not like the outcome of the vote 
 Thus dual citizens have a more 
‘substantive exit option’ since they have another state that must admit them. If the political, social or 
economic states of affairs in the country of residence deteriorate, dual citizens can always leave, while 
the same option becomes more problematic for mono-citizens. 
                                                 
125 With the exception of the European Union, where a European citizen has admission rights in any member state. 
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and do not have to live with community’s decisions (Bloemraad 2007: 168-169).126
Two comments are in order here. Firstly, EU citizens are like multiple citizens with 27 
citizenships in this respect. Some claim that if this expansion of free movement is problematic, then EU 
citizenship should also be opposed. However, the case under consideration is different. An exit option 
based on a union of states law, which applies to any mono-citizen of such a union, is different from an 
exit option based on dual citizenship – which applies only to some particular individuals. Secondly, 
another possible objection states that the same privilege of a substantive exit option is also enjoyed by 
‘external quasi-citizens’ – the so-called ‘ethnizens’ – and if this privilege is morally problematic then 
the latter should also be deprived of it.
 In consequence, the 
exit option offered by dual citizenship raises a concern about citizenship equality which has to be dealt 
with.  
127
5.3.3. Third violation: military-related judicial considerations 
 I readily accept this objection. I do believe that a greater 
freedom of movement and more exit options should be implemented not through dual citizenship or 
‘external quasi-citizenship’ status, but through more unions of states like the EU. 
 
A third violation of the democratic principle of citizenship equality by multiple citizenship is linked to 
military and military-related judicial considerations. Firstly, regarding conscription, a widely accepted 
international norm128 prohibits double conscription of dual citizens. That being said, in countries which 
still practice conscription there are only two ways of dealing with dual citizens. One is based on the 
habitual residence principle (the citizen must serve in the country of residence), while the other is based 
on the option model (the citizen is allowed to choose the country in which she is going to serve). As 
one scholar acknowledges, the latter is a clear instance where dual citizens are treated more favourably 
than mono-citizens (Legomsky 2003: 105) hence the principle of equality is violated.129
                                                 
126 It is true that this would entail a general critique of exit rights for mono-citizens too, which is hard to state on liberal 
grounds. I believe that this is not Bloemraad’s intention. She is referring here strictly to the unequal balance of rights and 
opportunities between mono- and dual citizens, in the sense that dual citizens can simply leave if they do not like the 
outcome of the vote, while mono-citizens cannot. This does not mean, of course, that no citizen should be allowed to leave. 
127 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
128 For example, among the international treaties that prohibit dual conscription are the 1930 Hague Protocol Relating to 
Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality, the 1963 European Convention on the Reduction of Cases of 
Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, and the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality. 
129 Some may object that mono ‘external’ citizens who do not have to serve in any army – either in the country of origin or 
that of residence – are even more privileged than dual citizens who can choose the shorter military service. The objection 
fails since its thrust lies on the non-existence of compulsory drafting rather than on citizenship status. 
 But the free 
choice model raises problems not only connected to the principle of equality, but also to that of 
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fairness, since dual citizens ‘tend to opt for military service in the state where the duration of military 
service is shorter’ (Reermann 2003: 131). 
Secondly, regarding military-related judicial considerations, let us consider the situation of a 
plural citizen who ‘voluntarily takes up arms for one of his states of nationality against his other state 
of nationality’ (Legomsky 2003: 119). Usually the state against whom he has served considers this an 
act of treason and the citizen is sanctioned accordingly. It is important to note here that the charge of 
treason is the same irrespective of whether the defendant is a mono- or a dual citizen. However, 
Legomsky proposes denationalisation instead of criminal sanctions for dual citizens (Legomsky 2003: 
122). In other words, in identical cases sanctions attached to the charge of treason are fine for mono-
citizens but not for dual citizens. This is yet another violation of the democratic principle of equality by 
multiple citizenship status.  
It is important to note that the situation is not only an imaginary one. Audrey Macklin relates 
the story of a Saudi-American dual citizen detained in the United States as an enemy combatant. The 
story ends with the negotiated agreement according to which the United States government allowed the 
defendant to leave prison and go to Saudi Arabia in exchange for renouncing his US citizenship 
(Macklin 2007: 58). There could be one objection here, according to which extradition to Saudi Arabia 
(where torture is practiced) is not quite a privilege, hence this may be a case where dual citizenship 
becomes a liability since it allows to deport enemy combatants or terrorist suspects to countries where 
there is no rule of law.130
5.3.4. Fourth violation: political rights and external voting 
 However, in the case mentioned the solution has been negotiated, so the 
defendant preferred to go to Saudi Arabia rather than to keep US citizenship and remain in a safe 
country’s prison. 
 
The fourth and final violation of the democratic principle of citizenship equality concerns the 
enjoyment of political rights and it is connected to the impact external voting may have on domestic 
politics, the problem of dual voting – infringement of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle – and the 
question of office holding by dual citizens. Let me take the three instances in turn. 
 
                                                 
130 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
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(a) The impact of external voting 
With regard to the impact non-resident voting has on election outcome worries have been expressed 
concerning the quality of democratic institutions – especially parliamentary democracy – and the 
reduced sovereignty of the polity’s resident citizens (Kovács 2010: 6), (Bieber 2010: 19). What is the 
threat large numbers of organised emigrants raise to domestic politics? The infringement of equality 
materialises in election outcomes rather than in external voting per se, and it has to do with two general 
considerations. On the one hand, residents have to live with a state of affairs that they cannot 
exclusively decide for themselves, while on the other, non-residents are not obliged to live with the 
state of affairs they helped to bring about, and this potentially encourages irresponsible voting. 
Some scholars tend to answer to these worries by pointing at various studies which reveal very 
low percentages of political participation among non-resident dual citizens (Itzigsohn 2007: 130-131), 
(Bloemraad 2007: 182, note 25). Such a rejoinder fails because of mainly two reasons: first, it does not 
address the normative problems of equality and fairness – non-residents still have a say in a political 
process they are not subjected to; second, even low turnout rates may sometimes weigh heavily in 
deciding an outcome. One good example is the 2005 regional elections in Galicia (Spain), where ‘the 
composition of the autonomous regional government was decided by votes from abroad’ (Itzigsohn 
2007: 132). Another example is the 2009 presidential elections in Romania, where the diaspora vote 
decided the new president.131
Aware of the complications raised by a non-resident franchise, some theorists who accept in 
principle external voting believe however that it must be seriously restricted. For example, a harsh 
‘double test’ for it has been proposed. Firstly, external voting rights ‘should not be granted on the basis 
of morally arbitrary criteria, such as descent from citizens,’ while at the same time ‘they should not 
create a risk of external domination of the domestic citizenry’ (Bauböck 2010c: 39). But if we seriously 
take into account the cases cited above, it becomes difficult to see under what design external voting 
 And finally, overseas absentee voting tipped the balance in the 2000 US 
presidential election (Spiro 2003: 141). A prima facie obvious solution might be to offer a limited 
number of seats in the parliament for non-resident citizens (Blatter 2010: 15). But this doesn’t solve the 
problem, it just casts it at another level. After Italy passed a law offering special representation in the 
senate for emigrants, ‘migrant representatives gave the majority in the senate to the centre-left coalition 
in the 2006 national elections’ (Itzigsohn 2007: 132). 
                                                 
131 George Sava, ‘Diaspora a decis preşedintele României’ [The Diaspora decided Romania’s president], Pagini româneşti 
[Romanian Pages], 15 December 2009, link: http://www.paginiromanesti.ca/2009/12/15/diaspora-a-decis-presedintele-
romaniei/ (accessed 12 March 2013). 
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could meet the second condition. Presumably no kind of external voting whatsoever could pass 
Bauböck’s test, and later in this chapter I will claim that this is one of the reasons why we should 
abandon altogether the idea of external voting. 
In order to deal with such problems raised by external voting, Bauböck distinguishes between 
‘swamping’ and ‘tipping’ scenarios. In ‘the former, the external vote dominates the domestic vote or is 
seen to be disproportionably large, while in the latter, the external vote’s size may be comparatively 
small, but it is perceived to determine the outcome in a close electoral competition’ (Bauböck 2007b: 
2444). According to this scholar, only the former can be said to involve domination. Potential tipping is 
unavoidable and it is fallacious to pick out any particular group of voters whose voting patterns differ 
from the rest of the voters and accuse it of tipping the results. In other words, any outcome may be said 
to have been tipped by a potentially infinite number of groups – defined by age, sex, class, education, 
ethnicity, body height, and so on. In consequence, the proposal is to deal only with ‘swamping’ 
scenarios by proposing a fixed number of reserved seats in the legislature and to set aside the ‘tipping’ 
scenario of external voting just as we set aside the ‘tipping’ scenario in the case of groups defined by 
age, sex, class, etc.  
Nevertheless, if we seriously take into account the proposal of residence-based citizenship, then 
the tipping scenario of external voting is qualitatively different than the tipping scenarios supported by 
differences regarding age, sex, class, education, ethnic, body height, and so on. The big difference is, of 
course, the fact that those who tip the vote are not residents – while all the others, irrespective of age, 
sex, and so on, are indeed residents. This indeed follows from my premise that external voters cannot 
legitimately influence the outcome of elections. But according to Bauböck this makes the question of 
tipping irrelevant, since a supporter of the residence-based theory of citizenship has to oppose external 
voting even where no tipping ever occurs. Bauböck considers that it would violate citizenship equality 
to treat those who legitimately vote from abroad as fundamentally different from those identified by 
body height (and I accept this argument, since I also accept external voting in the case of short-term 
emigrants or people serving the state from abroad, like embassy personnel).  
So the disagreement is at a different level: who should be a citizen in the first place? I will 
discuss this problem (together with Owen’s argument for including ‘external’ citizens at least in 
constitutional referenda) later.132
                                                 
132 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. For the discussion of who should be a 
citizen in the first place, see further sections 5.4.1. and 8.1.2. 
 Nevertheless, what I want to emphasise here is that there is a subclass 
of tipping scenarios that Bauböck dismisses too quickly: those in which voters are not residents. 
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Having to live in a context decided by a group of fellow resident citizens – defined according to a 
specific body height but also subjected to the political power they voted for – is qualitatively different 
from having to live in a context decided by non-resident citizens – who are not subjected to the political 
power they helped to bring about. 
 
(b) The problem of dual voting 
A second way multiple citizenship violates the principle of equality in connection with political rights 
is linked to the infringement of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle (Gerdes and Faist 2007a: 143). The 
idea here is that dual citizens have more votes than mono-citizens and this infringes citizenship 
equality. The obvious rejoinder admits that plural citizens have more votes, but it also claims that these 
votes are cast in different polities, such that a dual citizen still has only one vote in each country of 
citizenship, just like his fellow mono-citizens. However, this argument overlooks some more subtle 
points. One scholar summarises the way equality principle could still be violated as follows: 
 
‘Practical obstacles to the exercise of double voting do not touch the objection where it is most 
completely operative, at the level of important symbolism, particularly if international cooperation and 
involvement continue to grow and the significance of single sovereigns continues to decline. As 
nations participate increasingly in regional and international bodies, those bodies take on some 
important characteristics of a single governance system. Those who can vote in two constituent units 
have twice the voice in such a system, compared to those who are mono-nationals. The relevant 
political arena is no longer simply the single nation-state.’ (Martin 2003: 14) 
 
Take the example of two countries of the European Union who accept dual citizenship and external 
voting. Because of their status, dual citizens who can vote in these two national elections are 
represented twice in legislative institutions of the Council (Owen 2011a: 22). But there is also a slightly 
different manner in which double voting can make a difference: a plural citizen can contribute to elect 
politicians in all of his countries of nationality ‘on the same side of certain policy issues. For example, 
U.S.-Canadian dual nationals might vote for pro-NAFTA politicians in both the U.S. and Canada’ 
(Koslowski 2003: 178). As these examples show, in an increasingly interconnected world the problem 
of double voting looms large even though a dual citizen casts his two votes in two different polities; so 
the equality principle is still violated. To be sure, the substantive impact of such double voting as in the 
cases presented above is almost insignificant. However, its real significance is, as Martin – quoted 
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above – noted, at the symbolic and – I would also add – at the normative levels. We can of course agree 
that if we find a minimal violation of the ‘one person one vote’ principle but there are independent 
moral reasons for tolerating dual citizenship and external voting, then the infringement is not decisive 
for the normative judgement.133
(c) The problem of office holding by dual citizens 
 However, what I am trying to demonstrate here is that there are no 
such strong independent moral reasons. 
 
Finally, the third violation of the equality principle in relation to political rights concerns office holding 
by dual nationals. At the international level current practice varies. In Turkey, for example, dual 
citizens ‘can be selected for any position in administration, government, parliament, or the judiciary’ 
(Rumpf 2003: 372) and several members of parliament are multiple citizens. International institutions 
seem to follow a liberal path. In 2010, for example, the European Court of Human Rights decided that 
Moldova couldn’t introduce restrictions on candidacy rights for dual citizens in a context where this 
would disfavour political competitors (i.e. the opposition) in forthcoming elections.134
                                                 
133 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
134 However, the ECtHR left it to member states to restrict office holding by dual citizens in other contexts. See Tanase v. 
Moldova (Grand Chamber), E.Ct.H.R. 7/08 (2010). 
 On the other 
hand, Valdas Adamkus, an American-Lithuanian dual citizen, had to renounce his American 
citizenship in 1998, before being invested as the president of Lithuania. The incumbent Estonian 
president Toomas Hendrik Ilves had done the same thing prior to his investiture in 1993. 
At a first look, there is nothing wrong with dual nationals serving in high office. As Spiro 
claims, we should trust voters to decide for themselves whether dual citizens can represent their 
interests or not in elective offices. Indeed, the best argument on the pro side is that voters have a right 
to elect persons by whom they want to be represented. If voters know and decide to elect a multiple 
citizen – maybe because they are themselves multiple citizens – then denying eligibility to that 
candidate infringes on democratic freedom of election. Moreover, for appointed offices, usual rules 
employed to solve conflicts of interests should be applied (Spiro 2003: 146-152). The only problem 
Spiro sees in this regard is one of ‘dual office holding [sic], not of office holding [sic] by dual 
nationals.’ Holding office in two national parliaments or governments need not raise any concern 
beside the usual worry regarding effectively carrying out two full-time jobs at the same time. In other 
words, there is no problem with dual citizens holding offices in several countries sequentially, only 
with them holding such offices simultaneously. 
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However, such a lack of concern may prove to be a bit too quick. In some regions of the world 
where conflicts over borders are not yet settled – or even when settled, memories of past injustice are 
still alive in people’s minds – not only office holding by plural citizens, but multiple citizenship as such 
may not be a good idea if the primary goal is to maintain peace. This is actually the case in Central and 
Eastern Europe, where there is a trade-off between dual citizenship and autonomy. National minorities 
may have one or the other, but not both (Bauböck 2007a). A Slovak-Hungarian dual citizen performing 
as a minister or a member of the Slovak Parliament would cause serious conflicts. But this is not the 
case only for regions where conflicts over borders are not yet settled. Suppose that a dual citizen is a 
member of parliament in each of his two countries of nationality. In performing his duties he could 
always help to bring about decisions that support the interests of the country he is most attached to. 
This is clearly a violation of the principle of equality, since mono-citizen representatives do not have 
the same power. 
The best argument on the con side is that members of governments and legislative assemblies 
have special duties towards the common good of that polity that are stronger than those of citizens who 
vote for them. They have a mandate, and this mandate may be incompatible with being simultaneously 
eligible for office in another polity. This argument is advanced by one author who believes not only 
that ‘residence is a reasonable requirement for officeholders’, but also that ‘[c]andidates’ role is that of 
agents or trustees and their task demands full devotion. This role, in contrast with that of voters, is 
hardly compatible with simultaneous commitments towards another country’ (Bauböck 2007b: 2430-
2432); see also (Bauböck 2005a: 22). 
Moreover, keeping high offices exclusively for mono-citizens may also prove to be an 
important preventive policy of national security as long as there is no guarantee, as Martin warns, that 
the ‘no war between democracies’ trend cannot be reversed. Moreover, since some policies may have 
disastrous consequences, popular anger directed at dual citizens in high office may ‘spill over into 
cross-border hatreds or suspicions. As a way of avoiding any such risk, states may validly require 
mono-nationality of high policymaking officials serving in their governments’ (Martin 2003: 17). 
 
5.3.5. Preliminary conclusions: why dual citizenship should be abandoned 
If political rights of non-resident citizens raise so many difficulties, one possibility would be to suspend 
them altogether, perhaps by making them dependent on residency (Owen 2010). On this proposal we 
can build an argument that can be called the ‘dormant second citizenship’ model. It refers strictly to 
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emigrants and, in more generous regimes, also to their children – the first generation born abroad – 
whose citizenship rights in the non-residence country are ‘dormant’ and can be activated only if and 
when these individuals take up residence there. Let us take a closer look to this proposal. The problem 
it seriously faces is that, in the last fifty years, in the international system human, civic and social rights 
have been decoupled from citizenship. This means that political rights are the only ones left at the core 
of the notion of citizenship – as Carens put it, ‘all states limit the political activity of aliens. If they did 
not, what meaning would be left to citizenship?’ (Carens 1989: 36).135 If political rights are 
‘suspended’ for ‘external’ citizens – just as many other rights dependent on residence are suspended – 
then it is very hard to see what this ‘dormant second citizenship’ is supposed to mean. Of course, some 
may claim that it is still extremely important since it offers the right to return. But as I am trying to 
argue in the following chapter, the right to return is also already decoupled from citizenship. In the last 
years it is also offered by many countries to ‘external quasi-citizens’. If this is so, then it is hard to see 
what dual citizenship – or the dormant second citizenship – can offer more than the ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ status except simple recognition by other states under international law.136
However, as Spiro rightly remarks, such a move – suspending political rights by making them 
dependent on residency – raises an equality problem of its own. Since, as we have already seen, the 
democratic principle of equality is at the core of citizenship status, suspending political rights of some 
citizens while still accepting them as members of the polity would amount to creating second-class 
citizens (Spiro 2003: 143-144). Not everyone agrees with this view. Rainer Bauböck considers that 
‘external’ citizens always have fewer rights and duties than resident citizens; according to him, this 
follows from the limits of territorial jurisdiction of states.
 
137
                                                 
135 However, in some countries local political rights – for example, local voting rights – are also offered to denizens. 
Usually only national political rights can be regarded as the exclusive right of citizens – although in a few cases (UK, 
Portugal, New Zealand, Chile, Uruguay and Malawi) even national voting rights are no longer strictly attached to 
citizenship; in these situations, a national franchise is offered to (some categories of) foreign citizen residents (Bauböck: 
2005b). 
136 ‘External quasi-citizenship’ is a status under domestic law. Dual citizenship, even if dormant, remains a status regulated 
also under international law and triggers mutual recognition of individuals’ ties to states. 
137 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, May 2012. 
 Two responses can be made here. First, as 
I have already spelled out, if political rights for ‘external’ citizens are also suspended – along other 
rights which cannot be accessed since their enjoyment presupposes residence – then it is hard to see 
what ‘external’ citizenship amounts to – except the right to return, which, as I have already 
emphasised, can also be enjoyed by ‘external quasi-citizens’. Second, in our times territorial 
jurisdiction is not an argument for restricting voting rights, since the voting process can also be 
organised abroad in consulates and embassies. So not providing the possibility of voting abroad – at 
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least in cases where this is feasible, does not raise enormous costs, and does not threaten to always 
dominate the domestic vote – may be seen as a step towards creating second-class citizens. 
In consequence, if Spiro is correct, it seems that we are in an impossible situation. Offering full 
citizenship rights to non-resident citizens would violate the principle of equality; not offering them 
these rights would also violate citizenship equality. Moreover, since – as this chapter tried to show – 
dual citizenship violates in many other ways the principle of democratic equality, there is one option 
left – an option which Spiro believes to be blatantly absurd: ‘if rights other than the franchise loom 
large, the answer to the equality objection is to prohibit dual nationality altogether, not to limit the 
parallel political rights that may come with the status’ (Spiro 2003: 143). I believe such an option is not 
as absurd as Spiro claims. Since dual citizenship (a) has no real practical advantages for either actor 
involved; (b) has real practical disadvantages for every actor concerned (as I have already shown in the 
section two above); and (c) violates in several ways the principle of democratic equality, then the 
obvious solution is to terminate the status of dual citizenship altogether. 
 
5.4. One citizenship, multiple nationality 
But if we reject the dual citizenship status altogether, then what happens with citizens who leave and 
take on another citizenship? Does losing their political relationship with the country of origin imply 
losing an important relationship? Not necessarily. This section tries to propose and support a distinction 
– already discussed in chapter one – between citizenship and nationality by arguing that citizenship 
must be exclusive – and strictly dependent on residence – while nationality may be plural. The way I 
am using these terms, ‘citizenship’ refers to political belonging to a state – which triggers full political 
rights for the resident citizen – while ‘nationality’ refers to the fact of belonging to an – ethnically 
distinct or ethnically diverse – nation. The first part of this section asks who is entitled to which 
exclusive mono- citizenship and proposes a radical interpretation of the ‘stakeholdership’ principle, 
which is taken to imply resident status. The second part explains the distinction between citizenship 
and nationality. Finally, the third part offers some examples. 
 
5.4.1. Who is entitled to which exclusive, mono-citizenship? ‘Stakeholdership’ as residence 
To begin with, let us set aside for the time being the fact that I have dismissed dual citizenship and let 
us ask who has a claim of membership in a political community in the first place. According to some 
views – also expressed in the Nottebohm case – a person has a claim to membership in a polity if she 
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has a ‘genuine’ link with that state. The problem of ‘effective link’ is more important than it may be 
considered at a first look because citizenship is at its core a special relation between the individual and 
her polity – or to put it in other words, between all community members. Everything else, from state 
security to the proper functioning of political institutions and of the welfare scheme depends on the 
trust members have in each other: thus securing community requires securing the shared bond. This is 
why leaving formal membership status to an individual’s unconstrained choice – as liberal as it may 
seem at a first look – devalues citizenship (Bauböck 2010c: 38). And it does so not only because it 
decreases trust among community members, but also because people start to feel ‘so tangentially 
connected to their multiple communities that they do not participate at all’ (Jenne and Deets 2010: 23) 
in either of them. Such an option should be constrained according to who has a legitimate interest in 
choosing; the genuine or effective link is the accepted condition for proving that an interest is justified. 
All these points may seem prima facie obvious, but this is where all the hassle begins, since 
there is no commonly accepted interpretation of what ‘genuine link’ is supposed to mean. The best 
proposal to settle membership claims I am aware of, the ‘stakeholdership’ principle, is ambiguous 
regarding this issue. According to it,  
 
‘all those and only those individuals have a claim to membership in a particular polity who can be 
seen as stakeholders because their individual flourishing is linked to the future of that polity. 
Individuals hold a stake if the polity is collectively responsible for securing the political conditions for 
their well-being and enjoyment of basic rights and liberties’ (Bauböck 2009a: 15) 
 
But when is an individual’s thriving linked to the future of that polity? Or, to put it differently, when is 
the polity responsible for her security and well-being? I believe there can be two interpretations of the 
stakeholdership and the genuine link principles: one is more permissive, the other more restrictive. The 
more permissive one is advanced by the proponent of the above mentioned principle himself: ‘Migrants 
who are permanent residents in a receiving society but retain strong economic, social, cultural and 
family ties with a sending country have a plausible claim to citizenship in both polities’ (Bauböck 
2007a: 72). According to this interpretation economic, social, cultural and family ties are enough to 
prove the existence of a genuine link – or of holding a stake – and thereby to legitimate a membership 
claim. Moreover, there is a trend in international law towards such a permissive, liberal interpretation: 
according to the 2008 OSCE Bolzano Recommendations states ‘may take preferred linguistic 
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competencies and cultural, historical or familial ties into account in their decision to grant citizenship to 
individuals abroad’.138
Moreover, journalists and politicians also believe dual citizenship may be extremely 
problematic for future independent states, as it may be the case for Scotland.
 
However, the problem with this permissive interpretation is that it is obviously over-inclusive: 
one may learn several languages and may own property in a lot of states. Moreover, because today 
people travel and move a lot, one may also have family ties in various states. All these considerations 
would trigger several citizenship statuses for one and the same person, and this clearly ends up in 
devaluating citizenship and the special bond created by membership in a particular polity. Because of 
this reason some scholars have begun to be sceptical about a lax interpretation of the effective link 
principle. André Liebich, a plural citizen himself, admits that he has ties to four different states; 
however, he began to ‘think that plural citizenship is not as unproblematic as [he] once thought it was’ 
(Liebich 2010: 29).  
139 The 1997 European 
Convention on Nationality also understands ‘genuine link’ as meaning ‘habitual residence’ (Kovács 
2007: 103), since it considers that loss of nationality can be determined by the ‘lack of a genuine link 
between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad’ (art.7(1)(e));140
It is important to note that the more restrictive interpretation is also congruent with the 
democratic principle according to which every person subject to the laws of a state must also have a say 
in the making of those laws, or to use Dahl’s words: ‘The demos must include all adult members of the 
association except transients and persons proved to be mentally defective’ (Dahl 1989: 129). Since the 
converse – no person not subject to the laws of a state should have a say in making those laws – is also 
 some states like 
Sweden for example already implement this interpretation in offering access to their citizenship (Spång 
2007: 107). Finally, other scholars readily support this view too (López-Guerra 2005), (Benhabib 2007: 
250), some of them underlining the fact that, in order to avoid difficulties raised by multiple citizenship 
status, the provision of political rights and the decisions in international conflicts concerning diplomatic 
protection, taxation laws, military service and so on should all be based on the residence principle 
(Martin 2003), (Hailbronner 2003: 26), (German Marshall Fund 2003: 387-388). 
                                                 
138 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities , ‘Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-
State Relations’, 2008, downloadable at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/33633 (accessed 12 March 2013). 
139 Russell Vallance, ‘The idea of dual citizenship on a mass scale is completely impractical’, The Herald Scotland, 13 
March 2013, available at http://www.heraldscotland.com/comment/letters/the-idea-of-dual-citizenship-on-a-mass-scale-is-
completely-impractical.20485027 (accessed 26 March 2013). 
140 European Convention on Nationality (1997), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm, 
accessed 7 May 2012. 
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valid, then non-residents cannot enjoy political rights because they are not subject to home state’s 
laws.141
However, an interesting objection here is that non-resident citizens are subject to some of their 
home-state laws – for example, laws that define the nature of the polity – so they should have the right 
to vote at least in constitutional referendums
 But if, as we have already seen, we are not allowed to design different classes of citizens – one 
enjoying more rights than the other – then dual citizenship should be abandoned.  
142
This more restrictive interpretation – residence as the sine qua non condition for holding a stake 
– seems to avoid all the problems raised by the more permissive one. The interesting thing is that if 
habitual/permanent residence is the only condition for proving the existence of a genuine link and 
thereby the only one legitimising a membership claim, then the reason for having multiple citizenship 
vanishes: an individual cannot permanently reside in two countries at the same time,
 (Owen 2010). I readily grant this point as long as we 
are talking about non-resident citizens – that is (according to a residence-based theory), individuals 
living temporarily outside state’s borders or those living for a long time outside the country being in 
their state’s service (these two exceptional groups should remain generally enfranchised in national 
elections since they are full citizens according to the residence-based theory of citizenship I am 
proposing: they are either just temporarily outside state borders or they are living outside serving their 
state). However this does not harm to the argument that long-time non-residents – who also acquired 
full citizenship status in their current country of residence – should otherwise be excluded from the 
political life of the polity in which they do not reside and thus from its formal membership. As I 
explain below, this can be done by disconnecting nationality from citizenship status. 
143
                                                 
141 One counter-argument here would be that non-residents are subject to immigration laws and thus have a claim to 
political representation; this argument would a fortiori apply to ‘external’ citizens who want to return. However, as I am 
trying to show in the next chapter, an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime (which may offer different rights to ‘external 
quasi-citizens’ but no political rights) would easily address this problem, so dual citizenship is not necessary. 
142 Some may argue that there are in fact several exceptions, like laws on taxation of expatriates and on diplomatic services 
and protection (Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013). However, these cases are 
more controversial. It is questionable whether taxation of expatriates by the US government is really defensible from a 
normative point of view. Regarding diplomatic protection, this should be offered in my view by the country of citizenship – 
according to the residence citizenship proposal. This would also easily deal with cases of international conflicts based on 
diplomatic protection of multiple citizens. 
143 What about individuals who do not have any permanent residence, but habitually reside in two or more states? Should 
their citizenship change every time they move from one residence to the other? As I will try to show later in sections 8.1.1. 
and 8.1.4., the experience of temporary workers shows that in time they become ‘permanent’: in other words, in time most 
people tend to take roots rather than to move continuously. As Rubio-Marín suggests, setting aside a small cosmopolitan 
elite ‘people are generally inclined to set down roots in specific residential habitats (in which they make long-term 
investments) and to rely on specific institutional, social and cultural frameworks to lead a meaningful existence’ (Rubio-
Marín 2000: 17). Probably even people from the ‘cosmopolitan elite’ would finally set down roots, so I see no problem in 
changing citizenships according to residence (until the moment of setting down roots) for this small category of individuals. 
 so she has only 
one legitimate claim to membership – that is, a claim against her country of residence. This is, to be 
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sure, a radical interpretation of holding a stake or having a genuine link. I do not claim that speaking 
the language of a country, having cultural affinities or family ties, owning property and so on do not 
qualify as ‘genuine’ links that could support a strong relationship of the individual with that 
community. What I do claim is that they should not qualify as claims to membership. From now on, I 
want to make a difference between a genuine link to a community – which can be legitimated by family 
and cultural ties, etc. – and having a stake in a political community – which legitimises a claim to 
citizenship. 
 
5.4.2. Citizenship versus nationality: clarifying the concepts 
This distinction made above is the basis of another one between nationality and citizenship. Briefly put, 
individuals may have genuine links to many social and cultural communities – they may have ties to 
different cultures, speak several languages, own properties in many countries – so they do have 
relationships to those polities; I call this, in a very loose sense, ‘nationality’.144
This distinction is obviously not a new idea. The problem is that both terms have been used in 
so many different ways that it is hard to make an argument without rigorously defining them. For 
example, one scholar characterises nationalism as the sum of practices emigration countries employ in 
order to strengthen ties with their diasporas, while citizenship is considered a rather legal term 
comprising rights and duties of members. In this way, nationality and dual nationality become broader 
terms than citizenship and dual citizenship (Faist 2007d: 1). However, the same author published in the 
same year another work where he claims that the two terms are so radically distinct that – in some 
regions of the world, especially in Western and Central Europe – they belong to two different domains: 
while nationality is a legal concept, citizenship is supposed to be a political one (Faist 2007c: 8). The 
 Such a person may have 
multiple nationalities according to her multiple genuine links. However, the same person may hold a 
stake in – hence can be a citizen of – only one political community: the community of which she is a 
resident and where she must enjoy full political rights. The distinction between nationality and 
citizenship allows us to claim that an individual may have multiple nationalities, but only one 
citizenship. 
                                                 
144 As already explained in the first chapter, nationality can refer either to “nationality identity” – in nation states or stateless 
nations – or to a legal status of individuals in relation to states under international law. Throughout this study which 
supports the idea of ‘residence-based citizenship’, I am using the term ‘nationality’ in the first sense, i.e. ‘national identity’. 
Whenever referring to nationality as a legal status of individuals in relation to states under international law I will call this 
‘citizenship’. 
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question is whether these two views are consistent with one another.145
But scholars are not the only ones to be blamed for this conceptual confusion. The distinction is 
sometimes also caused by different political and historical contexts. For example, in Eastern and 
Central Europe nations and modern states have known dissimilar and sometimes quite separate 
developments. As a result, for example, ‘[i]n the Polish tradition, citizenship and belonging to a nation 
are conceptually distinct’ (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2007: 147), see also (Faist 2007b: 184). 
The  consequence of such a distinction is the fact that in Poland the concept of nationhood is more 
important than that of citizenship (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska et al. 2007: 161). This is not quite 
difficult to understand since, as the Kurdish and Catalan cases show, there are nations in the world 
which do not have their own state. In other words, an ‘ethno-cultural nation’ is an entity quite distinct 
from a ‘political nation’, and actually it is pretty hard to find a real world case where both entities 
coincide.
 Interestingly, a legal theorist 
views the relationship as being diametrically opposed to Faist’s first view: she defines nationality as a 
form of citizenship, the result being that ‘citizenship is the broader category’ (Bosniak 2003: 28, note 
3). Finally, another scholar considers that citizenship and nationality are different terms which entitle 
individuals to different types of rights and benefits (Bloemraad 2007: 180, note 6). 
146
As the above examples illustrate, nationality and citizenship are indeed two distinct notions. If 
this is correct, then I want to clearly define the way I am using them in the context of this study. The 
best way to do this is to say that nationality indicates affiliation to one or more specific (ethnic, 
cultural, etc.) groups defined as ‘nations’. This relationship may in some cases be used by states as a 
basis to entitle the qualified non-resident individuals to some – arguably all – membership rights except 
political rights. Obviously, citizenship is thus exclusively referring to political rights. In other words, 
citizens – as I have defined the term above, a citizen of a state should be any permanent resident in that 
state
 
147
                                                 
145 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
146 The same distinction between citizenship – the legal relationship between a person and her state – and nationality – 
belonging to a nation – is also implemented in other states’ laws, similar to Mexico’s – as we will see in the next two 
chapters – and many European countries, as already explained in chapter one. 
147 Of course, this is my proposal: few states today practice naturalisation of permanent residents based on ius domicilii – 
see chapter seven on present-day legislation. Moreover, my claim that ‘a citizen of a state should be any permanent resident 
in that state’ does not exclude a residency requirement – I have proposed a threshold of three years previously lived in that 
state. 
 – enjoy political rights, while nationals – persons ethnically or culturally linked with that state 
but who do not habitually reside there – do not: ‘dual nationality does not necessarily entail access to 
all the rights and benefits of national citizenship, like voting or the right to hold office’ (Jones-Correa 
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2003: 304). One example of a state that employs these terms according to my proposed definitions is 
Mexico, for which citizenship is simply nationality plus political rights (Jones-Correa 2003: 316).  
But is such a distinction justified? The present chapter tried to show that it is. Let me summarise 
my points. First, the advantages offered by dual citizenship are either inexistent or they can be obtained 
through other means. Second, the various difficulties this status raises are serious. Third, formal plural 
status violates in several ways the democratic principle of citizenship equality. Fourth, the same 
principle of equality prohibits us from designing different classes of citizens according to the rights 
they can or cannot enjoy. If we add to this that citizenship is a right but dual citizenship is not (Faist 
2007d: 7), then we can confidently accept only one citizenship – based on the permanent residence 
criterion – and then recognise all the other ties a non-resident individual might have to the state – or 
states – in question through the concept of nationality – or multiple nationality. 
Indeed, why is it necessary to recognise multiple ties individuals might have to several states by 
according them formal plural status, as many scholars seem to ask for (Owen 2010: 64), (Kusý 2004: 
307), (Blatter 2010: 16), (Egry 2010: 26), (Faist 2007d: 21), (Spång 2007: 113), (Bloemraad 2007: 
179)? Or, to put it in another way, why ‘a legal status such as nationality should be treated as a vehicle 
to recognise or confirm a specific identity or group belonging – or, as Spiro puts it, to “actuate 
identities”’? (Horváth 2010: 35). The problem is that for migrants themselves citizenship and identity 
are quite different concepts. A study on immigrants in Canada revealed that they see ‘dual citizenship 
as an identity claim rather than as a legal status’; ethnic affinities ‘do not translate into a strong desire 
for formal political and legal attachment to the country of origin’; and finally, immigrants who qualify 
for dual citizenship ‘do not bother to apply for it’ (Bloemraad 2007: 174-175).148
If, as we have already seen, there is no evidence that dual citizenship reinforces individual ties 
to states; if, moreover, affective connections to family, friends, the place of birth and so on ‘are not 
contingent on citizenship status’ (Spiro 2007: 193); finally, if most of dual citizens value formal plural 
 Another study in 
Canada, this time specifically on Hong Kong immigrants, reveals that for them ‘self-reported 
citizenship reflects people’s identities more than it describes citizenship rights’ (Preston, Siemiatycki et 
al. 2007: 209). The ironical conclusion seems to be that ‘despite academics’ interest in – and, in some 
cases, concern with – dual citizenship, the vast majority of immigrants care little about their access to 
multiple political memberships’ (Bloemraad 2007: 174-175). 
                                                 
148 Evidently, strictly speaking nobody applies for dual citizenship in countries that tolerate it such as Canada. You can only 
apply for the citizenship of Canada and become a dual citizen as a result. 
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status only for its instrumental worth, then the argument that multiple citizenship recognises or actuates 
plural identities is doomed to fail. 
Before concluding, two more problems must be addressed. Firstly, the most important meaning 
of ‘nationality’ today is (unlike the definitions I have proposed above) citizenship seen from the 
perspective of international law. This may seem to leave open the question what my proposal entails: 
will multiple nationals in my sense of the term enjoy any of the protections offered to nationals under 
international law (e.g. exemption from state powers over foreign nationals)? I believe they do, since 
they are also citizens (or ‘nationals’, according to the international law) of a specific state. Secondly, 
one may ask whether multiple nationality in my sense entails specific obligations of mutual recognition 
of such ties between individuals and states. I believe such mutual recognition is desirable, but not 
necessary since recognition of a class of ‘external quasi-citizens’ is a domestic political problem, not an 
international issue. 
 
5.4.3. Examples 
The distinctions between nationality and citizenship and between cultural and political nation are very 
important in parts of the world where conflicts over borders are not yet settled or, if they are, then 
memories of historic injustice loom large. A case in point here is Central and Eastern Europe, where 
after the fall of communism states started to engage in nation politics which reached individuals and 
had consequences beyond their own borders, creating what has been called a ‘Status Law syndrome’ 
(Ieda 2004: 4). After the two waves of European enlargement states like Hungary replaced the external 
protected status applicable in its EU member state neighbours with semi-dual citizenship status in a 
first step (that is, citizenship minus political rights, what I have called here ‘nationality’) and full dual 
citizenship in a second step. Political rights have been accorded to non-resident citizens (the former 
‘ethnic kins’ in neighbouring states) on 1 January 2012 when the new Hungarian Constitution came 
into force. I will discuss later in the next chapter the problem of external protected status – or of what I 
will call ‘external quasi-citizenship’; what is important to underline here is that in such cases dual 
citizenship is clearly not an option: ‘kin nationalities’ are better protected through some form of 
cultural and political autonomy in the state of residence than through citizenship offered en masse by 
the kin state. However, because of disputed borders and memories of historic injustice kin minorities 
cannot have both autonomy and dual citizenship status: indeed, there is a trade-off between the two 
(Bauböck 2007a), (Bauböck 2010a). 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
140 
 
If this is correct, then the distinction I have proposed between nationality and citizenship is an 
important one and it must also be applied in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, as elsewhere, not plural 
citizenship, but one citizenship plus multiple nationality (or, as I will call it in order to avoid a strictly 
ethnic interpretation, ‘external quasi-citizenship’) is the answer. The advantages of certifying and 
coding ‘nationality’ will be discussed in the next chapter. But one could claim that it also creates more 
problems than it solves – for example problems of discrimination, precisely in those societies where 
nationality and citizenship could actually be separated in meaningful ways.149
Before ending this section, a specific objection must be answered. According to it, it makes no 
sense to have a distinction between citizenship and nationality, as long as some citizenship rights – for 
example, political rights – can be provided according to the residence criteria: since this is easily 
feasible, the proposed distinction becomes superfluous (Spiro 2003: 143), (Owen 2010: 61-62). But 
there are two motives for which this division may not be so. The first reason is normative. As we have 
already seen, equality is citizenship’s main thrust; introducing a second class citizenship – for those 
nationals stripped of their political rights for residence-related reasons – may not be a liberal and 
 However in chapter six I 
design the concept of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ in such a way that, firstly, it is not based only on 
ethnicity or ‘nationality’, but also on different other ties people may have to an origin country. And 
secondly, such a status is applied by the home state on its territory; the codification is not at the 
international level so it does not have legal influence in other states. 
In the next chapter on the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status I will go into detail regarding the 
rights ‘nationals’ – more exactly, a part of nationals defined as ‘external quasi-citizens’ – may enjoy. 
For the moment it is enough to say that the range of rights may be anywhere between ‘full citizenship 
rights minus political rights’ – as in Turkey, where having Turkish nationality but not citizenship has 
almost no consequence in what concerns enjoyment of rights (Rumpf 2003: 369) – and simply 
receiving financial aid for the protection and promotion of kin minority’s language and culture in the 
state of residence (on the one hand) and other small benefits in the ‘kin country’ (on the other hand) – 
as provided by the revised 2004 Hungarian Status Law (Ieda 2004: 49-53). Of course, it goes without 
saying that in the case of nationals having no electoral rights, their status does not imply that they enjoy 
no forms of political manifestation at all: for example, they can still engage in lobbying, delivering 
electoral discourses, or can even be allowed to form a consultative council that can have an official or 
semi-official status in the home country (Spiro 2003: 146). 
                                                 
149 I would like to thank Anna Triandafyllidou for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with 
the author, November 2013).  
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democratic way to conceive a political community. The second reason is rather pragmatic. Since 
citizenship status is very demanding – it requires permanent residence within state’s borders – criteria 
for nationality can be relaxed, such that any link which can be considered ‘genuine’ – speaking the 
language, sharing the culture, having family ties, owning property, and so on – may be used by 
individuals to access nationality status in the countries they feel linked to. However, neither relaxed 
rules for offering nationality nor the possible multiplicity of such a status have an impact on 
citizenship. In other words, citizenship – that is, political membership – is not devalued by recognizing 
various ‘nationality’ ties an individual may have to one or multiple states of which he is not a citizen. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has led to the following findings: (a) the advantages offered by formal plural membership 
are either inexistent or they can be obtained through other means; (b) dual citizenship can raise various 
and serious difficulties for all the actors involved; (c) normatively, this status violates in several ways 
the democratic principle of citizenship equality; (d) the same principle of equality prohibits creating 
different classes of citizens enjoying different types of rights; (e) citizenship status should be offered 
only to individuals who have a legitimate claim, and the only legitimate claim is based on permanent 
residence; (f) normatively, politically and historically there is a real distinction between nationality and 
citizenship. From these six premises, I conclude that we should abandon multiple citizenship status 
altogether.150
There are two simple ways to eliminate the incidence of dual citizenship in order to implement 
my proposal. The first one is the option model – as in Germany, where between the age of eighteen and 
23 a plural citizen who acquired German citizenship via ius soli (as the child of settled immigrants) is 
 Instead of it, I have advanced the proposal of ‘one citizenship, multiple nationalities’ – 
according to which a person may enjoy only one, exclusive formal political status if she permanently 
resides in a state, but she can also have recognised her various ties with the states in which she does not 
reside through nationality status which enables her to enjoy different rights short of political rights. 
                                                 
150 But what happens in this case to immigrants who do not want to naturalise? One could say that a consistent defence of 
residence-based citizenship that wants to avoid a ‘citizenshipless’ status would have to abolish consent in both exit and 
entry, i.e. automatically withdraw citizenship and automatically bestow citizenship based on ius domicilii. As I will show in 
the last chapter, I do not want to go that far. First of all, according to sociological studies regarding immigrants, the longer 
the residence period, the stronger the desire to naturalise. Moreover, I claim that the onus is on states to offer stimulating 
incentives for immigrants to naturalise. And finally, if even in this case there would still remain a number of long-term 
immigrants that refuse to naturalise, I claim that this number of second-class citizens is extremely small, so accepting some 
dissenters cannot destroy liberal democratic values. In their case we can apply Ottonelli and Torresi’s view discussed in 
chapter four, according to which one may need to strike a balance between migrants’ individual plans and liberal democratic 
values. 
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obliged to choose only one citizenship (Gerdes, Faist et al. 2007b: 47).151 Of course, the formulation of 
the law implies that those who acquired citizenship based on ius sanguinis can usually continue to keep 
any other citizenship acquired at birth. However, the law could apply to every individual irrespective of 
the way she acquired citizenship, so it should also address the question of inherited dual citizenships. 
The second way is the renunciation requirement for those who apply for another state’s citizenship.152
                                                 
151 Obviously, this model does not eliminate dual citizenship for children. This may raise some problems like military 
service, if at least one country conscript at the age of 18. The law could be modified to the extent that the decision must be 
taken either by parents at birth or by the child between the age of 16 and 18, for example. 
152 This condition may require enforcing universal compliance, since multiple citizenship would still result if some states do 
not comply (e.g. do not release their citizens). 
 
The only possible exception from the principle of avoiding dual citizenship I am aware of emerges in 
the case where origin country refuses to release its citizens from their formal status. This refusal cannot 
be defended in normative terms, but it does happen in the real world, for example in Afghanistan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia (Hagedorn 2003: 191), (Gerdes and Faist 2007a: 154). The solution here is not 
acceptance of dual citizenship status but strengthening international norms of human rights in the 
direction of obliging non-democratic states to release their citizens from their formal status according 
to their request – arguably, they cannot only be released from their citizenship status, but this status 
may be also withdrawn. There may be, of course, different conditions of and sanctions for renunciation. 
As one scholar puts it, the state may permit renunciation but is not obliged ‘to be gracious about it’ 
(Legomsky 2003: 112). However, the possibility of renunciation must exist and the conditions must not 
be difficult to fulfil. 
Finally, it should be stressed that citizenship must be exclusive only in its horizontal dimension. 
It is not and should not be exclusive vertically. A state’s formal membership can be the basis of 
vertically nested citizenship either internally – in the case of federations – or externally – in the case of 
unions of states, like the European Union (Bauböck 2010b), (Skrobacki 2007). Moreover, vertically 
nested citizenship could promote better than dual citizenship objectives such as enhanced freedom of 
movement, since it would not discriminate against mono-citizens, as formal plural status presently 
does. Of course, in the near future states will continue to accept or tolerate dual citizenship, hence my 
proposal of ‘one citizenship, multiple nationalities’ may seem rather utopian. However, the fact that 
most of the international community accepts such a status does not thereby render dual citizenship 
normatively legitimate. 
 
. 
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Chapter 6. ‘Citizens-Plus’ (2): ‘External Quasi-Citizens’ 
 
‘… the country of origin becom[es] a source of identity, the country  
of residence a source of rights, and the emerging transnational space,  
a space of political action combining the two or more countries’  
[Riva Kastoryano, quoted by Anupama Roy (Roy 2010: 152)] 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I argued that, for both symbolic and practical reasons, dual citizenship is a 
status that in most cases should be avoided. However, I did not dismiss the fact that many people have 
real and strong ties to more than one country. To put this more precisely, they have strong ties to 
countries other than the country of residence – which is, or should be, as I have argued, the country of 
citizenship. I refer to people in these circumstances as ‘external quasi-citizens.’153
The first category of ‘external quasi-citizens’ are migrants or their descendants who live – have 
residence – in a country other than that of their origin. The second category includes ethnic groups that, 
after a re-drawing of borders, find themselves living in a different state. The final category covers co-
ethnic groups who have never in the past shared a state territory with a current kin state but whose kin 
cultures have emerged in a historic period before state formation. For example, Turkey now officially 
includes Turkic populations – Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, etc. – in its conception of diaspora although 
these territories were not part of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, as I will try to argue, normative 
claims to ‘external quasi-citizenship’ depend on cultural commonalities – so there is a wide scope of 
inclusion – and not only on involuntary incorporation as a minority into a nationalising state, which 
reduces the scope of such claims greatly.
 Three categories of 
people are included under this rubric.  
154
As a consequence of such links, ‘external quasi-citizens’ have some interests in preserving the 
tie with their kin country. They may simply want to have a larger space of free movement; they may 
have inheritance interests, economic interests, or simply regard that country as the only entity able to 
provide resources for preserving their language and cultural identity. The normative question here is: 
 
                                                 
153 The term was first proposed by Bauböck (2007b: 2396) and was also used by Owen (2011a). A term which is more often 
used in the literature is ‘ethnizens’ (also proposed – but later dropped – by Bauböck, who thinks now that ‘ethnizens’ are a 
specific subcategory rather than synonymous with ‘external quasi citizens;’ personal communication on file with the author, 
September 2013). I prefer not to use the term ‘ethnizenship’ since it refers directly to a person’s ethnicity, while I am 
interested not in ethnicity per se, but in various strong links – which include ethnicity, but are not reduced to it – a person 
may have with other countries besides the country of residence. 
154 In this chapter I am discussing only the first two categories of ‘external quasi-citizens:’ since I am arguing that the status 
depends on cultural commonalities, it is obvious that it naturally covers the third category too. 
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what type of relationship is acceptable between an ‘external quasi-citizen’ and her country of origin? 
Some authors – and governments – believe that such links should be legally acknowledged in one form 
or another, ranging from the provision of resources to ‘external quasi-citizens’ to preserve their 
language and culture to a direct offer of full citizenship rights. Other authors believe that, especially in 
cases where there are difficult historical relations between countries, such persons should be supported 
only by their country of residence. Finally, some think that certain groups have a right to self-
government or even the right to secession. 
The first part of the chapter starts by revisiting four cases of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ laws 
implemented in recent years. I divide ‘external quasi-citizens’ into two categories: people who have 
this status because they migrated – in this sense, they are also migrants – and people who have this 
status because of a border revision – in this sense, they are also ‘ethnic kins’ of another state. The 
selected cases are India, Mexico, and Turkey – representing an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime 
predominantly155
The second part of the chapter discusses in a comparative perspective who qualifies for such a 
position and what is the range of rights enjoyed by an individual eligible for this status. The third part 
examines the normative implications of these cases: whether ‘external quasi-citizenship’ should be 
conceived as a ‘status’ or as ‘favourable treatment;’ what home
 for migrants – and Hungary, presenting an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime for 
‘ethnic kins.’ This is not a random selection of countries. It ranges from the most restrictive regime – 
India, which offered this status only to some ‘external quasi-citizens’ who were also citizens of wealthy 
countries – to the most generous one, Hungary. The Hungarian state recently offered dual citizenship to 
Hungarian ethnics from neighbouring countries. 
156
                                                 
155 Each of these countries also has potential border-revision based kin groups: India/Pakistan, Mexico/US Chicanos, 
Turkey/Ottoman Empire territories. For Turkey the historic period of border revisions is even the same as for Hungary – the 
post First World War Peace Treaties. So the difference is not on the history of emigration and border revisions, but on the 
current diaspora policies. 
156 The concept of a ‘home state’ belongs to a rather ambivalent terminology which is biased in favour of the ‘kin state’ 
claims. I will however use it given the lack of a better term that applies both to kin states and sending states. 
 states proffer as reasons for offering 
some benefits through such a legal standing; whether such a regime is also normatively justified; what 
type of rights ‘external-quasi citizens’ may enjoy; and finally, whether such a regime may be 
discriminatory, and for whom it may prove to be so. 
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6.2. Three examples of migration-based ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes 
 
6.2.1. India 
India is the most restrictive state out of the four analysed here regarding the treatment of its ‘external 
quasi-citizens’; moreover, the simple fact that this category of people has been taken into account by 
their country of origin had purely economic reasons.157
                                                 
157 On the other hand, the fact that former Indian citizens and their descendants in Pakistan and Bangladesh were excluded 
had purely political reasons. 
 
The creation of Indian citizenship was a difficult task and took a particular path because all 
normal conditions for such an endeavour were lacking. The multiplicity of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious groups rendered the creation of a homogeneous national identity out of the question. From the 
very beginning the process was not only a top-down endeavour, but it also started with a strictly 
territorial notion of identity. This approach was reinforced soon after this country’s independence 
when, because of the partition that created Pakistan in 1947, India decided to withdraw citizenship 
from all Indians that wanted to stay in Pakistan. In 1955 the Citizenship Act went further and simply 
abolished dual citizenship, although the approach was rather permissive. By migrating a person lost 
Indian citizenship, but the same person was able to reacquire it by returning to the state territory. Thus 
independent India came into being with a ‘territorial conception of citizenship rather than an ethnic 
one’ (Adeney and Lall 2005: 11) and dual citizenship was officially excluded. 
However, after approximately forty years things started to change because of remittances. On 
the one hand, the state wanted to attract economic investment in India by relying on ‘external quasi-
citizens’ money; on the other hand, the fear of foreign interference rendered dual citizenship out of the 
question. ‘External quasi-citizens’ were thus categorised into different groups by the Indian 
government and subjected to various restrictions. In 1999 there were at least two legal categories of 
‘external quasi-citizens’: PIO – Person of Indian Origin – and NRI – Non-Resident Indian. But the 
distinction was far from sharp: the main difference is that NRI may have or may not have Indian 
citizenship, while a PIO always lacks it. However, having Indian citizenship while living outside India 
did not make a big difference in the past for a NRI in comparison with a PIO. In the mid-1980s the 
government restricted the rights of its citizens who are not also residents – for example, the right to buy 
and own property (Adeney and Lall 2005: 18). These restrictions were later dropped for NRIs. 
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But soon remittances started to have an important economic impact. Roy estimates that ‘in 
2005, the overseas Indians sent remittances to India of an estimated 21.7 billion dollars, more than 
what China (21.3 billion) and Mexico (18 billion) received’ (Roy 2010: 143). Given these changing 
circumstances, the government shifted its position towards ‘ethnizens’ and called them now the 
‘extended family’. In 1999 a green card was launched for the PIOs which allowed them to invest and 
live in India for longer periods and to be treated on a par with NRIs. They were permitted to buy and 
own immovable property, their children acquired the right to be admitted to educational institutions in 
India, and they became eligible for national housing schemes (Adeney and Lall 2005). However, the 
government restricted the scope of this notion. Firstly, the status was accepted only in order to attract 
more remittances; only Indians from the wealthy countries were eligible to apply for Indian quasi-
citizenship. In this way, for example, Indians from South East Asia and those from East Africa were 
excluded – this made Fatima Meer, a member of National African congress, declare that PIO is actually 
a ‘dollar and pound citizenship’ (Roy 2010: 141). Secondly, Indians from Pakistan and Bangladesh158
In a final step, in January 2005 the Indian government announced that all former Indians would 
become eligible for the PIO status – however, Indians from the colonial diaspora and those who 
migrated to Bangladesh and Pakistan were still excluded. What is important to note is that PIOs will 
still not enjoy important political rights – i.e., the right to vote and the right to stand for elections. Even 
if we set aside the controversial exclusion of Indians from Bangladesh, Pakistan and colonial diaspora – 
which is, in fact, a political and not an ethnic way of building ‘the nation’, since the so-called 
‘ethnic’
 
were also excluded because of political reasons. 
159
                                                 
158 The terminology does not help us here, since it is difficult to say who the ‘Indians’ in Pakistan and Bangladesh are, since 
the whole population of these two countries is of ‘Indian origin’. I consider the notion as referring to Muslims from what is 
now Indian state territory who were resettled in what was then still united Pakistan after partition and to other former Indian 
citizens who preferred to remain there. 
159 As I have already pointed out above, there are no real ‘ethnic Indians’: the partition was done on religious, not on ethnic 
grounds. 
 Indians from those regions are not considered ‘real’ Indians – we still have the problem that 
a ‘person of Indian origin’ is not a full citizen because she lacks political rights. In other words, the 
status of such a person is that of an ‘external quasi-citizen’ in one of the two senses in which I have 
defined this term earlier: a migrant or her descendants who live/have residence in another country than 
that of her origin. Because of this connection the ‘external quasi-citizen’ is offered some rights by his 
origin country – but not full citizenship rights. 
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6.2.2. Mexico 
The Mexican case is even more inventive and interesting, since it differentiates between (multiple) 
nationality and (multiple) citizenship – but once again, the difference is residence within or outside the 
country. Put simply, once a Mexican lives abroad and acquires another citizenship, she loses Mexican 
citizenship. However, since 1997, such a loss does not also imply losing her Mexican nationality. 
Mexican ‘citizenship’ may be lost in several ways, but Mexican ‘nationality’ is everlasting and cannot 
be lost.160 This difference between citizenship (which is based on residence and offers full political 
rights) and nationality (which may offer a bundle of rights to a person except political rights) 
encompasses exactly the definitions I have proposed in the previous chapter. From the Mexican 
constitutional perspective, ‘nationality’ is a sociological concept and refers to ‘the sense of belonging 
felt by a group of persons who share one culture, including language, traditions, history, and social 
values’ (Ramirez 2000: 313-314). Moreover, nationality links an individual to her state and is acquired 
at birth or through naturalisation. By contrast, as Ramirez also notes, ‘citizenship’ is a legal concept 
and refers to the legal relationship between an individual and her state, specifying both parties’ rights 
and responsibilities. Unlike nationality, citizenship confers political rights and is acquired at the age of 
eighteen – in consequence ‘[s]trictly speaking, no one is born a Mexican citizen’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 
178).161
Thus, such a system must be considered one of dual or multiple nationality, but not one of dual 
or multiple citizenship (Ramirez 2000: 326-327);
 
162
                                                 
160 However, there is still one category that can lose not only Mexican citizenship, but also Mexican nationality, and that is 
the category of naturalised Mexicans (Ramirez 2000: 321-323). It is important to note that, in comparison with Mexicans by 
birth, the same category of naturalised immigrants are not allowed to keep dual nationality as it is defined in the Mexican 
law (Ramirez 2000: 336). 
161 In The Second Treatise of Government (1689), Locke makes an analogous argument: ‘But it is plain governments 
themselves understand it otherwise; they claim ‘‘no power over the son, because of that they had over the father;’’ nor look 
on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child by an English woman in 
France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England’s ; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it : nor 
the king of France’s ; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases ? and who ever 
was judged as a traitor or deserter, if he left or warred against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were 
aliens there ? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right reason, that ‘‘a child 
is born a subject of no country or government.’’ He is under his father’s tuition and authority till he comes to age of 
discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will unite 
himself to: for if an Englishman’s son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by 
his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his 
son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally 
over his children is the same, wherever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations are not bounded by the positive 
limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.’ (Locke 2003: 152). 
162 Of course, this was the situation before external voting rights were introduced – as I will further discuss. 
 in other words, co-nationality is permitted, while 
co-citizenship is not (Chavez 1997). Even if, as in the Indian case, we cannot speak of a dominant, 
overarching ethnicity – since Mexico, just as India, is composed of various ethnic groups and, unlike in 
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India, mestizaje, i.e. mixed indigenous and European descent, is regarded as the dominant national 
identity163
The reason why the Mexican government implemented this distinction between citizenship and 
nationality – which was considered to imply ‘a dual nationality, and not a dual citizenship, 
system’
 – a person born as a Mexican remains a Mexican national for the government even if she 
loses Mexican citizenship. Once again, such a person can be considered as an ‘external quasi-citizen’ in 
the sense defined at the beginning of this chapter. 
In Mexico citizenship is thus based on residence. Establishing permanent residence outside the 
state and being granted another country’s citizenship implies losing Mexican citizenship, but it is 
important to note that, because nationality is retained even in such a case, the loss of citizenship rights 
is effective only as long as the person maintains permanent residence abroad as a citizen of another 
state. When the same person of Mexican nationality comes back to permanently reside in Mexico and 
renounces that country’s citizenship, she becomes a Mexican citizen again. Having Mexican nationality 
is therefore only a qualifier for Mexican citizenship, but the former does not, by itself, imply the latter. 
164
The third cause was the hope that keeping ties with Mexican-Americans eligible to vote in the 
U.S. and offering them some rights through an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime would create a large 
bloc of voters in the US elections sympathetic to Mexico and thus policy makers themselves would be 
more favourable to their voters’ country of origin. But such a reasoning, which may prove to be well 
(Chavez 1997: 124) – is, just like in the Indian example, purely economic in nature. But in 
this case there were four causes that drove the change in the government’s position. The first was, just 
like in India, the desire to increase the flow of remittances – according to some estimates, these ranged 
‘from $3.2 billion to $5 billion per year’ (Chavez 1997: 127). The second cause was not less important: 
according to some authors, in 2000 there were 7.8 million people of Mexican birth living in the United 
States – roughly eight per cent of Mexico’s population. Moreover, ‘[a]n additional 13.8 million persons 
born in the United States claim Mexican ancestry’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 174). This is why the Mexican 
government was directly interested in keeping those emigrants outside Mexico in order to relieve 
pressure on the job market. Such a concern was motivated by US legal initiatives in the 1990s against 
illegal migration – among which the infamous 1994 California Proposition 187 – which raised the 
threat of large masses of Mexicans returning home and putting pressure on the job market. 
                                                 
163 At the terminological level we find here a difference between ‘ethnic heterogeneity’ and ‘mestizaje’ (on the one hand), 
both of which can be contrasted with a ‘dominant ethnicity’ (on the other hand). 
164 Chavez may be wrong here: if the Mexican conception entails that nationality is an indissoluble bond acquired at birth, 
then it is highly unlikely that it would be possible to acquire another nationality. A Mexican national can become the citizen 
of another country, but not a national in the same sense that Mexico attributes to this term (Rainer Bauböck, personal 
communication on file with the author, April 2013). 
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founded in other countries of immigration, does not succeed in the case of Mexico. According to some 
authors, Mexicans in the United States are more and more taking a stance against illegal immigration 
and against immigration in general: ‘in recent years many newly naturalised U.S. citizens have aligned 
themselves with anti-immigrant groups and a 1995 poll showed that a majority of Mexican-Americans 
residing in Texas supported the general concept of Proposition 187’ (Chavez 1997: 134-135).165
Regarding the rights dual nationals enjoy in Mexico, the most important rights seem to be the right to 
return and the right to acquire property in the coastal and border zones – the last one being reserved 
until the 1997 Constitutional reform only to native citizens. However, there is a large range of rights 
that are reserved only for Mexican native citizens
 
Finally, the fourth economic reason for accepting dual nationality was that, in the increasingly 
competitive Mexican politics beginning with the 1980s, opposition parties suddenly acquired an 
interest in migrants and started to advertise themselves among the Hispanic groups in the U.S. in order 
to attract funds for political campaigns (Fitzgerald 2005: 184). In summary, according to Fitzgerald, 
 
‘Mexico has recognised dual nationality because of US-resident Mexicans’ increased remittances, 
the unparalleled numbers of Mexicans abroad in absolute and relative terms, their potential source 
of support for the Mexican state as an ethnic lobby, and the contested incorporation of emigrants 
into Mexican partisan politics’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 186) 
 
166
                                                 
165 This should of course be taken cum grano salis: the opinion of Mexicans holding US citizenship and residing in Texas is 
not necessarily the opinion of all Mexicans holding US citizenship and residing in the Unites States. Moreover, Chavez 
wrote this in 1997 so his claim is in need of updated opinion poll evidence in 2013. The Republican Party is trying to regain 
the Latino vote by moving towards supporting regularisation and immigration more generally – so why would they do this if 
a majority of Mexican naturalised citizens opposed immigration?  The stance the Republican Party should take towards 
immigration reform is however highly debated among Republicans themselves – see, for example, The Economist, ‘The 
highest hurdle – Getting a bill through the House will be harder than climbing the border fence’, The Economist, 6 July 
2013, available at 
 and thus they cannot be accessed by dual nationals 
or, in this case, ‘external quasi-citizens’. These range from eligibility for political offices to peacetime 
military service. A number of reforms called the ‘restricted employment’ laws were passed in order to 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21580475-getting-bill-through-house-will-be-harder-
climbing-border-fence-highest?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/pe/immigration (last accessed on 31 July 2013). 
166 It is important to note that because of historically motivated fears of foreign interventions, the Mexican state imposes a 
series of restrictions on emigrants and naturalised immigrants, thus creating a regime of ‘differentiated citizenship’: among 
other restrictions, naturalised immigrants cannot serve in some public positions or in the military, must renounce any former 
nationality, are susceptible to denaturalisation, and so on. However, this is not the only type of differentiated citizenship 
imposed by the Mexican state: one can also find distinct statuses – each with its proper bundle of rights, duties and 
restrictions – like ‘foreigners’, ‘naturalised Mexicans’,  ‘native Mexicans of native parents’, ‘native Mexicans of foreign-
born parents’, and finally ‘citizens’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 178, 187). 
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‘carve out certain services, occupations, and employment prohibited to dual nationals and, of course, to 
foreigners’ (Ramirez 2000: 338). 
An interesting recent development is that in 2005 Mexicans living abroad were granted the right 
to vote for presidential elections and they voted for the first time in 2006, when the external voting 
turnout was surprisingly small.167 However, starting with this point, the situation seems to be very 
unclear. On the one hand, some authors announced that the vote was open ‘to all Mexican citizens [my 
emphasis] ages [sic] 18 and older who ha[d] a valid voting ID card’ (Gutierrez, Batalova et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute/Instituto Federal Electoral announces on its 
website that double nationals – i.e., not only citizens – are granted the right to vote.168
Finally, it is interesting to ask why the Mexican government preferred to accept double 
nationality but not full double citizenship.  There seem to be two types of reasons for such a decision. 
The first is historical and refers to fears of interventions from other states: because a large part of 
immigration to Mexico comes from the three countries that have in the past occupied parts of the 
territory of this state – Spain, France and the U.S. – Mexico developed an ‘anti-interventionist 
 Thus, the 
difference that legally still exists between ‘nationality’ – belonging to the Mexican nation – and 
‘citizenship’ – belonging to the Mexican nation, plus living in Mexico, plus voting rights – becomes 
difficult to understand and both concepts of nationality and citizenship turn out to be more fluid than 
before. In order to avoid confusion, I will limit my discussion of the Mexican case to the period that 
starts with the moment when Mexican nationality was declared as being ‘everlasting’ (1997) and 
finishes with the moment Mexican nationals were granted the right to vote in presidential elections 
(2005). In this period, three points are important to our discussion: (a) Mexicans living abroad were not 
allowed to vote; (b) the strict difference between nationality and citizenship was maintained; (c) since 
Mexico accepted dual nationality but not dual citizenship, a Mexican acquiring another citizenship was 
stripped of Mexican citizenship. I am interested here only in Mexicans who in this period: (1) were 
stripped of their Mexican citizenship because of their second citizenship; and (2) still kept the Mexican 
nationality since it was ‘everlasting’. 
                                                 
167 It is important to add that there was also a very low turnout in the 2012 presidential elections. Some authors attribute this 
to very high administrative hurdles for voter registration for Mexican nationals abroad – see for example Lafleur (2011) – 
while others take it as evidence for a lack of interest among American Mexicans in Mexican politics – see Spiro (2007). 
168 ‘Puedo votar si cuento con doble nacionalidad? R: Si. Todos los connacionales que residen fuera del país y que 
realizaron su tramite para inscribirse en la Lista Nominal de Mexicanos Residentes en el Extranjero, pueden participar en la 
eleccion de Presidente de la Republica, aun cuando tengan doble nacionalidad’. Translation: ‘Can I vote if I have double 
nationality? A: Yes. All co-nationals that live outside the country and that made the procedure for registration in the 
Nominal List of Mexicans Living Abroad can participate in the election of the President of the Republic, even if they have 
double nationality’ – see http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/votoextranjero/voto_menu-preguntas.htm (accessed 16 May 
2012). 
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nationalism’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 183) based on the fears that emigrant Mexicans who are citizens of other 
states could influence the politics of those states against Mexican interests. The second type of 
reasoning is more recent and it is mainly politically motivated. It refers to irresponsible voting; that is, 
to the huge numbers of emigrant voters – as we have seen, the number of emigrant Mexicans is as high 
as eight per cent of the Mexican population – who do not have to bear the consequence of their 
voting.169
6.2.3. Turkey 
 
 
The third case under consideration, and one which seems to be even more liberal than that of India and 
Mexico, is that of Turkey – the first instance out of the four considered in this chapter that tolerate dual 
citizenship. There are three main reasons for this toleration: the number of Turkish citizens living 
abroad, their economic importance, and the pressure of expatriate Turkish organisations. The result is 
that since 1981 dual citizenship has been allowed as long as the person enjoying it informs the Turkish 
authorities (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 127-128). 
However, the simple acceptance of dual citizenship was not enough for Turkey, since the 
largest part of its external population based in Europe – approximately 2.1 million people (Caglar 2004: 
274) – was living in Germany, a country that does not accept dual citizenship through naturalisation. In 
these conditions, the logical step for Turkey was to also create an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime in 
1995 – that is, a ‘privileged non-citizen status’ – by offering a ‘pink card’ (pembe kart) to persons that 
renounced Turkish citizenship in order to take the German one, but who still want to keep ties with 
their country of origin (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 133). This way, a former Turkish citizen was able to both 
take German citizenship and secure the rights offered by the pink card in Turkey. 
The Turkish state went even further and actively pressured Germany to put the problem of dual 
citizenship on the political agenda while also encouraging emigrants to both take German citizenship 
and keep ties with their home state. However, it is interesting to note in passing that the Turkish 
Government didn’t apply the same vision and conditions to immigrants in Turkey. Starting with World 
War Two – when Christian and Jewish minorities had to pay rates ten times higher than those of 
Muslims – and continuing with today’s non-reciprocation of tolerance towards immigrants, the Turkish 
state applies different standards to emigrants and immigrants (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 137-138). 
Moreover, even for dual citizens of Turkish origin the requirement of notifying Turkish authorities 
                                                 
169 It is true however that the presumption of irresponsibility is not plausible for transnationally mobile Mexicans. 
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about the dual status is strictly enforced: for example Merve Kavackci, a former deputy in the Turkish 
Parliament, was stripped of her Turkish citizenship under the accusation that she took US citizenship 
without permission from authorities (Caglar 2004: 291).  
The aim of the pink card was obvious: Turkish emigrants were encouraged to apply for 
citizenship in countries that did not accept dual citizenship, but they were also encouraged to keep ties 
with their ‘home’ state. Before this opportunity, relinquishing Turkish citizenship was a pretty hard 
option for German Turks, since once they became ‘foreigners’ they were subjected to harsh conditions 
and restrictions in Turkey, ranging from ‘the restrictions on practicing certain professions (e.g. 
opticians) to buying land in the villages or in security sensitive areas. Even the funeral and burial of a 
foreigner in Turkey requires special permission from the Interior Ministry’ (Caglar 2004: 289, note 10). 
This is why the rights offered by the pink card to which foreigners do not have full access – free 
movement, property rights, residence, the right to work and to invest in the country – were substantial 
and, at least at the beginning, the Turkish authorities anticipated that a large number of emigrants 
would apply for it. 
The most interesting thing about the pink card is that by using it, its holder – who is legally not 
a Turkish citizen, but a non-resident alien – acquires a bundle of rights that other aliens do not enjoy. 
Moreover, the children of the holder also acquire these rights. As Caglar puts it, this document defined 
as a residence permit is a ‘clear case of extending substantive rights without formal citizenship status’ 
(Caglar 2004: 278-280), although the legal subtlety to which the Turkish authorities appealed to 
incorporate ex-members (treating non-resident aliens as virtual residents) is a rather forced move. 
But in spite of these legal efforts, the two important effects of the pink card are, according to 
some authors, rather disappointing. On the one hand, after the introduction of the new German 
citizenship law the number of applications for German citizenship within the Turkish emigrant 
community dropped considerably in spite of the legal possibility offered by the pink card. On the other 
hand, the number of ethnic Turks who applied for a pink card was not as high as Turkish authorities 
had hoped (Caglar 2004: 283-284). This seems to be a complete failure of the pink card, since it fell 
short of increasing the number of Turkish emigrants applying for both German citizenship and the pink 
card.  
According to the same author the reasons for this failure are twofold. The first one does not lie 
in the ‘ethnizenship’ regime per se, but in the ‘trust relations’ between Turkish emigrants in Germany 
and ethnic German citizens, which were at a very low level. The second reason is the relationship 
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between Turkish emigrants and the Turkish state. On the one hand, in some cases in Turkey the 
administrative staff and state executives refused to take the card into account. On the other hand, 
German Turks are aware of their ‘negative stigmatisation’ and lack of symbolic capital in Turkey. At 
the end of the day, in Germany the card stigmatises its holder as a ‘foreigner’, while in Turkey it 
stigmatises him as a member of the lucky and wealthy ‘diaspora’. Its holder is thus vulnerable both in 
Germany as an object of stigmatisation, and in Turkey, since the card does not also offer voting rights 
(Caglar 2004: 286-287). 
Setting aside the special political problems of Turkish emigrants in Germany, the pink card is 
an obviously better alternative to the two legislations we have talked about before. Unlike the cases of 
India and Mexico, it seems that in Turkey emigrants’ political activism in host countries and Turkish 
government’s economic and political interest explains not only the toleration of dual citizenship, but 
also the readiness to find a substitute for it in cases of countries that, like Germany, do not accept it in 
the first place (Kadirbeyoglu 2007: 143). In 2004, however, the citizenship law was amended: the ‘pink 
card’ was renamed as the ‘blue card’, and the latter allowed privileged non-citizens and their non-adult 
children to retain social security rights. However, the amendment stated clearly ‘that these people lose 
their voting rights, the right to be elected and employed in the public sector’ (Kadirbeyoglu 2010: 7). 
The possessor of the blue card is therefore an ‘external quasi-citizen’ rather than a dual citizen. 
 
6.3. Hungarian ‘ethnic kins:’ from ‘external quasi-citizenship’ to dual citizenship 
The fourth and final example of an ‘ethnizenship regime’ is Hungary. The situation here is a bit 
different, since ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries are not migrants, as in the Indian, 
Mexican, and Turkish cases. On the contrary, they are ethnic groups whose territories, after the 
redrawing of European states’ borders after the First and the Second World Wars have been assigned to 
other states. 
A quick historical review is necessary here. Up to 1918, under the Habsburg Monarchy (until 
1867) and then under the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary (1867-1918), Hungarian nationalism was 
‘more political than culturo-linguistic’ – because of several attempts of the Hungarian elite to obtain 
independence from the Habsburg rule – and ‘more territorial than ethnic’ (Waterbury 2010). On the one 
hand, the Hungarian territory had to be defended first against the Ottomans and then against the 
Habsburgs; and, on the other hand, the privileges of the ruling class were more important than 
ethnicity. After all, ‘at the end of the eighteenth century, only 29 per cent of the population in the 
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Hungarian lands identified as Magyars’ (Waterbury 2010: 26-27). However, at the end of the 19th 
century, after the liberal ideas of the 1848 revolution, Hungarian nationalism started to become 
exclusionary through demands of ‘Magyarisation’ targeted at the subject nationalities, and through 
closing minority language schools and limiting other minority cultural activities. 
After the First World War Hungary’s union with Austria was dissolved, but at the same time 
Hungary lost through the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920) two-thirds of its former territory and ‘one-
third of its Hungarian-speaking population to neighbouring Romania, newly created Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia, and Austria’ (Waterbury 2010: 30). Although from an ethnic point of view Hungary 
became fairly homogeneous through these partitions, Trianon became a symbol of suffering and very 
strong revisionist nationalism emerged between the two World Wars. Under the long term office of 
Miklós Horthy, irredentist organisations emerged and the government tried to keep ties with 
Hungarians across the border: (a) by offering subsidies for ethnic Hungarian educational, cultural, and 
media institutions; (b) by offering political support to Hungarian political organisations in their new 
states; and (c) by trying to gather economic and demographic data about Hungarian ethnic communities 
in order to support claims for border revisionism. In the Second World War Hungary aligned with Nazi 
Germany and for a while succeeded in taking back the lost territories. However, the 1947 Peace of 
Paris forced Hungary to accept a return to the Trianon borders. 
Then half a century of Communist rule followed, and under the social-internationalist ideology 
the situation of co-ethnics beyond the borders was considered an internal matter of each state. 
However, unofficial cross-border connections and the samizdat literature kept the problem of ethnic 
Hungarians over the borders alive. In the 1970s and 1980s, because of a shift in interstate relations with 
the Soviet Union, Hungary started to gain a stronger position in international relations and this allowed 
it to put on the table the diaspora issue and to criticise the treatment of Hungarian minorities by their 
communist ‘host states.’ The government allowed populist dissidents to ally with ethnic Hungarian 
dissidents in neighbouring countries and fight for the rights of ethnic Hungarians there, since this move 
deflected other critiques of the regime. At the end of the 1980s, both the government and Hungarian 
academic intellectuals started to claim that ethnic Hungarians across the borders are in fact members of 
the Hungarian nation (Waterbury 2010: 47). In 1988 the government set up a special fund to help 
Hungarian refugees fleeing Romania, and in the next year Hungary succeeded in getting the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to condemn rights violations in Romania. 
Immediately after the fall of communism in 1989, all political parties shared a consensus 
regarding the main policy lines concerning ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries. Although 
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serious problems did exist (for example, the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina in the time of the 
Yugoslav succession wars and Romanian and Slovak attempts to restrict bilingual signs and education 
in the minority’s language), the Hungarian political class treated all these problems with moderation 
and interest for ethnic Hungarians, considering that diplomacy and integration into European 
organisations would improve their conditions. 
However, as criticism against the first political party in power – the Magyar Democratic Forum, 
which won the first elections in 1990 – grew stronger, this party turned to a nationalistic rhetoric. 
Meetings with the World Federation of Hungarians intensified and the political and financial support 
for ethnic Hungarians’ political parties attracted a sympathetic clientele. Moreover, diplomatic relations 
with neighbouring countries and support to integrate in regional organisations were conditioned by the 
improvement of ethnic Hungarians’ situation and by guarantees regarding minority rights. In turn, the 
opposition responded by underlining: (a) the regional instability such a policy would create; (b) the 
threat that irredentist policy would cast upon Hungary’s accession to European institutions; and (c) the 
danger of rising anti-Hungarian feelings in neighbouring countries. In 1994 socialists won the elections 
and set the state policy towards Hungarian ethnics on a normal path. It signed bilateral treaties and 
normalised relationships with Romania and Slovakia, and the diaspora issue became a less important 
goal of its foreign policy. 
The main danger for these normalised relations between neighbouring countries was the 
economic belt-tightening which was politically exploited (alongside the diaspora problem) by the right-
wing Fidesz – which became the main opposition party. The critiques against socialists’ economic 
reforms, the poor state of economy and the way ethnic Hungarians were treated – with deteriorating 
political conditions for them in the neighbouring countries, for example restricted mother-tongue 
education, and the lack of proper response from the Hungarian government – helped Fidesz to win the 
1998 elections. After its political success, Fidesz quickly began to propagate its kin-state nationalism: 
the diaspora was presented as an asset and not a burden, and the contact with ethnic Hungarian leaders 
was institutionalised through an organisation named the Hungarian Standing Conference. 
The beginning of negotiations for EU membership in 1998 revealed, however, that a possible 
accession to European Union and the Schengen zone would once again break ties with ethnic 
Hungarians in neighbouring countries. There seemed to be a consensus that Hungary should come up 
with a new, creative legislation that could support even in such a case Hungarian ethnics beyond the 
European Union’s borders. The offer of dual citizenship was out of the question at that time. On the 
one hand, public opinion held an ambiguous attitude towards Hungarians abroad and a clear negative 
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opinion about ethnic Hungarians that had immigrated to Hungary. On the other hand, a massive 
immigration of ethnic Hungarians would stop the Hungarian right wing’s project of Hungary’s cultural 
and linguistic influence in the region. Furthermore, even some political leaders of ethnic Hungarians 
opposed the idea since this could have meant losing both voters and political prospects (Waterbury 
2010: 99), (Stavilă 2011). 
The so-called 2001 ‘Status Law’ seemed thus to be the best solution Hungary could find. On the 
one hand, this law offered some benefits to ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries, ranging 
from subsidies to public transportation to free access to Hungarian universities. On the other hand, 
Hungarian ethnics were authorised to receive a labour permit valid for three months per year and they 
were allowed to support and consequently receive benefits from the state welfare and health-care 
systems. Moreover, the Status Law offered subsidies for ethnic Hungarians even if they remained in 
their countries of residence in the form of educational, cultural and entrepreneurial projects. The 
practical effects of this law were minimal: for example, the three-months labour permits were not able 
to stop illegal migration and illegal work and were no longer valid after Hungary joined the European 
Union. However, the most important effect of this law was symbolic: ethnic Hungarians valued the 
identity cards offered by Budapest as an official acceptance of their membership in the Hungarian 
nation. 
The Status Law was heavily criticised by Hungarian opposition politicians, by neighbouring 
countries, and by European institutions. At home people feared that: (a) the law would tie the diaspora 
too closely to Budapest, creating a form of paternalism that would impede its independence; (b) several 
provisions of the Status Law would create tensions with neighbouring countries; (c) the law would 
encourage massive immigration of ethnic Hungarians in Hungary; (d) the ability of ethnic Hungarians 
to fully incorporate themselves in their kin state would thus be severely disrupted; and finally (e) that 
offering free movement rights in Hungary to citizens of some countries that have no prospects of 
joining the European Union in the foreseeable future (for example, Ukraine and Serbia) presented the 
possibility of thus breaking EU laws. 
Slovakia and Romania also accused the Status Law of: (a) violating their state sovereignty 
through its extraterritorial aspect – for example, the institutions mandated by the Hungarian 
government to decide eligibility for the Hungarian card in each case were supposed to work on the 
territory of other states; (b) discrimination – offering work permits to only some of their citizens but 
not to the others; and (c) creating a special subset of their populations that would be officially seen as 
Hungarian through the special identity cards received from Budapest. 
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Finally, the international aspect of the conflict generated by the Status Law was considered by 
the Venice Commission in 2001, in response to Romania’s accusation that Hungary was violating 
established European norms. In a landmark decision, the Commission decided that European states like 
Hungary have the right to intervene to support ‘ethnic kin’ groups in other states but only with the goal 
of minority protection. At the same time, it clearly stated that minority issues cannot be solved 
unilaterally through domestic legislation by the kin state, but only through bilateral treaties. The 
consequence was that Fidesz had to negotiate modifications to the Status Law with both Romania and 
Slovakia. 
After the 2002 elections Fidesz was again in opposition, and in 2003 the socialist majority in 
the parliament changed the most controversial provisions of the Status Law. Work permits were 
withdrawn, educational benefits were extended to anyone learning Hungarian, subsidies were granted 
to organisations rather than to individual families, and mention of ‘the united Hungarian nation’ in the 
preamble of the law was replaced with a reference only to cultural connections between Hungary and 
its diaspora (Waterbury 2010: 121). However, in the same year Fidesz struck back and allied itself with 
the World Congress of Hungarians in asking the government to hold a referendum on dual citizenship – 
the intent being to offer ethnic Hungarians citizenship without residence. The socialist government 
opposed the referendum, pointing to the threat of increased migration, the socioeconomic costs of dual 
citizenship, and the pressure on the healthcare and pensions funds levied by more than three million 
ethnic Hungarians who did not work in Hungary. The referendum failed due to the small numbers of 
those who bothered to vote – but even so, it is interesting to note that out of those who did vote, 49 per 
cent were against the proposal.  
The failed referendum made Fidesz set aside for a while its claims related to diaspora, and this 
helped the socialist party to implement a more realistic set of reforms in this domain. In the following 
eight years in which the socialists governed (2002-2010) the diaspora policy was radically changed: (a) 
diaspora problems were placed under economic development policy, the central point being 
modernization, development and competitiveness of the Hungarian communities in the region; (b) the 
strong dependence of ethnic Hungarians on Budapest was changed and the clientelistic networks 
terminated at least for that period of time; (c) the funding process became more transparent; (d) the 
decision-making process related to diaspora matters was shielded from the influence of the diaspora 
elites. These processes were supported by the expectation that, after the EU accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007, more than 90% of Hungarians would be reunited in a common Europe. 
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The economic recession and government scandals after 2006 had three direct consequences: the 
socialists lost the support of the majority of their voters, the extreme right was strengthened through the 
creation of the far-right Jobbik party, and ethnic politics came once again to the fore. The decline of the 
completely discredited socialists and the rise of the right wing extremists of Jobbik made the right wing 
nationalists of Fidesz the voters’ preferred choice. Fidesz returned to power in 2010 with an incredible 
majority of two thirds of the votes. Immediately after the elections Fidesz and its Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán started a set of major and controversial reforms in different areas – the judiciary, mass-media, 
the economic system – which set Hungary on a collision course with European Union laws. Amongst 
others, Fidesz wanted to change again the relation with ethnic Hungarians abroad – and this time it 
simply offered dual citizenship to all Hungarians in the neighbouring countries with the notable 
exception of Austria, which had already been exempted from the geographic scope of the 2001 Status 
Law. 
At the beginning, the offer was not exactly one of full dual citizenship since ethnic Hungarians 
were not allowed to vote. However, the proposed law had tremendous effects in Slovakia, where the 
government reacted quickly by changing its own citizenship law to the effect that any person who 
would acquire another citizenship would automatically lose her Slovak citizenship170
The Orbán government made yet one further and final step. In December 2011 it passed a new 
electoral law which offered new Hungarian non-resident citizens from neighbouring states political 
rights (Bozoki 2013: 4).
 – for a further 
discussion about the ‘Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat’ see (Bauböck 2010a). Surprisingly, the same offer 
did not raised any serious reactions in Romania, since at that time the Romanian government was also 
offering citizenship en masse to persons from the Republic of Moldova. 
171
                                                 
170 In 2012 the current Slovak government planned to change this law in order to limit the withdrawal of citizenship in such 
cases – see Dagmar Kusa, ‘New Slovak government plans to limit withdrawal of citizenship in case of acquisition of a 
foreign nationality’, EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, 17 March 2012, available at 
 External voting is expected to be implemented for the 2014 national 
elections (Bozoki 2013: 9). Even if they are enfranchised only in national legislative elections – not 
being allowed to ‘vote or run as candidates in local or regional ones’ (Bozoki 2013: 8) – the circle is 
http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/614-new-slovak-government-plans-to-limit-withdrawal-of-citizenship-in-case-of-
acquisition-of-a-foreign-nationality (accessed 19 August 2013). However, in June 2013 the European Court of Human 
Rights rejected two complaints by citizens stripped of Slovak citizenship – see Zuzana Vilikovská, ‘ECHR rejects two 
complaints by citizens stripped of Slovak citizenship’, The Slovak Spectator, 7 June 2013, available at 
http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/50312/10/echr_rejects_two_complaints_by_citizens_stripped_of_slovak_citizenship.ht
ml (last accessed 19 August 2013). 
171 According to the current electoral law, there are some differences between electoral rights of non-resident citizens and 
those of residents: ‘the former can vote only for party lists’, and not in single seat constituencies (Bozoki 2013: 6, 8-9). 
Another difference is that unlike residents, non-resident citizens have to register before elections; also unlike residents, they 
are allowed to cast their votes by post according to the new electoral law of April 2013 (Bozoki 2013: 7, 11). 
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now closed. For the first time after the Trianon Treaty, that is, after almost 100 years, ethnic 
Hungarians from neighbouring countries are once again incorporated into the Hungarian nation. The 
story that started with some form of ‘ethnizenship’ and ‘external quasi-citizenship’ ends with full 
citizenship status and rights. 
 
6.4. Common developments, surprising differences: discussion of the four cases 
 
6.4.1. Who qualifies for ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status? 
Before asking what is and what is not normatively acceptable in the above ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
regimes, it is important to see in a comparative perspective who qualifies for such a position and what 
is the range of rights enjoyed by an individual eligible for this status (see table 4 in the Annex). 
The first interesting thing is that while in India and Mexico the criteria of inclusion seem to be 
former citizenship and presence in the territory, in Turkey and Hungary – the states whose ‘external 
quasi-citizenship’ regimes seemed to be more liberal at the beginning – the criteria are strongly 
connected with ethnicity. Indeed, as we have seen in the preceding section, the governments in India 
and Mexico developed a territorial notion of citizenship. Previous presence in the territory and previous 
citizenship status of a candidate or of one of her relatives seem to be the only qualifiers for ‘external 
quasi-citizenship’ regimes: their target is formed by the group of former citizens and their children 
irrespective of ethnicity. However, there is an important difference between the Indian and Mexican 
regimes. In India, the existence of previous citizenship status for first generation migrants or the 
existence of a family link with a former citizen – for second generation migrants and beyond – are the 
only requirements in order to get the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status. 
Mexico is a bit more restrictive. Since the 1997 constitutional reform, ‘a legacy of anti-
interventionist nationalism restricted emigrant nationality by limiting ius sanguinis to the first 
generation born abroad’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 183). Thus it is clear that second and third generations born 
abroad will not automatically receive citizenship. Moreover, they would not even keep the ‘nationality’ 
status – and, with it, the ‘external quasi-citizenship position.’172
                                                 
172 This decision seemed to have been influenced by US politicians, who warned Mexico about the possible huge number of 
Mexican dual nationals in the future – for example, if we take into account that today there are approximately ten million 
Mexicans in the US and consider also that that they tend to have several children per family, we can easily make an estimate 
about the huge number of Mexican dual nationals on the US territory in four or five generations. 
 Consider the following imaginary case. 
Pedro is born in Texas to a Mexican-born father and a French mother; he automatically receives 
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Mexican nationality – and, if he doesn’t have another citizenship, he also receives Mexican citizenship 
at the age of 18. Now suppose Pedro has two children, a boy Carlos with another Mexican woman who 
is also born in Texas and thus belongs to the second-generation and another boy Yoshiro with a 
Japanese-American woman (also born in Texas). The two children would not qualify for Mexican 
nationality: Carlos would thus be a third-generation Mexican, while Yoshiro would be the grandson of 
one Mexican national. Suppose now that Pedro has three other girls: Rosita, born in the US (with a 
native Mexican mother who has just crossed the border), Blanca (born in Spain to a Spanish mother 
who previously naturalised in Mexico), and Larisa (born in Mexico whose mother is a Romanian 
tourist Pedro met during a crazy holiday in Cancún). All these three girls will acquire Mexican 
nationality: Rosita (her mother is Mexican-born), Blanca (her mother is a naturalised Mexican), and 
Larisa (because of ius soli).173
In Hungary, the first ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime (1920-1947) and part of the second 
(2001-2003) were designated only for ethnic Hungarians and their families – mixed families included – 
so this was actually not an ‘external quasi-citizenship’, but an ‘ethnizenship regime’ just like the 
Turkish one. Moreover, after the Venice Commission’s decision in October 2001, Hungary had to sign 
a Memorandum of Understanding with Romania in order to successfully implement the Status Law; 
 
In Turkey, both the pink card and the document that replaced it – the blue card – were strictly 
designed only for Turkish emigrants living in states where dual citizenship was not accepted. 
Moreover, both cards have been designed only for former Turkish citizens who meet two very strict 
conditions: (a) they must be Turkish by birth, and (b) have renounced their citizenship with state 
approval. Since this strict possibility of renouncing citizenship became available only after the 1981 
law, it is clear that the Turkish ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime was designed to exclude minorities 
who left Turkey before 1981 – like Armenians, Jews, Roma, etc. The reason for this exclusion was that 
the Turkish state wanted to eliminate the possibility for members of these minorities to come back to 
Turkey and ‘reclaim property that had been confiscated when they changed their citizenship’ 
(Kadirbeyoglu 2010: 7). Again, the same regime excludes those individuals who became Turkish 
citizens by naturalisation. As we can see, although the Turkish state accepts dual citizenship, its 
‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is the most restrictive – in comparison with that of India and 
Mexico, where these two conditions do not apply. 
                                                 
173 See Article 30 – ‘The Mexicans’ – of the Mexican Constitution: 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012). I want to thank Henio Hoyo for 
offering me Pedro’s imaginary example (email on file with the author, 9 May 2012) and to Luicy Pedroza for checking the 
accuracy of my interpretation of the Mexican Constitution (discussion on file with the author, 15 July 2013). 
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some modifications were implemented at the request of the Romanian Government – one of them, for 
example, being that ‘non-Hungarian dependants of ethnic Hungarians would no longer be eligible for 
Certificates or benefits’ (Waterbury 2010: 113). From this point of view, and with the unintended help 
of the Romanian Government, the ‘ethnizenship regime’ centred even more on ethnicity than ever 
before. Since the revision of the Status Law in 2003 by the Socialist government, the benefits retained 
– after the elimination of the most controversial ones – in the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime have 
been extended not only to ethnic Hungarians, but also to everyone learning Hungarian. However, this 
law’s ethnic flavour has remained, since in order to qualify for the identity card a person should be 
supported by an organisation – a local Church or political party – which must testify that she is an 
ethnic Hungarian. Since 1 January 2012 any ethnic Hungarian from a neighbouring country can acquire 
Hungarian citizenship, thus becoming a dual citizen. 
 
6.4.2. What rights could ‘external quasi-citizens’ access? 
Let me now investigate the range of rights that can be accessed by an individual eligible for ‘external 
quasi-citizenship’ status. Clearly, the most important right enjoyed by all those who qualify for this 
position – in all the four countries studied above – is the right to return. This was, until the emergence 
of quasi-citizenship regimes, a right reserved only for citizens. This is logical, since one cannot be 
eligible for national housing in India, acquire property in the coastal and border zones in Mexico, 
practice certain professions reserved only for Turkish citizens, or apply for a state-subsidised place at a 
Hungarian university unless one is able to come back to the country of origin. 
Another important right is the right to re-acquire full citizenship status by re-establishing 
permanent residence. In Hungary the situation was, until 2012, more complicated. During the 
communist period national minorities were considered the problem of the state in which they lived. 
Since the fall of communism and until the Status Law the Hungarian state was afraid of mass migration 
so it decided to design a system of benefits that could be accessed by ‘external quasi-citizens’ 
especially in their countries of residence. However, after the 2004 and 2007 accessions to the European 
Union, more than 90% of ethnic Hungarians became free to travel to Hungary, so acquisition of 
Hungarian citizenship became initially less important. Further, since 2012 ethnic Hungarians have been 
able to apply for Hungarian citizenship; this is important not only for ethnic Hungarians living in non-
EU countries – since they can thus acquire free movement rights within the European Union – but also 
for those living in EU countries which are not part of the US visa waiver program – for example, 
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Romania – and thus cannot travel to the US without a visa; Hungary has been in this program since 
2009. 
The third right concerns buying and owing property in the origin country. This may not be a 
spectacular offer in Hungary and the rest of the Western world, where foreigners are not restricted in 
acquiring property. However, the other three countries under scrutiny restrict foreigners in their rights 
in this respect. Until 1997 only Mexican citizens were allowed to buy land in the coastal and border 
zones; in Turkey, foreigners cannot buy land in the villages or in security sensitive areas; while India 
also offered ‘external quasi-citizens’ similar property rights. 
The fourth important right that is offered by all four regimes without exception is admittance to 
state educational institutions. This right is accompanied by other educational and cultural rights for 
both individuals and cultural associations, ranging from subsidised tickets for state-owned cultural 
museums – for individuals – to eligibility for state-supported cultural activities for cultural 
organisations.  
There are also some differences between these four regimes regarding the rights offered to 
‘external quasi-citizens.’ For example, only India and Turkey clearly underline the rights to live, work 
and invest in the country. Mexico most likely takes them for granted, while Hungary has to offer these 
rights to all European citizens, so probably only the small number of Hungarians living in non-EU 
countries would benefit from such entitlements. Some social rights that foreigners cannot access, such 
as eligibility for national housing schemes in India or the retention of attained social security rights in 
Turkey, are generously offered to ‘external quasi-citizens’. The Turkish state also offers them the right 
to practice certain professions reserved only for Turkish citizens, makes them eligible for inheritance, 
and allows them to have funerals in Turkey. Hungary goes even further: it offers not only a set of rights 
that ethnic Hungarians abroad can use while on Hungarian territory (for example, subsidies to public 
transportation) but also a set of benefits that can be accessed even from the country of residence, 
without having to go to Hungary. Among these, one can find subsidies for ethnic Hungarian 
educational, cultural, and media institutions, as well as subsidies to political parties and organisations 
in the host state. 
However, there is a type of rights neither of these countries has offered to ‘external quasi-
citizens’: political rights. There may be extensive differences between the four regimes analysed here, 
but this seems to be the most important similarity. Interestingly, even Turkey, a country which 
otherwise readily accepts dual citizenship, strips the holders of the pink and blue cards of their political 
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rights and the right to be employed in the public sector. The motive for this reasoning advanced by 
origin states seems to be that, while there are important justifications for keeping some formal ties with 
‘external quasi-citizens’ – such as promotion of common language and culture, or securing the flow of 
remittances – these ties are not strong enough to qualify such a person for full citizenship status. 
Another alternative interpretation is that democratic representation is the one aspect of citizenship that 
requires a clear distinction between members and non-members. While rights to ownership, return, 
benefits, etc. can be extended to various categories of quasi-citizens, voting rights cannot because this 
creates uncertainty about the boundaries of membership that undermines democratic representation. 
However, when some government mistakenly considers these formal ties strong enough, or 
when political purposes require it, the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is transformed into some 
form of dual citizenship. This happened in 2005 in Mexico, when the government decided to offer non-
residents the right to vote in presidential elections. It also happened in 2011 in Hungary, when the false 
dual-citizenship regime – arguably, an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime, since it offered no political 
rights – was transformed into a real dual citizenship status through the offer of some form of voting 
rights to dual citizens. One could argue that I wrongly assume here that ‘real’ dual citizenship always 
entails external voting rights. According to such a critique there are many countries that have 
traditionally tolerated dual citizenship but do not grant ‘external’ citizens voting rights, no matter 
whether they are mono- or dual citizens – e.g. Ireland and Greece; the question of whether citizenship 
comes with external voting is thus considered to be a separate one.174
                                                 
174 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
 However, as I have already tried 
to explain in chapters one and five, I consider political rights as the only item that still offers 
citizenship some particular value: anything else – social rights, economic rights, and the right to return 
– is now largely disconnected from citizenship status. So if we go further and disconnect citizenship 
and political rights too (a move which some countries have already made, as we will see in the next 
chapter), then it is hard to understand what citizenship is supposed to mean anymore. 
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6.5. What is acceptable and what is not in an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime? Normative 
considerations 
 
6.5.1. ‘External quasi-citizenship’ between ‘formal status’ and ‘favourable treatment’ 
The first thing that must be clarified is whether ‘external quasi-citizenship’ should be conceived as a 
‘status’ or as ‘favourable treatment’ (Bárdi 2004: 78). The distinction has been proposed by Bárdi in 
his article on the Hungarian Status law. He is not clearly defining the terms but according to what he 
writes, in the ‘debates following the announcement of the Status Law’ in 1999, the question of status 
versus favourable treatment for ‘ethnic kins’ was one of the ‘issues of principle’ Bardi (2004: 78). The 
way I understand this distinction, a ‘status’ implies not only some ‘duty’ of a state towards a category 
of individuals, but also a new law concept which must be agreed on in international law, related to ‘a 
systematic codification of measures to support Hungarians living beyond the borders’ Bardi (2004: 79). 
On the other hand, ‘favourable treatment’ seems to imply a treatment a state may or may not (but it is 
under no moral or legal obligation to) offer to some category of foreign individuals exclusively on its 
own territory. 
Thus, in the first case of a ‘status’, the home state creates a new special legal status (probably 
also accepted in the international law) for the specified category of individuals. In the second case of 
‘favourable treatment’, the state chooses (according to some simple selection rules) some individuals 
which are citizens of other states – which may or may not have resided in the country that grants the 
benefits – and offers them a bundle of privileges under the label of ‘favourable treatment’. My claim is 
that ‘external quasi-citizenship’ is – or should be – all about favourable treatment and not about 
creating a special status. Since I argue that the important thing is to match as far as possible the 
category of ‘citizens’ and that of ‘residents’, creating a new status besides ‘citizenship’ does not make 
much sense. In consequence, ‘external quasi-citizenship’ should not be a legal status in international 
law: a state simply decides to offer a favourable treatment to a group of individuals that do not reside 
within its borders, and this is – or again, it should be, as we will see soon – an internal affair of that 
country. 
 One obvious counter-argument here is that this creates a big problem for a residence-based 
theory of citizenship: international law currently protects foreign residents based on their 
nationality/citizenship of origin. If we substitute this with citizenship for long-term residents and we 
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also consider ‘external quasi-citizenship’ as merely a bundle of privileges under domestic law, then we 
do abolish the protection that international law offers to foreigners. Moreover, the objection could go 
further and consider that this argument could also undermine my claim in chapter 4 that international 
law and courts should have a more prominent role. They would merely protect general human rights 
without being able to defend the claims of foreigners based on their affiliation with a country of 
nationality involving for example a right to diplomatic protection.  
However, I believe this objection does not undermine my argument. Firstly, even under a 
residence-based citizenship regime – coupled with an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime – 
international law would continue to protect many foreign residents based on their 
nationality/citizenship of origin. I am referring here to those foreign residents who do not qualify for 
the citizenship of their country of residence – because they do not meet the residence criterion yet – and 
to those who are residing outside their origin country being in their country’s service – persons working 
in the military, embassies, and so on. So conceiving ‘external quasi-citizenship’ as ‘favourable 
treatment’ does not amount to putting an end to the protection international law offers to foreigners. 
Secondly, international courts would obviously still be able to defend the claims of these types of 
foreigners. 
The problem though is whether a state has the right to offer this type of favourable treatment to 
citizens of another country. Moreover, if the answer is affirmative then what is the extent of this right? 
The landmark decision of the Venice Commission in October 2001 answers both questions regarding 
the situation of kin minorities. On the one hand, it acknowledges a special bond between kin minorities 
and their kin states; on the other hand, as a consequence, it considers that preferential treatment of kin 
minorities by their kin states is acceptable, but only in the fields of culture and education. This decision 
was however expected: ‘many states make provision for the acquisition of benefits […] for ethnic kin 
who are citizens of another state’ (Schöpflin 2004: 93). Among these, the most important and recent 
cases are Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine, Germany, and Portugal (Halász, Majtényi et 
al. 2004: 333-335).  
Moreover, since the Venice Commission acknowledges ‘special bonds between a state and its 
kin minorities, this could arguably amount to the ‘recognition of the nation conceived in ethno-cultural 
terms’ (Kántor 2004: 115). But if this is so, then the same situation applies not only to ‘ethnic kins,’ but 
also to migrants and their descendants: they are also ‘part of the nation conceived in ethno-cultural 
terms’. However, it is important to note an extremely important fact here: in the Venice Commission’s 
terms, accepting ethnic and cultural relations between a state and ‘ethnic kins’ – or migrants and their 
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descendants – does not amount to anything else except preferential treatment limited to the fields of 
culture and education.175 In other words, no other kinds of links (related to work permits or political 
rights) are acceptable.176
It is important to note that Hungary was not the first European state to offer a special status to 
‘ethnic kins’ who have never lived in or even visited the country. This type of legislation had been used 
by other states before Hungary without respecting the emergent European norms (that is, without 
restricting preferential treatment only regarding culture and education). For example, before modifying 
its citizenship laws in the 1990s, Germany permitted ‘“ethnic” Germans [living in East European 
states] to acquire German citizenship, while denying it to “Turks” living in Germany for three 
generations’ (Adeney and Lall 2005: 5), (Brubaker 1992). And this preferential naturalisation 
especially happened in the case of many members of the German diaspora ‘even though they may 
never have visited the country’ (Adeney and Lall 2005: 5), (Tóth 2004: 383).
 
177
6.5.2. States’ reasons for offering an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime 
 It is important to note 
that in this case, unlike in the Hungarian one (at the time of Venice Commission’s decision), the 
German state directly offered citizenship to ‘ethnic kins’, not simply preferential treatment in the field 
of culture and education. Schöpflin considers therefore that the Hungarian Status Law was ‘an attempt 
at a moderate solution… one that gave the Hungarian minorities some status in the eyes of the 
Hungarian state, but one that fell short of full citizenship which would necessarily mean dual 
citizenship’ (Schöpflin 2004: 102). 
 
But why would a state be interested in keeping such ties with ‘external quasi-citizens,’ since this also 
means outlaying resources for the benefits bestowed? Beside the economic motivation connected with 
                                                 
175 According to the Venice Commission, ‘In fields other than education and culture, the Commission considers that 
preferential treatment might be granted only in exceptional cases, and when it is shown to pursue the genuine aim of 
maintaining the links with the kin-States and to be proportionate to that aim (for example, when the preference concerns 
access to benefits which are at any rate available to other foreign citizens who do not have the national background of the 
kin-State)’. See Venice Commission, Report on the preferential treatment of national minorities by their kin-state, Venice, 
19-20 October 2001, D(d), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10094&Language=EN (last accessed 4 September 2013); for 
the French version, see http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-INF(2001)019.aspx (last accessed 4 
September 2013). 
176 In my view we could also include the right to return – as I will later try to argue, based on the example of the four 
‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes analysed here. 
177 Preferential naturalisation is indeed very common and exists in many more European countries. For a discussion of 
preferential naturalisation and its limits in international law, see the OSCE High Commissioner of National Minorities 
(HCNM), The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations & Explanatory Note, June 
2008, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/33633?download=true (last accessed 19 August 2013). 
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the flow of remittances (at least in the migrant-sending states analysed here), one author suggests an 
additional three main reasons (Ieda 2004: 15).  
One is to ensure that those who live outside the country but are ethnically and/or culturally 
linked with it form part of the nation as a whole. The second is to promote and preserve the well-being 
of ‘external quasi-citizens’ in their home country. This is very important, at least in Mexico and 
Hungary, because both countries want to keep their ‘external quasi-citizens’ in the place where they 
currently reside. Economic reasons predominate here. In Mexico more than eight per cent of the 
population lives outside the country, while according to some estimates the number of ethnic 
Hungarians in neighbouring states could be up to one third of Hungary’s current population. A high 
percentage of return migration would obviously put incredible pressure on the job market in both 
countries. The final reason for keeping ties with ‘external quasi-citizens’ is to promote their awareness 
of national identity, with the goal of maintaining the home state’s influence in the region (Hungary), of 
promoting the home state’s interest through lobbying in the host state (Mexico), and of securing the 
flow of remittances (Mexico, India, Turkey). 
Up to now I have succeeded in showing: (a) that an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime which 
simply offers favourable treatment to citizens of another country in the fields of culture and education 
is accepted by at least one international organisation (Venice Commission); and (b) what reasons home 
states give for offering some benefits through such ‘favourable treatment.’ What remains to be 
discussed in the rest of this paper is: (c) whether such a regime is also normatively justified; (d) what 
type of rights ‘external-quasi citizens’ may enjoy; and (e) whether such a regime may be 
discriminatory, and for whom it may prove to be so. 
 
6.5.3. The normative justification of an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime 
In what concerns the normative justification of ‘external quasi-citizenship,’ we have to understand that, 
unlike in the case of dual citizenship, we do not have here the possible alternative of ‘dormant 
citizenship.’ The latter refers strictly to emigrants – and, in more generous regimes, to their children 
(the first generation born abroad) – whose citizenship rights in the non-residence country are ‘dormant’ 
and can be activated only if and when these individuals take up residence there.178
                                                 
178 There are, of course, extremely generous regimes which do not limit the transmission of citizenship over generations: 
according to one author, ‘seventeen EU countries allow for endless transmission of their citizenship to persons born abroad 
to a citizen parent’ (Bauböck 2010a: 1). However I will not take them into account since I agree that such a stance is 
normatively indefensible – see for example Bauböck (2007b and 2009a). 
 I have tried to argue 
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in the previous chapter that dual citizenship status should be rejected not only for the disadvantages it 
creates for all actors involved, but also with the goal of matching as far as possible the categories of 
‘citizens’ and ‘residents.’ However, even if we would accept full dual citizenship only for the first 
generation of immigrants, it seems fairly reasonable to suppose that second, third and possibly 
subsequent generations would also learn the language and would like to keep cultural connections with 
the origin country even if they wouldn’t seek to actually move there. ‘External quasi-citizenship’ can 
potentially meet these interests by offering second and later generation individuals ‘favourable 
treatment.’ 
I would go even further and argue that this favourable treatment should also be offered to 
emigrants and their children, instead of dual citizenship. There are two main objections against this 
proposal. According to the first objection, only citizens have the right to return. It is an accepted fact 
that, over the years, plans change and migrants or their children may decide for various reasons to 
return to the origin country. If dual citizenship is not accepted and the right to return is a right strictly 
connected with citizenship, then these individuals would have serious difficulties to return. However, 
as we have already seen in the four ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes treated above, the right to 
return is one of the first rights attached to each of these regimes. So the first objection fails since it is 
based on a false premise: that the right to return is reserved only for citizens. 
But at this point one may enquire about the difference between ‘external quasi-citizenship’ and 
a ‘dormant’ citizenship as long as both categories offer the right to return but neither of them the right 
to vote.179
                                                 
179 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this problem (Joseph Carens, personal communication 
on file with the author, November 2013). 
 I believe there are serious differences that may prove the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ to be 
the best alternative. I have discussed these reasons above in section 5.3.5., so here I only want to 
summarize them. Firstly, a ‘dormant’ citizenship (just like dual citizenship) may still generate 
international conflicts based on diplomatic protection and may also offer states a way to strip their 
members of this status, as long as they do not remain statelessness. Secondly, suspending political 
rights by making them dependent on residency raises an equality problem: since equality is a principle 
situated at the core of citizenship status, suspending political rights of some (in this case, non-resident) 
citizens while still accepting them as members of the polity would be equal to creating second-class 
citizens (Spiro 2003: 143-144). Finally, if as we have seen in chapter one citizenship exclusively means 
today having full political rights in a polity (because human, civic and social rights have been 
decoupled from citizenship in the international system in the last fifty years), then suspending political 
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rights of an emigrant but still considering her a citizen amounts to simply building a meaningless 
status. If political rights are ‘suspended’ for ‘external’ citizens – just as many other rights dependent on 
residence are suspended – and if the right to return is not exclusively attached to citizenship status 
anymore, then it is difficult to understand what this ‘dormant citizenship’ is supposed to mean. 
The second objection shows that theories on migration and citizenship generally support the 
fact that at least first generation migrants should retain full citizenship – including voting rights – in the 
origin country (Bauböck 2005a: 10-11).180 However, even their authors underline that for first 
generation migrants external franchise is at most permissible: ‘(e)ven for permanent first-generation 
expatriates, the external franchise should not be seen as a fundamental individual right but as 
permissible’(Bauböck and Perchinig 2009: 487). In order to explain why I disagree, take the following 
example of a Romanian citizen that moved to United States twenty years ago and has double 
citizenship: Romanian and American. He comes to Romania once in a while, say every four or five 
years, just to visit his friends and family. I claim that such a person should not have full Romanian 
citizenship: more precisely, he should not have political rights in Romania. As I have already explained 
in the last chapter, in my view citizenship should be strictly linked with residence. Since the person 
lives in the US, he should have US citizenship but not Romanian citizenship. Of course, this person has 
various links with Romania: his parents and some of his friends live there, he may have properties there 
and many other types of interests we can think of. This is why I believe ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
status is important. I think the person should have some rights in Romania – but not all the rights a 
Romanian citizen enjoys.181
There is an obvious critique here. As we have seen in the previous chapter, if first-generation 
immigrants lack voting rights in the origin country, then they do not have any power to influence 
political decisions that may seriously affect them – for example, a possible suspension of property 
rights and the nationalisation of their properties by the state.
 
182
                                                 
180 For an opposite view, see Lopez-Guerra (2005). 
181 This is also true for ‘external’ citizens: presently they normally do not have all rights, but only very selected ones – e.g. 
they do not have rights to social assistance for long-term unemployment, coverage of health costs in a national health 
service, etc. Most of their civil rights are in no way guaranteed by their state of origin, since this would violate territorial 
jurisdiction of the state of residence. 
182 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013. 
 The rejoinder here proceeds along two 
different lines. First, it is difficult to understand how such a decision could be implemented in a liberal 
democratic state. Second, it is difficult to imagine that a democratic state doing such a thing would not 
seriously breach not only a number of international conventions that it had already signed, but also its 
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own laws – for example, laws which design the status of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ and protect 
individuals from such interventions.  
While I accept that such a concern may be seriously raised in connection to authoritarian and 
dictatorial states, I can see no possible ground for it within the liberal-democratic world. This may 
probably seem a highly idealised and naïve image of liberal democracies that no real-world state can 
meet. It is true that there have been quite a number of disputes over properties of foreigners between 
liberal democracies, and such cases have required diplomatic intervention. More generally, since liberal 
democracies are likely to privilege the interests of their citizens over those of foreigners, and since 
international law is not self-enforcing, the protection of human rights under international law needs 
very often the backing of states that intervene on behalf of their citizens abroad.183
Besides political and economic problems like international disputes over individual property 
rights, we must also recognise that the whole concept of an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is to 
extend, rather than limit, the rights
 However, we must 
not forget that under a residence-based theory of citizenship individuals are citizens of the country they 
are living in as long-term residents – even though they may be temporarily outside the territory being in 
that state’s service. If such citizens are also ‘external quasi-citizens’ of another country and, if in an 
exceptional case, such a country nationalises their property – which would be difficult to imagine, since 
in our days home states try to improve the links with their diasporas by offering ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ regimes – then they can access diplomatic protection of their country of 
residence/citizenship and the dispute could be solved in international courts. 
184
6.5.4. What type of rights ‘external-quasi citizens’ may enjoy? 
 of non-resident persons linked in various ways with the origin 
country. It is difficult to imagine a state that would establish an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime (in 
which, as we have already seen, property rights are among the first rights accorded in each instance 
analysed here) and, at the same time, restrict the rights that had been offered as part of that regime in 
the first place. 
 
Further, we have to ask what type of rights ‘external-quasi citizens’ may enjoy. As we have seen, the 
Venice Commission accepted rights offered by kin states to kin minorities – and we can arguably add 
                                                 
183 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, August 2013. 
184 This ‘extension of rights’ is, of course, in accordance with a residence-based citizenship. It may seem as a restriction to a 
supporter of dual or multiple citizenship, since political participation and diplomatic protection cannot be accessed by 
‘external quasi-citizens.’ 
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here rights to migrants and their descendants – only in the fields of culture and education. However, the 
same Commission also argued that these rights should be offered through bilateral treaties rather than 
through domestic legislation. But even if this may be the best solution, there are states that would not 
accept extra-territorial benefits offered by other countries to some of their citizens, even if these would 
be strictly educational and cultural benefits. The right to return – already accepted by all ‘external 
quasi-citizenship’ regimes discussed in this chapter – seems thus to be normatively justified as the only 
solution available to avoid in some cases international conflicts. 
It is difficult to make a normative assessment regarding which other benefits ‘external quasi-
citizens’ may enjoy. As we have already seen, only two situations seem clear: (a) they should not enjoy 
political rights; (b) they should enjoy at least the right to return, cultural and educational rights. I tend 
to believe that the range of rights between the two extreme points can be decided by each state 
according to its own interests. Some states like Turkey could offer to first generation emigrants the 
possibility to retain contribution-based social security rights, while others could offer ‘external quasi-
citizens’ a range of rights enjoyed only by full citizens and not by foreigners, like the right to acquire 
property in the coastal and border zones in Mexico. Still other states try to officialise a relationship 
with diaspora in order to better address its problems. For example, Hungary decided to semi-officialise 
the status of the World Federation of Hungarians organisation in order to offer it a possibility to 
influence decisions regarding Hungarians abroad. Finally, India also offers extensive social rights, such 
as eligibility for national housing schemes.  
The only situation when such an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime may prove to be 
discriminatory seems to be in those cases where the favourable treatment is offered strictly to ‘ethnic 
kins’ and migrants, but not to all persons that have ties with the home country. This is not happening in 
India and Mexico – two countries which lack ethnic homogeneity anyway – but it may be a problem for 
Turkey and Hungary. As we have already seen, in Turkey the pink/blue card is offered only to native-
born Turks, but not to those who are Turks by naturalisation. The case of Hungary is even more 
intriguing. Individuals eligible for its ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime are only ethnic Hungarians, 
but not also (to offer just two examples) ethnic Jews and ethnic Roma. Offering favourable treatment 
only to the first category, but not to the others, would evidently amount to ethnic discrimination.  
Kántor considers that in theory they should also qualify for the Hungarian ‘quasi-citizenship’ 
regime, although he recognises that in practice the attitude of advisory body officials may be very 
reluctant. He notes that after the Venice Commission’s decision, the Hungarian Standing Committee 
changed in October 2001 eligibility rules: those persons are eligible for the ‘quasi-citizenship’ regime 
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who declare themselves to be Hungarian, speak Hungarian, ‘and also fulfil one of the following 
criteria: 1. are registered as members of any officially recognised Hungarian organization; 2. are 
registered as Hungarian in a church; 3. are registered as Hungarian on the relevant state’s citizenship 
roll’ (Kántor 2004: 113). This way, Hungary seemed to solve the ethnic discrimination problem. 
 
6.5.5. Is ‘external-quasi citizenship’ discriminatory? For whom? 
Finally, I want to move forward and ask whether the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is 
discriminatory, and for whom it may prove to be so. One suggestion is offered by a theorist who 
considers that in the Hungarian version of the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime there is nothing 
‘liberal or morally justified about privileging ethnic Hungarians by granting them free movement rights 
denied to other citizens of the states where they reside’ (Bauböck 2010c: 38). This evidently applies to 
all instances of the regime considered in this chapter. Here Bauböck evidently believes that the 
favourable treatment regarding freedom of movement185
‘that for a measure to be considered discriminatory [it] is necessary that it deprives individuals of their 
universally recognised human rights or the possibility of enjoying them. Accordingly, a measure 
which grants one group of persons additional rights, even if this is on ethnic grounds, cannot be 
considered discriminatory against others, as long as they continue to enjoy their own human 
rights’
 delivered by one state to a number of citizens 
of another state is discriminatory towards all the other citizens in the target country who are not eligible 
to obtain it. I tend to disagree. According to Renate Weber, the United Nations International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination clearly shows 
 
186
Another slightly different way to put the charge of discrimination is to say that the ‘external 
quasi-citizenship’ regime of a home state discriminates between different citizens of a host state 
(Weber 2004: 353) 
 
In consequence discrimination can occur in the host country and may be directed against ‘external 
quasi-citizens’ of another country: ‘It may be ridiculous to hold and carry a document attesting one’s 
membership of a national group, but what is ridiculous is not illegitimate as long as it is not used in 
order to discriminate against the holder’ (Weber 2004: 357-358). 
                                                 
185 It is important to note that Bauböck strictly refers to freedom of movement. He is not claiming that any privileges for co-
ethnics are inherently discriminatory (personal communication on file with the author, April 2013). 
186 See article 1(1) of this convention, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (accessed 11 May 2012). 
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according to their ethnicity (Bauböck 2007a: 69). I think this argument is a valid and strong one, but I 
also believe that quasi-citizenship regimes can be designed in ways that can avoid this charge. As we 
have already seen, in non-homogeneous ethnic countries such as Mexico and India this charge does not 
apply. However, it may apply for example in Hungary,187
There are two problems with this way of supporting an ‘ethnizenship’ interpretation of a ‘quasi-
citizenship’ regime. Firstly, in international relations every state is responsible – and thus held 
accountable – for the way it treats its citizens. If an ethnic minority in a specific state faces 
disadvantages triggered by its minority position, then that country is responsible to eliminate those 
disadvantages. If the state is not doing this because of a lack of interest or any other cause then it can be 
pressured by regional and international communities to treat the problem seriously. Indeed, the 
question of ‘equality as justice’, as well as that of ‘substantive equality’ should fall within the scope of 
a state’s duties towards all of its citizens, and this has nothing to do with the question of quasi-
citizenship regimes. Secondly, ethnicity is by no means a reasonable criterion that can be used as a tool 
to achieve substantive equality. Turkey cannot normatively defend the fact that the pink/blue card is 
offered exclusively to native born Turks but not also to naturalised Turks. Mexico cannot normatively 
defend the fact that native Mexicans qualify for dual nationality while naturalised Mexicans do not. 
Finally, Hungary cannot normatively defend that ethnic Hungarians qualify for the identity card, while 
 and the arguments in favour of such 
interpretation are eccentric, to say the least. For example, some authors build their case on the 
Aristotelian doctrine of justice as equal treatment of equals, according to which ‘not everybody should 
be treated in the same way, but only those who are in the same situation’ (Halász, Majtényi et al. 2004: 
328). Since ethnic Hungarians living in other countries are nevertheless Hungarians ‘in the same 
situation’ and they also have to face disadvantages that arise from being in a minority position, the case 
for positive discrimination amounts to ‘a commitment to the principle of equality’ (Halász, Majtényi et 
al. 2004: 329). Basing his case on the principle of substantive equality defined as ‘unequal treatment of 
unequal cases in proportion to their inequality,’ another author believes that since such laws aim ‘to 
achieve equality between minorities and majorities by assisting in protecting minority identity, [they] 
cannot be discriminatory’ – on the contrary, they aim to achieve ‘the real equality’ (Varennes 2004: 
422).  
                                                 
187 It is true that Hungary has officially recognised – even if relatively small – ethnic minorities, including the Roma. 
However, according to the 2011 census 98.1% of the population is Hungarian and all the other ethnic groups, altogether, 
reach the percentage of 1,9% (source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Hungary#2001-2011). 
This is why I am treating Hungary as an ethnicly homogeneous country. 
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ethnic Roma or ethnic Jews – historically related in the same way to Hungary as ethnic Hungarians 
from neighbouring states are – do not. 
Some may say that by talking about discrimination related to the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
regimes, we completely misapprehend the real target of discrimination: that is, the citizens of the origin 
state, not those of the host/targeted country that do not qualify. The reason is simple: such quasi-
citizenship regimes prescribe social and cultural benefits to a group of ‘foreigners’ – from free 
education in one’s language to eligibility for national housing schemes and medical care – ‘with no 
reciprocal tax obligations’ (Ieda 2004: 30), while citizens in the origin state have to pay taxes. In 
consequence, as János Kis writes with regard to the Hungarian quasi-citizenship regime, the 
justification of the Status Law needs to be directed at Hungarian tax-payers (Kis 2004: 158). This is 
also underlined by Miroslav Kusý, who agrees that it is hard to justify to the origin state’s citizens why 
they should spend tax money on non-citizens. Writing about another case of quasi-citizenship regime, 
he believes that if ‘the Czech government bestows any privileges on Czechs holding Slovak 
citizenship, this does not imply a disadvantage to other citizens of Slovakia. It may be a case of 
discrimination against the citizens of the Czech Republic’ (Kusý 2004: 308).188 Moreover, Kusý 
believes there is nothing wrong in offering such privileges to non-citizens as long as citizens approve 
the favourable treatment.189
Finally, it is interesting to see that, far from being discriminatory, an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
regime conceived as ‘favourable treatment’ and not as ‘status’ can avoid discrimination in situations in 
which a dual citizenship regime cannot. Take the following examples. In 2004 Czechs were able to 
travel in the United Kingdom visa-free, while Slovaks were not. However, because of the Czech dual 
citizenship regime, Slovak-Czech dual citizens also enjoyed free movement (their fellow Slovak mono-
citizens did not). In this case, it is difficult to understand some scholars’ claim that ‘it is wrong to 
perceive [this situation] as discrimination against non-Czech people in Slovakia’ (Kusý 2004: 308). On 
a stakeholder account – which supports Kusý’s claim – this depends entirely on whether the special 
claims of dual citizens to dual citizenship are justified because their relation to these two states differs 
 
                                                 
188 It is also important to note here that another relevant form of discrimination is that of ethnic minorities whose co-ethnics 
abroad are excluded from similar privileges. 
189‘(T)he German minority living in Slovakia has for a long time been supported by the German government in an 
incomparably more generous manner. It subsidises schools from Bratislava to Medzev – amongst others the bilingual 
grammar school in Poprad – and it sends German instructors and textbooks to these schools. The children belonging to the 
German minority receive scholarships if they learn German in Slovak schools or if they choose to pursue their studies in the 
language of their kin-state. In the areas most densely populated by the minority, the German government has purchased two 
cultural centres and some old folks’ homes; it finances their construction and maintenance, just as it subsidises a whole 
range of cultural activities, the media and the reconstruction of monuments. On seeing all this nobody started trembling for 
Slovak independence’ Kusý (2004: 307-308). 
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from that of mono-citizens. If they have stakes in two states that others don’t, then they rightly benefit 
from the international treaties that either of their states concludes.  
Let us explore slightly different examples. In 1992, Germany offered citizenship to Silesian 
Germans from Poland, and thus ‘a part of the population of Poland had received the benefits of 
European citizenship ahead of their ethnically Polish counterparts who had to wait over a decade to 
acquire the same status’ (Kovács 2007: 95). This is even more discriminatory than the first case 
because, unlike Slovak-Czechs, German-Poles did not acquire only the right to freely travel to one 
specific country – that is, to their second country of citizenship – but they also became European 
citizens, unlike their fellow mono-citizens in their origin country. Thirdly, in a similar case Greece 
wanted to offer non-resident dual citizenship to ethnic Greeks in Albania, but Albania opposed this 
proposal because this would have implied creating a class of privileged minority citizens who were also 
European citizens in a country that is not part of the European Union (Kovács 2007: 95), 
(Christopoulos 2009).  
Unlike a dual citizenship system, the type of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime I have 
proposed in this article – conceived as ‘favourable treatment’ and not as ‘status’ – would offer Slovak-
Czechs, German-Poles and Greek-Albanians the right to enter the origin state – and arguably, the right 
to free movement in the Schengen states if those states are also members of the Schengen agreement – 
but not all the other rights enjoyed by European citizens.  This is also one of the reasons why the recent 
Hungarian decision of offering dual citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries is 
not normatively defensible. Offering not only Hungarian but also European citizenship to ethnic 
Hungarians living in countries which are not members of the European Union is not acceptable. 
Moreover, the Hungarian system of double citizenship introduced in 2010 cannot be supported for all 
the reasons I have explained in the previous chapter. 
 
6.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tried to normatively assess the idea of an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime. 
India (starting with the 1990s programs for PIOs and NRIs), Mexico (from 1997 when nationality was 
declared ‘everlasting’ until 2005 when non-resident nationals received the right to vote in presidential 
elections), Turkey (starting with the 1995 ‘pink card’ program) and Hungary (until the 2010 law on 
dual citizenship) are all countries that have implemented some sort of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
regime. The interesting point that needs to be emphasised here is the fact that, for different reasons, all 
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these four countries built an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ system exactly because they wanted to avoid 
the offer of dual citizenship, but at the same time they also wanted, for both nationalistic and economic 
reasons, to keep ties with former citizens and their descendants. 
It is important to underline the fact that an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime entitles the group 
of targeted persons to favourable treatment and not to some internationally accepted status. In other 
words, a state may decide to keep ties with former citizens and their descendants who are presently 
living in other countries, but the status conferred has no legal character except in the home state. The 
only possible problem that may appear is within a union of states where freedom of movement is 
accepted. For example, a state of the European Union and member of the Schengen zone would 
probably have serious problems in defending an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime that would offer to 
non-communitarian citizens freedom of movement in the other communitarian states. Even if we accept 
this as a serious problem in my argument for supporting this kind of regime, we have to take into 
account at least two points: (a) this case is limited only to the European Union and cannot constitute a 
problem in the rest of the world; (b) even in the case of the European Union, such an ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ regime may be a better solution than offering the status of a full European Union citizen – 
through a hazardous gesture – en masse to citizens of other non-European states, as Romania 
repeatedly did for Moldovan citizens in the last twenty years. 
I have also claimed that an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime may offer very broad qualifying 
conditions for the targeted persons – for example, having a citizen of the origin state in the close family 
or a cultural link may be considered as strong enough qualifying conditions. However, this system 
should not be reduced to the stricter and normatively dubious form of an ‘ethnizenship regime.’ 
Further, once qualified, an ‘external quasi-citizen’ may enjoy all the rights the origin state accepts to 
offer her. Of course, since we are talking about ‘favourable treatment,’ maybe the term ‘benefits’ 
should be used instead of ‘rights.’ In any case, usually the bundle of rights (or benefits) should be 
situated somewhere between a minimum (the right to return, educational and cultural rights), and a 
maximum; namely, a whole range of social rights, but no political rights. 
I have also tried to show that such a system is accepted by at least the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission, that it is normatively justified, and that it may prove to be a better alternative to a 
dual citizenship regime. Such an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ proposal understood as ‘favourable 
treatment’ may be discriminatory only if it is badly conceived, in two senses. In the first place, it may 
discriminate against the citizens of the state that supports it, since it would offer benefits to persons 
who do not in turn pay taxes. Since only tax-payers of the state that proposes an ‘external quasi-
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citizenship’ regime may be discriminated against, they should also be the only ones who decide 
whether such a ‘favourable treatment’ should be offered in the first place. Additionally, it may 
discriminate against internal minorities in the home state, if it does not take their ‘external co-ethnics’ 
into account. 
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Chapter 7. A Plea for Residence-Based Citizenship:  
An Analysis of Legal Provisions on Citizenship in Fifty States 
 
‘Sweden has increasingly been equalising the rights of citizens and  
foreigners […] The principle of domicile thus gained importance, and citizenship  
correspondingly lost significance […] the Swedish construction, where focus lies on  
permanent residence instead of citizenship […] Belonging to Swedish society  
through long-term residence is generally believed to create a strong link  
between the individual and the state’(Bernitz 2012: 1, 7, 8, 12) 
 
‘[…] citizenship is now [in the United Kingdom] a conditional and provisional status 
[…] the culture changes from one of belonging by residence and participation to  
one of belonging by entitlement and descent’(Sawyer and Wray 2012: 1-2, 31) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The last four chapters have tended to converge on the idea of effective citizenship, understood as a 
‘residence-based’ membership. We have already seen that there are no serious arguments to deny this 
status to long-term residents irrespective of their legal standing. In other words, legal long-term 
residents, temporary workers and irregular immigrants need (as a matter of justice) to be set on the path 
to full citizenship status. On the other hand, the cases of non-resident dual citizens and of ‘external 
quasi-citizens’ made obvious the fact that they do not have any moral claim to keep official 
membership status in a country where they have no longer lived for a long period. This chapter tries to 
openly address the problem of residence-based citizenship. I want to review this status’ exemplars as 
they appear in current citizenship laws in the members of the European Union, non-European Union 
states and a few non-European countries. I will draw on the 47 country reports on citizenship 
legislation delivered by the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, plus legislation in three other countries 
(Canada, the USA, and New Zealand). 
Three preliminary notes are important here. Firstly, it is essential to state from the very 
beginning that my intentions in this chapter are both practical and normative. From the practical point 
of view, I want to survey actual citizenship legislation in 50 states (or parts of these laws) that come 
very close to a residence-based theory of citizenship. The empirical information about existing 
practices of ius soli and naturalisation is intended to strengthen the normative arguments delivered so 
far in supporting a residence-based theory of citizenship. From the normative point of view, I want to 
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(a) dismiss other naturalisation requirements except residence, and (b) dismiss multiple citizenship as 
an acceptable status from both national and international relations’ points of view. 
Secondly, the EUDO country reports unavoidably reflect the legal interpretation and 
understanding of their authors. Beside the country reports, the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship 
offers a comparative database regarding modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship,190 which 
compares citizenship laws, and their implementation and impact, in Europe. Needless to say, 
sometimes these two projects offer different legal interpretations, according to their authors’ views. For 
example, I may consider Norway a very liberal country because it fits well with my proposal of 
residence-based citizenship (citizenship is offered to long-term residents and it is withdrawn from long-
term emigrants who apply for another country’s citizenship). However, prohibition of dual citizenship 
may seem to many a non-liberal legal provision, so Norway’s numerical indicator in ACIT/CITLAW 
does not link this state with a liberal view on citizenship acquisition.191
Thirdly, it is important to acknowledge that citizenship legislations are different in various 
states depending on whether a specific country is a state of origin or of destination, depending on 
particular histories and sociological and economical circumstances, and finally depending on the 
present situation (whether the migration phenomenon is stable or on the rise). Such historical and 
sociological considerations are always important, since citizenship provisions do not take place in some 
abstract normative space. However, the task of discussing each country’s context cannot be completed 
 Given this difference in 
academic understandings, the ways of constructing and comparing indicators, and finally personal 
opinions, interpretations may vary. As a consequence, in the framework of this chapter I have decided 
to strictly follow the country reports because of their detailed explanation on current legislation. 
However, I have also checked the country reports against the modes of acquisition and loss database, 
and provided a link to it every time when the information seemed relevant. The reader will thus be able 
to compare different views on citizenship legislation in each country.  
                                                 
190 The introductory paper written by Jeffers, Honohan and Bauböck (2012) is accessible online at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/CITLAW_explanatory%20text.pdf (last accessed 14 August 2013). The mode of acquisition page can be 
consulted here: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition, while the mode of loss can be consulted here: 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-loss. The CITLAW (EUDO Citizenship Law Indicators) main page can be 
accessed at the following link: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/eudo-citizenship-law-indicators. The ACIT (Access to 
Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration) main page can be accessed at the following link: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/about/acit. There is also a special report for each country, and the links are available in the bibliography.  
191 Indeed, a comparison of Norway on the six main ACIT/CITLAW indicators with EU 15 and EU 27 shows that apart 
from ordinary naturalisation conditions slightly above average, there is little that indicates that Norway is “liberal” 
http://ind.eudo-citizenship.eu/acit/printage/prepare/html/study/citlaw/chart/radar/field_1/1/field_2/58-57-36/field_3/1-4-11-
18-36-39/group/null (last accessed 14 august 2013). I want to thank Rainer Bauböck for drawing me attention on this case. 
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within the framework of this study. But an extensive legal analysis of the context of any single 
country’s immigration and citizenship legislation should take such considerations into account.192
Section five explains the connection between residence-based citizenship and the ‘zero option’ 
by discussing the internationally sanctioned provisions in the case of state formation and state 
 
Section two discusses acquisition by ius soli, and takes notice that an unconditional acquisition 
under this provision has been abandoned by almost all countries taken into consideration in the 20th 
century in order to avoid both ‘accidental citizenship’ and ‘citizenship tourism’. However, an ius soli 
acquisition based on a simple requirement of previous residence (applied either to parents or to their 
children) is a liberal provision supported by residence-based citizenship. 
Section three is dedicated to naturalisation policies based on residence. In a first step I make a 
distinction between very liberal regimes (which offer citizenship mainly based on a residence 
requirement) and less liberal ones which add many other conditions. A second step discusses these 
supplementary conditions in detail and tries to dismiss them, and also interprets the principle of 
‘genuine link’ as residence. The third sub-section examines the only requirement of a residence-based 
citizenship theory (i.e., previous residence in the country) and makes a distinction between liberal, 
normal and conservative conditions required by current legislations. The fourth subsection discusses 
different instances of residence-based naturalisation in present citizenship laws. 
Section four attacks the problem of multiple citizenship, in three parts. Firstly, I am trying to 
show that external voting rights cannot be accepted, because they either may decide the result of 
elections (thus giving non-residents a say in a political process they are not subject to), or they may 
impose an outcome on a political community where permanent residents represent the majority of the 
population (thus they do not have a say in a political process they are subject to). Secondly, I 
straightforwardly claim that dual citizenship cannot be accepted. After offering some real world cases 
of states that repudiate multiple status, I criticise the normative theory of ‘stakeholdership,’ which 
accepts it at least for first-generation emigrants and (under some conditions) for the second generation. 
Thirdly, I survey current examples of dual citizenship prohibition in present legislation and underline 
that in many cases multiple citizenship can and should be avoided because of reasons related to 
international relations. Moreover, I demonstrate that more than half of the countries under 
consideration have laws that try either to limit or to prohibit instances of dual citizenship. 
                                                 
192 The country reports offered by EUDO Observatory on Citizenship present a historical analysis of citizenship legislation 
for every single country. The reports can be consulted online at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles (last accessed 12 
November 2013). 
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succession. The sixth and last section concludes the debate by arguing against real-world cases that 
dismiss residence-based citizenship, either by legally sanctioning unacceptable cases of permanent 
partial citizenship, or by offering citizenship without requesting applicants any type of residence in the 
territory. 
 
7.2. Residence-based citizenship: ius soli 
Ius soli simply states that a person born in the territory of a state must acquire that state’s citizenship.193 
According to a recent study, Canada and the United States are the only ‘advanced states’ (Feere 2010) 
that still practice an unconditional ius soli.194 In Europe, only the Republic of Moldova still implements 
it.195
 The best normative defence of unconditional ius soli has been advanced by Joseph Carens. 
According to this scholar, ‘justice requires that democratic states grant citizenship at birth to the 
descendants of settled immigrants’ (Carens 2014, forthcoming: chapter two). The argument supporting 
this requirement starts by investigating the crucial importance of birthright citizenship to citizens’ 
children and then claims that every reason for supporting birthright citizenship in this case also applies 
to settled immigrants’ children. Because of their strong ties to the political community they were born 
 The last instances of such a practice in the European Union were registered in four countries. The 
first was the United Kingdom, which had unconditional ius soli until the 1981 British Nationality Act 
(which came into force in 1983). The second was Portugal, which had had a very strong tradition of ius 
soli from the 17th century until 1981, when ius sanguinis became prevalent (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 1). 
The third was Malta, where from independence (1964) until 1989 the law had the effect that ‘persons 
born in Malta [were] Maltese citizens, no matter whether they [had] foreign parents or not (Buttigieg 
2010: 2). The fourth was Ireland from independence until 2004, a period when everyone born in Ireland 
was automatically considered an Irish citizen (Handoll 2012: 1). 
                                                 
193 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on ‘Mode A02a: Birth in country (2nd generation)’, 
link: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A02a; see also ‘Mode A05: Birth in 
country (acquisition after birth)’, link: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A05 (last accessed 14 August 2013). 
194 According to Feere’s study published online in 2010 by the Center for Immigration Studies (http://cis.org/birthright-
citizenship), only 30 out of the world’s 194 countries grant unconditional ius soli (the author was not able to confirm the 
policy for only 19 countries). Interestingly, almost all countries are situated in North and South America (see table 1 
following the above link). 
195 See Legea Nr. 1024 din 02.06.2000 (the Citizenship Law of the Republic of Moldova, No. 1024/2000), art. 11 (1) (c): 
citizen of the Republic of Moldova shall be the child ‘(…) born in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, whose parents 
possess the citizenship of another state, or one of them is stateless and the other one is a foreign citizen’ (my translation); 
source: http://lex.justice.md/md/311522/ (last accessed on 14 August 2013). Interestingly, Feere disagrees in his 2010 study 
and lists Moldova among countries that do not practice an unconditional ius soli. 
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in, the latter have even ‘stronger claims to birth-right citizenship than the children of emigrant citizens.’ 
Moreover, this argument clearly implies that a policy of ‘double ius soli’ (automatically granting 
citizenship only to the third generation) is illiberal and, as Carens claims, ‘unjust.’ However, this 
scholar does not argue that a more restrictive ius soli is impermissible. He only offers a 
consequentialist argument which presents a contextual defence of unconditional ius soli in countries 
that have historically applied it (e.g. the United States and Canada).  
The argument has two steps. Firstly, it shows that the risk of offering citizenship to a child that 
will not grow up in a state is not particular to the unconditional ius soli policy, but also to ius sanguinis. 
Secondly, he considers that well-established rights may be violated through moving from unconditional 
to conditional ius soli. Countries like Canada and the United States see themselves as countries of 
immigration, and in their legal systems ‘acceptance of the children of immigrants as citizens has never 
been in doubt’. A change in their citizenship laws would be seen ‘as a repudiation of that basic 
openness to immigration’ and as ‘a betrayal of a fundamental national ideal.’ This is especially the case 
in the United States, where the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states: ‘All persons born or 
naturalised in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States.’196
However, Carens does not claim that anyone born in a state deserves birthright citizenship. The 
most important thing is the expectation that the child will be raised in the state of birth – or at least that 
the child will reside in that state for an ‘extended period as a minor.’ This is important, because an 
unconditional ius soli can either ‘lead to accidental citizenship’ (for example, transients giving birth to 
a child in a country with unconditional ius soli), or it can ‘create incentives for citizenship tourism’
 According to Carens, ‘to modify that amendment (…) would be a national tragedy’ (Carens 
2014, forthcoming: chapter two). 
197 
(for example, parents travelling to such a country to give birth to a child with the intention of acquiring 
legal residence in that country as the parents of an EU citizen child) (Dumbrava 2010: 9).198
If this is correct, then we have to somehow limit unconditional ius soli. In my view, Carens 
already offered the right answer. The residence criterion is the only one that should be taken into 
 
                                                 
196 Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv (last accessed on 3 August 2013). 
197 In the United States, children born by parents with the intention to receive citizenship are called ‘anchor babies.’ 
198 Only EU law has this effect, whereas irregular immigrants who are care-giving parents of a US born child can be 
deported. See the ECJ case of Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, case C-200/02. Catherine Zhu, the child of a Chinese couple working in the UK, has received European 
citizenship because of the Irish ius soli. Since she was an EU citizen, the court decided that she has the right to live in any 
member state, and since she was minor, the court decided that her mother has the right to reside with her. For a short 
summary, see http://www.eucaselaw.info/zhu-and-chen-2004/; text of the ECJ judgment: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002J0200:EN:HTML; text of the Advocate General opinion: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002C0200:EN:HTML (last accessed: 14 August 2013). 
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account: in other words, being born on the territory of the state (ius soli) and residing for a number of 
years in that country (residence-based citizenship) should be enough in order to create a right to 
citizenship acquisition.199 However, even if this seems to be morally acceptable, there will always be a 
special problem that will cast some shadow on this provision: indeed, whose residence are we talking 
about? This special problem has been already raised in legal debates in Portugal, and it concerns ‘the 
influence of the parents’ legal situation on the acquisition of citizenship of children’ (Piçarra and Gil 
2012: 22). As these authors rightly argue, ‘according to the pure principles of justice, the legal situation 
of the parents should not influence the acquisition of citizenship by the children, but only their own 
acquisition of citizenship.’ However, the cited authors continue that since the only link of new-born 
children with the community is through their parents, ‘children’s destiny’ cannot be separated from 
‘parents’ behaviour’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 22-23). Moreover, since according to the Constitution a 
Portuguese child cannot be alienated from his parents, such a legal separation would directly imply the 
impossibility to deport irregular migrants with Portuguese children. However, Serbia is the only 
country which elegantly solved the problem by rightfully deciding that the residence criterion should be 
applied to the child, not to his parents. According to its law, a child born in the territory to foreigner 
parents can acquire citizenship after two years of residence200
However, a general residence-based theory of citizenship would imply that ius soli should apply 
either at birth if one parent has resided in the country for a number of years (the first case), or after 
birth if the child has resided in the country for a number of years after birth (the second case). Portugal 
is an example for the first case, since it has implemented such a law since 2006. Immigrants of the 
second generation can acquire citizenship at birth when three requirements are met: (1) ‘one of the 
parents has lived legally in Portugal for at least five years;’ (2) ‘such parent is not in Portugal serving 
his or her own state;’ and (3) ‘the child declares [in person or through a legal agent if the person is a 
minor] his or her wish to be Portuguese’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 15). In Ireland (after the abolishment of 
unconditional ius soli in 2004) a child can become an Irish citizen if (according to conditional ius soli) 
one parent has legally resided in Ireland for three out of the last four years.
 (no other condition being required) 
(Rava 2010: 14). 
201
                                                 
199 As Joseph Carens puts it, ‘The most important consideration from a moral perspective is that, by adopting some sort of 
ius soli law, these states have recognized the principle that the descendants of immigrants deserve birthright citizenship 
when there is good reason to believe that they will grow up in the state where they were born’ (Carens 2014: chapter two). 
200 Serbia is the only state with such a short residence requirement. Of course France, Belgium, Italy and several other 
countries also have conditional ius soli requiring residence of the target person – but in these cases, there are residence 
requirements until majority (or somewhat shorter in the French current law). 
201 This is implicit in the ‘entitled to Irish citizenship’ clause, but not clearly so since naturalisation in Ireland is extremely 
discretionary.  
 The UK (where the 
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strong tradition of ius soli was lost in 1983) also adopted such a liberal law, but only for children of EU 
citizens: ‘after five years as a lawful resident under the [EU] free movement rules, a parent gains the 
status of permanent resident and can then pass British citizenship to a child born in the UK’ (Sawyer 
and Wray 2012: 16). According to the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, other contemporary and 
similarly liberal laws of ius soli can be found in Belgium (condition: the ‘child is born to noncitizens 
who have lived in Belgium at least 10 years before the birth of the child and who have filed a 
citizenship claim for the child before the age of 12 years’), in Greece (condition: the ‘person is born in 
Greece and both parents have been permanently resident there for five years at time of the person’s 
birth’), and in Germany (ius soli is acquired at birth and the condition is eight years of legal residence 
of one parent).202
In the second case, the residence requirement is somehow extended based on a voluntary 
decision of her parents or of the child upon reaching the age of maturity; this happens in all cases of 
after-birth acquisition. For example, French law provides that a ‘person born in France whose parents 
are neither French nor born in France will automatically become French at age eighteen if he or she still 
resides in France’ unless she explicitly decline French citizenship (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 2).
 
203 A 
full, updated list concerning acquisition of citizenship after birth in European countries has been 
delivered by the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship and can be consulted online.204
                                                 
202 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on Mode A02a: Birth in country (2nd generation), 
available at: 
 The normative 
problem is whether, in the second case, acquisition should be automatic and non-consensual or rather 
optional and thus consensual. A residence-based theory of citizenship supports automatic ius soli from 
birth and thus avoids consent for the second generation. This way, a child born in the territory gets 
citizenship irrespective of her parents’ nationality. From this theory’s point of view, consent is what 
needs to be offered to first generation immigrants, but not to children born in the country. The risk of 
over-inclusion for second generations without relevant ties can be taken care of through voluntary 
renunciation (by parents or later by the child) by those who have also acquired another citizenship. 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A02a (last accessed 15 August 2013). 
203 More exactly, according to the EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition, in France citizenship can be 
accessed by declaration if the person ‘is a minor who was born in France and has been resident there for 5 years since the 
age of 11 (declaration by child), or the child is under the age of 16 and has been resident in France for 5 years since the age 
of 8 (declaration by parent)’. Link: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=country&country=France (last accessed 11 September 
2013). 
204 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on Mode A05: Birth in country (acquisition after birth), 
available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A05 (last accessed 15 august 2013). 
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A final important provision is called ‘double ius soli.’ Here, an individual born in a country to 
an alien parent also born in that country becomes (automatically or voluntarily) a citizen of the 
respective state. Regimes that have only double ius soli are generally more restrictive than those that 
have only ius soli for the second generation. But this may not be always true if one considers the 
extremely illiberal second generation provisions in Italy (Zincone and Basili 2010: 2), Austria (Çınar 
2010: 15), Slovenia (Medved 2010: 12), etc. What is important is that several countries combine ius 
soli around majority for the second generation with automatic ius soli at birth for the third generation. 
France (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 2) and Belgium (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 7) are good 
examples. This combination is rather inclusive and third-generation ius soli compensates to some 
extent for the delay in inclusion of the second generation.205
7.3. Residence-based citizenship: naturalisation 
 Double ius soli laws can be found in 
France (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 4), Luxembourg (Scuto 2010: 1, 11), Morocco (Perrin 2011: 8), 
Portugal (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 14), and Spain (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 1). There was a 
similar law also in the Netherlands between 1953 and 1975 (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 5). However, 
together with Carens I do believe that generally double ius soli cannot be defended as a stand-alone 
provision since any child born in a country and who is expected to live for a number of years there 
should have the right to access citizenship through simple ius soli. 
 
 
7.3.1. Liberal versus less liberal naturalisation regimes 
Careful attention to the development of citizenship law in the Western world would reveal two tracks. 
On the one hand, there is a small group of liberal regimes, which tend to reduce most requirements for 
citizenship acquisition apart from time of residence. Here we have the example of Serbia, Sweden, 
Norway, Portugal, New Zealand, Canada, the USA, and Belgium (until 2012). On the other hand, we 
have the ever increasing number of Western countries that are moving further away from the liberal 
trend and are building strong obstacles against naturalisation. Let us take some examples. 
On the liberal side, until 2012 Belgium only required that those who applied for naturalisation 
be of age and have been resident in Belgium for three years (based on a residence permit of unlimited 
duration) (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 10). Moreover, after seven years of legal residence, there 
                                                 
205 Not every scholar agrees with this: as we have already seen, for Carens double ius soli is a rather illiberal principle: ‘The 
phrase “second-generation immigrant” is a contradiction in terms. Those who are born and brought up in a society simply 
are members. They have an unqualified moral claim to citizenship’ (1989: 47; see also 2014: second chapter). 
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was the ‘possibility to become Belgian by a mere declaration’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 1).206 In 
New Zealand a person who applies for citizenship must be of age (16 years), have full capacity, must 
be of good character, must have knowledge of responsibilities and privileges attached to citizenship, 
sufficient knowledge of English, should intend to have continuing residence in New Zealand and 
should comply with the rule of three years of residence before the application.207
Conditions are even less strict in Serbia, where since 2003 the requirements for naturalisation 
have been an application form, being of age, three years of residence, and a written statement that the 
applicant accepts the Republic of Serbia as his or her state (Rava 2010: 14). Finally, in Portugal in 
order to become a citizen the applicant must be of adult age, must have legally resided in Portugal for 
six years, must have sufficient knowledge of Portuguese language, and must ‘have no convictions for 
committing crimes which carry a prison sentence of three years or more according to Portuguese law’ 
(Piçarra and Gil 2012: 20). It is important to note that in the cases cited above, the two countries that 
require minimal language skills either asses these skills through a simple interview (New Zealand), or 
provide free language classes sponsored by the state (Portugal). Moreover, it is interesting to note that, 
unlike the general trend, there is no administrative discretion
 Sweden requires as 
conditions for naturalisation that the applicant prove her identity, be of age, have a residence permit, be 
of good conduct, and finally have had residence for the last five years in Sweden. There are no 
requirements regarding proof of means to support oneself, or knowledge of the state language. 
Moreover, there is no residence requirement for spouses or for partners. It seems there are a limited 
number of naturalisation refusals, and there are also ‘many possibilities of granting exceptions from the 
naturalisation requirements’ (Bernitz 2012: 13-14).  
208
                                                 
206 However the law has been changed and it seems Belgium is drifting away from the liberal residence-based citizenship 
model I am proposing. According to the new 2012 citizenship law that entered  into force on 1 January 2013, Belgium asks 
for five years of previous residence, knowledge of one of the three national languages, proof of social integration and proof 
of economic participation – see Belgian Code of Nationality (Code de la nationalité belge), 2013-03-17/14, available at 
 in granting citizenship to those who 
meet the qualifying criteria in Portugal (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 20), Norway (Brochmann 2010: 9), and 
Sweden (Bernitz 2012: 1). We can conclude that these countries are a very good example of residence-
based naturalisation, since residence is the only (or at least the most important) criterion in order to be 
accepted as a citizen. 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/loi_a1.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1984062835&table_name=loi&&caller=list&F&
fromtab=loi&tri=dd+AS+RANK&rech=1&numero=1&sql=(text+contains+(''))#LNK0007 (in French). 
207 New Zealand, Citizenship Act 1977, No. 61, ‘reprint as at 1 July 2013’, art. 8(1), art.8(2), and art. 17 (1-3), available at: 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0061/latest/DLM443684.html (last accessed 30 July 2013). 
208 This is indeed crucial. It is true that regimes with few requirements and strong discretion may be much more illiberal 
than those with more but clearly stated requirements and subjective entitlements. 
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Except in the cases cited above, naturalisation seems to be more restrictive (Kostakopoulou 
2010: 16) in the rest of fifty countries under scrutiny.209
7.3.2. Dismissing other naturalisation requirements except residence 
 In Macedonia for example, in order to apply 
for citizenship the candidate must be of age, have had legal residence for at least eight years, must have 
an accommodation, must have a permanent source of subsistence means, must ‘not (…) have been 
sentenced to imprisonment of minimum duration of one year in the country of his citizenship for acts 
punishable according to the regulations of Macedonia’, ‘there should (…) be [no] criminal proceedings 
either in Macedonia […] or in the country of his or her citizenship’ against him, must be fluent in 
Macedonian, must have no measure of prohibition of residence in Macedonia against him, he should 
not pose a threat to the security and defence of the country, he must sign a loyal oath, and must provide 
‘a release from the previous citizenship or a proof that it will be provided after the acquisition of 
Macedonian citizenship’ (Spaskovska 2012: 13).  
Other countries add several requirements for naturalisation, which are either dull or simply 
strange. In Latvia (Krūma 2010: 11) and in Romania (Iordachi 2010: 8) the applicant must prove that 
she knows the national anthem, even though there are numerous Latvian and Romanian born citizens 
who do not know it. Moreover, in Switzerland ‘foreigners may be required to be familiar with Swiss, 
cantonal, and local habits, customs, and traditions (…) The Canton of Lucerne even asks […] 
candidates to prove that they have contacts with Swiss citizens, and show an interest in social 
coexistence in their municipality.’ (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 24). Such requirements are 
well beyond the realm of the reasonable, since they test formally knowledge of customs that are by 
definition informal. And again, it is strange to require ‘interest in social coexistence’ and evidence of 
‘contact with Swiss citizens’ as long as there are probably enough Swiss born citizens who prefer to 
live a solitary, reclusive life. Finally, in Lithuania until 2002 there was another curious requirement, 
according to which the applicant must not be a chronic alcoholic or a drug addict (Swider 2011: 13). 
 
Joseph Carens has offered the most elegant argument for citizenship acquisition based exclusively on 
residence. According to him, ‘people have a moral right to be citizens of any society of which they are 
members (…) Membership is a social fact, not something that can simply be determined by political 
authorities’ (Carens 1989: 32). But who is a ‘member’ of a particular society in this sense? What are 
                                                 
209 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on Mode A06: Ordinary naturalisation, available at: 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A06 (last accessed 12 September 
2013). 
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those features – or ‘social facts’ – that could undeniably assure us that a person is a member of a 
specific society? According to Carens, living and working in a place is enough in order to create a 
moral claim of belonging: ‘the moral claims of the aliens derive from their social ties to these countries, 
from the fact that they live and work there’ (Carens 1989: 33). According to this scholar, social 
membership morally entitles people to citizenship. As a consequence, naturalisation laws should ‘make 
citizenship available to all long-term residents, requiring only the passage of time and the meeting of 
modest, inexpensive formalities [my emphasis]’ (Carens 1989: 46). 
But current citizenship legislation does not always closely observe the requirements of moral 
and political theory. Today, besides residence, there are four large categories of other substantive 
requirements and an important procedural question.210 These are: (a) language and civic knowledge 
tests; (b) clean criminal record, exclusion of tax evaders; (c) financial requirements; (d) renunciation of 
previous nationality; and (e) administrative discretion (Swider 2011) (which is the most important 
procedural aspect).211
Let us then survey the other requirements and the procedural question, in reverse order. 
Regarding the latter (naturalisation as administrative discretion), there is hardly any reasonable moral 
motivation to support it. As we have already seen in the cases of Portugal, Norway and Sweden, there 
is no administrative discretion in a number of states: if the applicant meets the requested criteria, then 
naturalisation will be granted. However, in most countries this is not the case. In Poland, for example, 
naturalisation is highly discretionary: ‘fulfilling the requirements does not guarantee the obtaining of 
this status’ (Swider 2011: 7). Moreover, in the UK (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 24) and in many other 
countries there is no legal possibility to appeal against refusal. Such a situation cannot really be 
defended from a liberal point of view, so administrative discretion should be minimised
 I will set aside for the moment the renunciation of previous nationality, to which 
I will return later (in section 7.4.3.). 
212
                                                 
210 Another systematic analysis of naturalisation conditions is offered by Goodman (2010b). For an overview of 
naturalisation requirements, one can access EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on Mode A06: 
Ordinary naturalisation, available at 
 in the 
naturalisation procedure. 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A06  (last accessed 12 September 
2013). 
211 Administrative discretion is the most important, but not the only procedural aspect. Other procedural aspects are fees 
(which are different from income requirements), appeal options, waiting times, etc. Results regarding empirical evidence on 
naturalisation procedures (besides administrative discretion) are briefly summarised in Bauböck et.al. (2013), available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit_report_eu%20level%20summary.pdf (last accessed 12 September 2013). 
212 Discretion may not be altogether dismissed, since it can also be implicit in criteria that require civil servants to make 
judgments based on their assessment of a case, such as ‘good moral character’ or ‘cultural assimilation/integration’, 
‘loyalty’ etc. – although, as I am trying to argue, these type of assessments should not be accepted as a part of the 
naturalisation procedure. 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
189 
 
Financial requirements213
What about clean criminal record and the exclusion of tax evaders? It is easy to understand a 
state’s interest in avoiding naturalising persons who are criminals or would not pay their taxes 
(suppose, for the sake of the argument, that any state could always acquire such information from the 
state of previous citizenship). Such legal transgression, however, doesn’t seem to have anything to do 
with citizenship and migration laws. As one author observes, ‘[i]f an immigrant violates the law, civic 
and criminal sanctions exist’ (Orgad 2010: 22). Firstly, as Swider puts it, ‘imperfect tax or health 
insurance payment is not necessarily a sign of bad will.’ Secondly, it depends on what ‘criminal law’ is 
supposed to mean in each country. For example, in Ireland ‘any traffic violation is considered to be a 
criminal offense, and naturalisation may be denied to a person purely because of a traffic ticket’ 
(Swider 2011: 9). Thirdly, from a liberal-democratic point of view, ‘even denying access to citizenship 
to serious criminal offenders can be seen as problematic […] since it results in their exclusion from 
political participation in a system that criminalises their actions’ (Swider 2011: 9-10). Finally, it is 
important to note that some countries have abandoned this type of requirements for naturalisation, as 
 are usually linked to stable income, evidence of employment, absence 
of debts, or dependence on social assistance. Two points can be raised here. On the one hand, in the 
21st century it is becoming increasingly difficult to find persons who work for all of their lives in the 
same place: changing workplaces (or even industry) several times is becoming the prevalent pattern. 
The fact that a candidate for naturalisation can prove evidence of employment, stable income or 
absence of debts during some period before the application does not mean that the situation could not 
change on the first day after she becomes a citizen of that country. And, obviously, the longer the past 
record counts, the harder it is to meet the criteria, since otherwise candidates could simply apply at a 
point in time when they are employed and have sufficient income. On the other hand, although it is 
surely easy to understand the state’s interest in not having an increase of socially assisted persons 
overnight, it is hard to morally justify the above condition. A straightforward argument for 
disconnecting financial requirements from citizenship acquisition is the fact that citizenship has 
historically become disconnected from social class (Marshall 1949/1997), while the impact of 
economic requirements is to introduce or maintain social class as an exclusionary criterion for access to 
citizenship, an attitude rather difficult to defend morally. The argument that membership should not be 
determined on basis of criteria of social class is perfectly sufficient to refute income as well as 
educational conditions. 
                                                 
213 For conditions regarding resources see the comparative report by Goodman (2010b: 40). 
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Serbia did after 2003 (Rava 2010: 11). For all these reasons, I believe such requirements should not be 
intermingled with the naturalisation procedure. 
Finally, the importance and relevance of language and civic knowledge tests is highly debated. 
In a recent working paper on this issue, Christian Joppke, for instance, believes that tests investigating 
knowledge of language and of principles and procedures of liberal democracy are legitimate, and tests 
investigating cultural knowledge are not unreasonable (Joppke 2010a: 1).214
Two rather different social arguments against language and civic knowledge tests have been 
raised. According to the first, they raise a barrier against naturalisation for ‘lower-educated, less-well-
off immigrants’ (Groenendijk and van Oers 2010: 9), creating thus the danger of involuntary 
 Such tests, he argues, are 
incompatible with liberal norms only when ‘beliefs (and not just knowledge) are tested,’ and when 
‘behavioural virtuosity is imposed as condition for naturalization’ (Joppke 2010b: 39). However, it is 
difficult to find a reasonable ground to agree with Joppke. Firstly, language tests for naturalisation 
deter applicants with lower education and language skills and thus work again as a class barrier in 
access to citizenship. Secondly, as one commentator underlines, it is hard to believe ‘that the political 
process in liberal democracies requires members to share only one language, or only this particular 
language (of the specific national culture dominant in a given territory)’ (Dumbrava 2010: 11). 
As to what constitutes cultural knowledge and cultural preservation, it is hard to understand 
even what these expressions are meant to mean. On the one hand ‘culture’ is not a fixed object, but a 
continuously changing phenomenon: over the centuries it can borrow from other cultures, it can 
intermingle with various, unfamiliar cultural settings, or it can give birth to artistic expressions. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to understand which ‘culture’ is supposed to be the subject of such a test, since 
almost no country on earth is the home of only one nationality or ethnic group. A further difficulty is 
that not even basic social norms are universally accepted in a specific country: for example, recognition 
of concubinage and homosexuality are in the Dutch curriculum for the cultural test, but ‘not all social 
and religious groups in the Netherlands do accept these norms.’ Moreover, ‘the acceptance of such 
norms is not necessary for a liberal democracy’ (Michalowski 2010: 6). Of course, we must distinguish 
between the acceptance of such norms by the government institutions of a liberal democracy (which 
may be seen as necessary), and the acceptance by all (actual or in-the-making) citizens, which clearly 
isn’t necessary since it would interfere with freedom of conscience. 
                                                 
214 In another article Joppke compares the citizenship tests in the USA, Australia, and Canada, and he argues that ‘elements 
of a restrictive turn are noticeable in Australia and Canada, but only at the level of political rhetoric, not of law and policy, 
which remain liberal and inclusive’ (Joppke 2013: 1). 
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‘permanent long-term residence’ status, which is another instance of permanent quasi-citizenship. 
According to the second, disciplining and standardising ‘the knowledge, feelings and way of life’ in 
order to create ‘the perfect citizen’ is not quite a liberal move (Carrera and Guild 2010: 29). As Carens 
notes, ‘integration’ becomes a category of discrimination when it is required as a precondition (beyond 
residence) for granting citizenship. This tends ‘to violate the principles of toleration and respect for 
diversity to which all liberal-democratic states are committed and to call into question the equal status 
of current citizens who differ from majority’ (Carens 1989: 38, 40). At the end of the day, as Orgad 
notes, if language and cultural and civic tests are considered so important, why not oblige natives to 
take them at maturity before voting (Orgad 2010: 21). The ‘passage of time’ thus becomes the only 
relevant qualifier for citizenship: 
 
 ‘(…) the only relevant social facts are birthplace and residence, the fact that one has been born and 
brought up in a society. To use measures of “integration” beyond that of time spent in a society is 
inevitably to invite invidious comparisons among current citizens along related lines. If one moves 
beyond the passage of time as a requirement for citizenship, one risks imposing demands on new 
citizens that old ones could not meet and defining the meaning of citizenship in terms of the social and 
cultural characteristics of the dominant majority. Any such approach threatens to conflict with 
fundamental liberal democratic principles’ (Carens 1989) (42) 
 
What is important to underline is that there are countries which do not have a language requirement for 
naturalisation, like Sweden, Italy and Ireland (Goodman 2010a: 36). Actually, there is no need for this. 
In the 21st century, because of their education and because they may know other languages besides 
their native one, people can live well in a country, pay taxes there and have relationships with native 
born citizens without knowing that specific language. Suppose an American has already lived for seven 
years in Hungary. His job is there (hence he is paying taxes to the Hungarian state), his children are 
learning in Hungarian schools, and he has Hungarian friends. As long as the centre of his life is in 
Hungary because of long-term residence, how can one consider that he cannot manage to live here as a 
fully-fledged citizen just because, not knowing the language, he is supposed to have different problems, 
such as problems with the administration?  
One counter-argument would state that a ‘fully fledged citizen’ in democracy presupposes the 
capacity to follow political debates, to form political opinions and to vote responsibly – and all these 
require knowledge of the official language(s). But usually in many states there are foreign-language 
newspapers, agencies, and multi-national companies that disseminate information. Moreover, one 
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foreign resident may arguably have different native friends that could offer him different insights which 
may not be more biased than the news presented in mass media are. The conclusion is that this 
requirement is an unnatural barrier to naturalisation and it must be dispensed with. At the end of the 
day, the ‘integration test […] diminishes the relevance of the length of residence in the country of 
origin as the main factor for the individual to get closer to the formal juridical equality granted by the 
acquisition of citizenship status’ (Carrera and Guild 2010: 33). It is important to underline that I do not 
want to imply that states do not need to support education in national language(s) since full citizenship 
does not presuppose that citizens can communicate in one or a few official language(s). Countries like 
Sweden, Italy and Ireland, which do not have a language requirement for naturalisation, still support 
education in national language(s). Such an education should be enhanced through different cultural and 
financial incentives rather than imposed as a condition for naturalisation. 
All these naturalisation requirements are in fact seen as small bits in a bigger and newer process  
sometimes called ‘naturalisation as the last step of successful integration,’ which seems to be spreading 
all over the western world. For example, in France the applicant must be ‘culturally assimilated’ 
(Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 15); in Denmark one has to deserve to become a citizen, since citizenship is 
seen as ‘a gift offered by the Danish people to those who deserve it’ (Ersbøll 2010: 32). Even in 
Norway some call for a conception of citizenship which sees it ‘as a reward for successful 
integration’(Fagerlund and Brander 2010: 39). In the Netherlands, the relation between immigration 
and integration has been simply turned on its head: ‘instead of being a means of integration, acquisition 
of Dutch nationality is […] seen as the crown on the completed integration process’(van Oers, de Hart 
et al. 2013: 1). The same tendency can be spotted in Austria (Çınar 2010: 1) and Germany (Hailbronner 
2012: 19).  
This type of policy can go even much further on the illiberal path. In the Netherlands the 
concept of ‘active citizenship’ has been proposed (but not yet transformed in a requirement for 
naturalisation) in order to ‘re-emphasise the responsibility of each individual for his or her place in 
society’ (Dumbrava 2010: 14-15); and in the UK the Brown government proposed the notion of 
‘probationary citizenship’, according to which ‘provisional citizens’ can be denaturalised if they do not 
respect UK laws during a probationary period of three years following naturalisation (Dumbrava 2010: 
14-15). This proposal, however, was later dropped by the Cameron government. As we have already 
seen, the most extreme stance is taken by a group of countries like Switzerland, Malta, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, which require the applicant to collect ‘testimonies from other (worthy) 
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citizens’ (Dumbrava 2010: 15) regarding the sufficient degree of their social insertion. It seems rather 
difficult to find a normative defence for such extreme requirements. 
Finally, we have to exclude, from a moral point of view, a special type of naturalisation called 
‘facilitated naturalisation.215
The first important category is that of family ties: for spouses and children some countries waived all 
naturalisation requirements (residence included). For example this happened under the label of ‘post-
nuptial citizenship’ in Ireland between 1956 and 2004 for foreign women marrying Irish husbands 
(Handoll 2012: 4). But usually the general tendency among countries is only to reduce the required 
number of residence years, as in France, which bases this decision on the years “of ‘common and 
affective life’ after the date of the marriage” (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 18). However, it is not clear at 
all why from the legal point of view family ties can substitute for residence in acquiring citizenship 
(and it is also important to note that in some cases family ties are considered sufficient without any 
residence). The residence-based theory I am defending calls for only one requirement for naturalisation 
 This is an instance of combining immigration and citizenship laws. 
Basically, all countries offer less severe conditions for naturalisation to different categories of persons: 
the underling norms here are related to family ties, individual past ties (former citizens), historical and 
cultural ties, special services to the country (military service), utility for the state (investment, 
reputational gains) and reciprocity in bilateral relations.  
Facilitated acquisition for all these categories cannot be defended under a residence-based 
theory of citizenship. This is not because they are impermissible: in fact, they can be easily morally 
defended by theories largely based on ius sanguinis. Moreover, the more severe conditions for 
naturalisation a country employs, the more defensible facilitated naturalisation for special groups 
becomes. The reason they cannot be defended by a residence-based proposal is that a theory which sets 
a low residence condition for ordinary naturalisation (and I have proposed in this study the three-years 
liberal threshold) matches most reasonable reduced residence provisions for special naturalisation in 
current laws. As a consequence, to keep the category of ‘facilitated naturalisation’ for some groups 
(probably by reducing even more the residence condition of an already very liberal residence-based 
theory) would run the risk of discriminating between different categories of applicants. 
 
Family ties 
                                                 
215 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on different modes of special naturalisation (spousal 
transfer, filial transfer, etc), available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition (last accessed 12 
September 2013). 
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– and this is previous residence in the country. If we take the liberal path proposed by countries like 
Canada, Serbia, New Zealand, and Belgium (the last one, only until 2012), which require only three 
years of residence before one qualifies for naturalisation,216
                                                 
216 See chapter 3, section 5. See also below in this chapter section 7.3.3. 
 then it is difficult to understand why 
facilitated naturalisation through shorter (less than three years) residence requirements for spouses (or 
minor children) of citizens is legitimate. The problem is not that such family ties should not have any 
moral weight or that such provisions unfairly discriminate against applicants without family ties – the 
problem is simply that if the only requirement for citizenship acquisition is three years of previous 
residence in the territory, then this requirement is more liberal than most provisions of ‘facilitated 
naturalisation’ implemented by most states. 
 
Individual past ties (former citizens) 
A second cluster of categories of individuals who can access facilitated naturalisation is that of former 
citizens, who are also required to spend fewer years in the country than other applicants – or even have 
no residence requirements at all, like former citizens subjected to the ‘option procedure’ of acquiring 
citizenship in Belgium (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 11). However, as in the case of family ties, 
three years of permanent residence are enough in order to qualify a person for citizenship irrespective 
of past ties. 
 
Ethnic, historical, and cultural ties 
The third category includes ‘ethnic kins’, who also enjoy a special status. For example, Romania has 
offered facilitated naturalisation to ‘ethnic kins’ from Moldova (Iordachi 2010), and Hungary to ethnic 
Hungarians from Romania (Kovács and Tóth 2010). Other cases ‘of external acquisition of citizenship 
based on ethnic origin can also be found in Croatia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Slovenia’ (Dumbrava 2013: 8). The specific problem with co-ethnic preference is that – in contrast 
with family ties – they generally apply also externally to non-residents. However (apart from the case 
of former citizens) this is clearly incompatible with a residence-based view of citizenship. As 
Dumbrava rightly notes, ‘policies of external citizenship based on ethno-national grounds not only 
jeopardize the democratic integrity in the home country, but also the prospects of welfare and self-
government of co-ethnics whom they aim to protect’ (Dumbrava 2013: 14). 
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This category also incorporates persons coming from countries considered to be a part of the 
same ‘cultural community.’217
The fourth special type of facilitated naturalisation which has to be excluded under a residence-based 
theory is that of persons with ‘special contributions’
 For example, between 1961 and 2006 France required no period of 
residence for immigrants coming from a former colony or a francophone country (Bertossi and Hajjat 
2012: 2). Also, Spain requires only two years of residence instead of the normal requirement of 10 
years ‘for those coming from Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Portugal and for Sephardic Jews’ (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 3). The problem again is not 
necessarily that all these facilitations are equally impermissible. Some of them may arguably be 
morally required, like in the case of former citizens who have lost their citizenship due to legal 
provisions that have in the meantime been changed (for example, in former communist countries). This 
is, indeed, a difficult case. But it is important to note that under a liberal regime of residence-based 
citizenship which requires only three years of previous residence for citizenship acquisition, such cases 
lose their significance. Regarding the difficult problem mentioned above (of former citizens who have 
lost their citizenship) a tentative answer under a citizenship-based regime would be to offer them either 
the possibility to return and to become citizens after three years of residence, or the ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ status discussed in the last chapter, if they prefer not to return. 
 
Special services (military service) 
218
                                                 
217 See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship acquisition based on Mode A19: Cultural affinity, available at 
 to the country. The most important category 
here is constituted by those enrolled in the country’s military service, as in the United States, Spain or 
France (Bertossi and Hajjat 2012: 19). However, being enrolled in a country’s military service should 
not be linked with naturalisation, and the latter must not be seen as some form of currency (as long as 
the service is already financially rewarded). Of course, this argument applies more straightforwardly in 
the context of professional armies which tend to be the rule nowadays. It is true that historically this 
link existed: this was the core citizenship duty, and even in voluntary armies the duty to defend ‘your 
country’ has always been linked to citizenship. As a consequence, faster access to citizenship for 
immigrants who serve in the army may be easy to justify at least in the republican tradition. A 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A19 (last accessed 12 September 
2013).  
218 For this category and for the following one (‘utility for the country’) See EUDO Citizenship database on citizenship 
acquisition based on Mode A24: Special achievements, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A24 (last accessed 12 September 
2013.) 
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residence-based theory that requires for everybody three years of previous residence may be not only 
morally preferable, but may also offer faster access to citizenship even when compared to this type of 
facilitated naturalisation, which may in fact be a longer process. 
 
Utility for the country (investment, reputational gains) 
The fifth category generally includes ‘exceptional cases.’ These roles or inputs are typically not clearly 
mentioned (in order to offer a large margin of discretion to decision makers), but two groups can be 
easily spotted. On the one hand, there are those who can contribute to the country’s international image 
as sportsmen, artists, and so on (and almost all the countries surveyed have provisions for such type of 
naturalisation). On the other hand, there are those who have invested money in the country – in 
connection to this latter group such a policy has been criticised as a practice of ‘selling citizenship’ for 
a big sum of money. This practice of investment-based schemes exists in two forms: either as 
privileged access to citizenship – among others, practiced in Austria, Montenegro, Greece, and Cyprus 
(Džankic 2012: 15) – or as privileged access to residence permits (Hungary, Canada, USA). The 
privileged access to citizenship was also supported for a period of time by some countries such as 
Ireland between 1989 and 1998 (Handoll 2012: 5-6). However, offering citizenship to those who are 
wealthy enough to invest in a country amounts to a commodification of citizenship – that is, it destroys 
all that citizenship is supposed to mean in the first place (that is, access to all citizenship rights for 
those living in and thus having a strong connection to the territory, and the right to have a say in the 
development of the country their lives are based on). 
 
Reciprocity (EU, Northern countries) 
The sixth category is based on reciprocity in bilateral relations. Examples include a facilitated 
naturalisation in Nordic countries for citizens coming from other Nordic states (Brochmann 2010: 3-4) 
and reciprocity among European Union countries. There is nothing morally objectionably here, and it is 
important to mention that a residence-based citizenship which sets a three-year residence condition for 
citizenship acquisition may be sometimes a bit more demanding than such agreements – for example in 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark a Nordic citizen can apply for citizenship (under the 
‘facilitated naturalisation’ clause) after two years of residency (Brochmann 2010: 10), (Bernitz 2012: 
5), (Fagerlund and Brander 2010: 7), (Ersbøll 2010: 2), while in Iceland after four years of residence 
(Jóhannesson, Pétursson et al. 2010: 18). However, in spite of this small difference of plus/minus one 
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year of residence my proposal may also prove to be more equalitarian, since the three-year requirement 
applies to everyone. 
 
As a consequence, we are left with residence as the only requirement for citizenship acquisition. 
As Joseph Carens puts it, ‘as a matter of fundamental democratic principle, people who have been 
settled in a country for several years are members of society and should be able to participate in the 
political process governing their society’ (Carens 2010b: 19). Let me then review what we have already 
seen up to this point, and make some general normative comments. Firstly, regarding immigrants, the 
only morally acceptable requirement for citizenship qualification is residence in the specific country. 
Many political theorists believe that in order to be qualified for citizenship in a particular state a person 
must have a ‘genuine link’ with that country. Moreover, since the 1955 Nottebohm Case, it has been 
established in the international law that ‘nationality [i.e. citizenship – my note] is a legal bond having 
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.’219
This definition is a bit vague since, of course, ‘interests and sentiments’ are never taken in these 
days to be a proof of a genuine link – however, what is left here (the ‘social fact of attachment’, the 
‘genuine connection of existence’, the ‘legal bound’ and ‘reciprocal rights and duties’) are directly 
evoking residency as the special bond which qualifies someone for citizenship. We can find today such 
instances of citizenship conceived as residence in the real world. For example, in Belgium ‘filiation to a 
Belgian parent does not always automatically lead to the acquisition of citizenship.’ The law requires ‘a 
minimal territorial link with Belgium and thus avoids the possibility of generations of persons who no 
longer have any genuine link with Belgium passing on their citizenship.’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 
2010: 7). Moreover, from 2000 until 2012 in Belgium ‘citizenship [wa]s closely linked to one’s 
residence on the territory and not as much to one’s integration into a society […] the legislation [took] 
as its point of departure the view that the foreigner [wa]s already integrated solely by virtue of having 
resided on the state’s territory for a certain number of years’ – in this period Belgium was thus 
‘radically opting for a residence-based concept of citizenship’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 23).
 
220
                                                 
219 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (second phase), Judgement of April 6th, 1955: International Court of 
 
Cyprus is also a case in point here: except the requirement of having a ‘good character,’ intention to 
Justice.Reports 1955. Links: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7248.html; http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=215&code=lg&p1=3&p2=3&case=18&k=26&p3=5 (accessed 22 November 2013). 
220 As we have already seen, this is not the case anymore: the new 2012 citizenship law changed this liberal path towards a 
residence-based conception of citizenship – see note 206 above. 
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‘reside in the Republic’ (or being at service of Cyprus), and a formal loyalty oath, the applicant for 
citizenship in Cyprus must satisfy only the residence requirement (which is seven years, and the last 
twelve months before application of continuous residence in the country) (Trimikliniotis 2010: 12-13). 
What we can observe in these liberal cases is a disconnection of citizenship and nationality: 
according to the residence-based notion of citizenship, and according to the definitions I have spelled 
out in chapters one and five, citizenship (the status of being a member of a state and enjoying full rights 
and duties) is not related anymore to nationality (which is conceived in this work as ethnic and national 
belonging). This is exactly the same distinction as Dumbrava’s between ethnic-cultural rules and civic-
territorial rules for citizenship conferral. According to this author, only the latter (seen as a 
‘commitment towards a political community defined in terms of territory and common political 
institutions’) are compatible with a liberal view (Dumbrava 2010: 5). Moreover, these membership 
rules are based on a link between members that is defined as ‘minimalist politic’ (they are ‘created and 
maintained with the aim of fostering a political community instrumental for individuals’ interests’ and 
require ‘only a minimum connection that is sufficient to maintain a functional political community’) 
and as ‘partly voluntaristic’ (since ‘some may choose voluntarily to join the political community’. It is, 
however, important to stress that this voluntary decision must be based on ‘the existence of the relevant 
political link’) (Dumbrava 2010: 3). The relevant political link is only one (as I have tried to argue), 
and this is residence in the territory. 
 
7.3.3. Previous residence years as the only requirement for naturalisation 
As we have seen, there are two main modes of residence-based acquisition of citizenship: (conditional) 
ius soli and naturalisation. Although in most current laws residence is not a sufficient criterion for 
naturalisation, it is always the most important one. However, the number of years required to be spent 
in the country before citizenship application varies greatly. The European Convention on Nationality 
sets a maximum limit of ten years,221
According to some scholarly commentators, the acceptable threshold is five years (Howard 
2006), ‘while three years is seen as an ideal of a highly liberal policy’(Swider 2011: 6). Before offering 
 so there is a great margin of discretion for countries to decide 
their own policies.  
                                                 
221 ‘Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility of naturalisation of persons lawfully and habitually 
resident on its territory. In establishing the conditions for naturalisation, it shall not provide for a period of residence 
exceeding ten years before the lodging of an application’ (Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, 
Strasbourg, 06.11. 1997, art. 6, para. 3); link: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm (accessed 18 
January 2013).  
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some examples, it is important to mention that for the liberal perspective on residence-based citizenship 
I am using in this work, I am referring strictly to the minimum number of years of simple legal and 
factual residence. This is important, since for some countries ‘only residence […] under a specific legal 
status [my emphasis] counts towards the residency requirement, thus effectively prolonging the factual 
residence requirement by the number of years necessary to obtain the relevant status (Poland and 
Bulgaria)’ (Swider 2011: 6). In other words, in this situation – as another scholar notes – for ‘the 
purpose of counting the legally-relevant period of residence, one must add to the years required for 
naturalisation the minimum period necessary in order to acquire the relevant residence status (in many 
cases a status of permanent residence)’ (Dumbrava 2010: 14).222
The total period of residence is three years in three cases: Canada,
 
223 Serbia,224 and New 
Zealand225 (it was the same in Belgium until 2012) and it goes up to four years in the case of Ireland. 
These are the countries with a ‘highly liberal policy.’ There are also seven countries which set the 
period of residence to five years: France, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the USA.226
                                                 
222 ACIT/CITLAW has calculated an ‘effective residence condition’ that takes into account not only the time needed for 
acquiring a residence status but also permissible interruptions of residence. See mode ‘ANAT06a – ordinary naturalization – 
residence conditions’, link: 
 However, Malta and the Netherlands cannot be situated in a liberal category just 
because of this moderate threshold, since both also request, as we have already seen, many other 
conditions for naturalisation, among which the requirement that the applicant must collect testimonies 
from other (worthy) citizens who must testify that the former are well integrated in society. Out of the 
http://ind.eudo-
citizenship.eu/acit/printage/prepare/html/study/citlaw/chart/barmap/field_1/1/field_2/59-58-57-56-5-8-10-11-12-13-14-15-
17-18-20-21-22-23-24-25-27-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-41-42-43-44-46-47-48-49/field_3/12/group/null (last 
accessed 14 august 2013). For further information, see Jeffers, Honohan and Bauböck (2012: 25-26), accessible at: 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CITLAW_explanatory%20text.pdf (last accessed 17 July 2013). 
223 Link: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/citizenship/become-eligibility.asp (accessed 17 July 2013). It is true that in Canada 
three years are required only for those admitted as ‘landed immigrants’ (i.e. permanent residents), but the period is longer 
for those who are admitted in temporary statuses. However, according to the Canadian law a person is eligible for 
permanent residence if she (a) has ‘an offer of arranged employment’, OR (b) is ‘a foreign national who has been living 
legally in Canada for one year as a temporary foreign worker or an international student’, OR (c) is ‘a skilled worker who 
has at least one year of experience in one or more of the occupations listed’ by the government (source: 
http://www.sse.gov.on.ca/medt/investinontario/en/Pages/bi_corp_services_perm_residence.aspx, accessed 17 July 2013). 
As a consequence, unlike a permanent resident (who can become a Canadian citizen in three years), a temporary resident 
can become a Canadian citizen in four years (one year needed to get permanent residency plus three years needed for 
citizenship status). Moreover, according to the governmental website ‘Citizenship and Immigration Canada’, to become a 
Canadian citizen ‘[one] may be able to count time [one] spent in Canada before [one] became a permanent resident if that 
time falls within the four-year period’ (source: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/citizenship/become-eligibility.asp, accessed 17 
July 2013). 
224 Serbia also requires only two years of residence (and adds no other requirements) for spouses of citizens, under the title 
‘citizenship through registration’ (Rava 2010: 14).  
225 New Zealand, Citizenship Act 1977, No. 61, ‘reprint as at 1 July 2013’, available online at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0061/latest/DLM443684.html (last accessed 30 July 2013). 
226 Link: http://www.uscitizenship.info/articles/applying-for-american-citizenship-the-essential-qualifications/index.html 
(accessed 18 January 2013). 
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fifty countries analysed, we can consider as liberal (in relation to both the residence period before 
application and the lack of other complicated requirements besides simple residence) only six states 
(Canada, Serbia, Sweden, New Zealand, the USA and Belgium until 2012), to which we can add 
Norway and Portugal, with a six-year residence requirement before application (Fagerlund and Brander 
2010: 19). Another country with only a residency requirement is Cyprus, which calls for a period of 
seven years of residency before the application. However, this seems to be well over the accepted 
period of five years, so I will not include the country in the liberal category. 
All the other states go beyond the five years threshold, and the number of residence years 
before naturalisation goes as high as ten years for ten European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) (Dumbrava 2010: 14) and 12 
years for Switzerland (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 10). 
It is interesting to note that Switzerland seems to be the most conservative country from this 
point of view. Here ‘regular naturalisation primarily falls under the jurisdiction of the cantons and the 
municipalities. Cantons and municipalities confer citizenship for their canton or their municipality 
respectively, whereby the applicant automatically acquires the citizenship of the federal state: Swiss 
nationality’ (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 17). At a first look this may seem to be very close to 
the idea of ‘urban citizenship’ promoted by Rainer Bauböck, which disconnects local from national 
citizenship (Bauböck 2003).227
7.3.4. Instances of residence-based naturalisation in current laws 
 In fact, it is exactly the opposite of a disconnected local citizenship 
model, since the Swiss model connects cantonal and local citizenship to the federal/national level. The 
latter is derived from the former and cantons and municipalities add further conditions to federal 
provisions on naturalisation. In this way, naturalisation in Switzerland becomes an even more 
burdensome process. 
 
Besides the already mentioned eight liberal states in section (3.1.) above (Canada, Serbia, Sweden, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the USA and Belgium until 2012) that are very close to an 
exclusively residence-based type of citizenship for immigrants, other states also have different 
provisions regarding specific cases where exemplars of a residence principle are easy to be discovered. 
                                                 
227 ‘Urban citizenship’ is a very interesting and promising instance of residence-based citizenship. According to Bauböck, 
‘cities should enjoy greater autonomy vis-à-vis national and provincial governments’, and this can happen by exempting 
municipalities ‘from certain aspects of national government monopolies in immigration, trade and foreign policy’ (Bauböck 
2003: 149). Moreover, cities can add an ‘automatic ius domicilii’ mechanism for citizenship acquisition, besides the three 
‘national’ mechanisms of ius sanguinis, ius soli and naturalisation. 
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Since these stipulations are incredibly diverse, it is almost impossible to organise them under rigorous 
normative categories, so in this section I decided to simply list them, in order to provide at least an 
overview of such provisions. 
It is interesting to see that some countries that are not fully liberal democratic nevertheless 
practice some quite sturdy versions of a residence-based regime. Lebanon, for example, has a pure 
residence-based regime for citizenship acquisition. The applicant should be of legal age and should 
have resided five years in the country before submitting the application. These are all the requirements, 
since this state’s nationality laws do not ask for any other condition for naturalisation (el-Khoury and 
Jaulin 2012: 15). However, we cannot situate this case in the above liberal group of states, since the 
new citizen is able to enjoy full equal rights and duties only ten years after naturalisation (within these 
ten years some limitations exist regarding electoral rights, civil service, and practicing some 
professions). Moreover, the ‘effects of naturalization are not automatically extended to the spouse and 
children’ (el-Khoury and Jaulin 2012: 16). Belarus, a country closer to dictatorship than to liberal 
democracy, does not accept dual citizenship and it strongly relates citizenship to permanent residence. 
However, the law offers a wide interpretation to this principle: 
 
‘On defining the place of permanent residence one should take into consideration not only the place of 
the factual staying of a person at this or that moment (in the Republic of Belarus or outside its 
borders), but his intention to have this place as a place of his permanent residence. The content of this 
term is determined by the purposes of going out of (leaving) the Republic of Belarus: whether this 
leaving is temporary or for permanent residence in a different state.’ (Ulasiuk 2011: 4) 
 
As we can see in this 2001 decision of the Constitutional Court, simply residing temporarily in another 
state does not have any consequence on citizenship status. Indeed, citizenship is lost only when 
‘permanent residence’ is intended. On the other hand, when the intention is to permanently reside in 
Belarus and all the other conditions are fulfilled, citizenship can be accessed. 
Setting aside less liberal countries and coming back to the European Union, we can find some 
very interesting legislation and legislation proposal related to residency. According to Hailbronner, in 
Germany the Democratic Party and the Greens have been promoting in recent years a ‘republican 
concept’ of citizenship, according to which ‘to comply with the laws and to respect the basic principles 
of the Constitution [are] the only prerequisites for acquisition’ of citizenship (Hailbronner 2012: 26-
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27). We should not be deceived by this formula: ‘complying with the laws’ still presupposes a period of 
prior residence before applying for the status. 
Residence-based citizenship is also offered in a number of countries to persons who are legally 
permanent residents and have completed a specific cycle of compulsory education in schools. This is 
for example the case in Latvia, under the condition that such persons ‘are not nationals of another state 
or have received an expatriation permit,’ since Latvia does not accept dual citizenship. But it is also the 
case in Portugal, where minors completing such a cycle can become citizens through a ‘subjective right 
to naturalisation,’ which means there is no administrative discretion. This has also happened in Norway 
since 1968, under the label ‘citizenship through notification,’ for persons who ‘had been living in 
Norway for at least ten years during childhood and adolescence’ (Brochmann 2010: 4). Moreover, the 
same category of access to citizenship has been offered in Norway since 2006 to Nordic citizens after 
seven years of residence and with the condition of renouncing any former citizenship, since Norway 
does not accept dual citizenship (Brochmann 2010: 9). 
Poland was until recently a liberal case, since up to August 2012 only ‘the duration and nature 
of an applicant’s stay in Poland’ (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 19) was important for citizenship 
acquisition under the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality. However, in practice civil servants also took into 
account the level of integration of that applicant, his family situation, and financial state of affairs 
(Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 19). But starting with the aforementioned date, Article 30 of the new 
citizenship law requires for naturalisation three years of previous residence (based on a permanent 
residence permit), regular income, a legal title to an apartment, and knowledge of the Polish 
language.228
                                                 
228 Sources: DorotaPudzianowska, A new citizenship law is due to replace Poland’s law of 1962, Citizenship News, EUDO 
Observatory on Citizenship, 25 January 2012 (link: 
 
Also in Britain until 1983 the ‘highest formal status’ and the most important status for key 
social provisions was residence (that is, settlement), not citizenship. Moreover, in due time (10 years 
for regular, 14 years for irregular migrants) the settled person was able to access citizenship status. 
After 1983 things changed. For example, an irregular migrant can now access the same status only after 
thirty years (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 1-2, 25), and ius sanguinis replaced both ius soli and residence-
based naturalisation. 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/566-a-new-citizenship-
law-is-due-to-replace-polands-law-of-1962, accessed 21 July 2013); Legal Guide to Polish Citizenship (link: http://polish-
citizenship.eu/foreigners.html, accessed 21 July 2013) and Wikipedia (link: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_nationality_law#Citizenship_by_naturalisation, accessed 21 July 2013). 
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However, the clearest instances of residence-based citizenship can be observed in two Nordic 
countries (Norway and Sweden), where the concept of legal residency or domicile has become in recent 
years more important than the concept of citizenship (Brochmann 2010: 8), (Bernitz 2012: 1). 
Moreover, in Sweden one can even say that ‘the principle of domicile […] gained importance, and 
citizenship correspondingly lost significance […] [in] the Swedish construction […] focus lies on 
permanent residence instead of citizenship […] Belonging to Swedish society through long-term 
residence is generally believed to create a strong link between the individual and the state’ (Bernitz 
2012: 7-8). Moreover, unlike the general trend in the Western world, not only does Sweden not require 
a language exam, it in fact practices the rather contrary so-called ‘home language policy,’ according to 
which ‘children with immigrant parents are encouraged to preserve linguistic ties with their countries 
of origin by attending publicly funded language courses where the children learn their native language’ 
(Bernitz 2012: 18): 
 
‘An alien’s status in Sweden is very similar to that of a Swedish citizen, and to a large extent Swedes 
and foreigners have the same rights. The development in Sweden as to increasingly giving equal rights 
to citizens and foreigners reflects a clear change in the view of the core and idea of citizenship. In 
many contexts the concept of domicile has taken over the role of citizenship.’ (Bernitz 2012: 19) 
 
The same goes for Norway, which has removed from naturalisation requirements the health certificate 
(1976) and the condition of economic self-support (1985). Moreover, it extended civic and social rights 
‘to legal residents through the principle of equal treatment’ – thus, also in this country, ‘the institution 
of citizenship proper has less value, relatively speaking’ (Brochmann 2010: 6). We could easily add 
here the former liberal Belgian regime, where until 2013 there was no integration condition except 
residence. Moreover, if a person did not apply for formal citizenship acquisition after three years, there 
was a ‘possibility to become Belgian by a mere declaration after seven years of residence’ (Foblets and 
Yanasmayan 2010: 1). Interestingly enough, and probably surprisingly, we could add Italy to the 
countries where citizenship is having less value, since ‘all civil rights and nearly all social rights are 
granted to legal residents as well’ (Zincone and Basili 2010: 3). 
In some countries there is a procedure for some categories of immigrants to acquire ‘citizenship 
through declaration.’ This is the case for ‘foreigners who were born in Belgium [who] can acquire 
Belgian citizenship without, in principle, having to go through any procedure’ (Foblets and 
Yanasmayan 2010: 8). Moreover, ‘the procedure also applies to foreigners who have had their main 
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legal residence in Belgium for at least seven years at the time of declaration and who have been 
authorized to reside in the country pursuant to the provisions of the law on residence of foreigners of 15 
December 1980’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 9). The same ‘citizenship through declaration’ 
category can be found in Poland, for spousal acquisition after five years of residence, and for 
citizenship reacquisition (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 11-12). Finally, it can be also found in 
Portugal for ‘spousal transfer’: according to the 2006 law, a spouse or a legal partner can access it after 
three years of marriage or living together, in case of civil partnerships (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 16). 
Unfortunately, in contrast to all these liberal developments, other countries are moving down a slippery 
slope towards an increasingly anti-liberal approach to citizenship acquisition. To take just one example, 
in the UK and other countries naturalisation is practiced under the ‘administrative discretion’ principle 
and ‘there is no appeal against refusal’ (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 24).229
7.4. Residence-based citizenship and multiple status 
 
 
 
7.4.1. Residents, emigrants and voting rights 
One of the most interesting problems raised by dual citizenship status concerns external voting rights. 
On the one hand, some political theorists accept that ‘democracies cannot be obliged to grant their 
expatriates absentee voting rights’ (Bauböck 2009a: 17). Indeed, granting such rights would mean 
offering some group of individuals a say in a political process they are not subject to. In other words, 
when external voting decides the outcome, resident citizens are obliged to accept a political situation 
decided by non-residents who are not even subject to the political situation they helped to bring 
about.230
There are real-life instances of this situation. As I have already pointed out in chapter five, in 
the 2005 regional elections in Galicia (Spain), ‘the composition of the autonomous regional 
government was decided by votes from abroad’ (Itzigsohn 2007: 132). Another example is the 2009 
 
                                                 
229 Another example was offered by the Netherlands until 2007 where applicants for permanent residence were requested to 
take the same exam as applicants for naturalisation. The illiberal flavour was also intensified by the fact that applicants 
lacked any opportunity to prepare for the test since its content was not published and there was no bibliography. 
Additionally, the fees were very high (over 600 Euros) (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 24, 26). This clearly revealed the 
intention to exclude certain categories of immigrants (‘the less educated and less well-off groups’). 
230 Rainer Bauböck (2007b) disagrees by making a distinction between ‘swamping’ and ‘tipping’ scenarios in external 
voting. I have criticised this view in chapter five on multiple citizens. 
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presidential elections in Romania, where the diaspora vote decided the new president.231
On the other hand, if there are cases where elections are won because of diaspora votes, we also 
have cases where more than half of the resident population is excluded from voting. This is the actual 
case in Luxembourg, where only ‘45 per cent of the resident population […] has the right to vote in 
national elections.’ As one author notes, this ‘underlines the real problem of the democratic legitimacy 
of the political decision processes in Luxembourg’ (Scuto 2010: 19).
 And again, 
overseas absentee voting tipped the balance in the 2000 US presidential election (Spiro 2003: 141). 
Finally, in 2007 the winning party in Croatia’s elections ‘won […] by a tiny margin thanks, in large 
part, to the votes from the diaspora constituency’ (Ragazzi, Štiks et al. 2010: 14). 
232
The simple solution to this problem is to award political rights only to the resident population 
and to exclude long-term emigrants who are permanent residents in (and hence should be citizens of) 
the host state. Setting aside the countries that terminate citizenship for long-term emigrants (see the 
following subsection), there are also countries that, although they do not take this route, nevertheless 
deny voting rights to most emigrant citizens (i.e., to non-residents), such as Albania (Krasniqi 2012a: 
20), Denmark (Ersbøll 2010: 3), Malta (Buttigieg 2010: 4), Montenegro (Džankic 2012: 8, note 9), 
Ireland,
 
233
                                                 
231 George Sava, ‘Diaspora a decis preşedintele României’ [The Diaspora decided Romania’s president], Pagini româneşti 
[Romanian Pages], 15 December 2009, link: 
 Greece (Bauböck 2007b: 2403) and Morocco (with the 1984-1992 exception) (Perrin 2011: 
17). Other countries have decided to suspend citizens’ voting rights after a specific period of living 
abroad: ‘citizens of New Zealand lose their right to vote after three years abroad, Canadians after five, 
Australians after six, and UK citizens after 15 years.’ The Philippines deny voting rights to dual 
citizens, and ‘Canadian citizens who register to vote also have to declare that they intend to resume 
their residence in Canada’ (Bauböck 2007b: 2424). A thoroughly up-to-date data on external franchise 
is offered by Arrighi, Bauböck et al. (2013), Dumbrava (2013) and Collyer (2013). 
http://www.paginiromanesti.ca/2009/12/15/diaspora-a-decis-presedintele-
romaniei/ (accessed 18 January 2013). 
232 According to Scuto, ‘The fact that only 45 per cent of the resident population of Luxembourg has the right to vote in 
national elections underlines the real problem of the democratic legitimacy of the political decision processes in 
Luxembourg’ (Scuto 2010: 19). However, the relevant number is the share of non-citizens in the adult population (voting 
age), and the author does not mention expressly whether 45% refers to resident adult population or resident population 
including minors. He seems to imply the former, since he raises the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the political 
decision processes. 
233 ‘We base our franchise partly on citizenship but also on residency. Irish citizens resident here can vote in all elections. 
British citizens living here can vote in elections though not in referendums. European citizens can vote in European and 
local elections. Non-EU citizens can vote only in local elections. Meanwhile, Irish citizens without residency here can’t vote 
at all.’ Sarah Carey, ‘Votes for emigrants must come with a price’, Irish Times, 1 January 2011, available at: 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0127/1224288402147.html (accessed February 2011). 
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On the other hand, the liberal regimes I have identified above already offer political rights to 
permanent residents. In Norway, immigrants ‘may vote in local elections after three years of legal 
residency’ (Brochmann 2010: 8). New Zealand ‘grants the right to cast votes (but not eligibility) in 
national elections to noncitizens after one year of legal residence’. That said, in the same country 
‘permanent residents can exercise their voting rights from abroad only during their first year abroad, 
whereas citizens retain the rights for three years’ (Bauböck 2007b: 2425). And in Portugal immigrants 
may vote ‘on the condition of reciprocity’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 28) based on a political agreement 
between Portugal and their country of origin. According to Arrighi et al., unlike ‘local voting rights, 
which besides Brazilian citizens include Cape Verde citizens as well as nationals from countries which 
have  signed a reciprocity agreement with Portugal, regional voting rights are extended to only 
Brazilian citizens who meet specified residence requirements’ (Arrighi, Bauböck et al. 2013: p. 54, 
note 11). The specified residence requirements in order to be granted voting rights in national 
legislative elections for Brazilians in Portugal are ‘three years of residence (…) under the terms of the 
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Consultation, signed in the year 2000 and ratified in 2004’ 
(Arrighi, Bauböck et al. 2013: 54). 
As a consequence, it is not difficult to accept that voting rights should only be offered to 
resident citizens. Regarding those living in other countries, only short-term emigrants should have the 
right to vote in their origin country. Those who are long-term emigrants and already citizens of other 
countries should have the right to vote only in their host state. In other words, we should accept the 
same time for phasing out the external franchise and acquiring citizenship in the host country. 
 
7.4.2. Residence-based citizenship and life abroad. Exclusion of multiple-citizenship status: 
examples and a normative argument 
To many scholars, the most frustrating thing about residence-based citizenship is its lack of full 
sympathy for long-term emigrants. While it offers them, as a matter of right, citizenship in the host 
country, it can find no reasonable argument to allow keeping the previous citizenship, and thus to 
accept dual or multiple citizenship. It seems that the more immigrants are equated with citizens with 
regard to rights and responsibilities in a specific state, the less emigrants are considered as citizens of 
their origin country.234
                                                 
234 See EUDO Citizenship database on loss of citizenship, especially Mode L02: Residence abroad, accessible at 
 The best real-world example is probably Norway, which imposes the loss of 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
loss?p=&application=modesLoss&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=L02 and Mode L05: Acquisition of foreign 
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citizenship for living continuously abroad, and elegantly explains this decision as ‘the complement of 
the acquisition requirement of stable residency for foreigners wanting to naturalise in Norway [my 
emphasis]’235
A discriminatory practice appears in those countries which impose the loss of citizenship after a 
period of residence abroad only for naturalised persons, but not for native born citizens. This happens, 
for example, in Malta. If the naturalised person has been continuously residing in a foreign country for 
seven years and ‘during this time has neither been at any time in the service of Malta or of an 
international organisation of which the government of Malta was a member nor given notice in writing 
 (Brochmann 2010: 11). 
Citizenship is also lost in Norway by those persons born abroad who did not reside at least two 
years in the country or at least seven years in Norway and another Nordic state until the age of 22. 
There are exceptions to this rule: people may apply for the right to retain citizenship, but they have to 
prove that they have ‘sufficient ties’ with Norway. Sweden also has a similar requirement: citizens born 
abroad who have never been domiciled in the country and have ‘never been in Sweden under 
circumstances that indicate a link with the country’ lose citizenship at the age of 22 (Bernitz 2012: 15-
16). As in Norway, people may submit an application to retain citizenship but, unlike Norway, it seems 
that usually permission is normally granted to the first generation born abroad. Denmark also seems to 
have a similar law regarding loss of citizenship unless proof is shown of a connection to the state: ‘any 
person, born abroad and who has never lived in Denmark nor been staying abroad under circumstances 
indicating some association with the country will lose his or her Danish citizenship on attaining the age 
of 22’ (Ersbøll 2010: 13). 
Until 2000 in the Netherlands the law specified an ‘automatic loss of Dutch citizenship upon 
spending ten years abroad;’ after this year, the law was changed and this time it says that the emigrant 
may still keep her citizenship if she applies for it every ten years (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 14, 16-
17). The same happens in Luxembourg, where expatriates can lose their citizenship ‘if, after residing 
for twenty years abroad, they abstain from declaring their wish to retain their Luxembourgish 
citizenship’ (Scuto 2010: 8). In Greece the law was even harsher until 1998, since it ‘stipulated the 
withdrawal of citizenship for those leaving Greek soil without intending to return’ (Christopoulos 
2009: 14). 
                                                                                                                                                                       
citizenship, accessible at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-
loss?p=&application=modesLoss&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=L05 (last accessed: 12 September 2013).  
235 It is important to note that for the purpose I have in mind (i.e., the defence of residence-based citizenship), I consider that 
any long-term resident is entitled as a matter of right to the citizenship of the host state. Only in this sense I am talking about 
long-term residents losing their previous citizenship (the citizenship of the previous state), since otherwise they would 
become, of course, stateless. 
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to the Minister of his or her intention to retain citizenship of Malta’ (Buttigieg 2010: 13), citizenship is 
lost. In Ireland a person can lose her citizenship if she was naturalised and afterwards resided outside 
the state for a period of seven years, ‘and without reasonable excuse has not during that period 
registered annually in the prescribed manner his or her name and a declaration of his or her intention to 
retain Irish citizenship (with an Irish diplomatic mission or consular office or with the Minister)’ 
(Handoll 2012: 15). The same happens in Lebanon: a naturalised person loses her citizenship after an 
absence of ‘five consecutive years’ (el-Khoury and Jaulin 2012: 19, note 71). 
It is true that the examples offered above go somehow against the trend, which is to keep 
connection with expatriate individuals by also maintaining their citizenship. However, here the problem 
is to how many generations should be accorded the right to keep citizenship through ius sanguinis? 
According to a recent study, in the European Union there are no less than thirteen cases of 
‘unconditional transmission of citizenship to descendants of citizens abroad: Austria, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Romania, and Slovakia’ (Dumbrava 2010: 8). I agree with the author that this ‘is a clear example of an 
illiberal (ethno-cultural) rule’: when a person has no other connection with a state except the fact that 
she is a descendant of a citizen (or a former citizen), there is no moral ground for the transmission of 
citizenship status. Then, where can we draw the line? 
An interesting answer in political theory is to keep the citizenship status for immigrants, since 
they are ‘stakeholders in both their country of origin and settlement’ (Bauböck 2009a: 17) and maybe 
for the second generation (i.e., first generation born abroad), on the condition that they keep strong 
connections with their parents’ countries (for example, after a period of residence there). Some 
countries actually implement this in their current laws, like the United Kingdom, which generally sets 
‘limits on passing citizenship by descent for more than one generation’ (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 4-5). 
However, if the relevant criterion is ‘connection with the state,’ then are long-term emigrants (that is, 
first generation immigrants) sufficiently ‘connected’ anymore? It is hard to understand why they would 
be considered so. In chapter six (on ‘external quasi-citizens’) I offered the example of a Romanian who 
left her country and moved to the United States where she lived for some twenty years. She has dual 
citizenship, travels to Romania every five years to see her family and friends, and maybe still has 
properties there. However, in any sense of the word, her centre of life is in the United States, not in 
Romania. Having family relatives, friends and property in another country (even the country of birth) is 
not enough to claim formal citizenship status. This is why I have proposed, in chapter six, the status of 
‘external quasi-citizens:’ a status that can admit ties other persons than resident citizens may have with 
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a specific country, but also makes clear that such ties are not strong enough to support a claim to 
citizenship. 
However, Bauböck thinks that in my example the person must keep her citizenship nonetheless. 
According to him, this is a good policy since an emigrant may change her mind sometime in the future 
and could come back to her origin country. Moreover, citizens must ‘see each other as belonging to 
particular intergenerational political communities’ (Bauböck 2012: 595), since this is important for the 
functioning of a political community at the level of independent states in the current international state 
system. I am still not convinced. On the one hand, if the person decides to come back to Romania after 
20 or 30 years, she can do this as long as she accesses and keeps the quasi-citizenship status I have 
proposed (and she is free to keep it or not). On the other hand, it is hard to understand what this 
belonging to a particular intergenerational political community is supposed to mean. Firstly, since her 
centre of life (her close family, her job) is in the United States, then a long-term immigrant would 
rather think her intergenerational community is in the US (the country where her children are brought 
up and where probably they will spend their lives) than in the former country to which she is linked 
only by her memories.  
Indeed, from this point of view permanent residence is more than it seems to be at a first glance. 
If one considers the matter at length, one sees that the person is living not in the country where she was 
born by pure luck, but in a state chosen by (a reasonable degree of) free will. Moreover, it is a state in 
which she wants to make a good life and to raise her children, a state in which her children will 
probably live and have in turn their own children. I claim this is enough for a minimal 
‘intergenerational community’ that a liberal democratic state needs in order to function. It is enough for 
a membership in a liberal-democratic community that should be based on a link between members that 
is ‘minimalist politic’ and ‘partly voluntaristic’, as Dumbrava claims (Dumbrava 2010: 3).236 But 
residence seems to be sufficient for this.237
                                                 
236 Someone may object that I am presupposing here that intergenerational political communities must be mutually 
exclusive with regard to membership. However, according to this objection this is so only for residential citizenship, not for 
birthright membership which can quite naturally be plural (Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the 
author, September 2013). I agree that unlike residence-based citizenship, intergenerational political communities based on 
birthright membership may be plural from a legal point of view. But I doubt that from a subjective point of view a person 
could reasonably see herself as member of several intergenerational communities. And even if this may be possible, we can 
still ask two questions. Firstly, how many intergenerational communities a person can subjectively really feel she belongs to 
– two, five, or maybe ten? Secondly, why should such a subjective identification be legally acknowledged through an 
official citizenship status? 
237 Accepting dual citizenship from a birthright and life-course perspective, Bauböck agrees that long-term residence is 
enough for acquisition but also considers that long-term residence abroad is not enough for withdrawal (Rainer Bauböck, 
personal communication on file with the author, April 2013). 
 We can even make a further (courageous) move and ask: at 
the end of the day, why do we suppose people need to see themselves as members of intergenerational 
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communities in the first place? When all’s said and done, a simple intention to live in a specific state 
plus strict liberal-democratic political laws (together with liberal-democratic sanctioned economic laws 
and international agreements) should be enough to guarantee a community’s continuity over 
generations, maybe even more so than the purely imagined ‘intergenerational community’ (which 
ultimately may prove to be simply an old and concealed vestige of the previous glorious but rather 
dangerous concept of ‘nationhood’). 
Finally, it is interesting to note in passing that there are real-world examples of non liberal-
democratic countries where it is simply impossible to renounce or lose citizenship. This happens for 
example in most Arab states, such as Morocco, where after the post-colonial period the King revived 
the doctrine of ‘personal and perpetual allegiance to the sovereign based on divine right’ (Perrin 2011: 
1). The state accepts dual citizenship, but if an individual wants to apply for naturalisation in a country 
which does not accept multiple citizenship, then she has to ask for release from Morocco. In this case, 
consulates can provide a certificate of loss, but this certificate has absolutely no impact on Moroccan 
citizenship (Perrin 2011: 17). Such a situation did in fact generate an international conflict with the 
Netherlands at one time: the Dutch government officially requested Morocco to facilitate loss of 
citizenship in order to naturalise around 200,000 Moroccans living in the Netherlands. However, 
Morocco refused, and appealed to the principle of ‘perpetual allegiance’ (Perrin 2011: 13, 21). 
 
7.4.3. Residence-based citizenship and life abroad. Exclusion of multiple-citizenship status: 
further examples and motivations based on international relations 
In chapter five on multiple citizens I have explained in detail why dual citizenship should be 
abandoned. Here I just want to survey real-world reasonable exclusions of this status, different 
restrictions applied to dual citizens in cases where this status is accepted, and other interesting instances 
where it is not welcomed. Let me start with the fact that, contrary to the general opinion, ‘a consistent 
approach towards avoiding dual citizenship may not be, at least theoretically, incompatible with a 
conception of (bounded) liberal-democratic membership’ (Dumbrava 2010: 13). Indeed, since in the 
20th century several countries have replaced ius soli with ius sanguinis and thus ‘ethnicised’ 
citizenship, a policy of returning to residence as the only requirement for citizenship (and thus no 
support for multiple citizenship) may not be necessarily illiberal. 
It is not so, for example, in the Central and Eastern European context, where national feelings 
are strong and, since nations do not match borders, governments are making continuing efforts to 
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expand ‘the national community beyond state borders.’ Since armed conflicts can have disastrous 
consequences, as the Yugoslavian case demonstrated, states have been forced to imagine new ways to 
make the national community bigger by incorporating ‘ethnic kins’ living in other states. Not 
surprisingly, dual citizenship (a liberal policy favoured by the West) has been seen as the best 
instrument to realise such intentions. For example, Romania has been engaged (against the European 
Commission’s protests) in a process of ‘restoring’ citizenship to ethnic Romanians from Moldova 
(Iordachi 2004), (Iordachi 2010). Another case is Hungary, which tried to implement the infamous 
Hungarian Status Law in 2001 in order to incorporate ‘ethnic kins’ living in the region (against 
Romania’s and Slovakia’s protests). 
Since the Venice Commission considered this move as being incompatible with European laws, 
Hungary moved forward and since 2010 simply offers full citizenship status to Hungarians living in 
neighbouring states. This raised some concerns since groups of ‘ethnic kins’ (for example, some 
Hungarians in Romania) are also requesting political autonomy, and coupling political autonomy with 
dual citizenship could threaten the integrity of the host state. Facing the international political turmoil 
created by such cases, and trying to find a solution for such political conflicts, some authors have 
considered that in Central and Eastern European countries there should be a trade-off between 
transnational citizenship and political autonomy. If ‘ethnic kins’ desire dual citizenship then they 
should abandon calls for political autonomy in the host state. However, if they desire political 
autonomy, then dual citizenship is excluded. The best solution in this case would be the rejection of 
dual citizenship in Eastern Europe and support for political autonomy arrangements (Bauböck 2007a). 
Another reason to abandon dual citizenship in Eastern Europe is that, in the countries in which 
it has been implemented, it has been obviously abused. One type of abuse is to access dual citizenship 
not because of some real desire to be a citizen of your kin state, but in order to become a European 
citizen. This abuse is manifest, for example, in the case of Moldovans taking Romanian citizenship 
(Iordachi 2010) and of Macedonians taking Bulgarian citizenship (Spaskovska 2012: 20). The abuse is 
clear from the simple fact that applications for Romanian and Bulgarian citizenship (made by 
Moldovans and Macedonians, respectively) multiplied enormously immediately before and after these 
countries’ accession to the European Union.  
Another type of abuse is made by criminals who are using dual citizenship in order to escape 
extradition. For example, in Macedonia a ‘former Minister of Health who holds both Macedonian and 
Bulgarian citizenship and was sought by Macedonian authorities for criminal charges, managed to 
escape extradition to Macedonia from Poland because of his Bulgarian citizenship’ (Spaskovska 2012: 
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20, note 42). This is also the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where around 500 criminals are using 
dual citizenship to escape prosecution (Sarajlić 2010: 16). But the security risk seems to threaten dual 
citizenship all over the world, not only in Eastern Europe. At least one author notes that dual 
citizenship is not irreversible in the context of terrorism (Kivisto 2007: 280). We should also consider 
the case of the UK where it is just the other way round. Dual citizenship is not an opportunity for abuse 
of rights but a liability for terrorist suspects: the UK can deport British terrorist suspects only if they are 
dual citizens who can be deprived of their British citizenship without becoming stateless. 
However, such reasons for abandoning multiple citizenship do not apply only to Eastern 
Europe, but in fact everywhere. For example, it is difficult to accept the (facilitated) naturalisation of 
ethno-cultural relatives, which includes giving up not only the residency requirement but also the 
requirement of renouncing a former citizenship, although this condition applies for the rest of the cases. 
As one author notes, ‘there is no justification for granting exceptions with regard to taking up residence 
or the renunciation of dual citizenship (if generally prohibited)’ (Dumbrava 2010: 18). A form of such 
facilitated naturalisation can be found in Serbia, where Serbians who migrated with the intention to live 
permanently abroad (and their spouses and descendants) can receive citizenship only by submitting a 
written statement (there is no residence criterion) (Rava 2010: 16). 
Interestingly enough, there are cases where states give ‘ethnic kins’ some ‘co-ethnic rights,’ but 
clearly refuse to offer them dual citizenship. Greece is an example here: until 2006 it had a ‘strategic 
choice to absolutely refuse Greek citizenship to Greeks from Albania.’ Since acquisition of Greek 
citizenship could have resulted in withdrawal of Albanian citizenship, Greece wanted to prevent ‘the 
definitive historical extinction or statistical death of […] the Greek minority in Albania’ (Krasniqi 
2012a: 18). This also happened in Bulgaria, where the Constituent Assembly of Veliko Turnovo (1879) 
did not accept a strong ius sanguinis since it didn’t want all ethnic Bulgarians to become citizens and 
thus to create a mass exodus in the region towards Bulgaria. On the contrary, it decided to keep ethnic 
Bulgarians ‘in adjacent lands as a way of legitimising future territorial expansion.’ Instead, the new 
state offered them some privileges (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 2, 4). Other countries refused dual 
citizenship to ‘co-ethnics’ simply because of the fear that possibly great numbers of ‘ethnic kins’ from 
the region would come to the country and would put a pressure on the job market. Welfare 
protectionism was, for example, one of the reasons why Hungarians opposed dual citizenship for 
‘ethnic kins’ in the 2004 referendum on this topic (Kovács and Tóth 2010: 12). Another example is 
Poland which officially does not accept dual citizenship, but offers to ‘co-ethnics’ a Polish ethnic card 
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entitling them to free movement, education, government stipends, and a work permit (Górny and 
Pudzianowska 2010). 
A further reason for opposing dual citizenship is offered by those countries with extremely large 
minority groups who fear that granting multiple status would result in their politics and internal affairs 
being decided by ‘outside’ forces .This is the case, for example, in Ukraine, where pro-western forces 
are, curiously enough, against double citizenship, while pro-Russian forces support it: ‘given the 
geopolitical realities in Ukraine and the role played by the “Russian factor” in Ukrainian domestic 
politics, this state of affairs is not really surprising’ (Shevel 2010: 18-19). It also happens in 
Montenegro, because of the fear that ‘dual citizenship from among the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia (most likely Serbia) would have […] a high impact on the voting population of the country 
and their electoral choices’ (Džankic 2012: 8). 
But not only Eastern European countries avoid multiple citizenship. One example in the western 
states is Germany, which since 1913 has provided for loss of citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of 
another citizenship. Moreover, in 2000 Germany also introduced ius soli and the option duty, according 
to which a child who acquires two citizenships by ius soli and ius sanguinis must ‘decide upon 
reaching the age of eighteen which nationality to keep and which to renounce’ (Hailbronner 2012: 7). 
Another interesting case is offered by those countries which do not accept dual citizenship in general, 
but only in some cases. For example, some countries offer dual citizenship only on the basis of bilateral 
agreements (or on the basis of reciprocity). This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which signed 
such conventions only with Serbia and Sweden (Sarajlić 2010: 10-11, 15); in the Czech Republic, 
which accepts dual citizenship only with Slovakia (Baršová 2010: 7, 10, 13); in Montenegro, which 
signed only one agreement with Macedonia (Džankic 2012: 11); in Russia, which signed two 
conventions, with Tajikistan (1995) and Turkmenistan (1993) (Salenko 2012: 16; 21-22, note 58); and 
in Slovenia (it requires release from former citizenship for naturalisation, except for citizens of those 
EU Member States where reciprocity exists) (Medved 2010: 13). 
Many other countries have different laws that try to avoid dual citizenship. There are different 
ways to avoid it, and other ways to practice such avoidance. There are states that practice an absolute 
and total avoidance of multiple citizenship; Norway (Brochmann 2010: 11) is one. Other countries 
practice a ‘general avoidance’ (or ‘avoidance in principle’), but have many exceptions. There are also 
states that avoid it in law but accept it in practice, and so on. Dual citizenship toleration is always a 
matter of degree, so the list below should be taken cum grano salis, since the countries listed practice 
different forms of toleration or non-toleration. Beside the six countries mentioned in the above 
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paragraph, there are 22 other countries which practice a form or another of avoiding dual citizenship 
(so a total of 28 states), and at least six countries which did avoid it in the past but accepted it recently.  
The states that do not accept dual citizenship in one form or another (besides those mentioned) 
are: Albania (Krasniqi 2012a: 14), Austria (Çınar 2010: 1, 9), Belarus (Ulasiuk 2011: 5, 11, 17), 
Bulgaria (Smilov and Jileva 2010), Croatia (Ragazzi, Štiks et al. 2010: 6, 9), Denmark (Ersbøll 2010: 2, 
26), Estonia (Järve and Poleshchuk 2010: 10), Georgia (Gugushvili 2012: 23), Germany (although in 
50% of naturalisations exceptions are granted) (Hailbronner 2012: 7, 16), Ireland (Handoll 2012: 15), 
Latvia (Krūma 2010: 1, 10), Lithuania (Kūris 2010: 3, 21, 29), Macedonia (Spaskovska 2012: 13), 
Moldova (Gasca 2012: 13-14), Montenegro (Džankic 2012: 2), the Netherlands (although ‘in 63% 
cases it is allowed to retain former citizenship’) (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 13, 18), Norway 
(Brochmann 2010: 9, 11), Poland (Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 14), Slovenia (Medved 2010), and 
Ukraine (Shevel 2010: 1). Another interesting case here is offered by New Zealand which broadly 
tolerates dual citizenship. However, according to the present citizenship law, citizenship ‘may’ be 
terminated in cases of acquisition of another citizenship.238 Finally, the six cases that until recently did 
not accept dual citizenship, but now do so are Switzerland (multiple citizenship status accepted since 
1992) (Achermann, Achermann et al. 2010: 16), Serbia (since 2000) (Rava 2010: 10), Luxembourg 
(since January 2009) (Scuto 2010: 9-11), Sweden (since 2001) (Bernitz 2012: 1), and Finland (since 
2003) (Fagerlund and Brander 2010: 12). Australia has also accepted dual citizenship since 2002.239
It is important to note that, although avoiding dual citizenship is in accordance with liberal 
democratic principles, there are some countries in the above list whose practice of dual citizenship 
avoidance is not in accordance with such values. One case in point is when states differentiate between 
citizens by allowing some set of individuals to access dual citizenship while denying the same status to 
others.  For example, there are dozens of countries which accept dual citizenship for birthright 
individuals, but not for naturalised citizens – among them Moldova (Gasca 2012: 13-14) and Poland 
(Górny and Pudzianowska 2010: 14). In the same vein, other states accept dual citizenship status for 
emigrants, but not for immigrants. Examples here are Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovenia (Dumbrava 2010: 
13). Conversely, some countries accept dual citizenship for immigrants, but not for emigrants. For 
example, in Georgia ‘it has been argued that the restriction which prohibits a Georgian citizen from 
being a citizen of another country applies only to a person who has obtained Georgian citizenship by 
 
                                                 
238 New Zealand, Citizenship Act 1977, No. 61, reprint as at 1 July 2013, art. 16, available at: 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0061/latest/DLM443684.html (last accessed 30 July 2013). 
239 I would like to thank Simon Watmough for drawing me attention on the Australian case (personal communication on file 
with the author, November 2013). 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
215 
 
birth or naturalisation, and it does not apply to a citizen of another country who has obtained Georgian 
citizenship by being granted Georgian citizenship’ (Gugushvili 2012: 22). Even more curiously, in 
Georgia dual citizenship is accepted, but multiple citizenship is not: ‘obtaining additional citizenship 
after already having had dual citizenship leads to the loss of Georgian citizenship’ (Gugushvili 2012: 
23). 
The second case in point is when states accept dual citizenship but impose some restrictions on 
those who enjoy this status. For example, the 1995 Georgian Constitution does not accept an individual 
with multiple citizenship to act as ‘Georgia’s President, Prime Minister or a Speaker of the Parliament’ 
(Gugushvili 2012: 1). Moldova prohibited for a short period (between 2008 and 2009) even more 
public positions to be hold by dual citizens, among which those of judges, mayors and presidents of 
local public administration, diplomats, etc. (Gasca 2012: 17). In the same vein, dual citizens in Bulgaria 
cannot run for parliamentary and presidential elections (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 10-11). Finally, in 
some states there are restrictions which are not directly related to multiple-citizenship status, but to the 
fact of being naturalised in that country (hence, not being a natural-born citizen): for example, only a 
‘natural-born citizen’ of the United States can become a president of this country.240
Sometimes, dual citizenship has been tolerated seemingly not because decision makers really 
wanted to, but simply ‘out of necessity’. This seems to be the case with the Czech-Slovak dual 
nationality, because of the great number of individuals that feel close to both countries since they were 
born and grew up in a period when both countries were forced to live under the same federation 
(Baršová 2010: 22). However, it is hard to understand why dual citizenship is seen as the only possible 
solution in this case. On the contrary, I believe that the solution I am proposing of one citizenship 
(based on residence) coupled with multiple nationality (and the benefits derived thereof) is at least a 
very good contender. This is especially so because both countries are members of the European Union, 
 The same 
restriction applies for presidency in Portugal (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 24), while in Spain only ‘nationals 
by origin’ can be a tutor to the King, have the right not to be deprived of nationality against their will, 
and can access double citizenship (with a country from the list of states with whom Spain has such 
agreement) (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 11). Such restrictions as those listed in the last three 
paragraphs cannot be accepted by a residence-based citizenship proposal. According to this theory, 
citizenship is due to residence, and there is no other assumption that could differentiate between 
different types of citizens. 
                                                 
240 US Constitution, Article II, section 1, Clause 5; source: http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A2Sec1.html (accessed 18 
January 2013).  
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so the benefits of being both a Slovak and Czech citizen are rather weak. Moreover, according to recent 
studies, Europeans do not feel the need to access another European citizenship anymore: ‘The statistics 
indicate that there is no substantial need or interest by Union citizens to acquire German nationality, 
due to the secure residence status and the participatory rights granted by Union citizenship’ 
(Hailbronner 2012: 24). 
There are of course serious objections against prohibiting dual citizenship, and they have to be 
taken into account. One obvious objection is that a general prohibition on dual citizenship will lead to 
increased statelessness, which is a major concern in the fields of international relations and human 
rights. According to a residence-based theory of citizenship a migrant should lose the citizenship of her 
former state of residence after a period of time (three years, as I have proposed) and should receive the 
citizenship of her host state. But unless we accept the less liberal proposal of an automatic and 
unconditional inclusion (Rubio-Marín 2000: 6),241
However, as I will try to show in the last chapter (see sections 8.1.3. and 8.2.) this may not be 
necessarily so. Firstly, it is a sociological truth that the longer the time, the greater the desire to apply 
for citizenship in the country of residence. Secondly, the onus should be on the state of residence to 
advertise the importance of citizenship and to offer serious incentives for citizenship acquisition. 
Finally, if at the end of the day there will be a small number of people that would still refuse to 
naturalise (no matter the time spent in the host state and the incentives given to them) then I believe 
their small number would not threat democratic institutions: in this case, they should be exceptionally 
allowed to retain the citizenship of their origin country.
 we must admit that some people will refuse to 
accept the new citizenship. And, since according to the residence-based proposal they lose their origin 
country’s citizenship, then they become stateless. It seems thus that residence-based citizenship can 
coexist only coupled with a less liberal, non-optional acquisition of citizenship in the country of 
residence.  
242
A second objection claims that in coerced migrations, such as those resulting from ethnic 
cleansing in Yugoslavia, states of origin must not have the right to deprive persons that that they have 
forced out of their territory of their citizenship on grounds of residence abroad. According to this 
objection, dual citizenship in these cases can be an elementary right and also a condition for reversal of 
ethnic cleansing through a right to return. But under a residence-based regime, there could be other 
 
                                                 
241 For an extensive critique of this view, see the last chapter. 
242 In the last chapter (section 8.2.) I show that a residence-based theory might find difficulties in answering who could 
claim the exception and under which conditions. 
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ways of dealing with such cases. For example, the origin state could offer individuals the possibility to 
return and thus to become once again mono-citizens. Or (in case they do not want to return and lose 
their origin state’s citizenship) the same state can offer them the possibility to access an ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ regime (as outlined in chapter six), which offers them not only the right to return, but also a 
large variety of rights (except political rights) in the origin state. Dual citizenship is not necessarily the 
only possible form of compensation in this case. 
 
7.5. Residence-based citizenship in state formation or succession 
A final interesting feature of residence-based citizenship is its connection with state formation or 
succession. The initial determination of citizenship at independence is ‘structurally analogous to the 
ongoing determination in migration contexts. In both cases there are primary rules that lead to 
automatic acquisition (ius domicilii or ius soli/ius sanguinis) and secondary rules that create individual 
options: the option right at independence (naturalisation) or renunciation after independence.’243
It is important to underline the fact that this policy was recently supported by two important 
international documents. In 1996, the Venice Commission issued ‘The Declaration on Consequences of 
 Now 
the ‘zero option’ is an option made by the state to automatically grant citizenship to all residents, and 
here we have a case of residence-based citizenship. But against a residence-based citizenship theory, it 
has been historically generally combined with an individual option to choose another citizenship: 
individuals are thus offered ‘the right to choose’ whether they want to become citizens in the new state 
or they want to acquire the citizenship of an external kin state. This is not acceptable under a residence-
based regime, since such an option basically offers the possibility to acquire citizenship according to an 
ethnic preference. The principle of residence is decisive in deciding a state’s initial body of citizens. 
According to Ulasiuk, 
 
‘The zero option foresees granting citizenship to all people living in a given state territory either at the 
moment of the declaration of independence or from the date when the corresponding law was adopted. 
It generally sets out, however, either a period of time within which persons can declare “their 
belonging to citizenship” (Vasilevich 2003: 282-283), or situations in which the automatic acquisition 
of citizenship is possible unless a person officially rejects citizenship in a given state.’ (Ulasiuk 2011: 
3) 
 
                                                 
243 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, September 2013. 
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State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons,’ which stated that ‘in all cases of State 
succession, the successor State shall grant its nationality [citizenship] to all nationals of the predecessor 
State residing permanently on the transferred territory.’ Similarly, the European Convention on 
Nationality declares (art. 18) that in the case of succession, states should take into account ‘the genuine 
and effective link of the person concerned with the State’ and ‘the habitual residence of the person 
concerned at the time of State succession’ (Ragazzi, Štiks et al. 2010: 1). 
The residence criterion was used by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to determine ‘the acquisition 
of Lebanese citizenship’ and it was complemented by the ‘right of option for those abroad to become 
Lebanese citizens within two years’ (el-Khoury and Jaulin 2012: 3). The residence principle was also 
the main tool to determine Moroccan citizens in the 1958 Citizenship Code (Perrin 2011: 8). And 
again, ‘permanent-residence criterion’ in post-Soviet Eurasia and ‘republic-level citizenship criterion’ 
in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were ‘used to determine the initial body’ of citizens (Baršová 2010: 
6).  
Other instances of the ‘zero option’ can also be found in Belarus, Armenia, and Ukraine 
(Ulasiuk 2011: 1-3), Yugoslavia (Sarajlić 2010: 5), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajlić 2010: 6-7), 
Bulgaria (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 4), Albania (Krasniqi 2012a: 4), Austria and Hungary (Çınar 2010: 
2), Kosovo (Krasniqi 2012b: 9), Lithuania (Kūris 2010: 3, 14), Moldova (Gasca 2012: 4), and 
Montenegro (Džankic 2012: 7). 
Concerning state succession, there is one illiberal instance opposed to the ‘zero option,’ 
understood as a residence criterion. After the fall of communism, in Latvia and Estonia the principle of 
‘state continuity’ was preferred to that of the ‘zero option.’ According to the former, the state simply 
resumes the existence that was terminated with the beginning of the Soviet occupation (Krūma 2010: 
2). Both states claimed that citizenship of the pre-Second World War republics was re-established and 
Soviet citizenship had legally ceased to exist. But this implied that only individuals who had Latvian 
and Estonian citizenship (at the time of the Soviet occupation) and their descendants had a right to be 
citizens. As a consequence Soviet-era settlers became (and at this moment, some of them continue to 
be) ‘non-citizens.’ ‘Non-citizenship’ is a legal category in Latvia’s law, according to which ‘the 
connection of a non-citizen with the Republic of Latvia is closer than that of a stateless person or a 
foreign national’ (Krūma 2010: 16). Estonia did the same thing in 1991 in relation to ‘Soviet-era 
settlers’ (Järve and Poleshchuk 2010: 1). As in the Latvian case, those who had taken up residence 
under Soviet occupation did not automatically acquire Estonian citizenship at independence. In 
comparison, the third Baltic state, Lithuania, decided (by a judgment of the Constitutional Court in 
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2006) that the body of citizens ‘was formed on the basis of permanent residents of Lithuania, 
irrespective of their nationality’ (Kūris 2010: 8). 
 
7.6. Conclusions: laws that defy residency and laws that do not require residency: why they don’t 
go well with the principles of liberal democracy 
The ‘partial citizenship’ of the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia (as we have already seen in the 
last paragraph) is not the only case of imposed non-citizen, permanent resident status. Other less liberal 
countries like Lebanon also enforce partial citizenship status on some individuals, for example for 
Palestinian refugees, ‘considered as foreigners of a special category who do not carry papers issued by 
their country of origin’ (el-Khoury and Jaulin 2012: 9). 
However, in liberal democracies the non-citizen, permanent-resident status has different degrees 
of voluntariness, and it matches more or less the category of non-citizen, long-term resident. I have 
already discussed above the huge number of 55 per cent resident population in Luxembourg which can 
be considered in the state of ‘denizenship,’ since it lacks voting rights (Scuto 2010: 19).244
Portugal also has a legal category of ‘quasi-citizenship’, although this may be considered 
liberal: citizens of Lusophone countries living in Portugal ‘enjoy wide-ranging rights as far as political 
participation and access to public office are concerned’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 2, 27). This is based on 
 In the 
United Kingdom one can find the legal status of ‘Indefinite Leave to Remain.’ According to Sawyer, 
this category is similar to the ‘concept of denizenship’ (Sawyer and Wray 2012: 5), guaranteeing 
individuals the right to stay in the country but not offering them full citizenship rights (Sawyer and 
Wray 2012: 5). The Netherlands also has two categories of people under the ‘quasi-citizenship’ status. 
On the one hand, this condition is designed for ‘inhabitants of the Moluccas, one of Indonesia’s 
archipelagos,’ who have enjoyed since 1976 ‘(almost) equal rights to Dutch citizens’ without being 
Dutch citizens (van Oers, de Hart et al. 2013: 33-34). On the other hand, the second category of Dutch 
‘quasi-citizenship’ resembles the UK’s ‘Indefinite Leave to Remain.’ Since 1990, a foreign citizen 
cannot be expelled ‘on the grounds of public order’ so long as he has had twenty years of legal 
residence. Additionally, since 2000 this person’s permanent residence ‘can only be withdrawn on 
grounds of national security or because the immigrant has taken up residence abroad’ (van Oers, de 
Hart et al. 2013: 34).  
                                                 
244 As already underlined in note 232 (section 7.4.1. above), the author does not mention expressly whether 45% refers to 
resident adult population or resident population including minors. However he seems to imply the former, since he raises 
the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the political decision processes in this country. 
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bilateral treaties, and up to now only one such treaty has been signed with Brazil. However, such 
citizens are denied access to many public positions in the state, like the presidency, membership of 
Parliament, diplomatic representatives, officers in the armed forces, etc. (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 27, note 
90). Moreover, ‘Lusophone citizenship does not provide any right to entry and permanent residence in 
Portuguese territory or to diplomatic protection in another country’ (Piçarra and Gil 2012: 28). 
On the other hand, in contrast with the countries discussed above which don’t offer long-term 
residents the possibility to access citizenship, there are other countries which do not require at all 
residency in the territory as a condition for citizenship. We have already seen that Hungary, for 
example, has offered citizenship to ‘ethnic kins’ in the region since 2010, but does not impose a 
residence requirement (Tóth 2010). This is also the case with Serbia, which offers citizenship to 
emigrants (former citizens) without requiring a minimum residence in the country (Rava 2010: 16). 
Finally, in the period between 1956 and 2004 Ireland waived all naturalisation requirements (residence 
included) for spouses of citizens under the ius connubii principle (Handoll 2012: 5, 7, 20). 
On the one hand keeping a status of permanent quasi-citizenship for residents in a state is not 
recommended from a residence-based theory’s point of view (although, as we will see in the last 
chapter, it may not be possible to fully exclude it either). On the other hand, a residence-based 
citizenship theory finds it difficult to accept to offer non-residents full citizenship rights and thus to 
give them a chance to contribute to making political decisions they will not have to cope with, as long 
as they are not residents of that country. 
Finally, as we have already seen, there are countries, such as Netherlands or United Kingdom, 
for which ‘long-term residence (…) is no longer considered to imply integration’ (van Oers, de Hart et 
al. 2013: 41). In contrast, the few countries that are still keeping a very liberal stance are constantly 
under attack. For example some authors decried the fact that Belgium did not require until the new 
2012 citizenship law anything else from a foreigner except long-term residence for citizenship 
acquisition:245
                                                 
245 As we have already seen, this was the case only until the new 2012 law which entered into force on 1 January 2013 (see 
note 206 above). 
 
 
‘Though citizenship cannot have as its sole objective the final evidence of the integration 
process, one should not fall into the opposite extreme, and reduce it to a mere confirmation of one’s 
residence. One could legitimately argue that this is, however, what has happened to Belgian 
citizenship since 2000. Nowhere in Europe are the conditions for the granting of citizenship to 
foreigners as flexible as in Belgium.’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 25) 
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But what is the problem with the liberal stance adopted by Belgium until 2012? The authors 
seem to believe that such a position goes against the genuine link principle, according to which one is 
supposed (in these authors’ view) to ‘seek (…) always to identify at best the core interests of an 
individual in the specific context within which he or she lives and to ascertain with accuracy the 
intensity of his/her integration within a social and legal system, before determining which law is 
applicable in any given case’ (Foblets and Yanasmayan 2010: 25). But the fact that a person is clearly a 
long-term resident in a country is already the best argument that she is already well integrated. It seems 
difficult to justify policies requiring identification of an individual’s ‘core interests’ of his life or 
ascertaining the intensity of her integration. The fact that the processes of naturalisation and integration 
go already very well after a short term of residence of only three years in Canada, New Zealand and 
Serbia (plus Belgium until 2012), or after five years in Sweden and six years in Norway is enough to 
demonstrate that nothing else is needed. Moreover, as we have already seen in this section, refusing 
long-term immigrants access to citizenship (just because they did not learn the language well or just 
because they did not pass a history test or a cultural examination which cannot be passed by many born 
citizens) is a clearly illiberal stance. 
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Chapter 8. Contenders of Residence-Based Citizenship and Avenues for Further Research 
 
‘To ignore the millions of persons who at present live in the society,  
but who are not of it, is to risk the perpetuation of marginality and  
lack of commitment. It is also to risk creating conditions that will  
tear at the fabric of the society’ (Rist 1978: xiii) 
 
‘I maintain that if we accept – as perhaps all contemporary democratic  
theorists do – that long-term residency in a democratic state is what should  
entitle people to full political rights, regardless of their ethnicity and  
national origin, then we must also endorse the idea that permanent  
non-residents should be disenfranchised’ (López-Guerra 2005: 216-217) 
 
8.1. Contenders of residence-based citizenship. Critique of alternative views 
In the last chapters we started to visualize what citizenship is from a residence-based point of view: 
citizenship is a basket of rights every individual should acquire just because she is a long-term resident; 
she uses this basket of rights in the country of residence in order to fully participate in a self-governing 
polity. In the liberal view I have proposed here (currently accepted by at least three states: Serbia, 
Canada, and New Zealand; and formerly accepted by one until 2012: Belgium) three years of residence 
qualify an individual for citizenship. In the case of irregular migrants, one year of effective residence 
qualifies her for permanent residence status, and then she must wait three more years in order to be 
able to apply for citizenship. The important thing is that, in the residence-based model I am proposing, 
citizenship is strictly a legal term that offers a basket of rights to residents; it is absolutely disconnected 
from other considerations like national, ethnic, economic, social, emotional, cultural and family ties. 
One could have – and does have – such type of ties even if one is not a citizen of the countries in which 
those ties exist.  
Clearly, this may seem a revolutionary view on citizenship: a citizen is not someone who has 
different sort of ties to a political community of residents, but a person that simply lives in – and hence 
is a part of – that community irrespective of any other consideration. However, when one changes 
one’s residence, one loses this basket of rights in the former state after three years of absence and takes 
the new one in the new state of residence after three years of living there (because statelessness must be 
avoided). Once a resident-citizen of a new country, the person should be able to acquire a different 
basket of rights in the former country of residence – a status called ‘external quasi-citizenship.’ I do not 
claim such a model cannot have its own problems; on the contrary, this is the subject of the present 
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chapter: a debate about the most important alternative theories, and an honest discussion of the 
resident-based model’s weakest points. 
In the first part of this chapter I want to briefly discuss four alternative theories of citizenship 
which do not easily come to terms with the idea of residence-based membership. All these theories 
meet specific problems: the ‘stakeholdership’ theory (Rainer Bauböck) may prove to be over-inclusive, 
just as David Owen’s very liberal theory which tries to include all ‘citizens-minus’ and ‘citizens-plus’; 
the automatic naturalisation model (Ruth Rubio-Marín) sanctions forced inclusion; and finally, two 
rather eccentric views would accept the status quo and the existence of different levels of ‘quasi-
citizenship:’ they would either sanction a negotiated exclusion (Valeria Ottonelli and TizianaTorresi) or 
a forced exclusion (Daniel A. Bell) of ‘citizens-minus.’ 
 In the second part of this chapter I want to honestly discuss what residence-based citizenship 
can easily provide for, but also the problems this theory finds difficult to answer. I claim that it can 
easily (a) solve the problem of partial citizenship, (b) offer an elegant answer to the problem of 
matching the categories of residents and citizens, (c) solve the problem of marriages of convenience, 
and most importantly (d) eliminate morally controversial standards of citizenship acquisition. However, 
the same theory may have problems in accurately answering at least two problems: firstly, regarding 
irregular migrants, as any other normative theory, it cannot provide a perfectly satisfactory answer to 
the way they must be treated (indeed, they still remain ‘impossible subjects’). But I will also try to 
show that a residence-based citizenship may still provide the best available moral solution to this 
problem. Secondly, the theory I am proposing may find it difficult to explain the difference between 
dual citizenship and ‘external quasi-citizenship,’ especially if we adopt the attractive proposal of 
devising multiple citizenship according to the Spanish way of differentiating between ‘active’ and 
‘dormant’ official statuses. However, I will try to show that the latter proposal would throw us back to 
many problems we have encountered in the discussion about multiple citizenship. 
The third and last part of the present chapter explains the avenues for further research for each 
empirical subject discussed in this study – irregular migrants, temporary workers, dual citizens and 
‘external quasi-citizens’ – and also for the concept of residence-based citizenship itself. Sociological, 
political, and especially normative subjects which seem interesting to be further investigated are taken 
into account. 
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8.1.1. Over-inclusion (1): the ‘stakeholdership principle’ 
The last three chapters frequently discussed the ‘stakeholdership’ theory, according to which an 
individual has a claim of being a member of a particular polity only if she is a ‘stakeholder.’ And an 
individual is a stakeholder ‘if the polity is collectively responsible for securing the political conditions 
for [her] well-being and enjoyment of basic rights and liberties’ (Bauböck 2009a: 15). Interestingly 
enough, the definition clearly seems to support that ‘stakeholdership’ is a form of residence-based 
theory, since political conditions for one’s well-being and her enjoyment of basic rights are directly 
related to the territory one is living in. However, Bauböck is interested not only in who has a claim to 
membership, but also in the stability and proper functionality of a democratic polity. He believes that a 
state must avoid boundary indeterminacy: democracies cannot work properly if too many people 
frequently come and go – that is, they do not merely migrate, but also change membership.  
In order to have a stable demos, the state-based polity246
 I believe this theory is over-inclusive, and there are two critiques I want to raise. According to 
the first one, ‘stakeholdership’ cannot reasonably justify the inclusion of long-term emigrants into the 
demos. It is important to see even from the beginning that this theory is rather indeterminate regarding 
the legal situation of long-term emigrants. On the one hand, as we have already seen in chapter five, 
full dual citizenship is normatively accepted: Bauböck considers that migrants who ‘retain strong 
economic, social, cultural and family ties with a sending country have a plausible claim to citizenship’ 
in both origin and host states (Bauböck 2007a: 72). The reason for this is that they are ‘stakeholders in 
both their country of origin and settlement’ (Bauböck 2009a: 17). The author refers here only to 
emigrants and to first generations born abroad, since he correctly considers that later generations 
 also needs at least two important 
things. The first is a legal provision, which regulates membership: among other conditions, it requires 
that citizens must have the right to keep the citizenship they acquired by birth or by naturalisation, even 
if they subsequently become residents of another country. The second is a psychological constraint: 
citizens must ‘see each other as belonging to [a] particular intergenerational political’ community 
(Bauböck 2009a: 2). These two requirements disconnect the ‘stakeholdership’ idea from residence-
based citizenship, since it accepts that long-term emigrants must keep their full citizenship in their 
origin countries. 
                                                 
246In Bauböck’s view, birthright membership is a condition for democratic stability only for polities that are states, i.e. 
members of the international society of states; sub-state and supra-state based polities do not require membership stability 
secured by birthright (personal communication on file with the author, April 2013). 
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cannot be presumed to be connected anymore with the origin country in a way that would entail a 
general right to citizenship there.247
 Regarding this category of first-generation emigrants, the question here, asked under the 
‘stakeholdership’ theory’s terms, is whether long-term emigrants are still sufficiently ‘connected,’ since 
‘connection with the state’ is considered the relevant criterion for citizenship status. As we have 
already seen, the strong ties that make a claim to citizenship plausible are supposed (by the 
aforementioned author) to be of an ‘economic, social, cultural and familial’ nature. So is a long-term 
emigrant sufficiently ‘connected’ with his origin state? In chapter six I offered the example of a 
Romanian living in the United States for more than twenty years: she has United States’ citizenship, 
she works, raises her children, and has friends there. Sometimes, maybe every five or six years, she 
comes to Romania for two weeks to visit some close family members. But are such familial ties 
sufficient to support a membership claim? Suppose that half of her close family relatives move to 
 
So let me take these two cases in turn. Regarding the first generation born abroad, Bauböck 
accepts their right to full citizenship in the origin country only on the condition that they keep strong 
connections with their parents’ home state. In his view, first generations born abroad should have the 
right to retain ius sanguinis citizenship until the age of majority, after which states of origin may but 
need not make retaining it conditional upon a declared intention of future residence or de facto return. 
However, according to the same author the external franchise should not be extended to them at the age 
of majority unless they intend or do return. But citizenship without full political rights (which is 
justified here by lack of residency) could be seen as a status of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ in the way I 
have describe it. Since I also agree with Bauböck that only residence triggers a right to access full 
citizenship status, and this scholar accepts that states at least may make retaining ius sanguinis 
citizenship at majority dependent on residence, there is no disagreement between us here – although in 
this case I do not understand why ius sanguinis citizenship until the age of majority protects the child 
better than a residence-based citizenship in the host country (based on ius soli) plus the status of 
‘external quasi-citizen’ in his parents’ state. However, I argue that further changing the state of 
permanent residence implies loss of citizenship: in consequence, my disagreement with Rainer 
Bauböck does not concern the first generation born abroad, but only first generation emigrants – who 
according to this author should keep their citizen rights, while I claim they shouldn’t. 
                                                 
247 In individual cases they may of course be so connected: this is why the status of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ could allow 
a member of a later generation the right to return and to take up residence there (as we have already seen in chapter 6). 
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Rwanda – are these family ties enough in order to give her a claim to Rwanda’s citizenship? Family 
ties are surely not enough in order to support such a demand. 
What about cultural ties? Suppose the same person would make a claim to Moldova’s 
citizenship because of strong cultural connections – speaking the same language, sharing the same 
culture. Of course nobody would accept these cultural links as sufficient (by themselves) for supporting 
a claim to Moldovan citizenship. Social and economic ties are even less plausible as sufficient 
connections qualifying a person for citizenship acquisition: one may have economic interests and 
probably many close friends in Mongolia, but – unless we accept the idea of investment-based 
citizenship, which I have criticised in the last chapter – these links are not enough to support a claim to 
citizenship acquisition in a specific state. It is thus not obvious why Bauböck considers ‘economic, 
social, cultural and familial’ ties as supporting a ‘plausible claim to citizenship.’ Indeed, they may be 
sufficient enough to offer a claim to an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status – as I have proposed in 
chapter six above – but not for full citizenship. Such a theory is rather over-inclusive, and it devaluates 
the idea of citizenship as a special bond between the individual and the state in which she resides. 
 On the other hand, sometimes Bauböck does not seem to be convinced that full dual citizenship 
status should be seen as a fundamental individual right in this case. In such moments he considers that 
emigrants are not entitled to political rights: the ‘external franchise should not be seen as a fundamental 
individual right but as permissible’ (Bauböck and Perchinig 2009: 487). I readily accept this claim 
since, as we have already seen in chapter seven above, resident citizens should not be forced to accept a 
political situation decided by non-residents who are not subjected to the political state of affairs they 
helped to bring about. However, the problem is that in a world in which economic, social and human 
rights are increasingly based on international agreements – so they do not depend upon enjoying a 
citizenship status in a particular polity – political rights are the last stronghold of citizenship. Indeed, as 
we have already seen in chapter six above, even the right to return is disentangled from citizenship and 
offered by an increasing number of countries to ‘external quasi-citizens’. In this case, losing political 
rights as a result of taking up permanent residence – hence, according to my theory, citizenship – 
abroad simply means losing citizenship in the former country of permanent residence. By accepting 
that external political rights are only ‘permissible’, Bauböck thus opens a large door for a spectacular 
return of the stakeholdership theory under the residence-based citizenship label. 
 Regarding the second critique I want to raise, the stakeholdership theory is based on a rather 
perplexing psychological assumption: according to it, it is important for the functioning of the political 
community that citizens ‘see each other as belonging to particular intergenerational political 
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communities’ (Bauböck 2012: 595). I have tried to answer this critique in chapter seven above (section 
7.4.2.) where I met serious difficulties in understanding what such intergenerational political 
community is supposed to mean. On the one hand, a double citizen – having both American and 
Romanian citizenship – who is living for twenty years in the United States has probably the centre of 
her life in this latter country: her close family, her friends, her job are all there. These are, I maintain, 
sufficient reasons to see herself as a member of an intergenerational political community, since this is 
the country for which she made a lot of sacrifices – including the sacrifice of leaving her origin country 
– where she invested efforts and money, and where her children and grandchildren will probably work 
and live. On the other hand, the origin country may be the source of deep feelings and cherished 
memories, and the state where some good old friends and maybe elderly family members still live, but 
this does not qualify anyone for full citizenship status. I strongly believe simple residence is enough for 
a membership in a liberal-democratic community based on a link between members that is ‘minimalist 
politic’ and ‘partly voluntaristic’ (Dumbrava 2010: 3). 
 On the other hand, as I have already asked in chapter seven above, why democracies need their 
citizens to see themselves as members of intergenerational communities in the first place? And do we 
have serious academic studies that empirically demonstrate that this requirement is a sine qua non 
condition to guarantee a community’s continuity over generations? I am sceptical about this condition: 
a liberal education regarding law-abiding behaviour and respect for democratic norms as the minimal 
conditions for one’s individual prosperity may prove to be more important than insistence on an idea of 
‘intergenerational community’ which is rather an exemplar of the old concept of nationhood than a real 
condition for securing the stability of a political community. 
 However, Bauböck could finally reply using his ‘hypermigration model’ (Bauböck 2011). 
According to it, state-based polities need a stable demos: the proper function of liberal democracies 
would be seriously damaged in a world where people frequently change membership. I fully agree that 
this is the case in a polity where all citizens are emigrants and all residents are non-citizens. However, 
in the context of residence-based citizenship – which requires as a matter of right citizenship for 
residents – it seems that Bauböck may be particularly concerned about both the number of persons 
changing citizenship according to residence, and about the frequency of this change. Regarding the 
numbers of immigrants worldwide, as we have already seen in chapters one and three, it is between 
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three percent and less than four percent of the world population.248
The problem is that, according to Bauböck, in a ‘hypermigration’ scenario the claim to retain 
birthright citizenship in countries of origin becomes much weaker; in such a scenario only a residence-
based citizenship would be defensible. So in his view, the relatively low current stocks and flows of 
international migration support his claim that birthright citizenship remains feasible and justifiable in 
the present world, which is not a ‘hypermigration’ world. The ‘hypermigration’ scenario is thus not 
intended to defeat residence-based citizenship. It is meant to show: (a) why it is not necessarily 
required in the present world and (b) why maintaining democratic cohesion would be difficult in a 
world in which citizenship could only be derived from residence.
 Even if the number of citizens with 
immigration background in one specific state can go as high as 16.6% of the total population in 
Germany in 2006 (Cyrus 2009) or even higher (as in Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria; outside 
Europe, Canada, Australia, Israel and the Arab Gulf states have even much higher percentages), the 
numbers are still relatively low to create serious problems for a liberal democracy. It is of course 
possible that in the future the numbers may grow – but as long as citizenship is based on residence, an 
immigration background becomes less important no matter how high the percentage is. 
So we have to go further to the problem of the frequency of people changing citizenship 
because of a change in residence. As I will try to show later at the end of section 8.1.4., the experience 
of temporary workers shows that in time they become ‘permanent:’ otherwise put, over time most 
people tend to take roots rather than to move continuously. As one author considers, setting aside a 
cosmopolitan elite ‘people are generally inclined to set down roots in specific residential habitats (in 
which they make long-term investments) and to rely on specific institutional, social and cultural 
frameworks to lead a meaningful existence’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 17). Finally, even in a situation of 
‘hypermigration’ there are democratic methods that could stabilize the demos (like offering serious 
incentives to stay, as I will show later in section 8.1.3.).  
249
                                                 
248 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, ‘International Migration Report 2006: 
A Global Assessment ‘, <
 I do agree with the first point: in 
the present world residence-based citizenship is not ‘necessarily required’, but what I tried to explain in 
this study is that in many specific ways it could be, even in the present world, more desirable. I 
strongly disagree with the second point: as I tried to argue, together with Rubio-Marín I believe that in 
time people are inclined to set down roots, so the risk regarding maintaining democratic cohesion may 
be exaggerated. Probably this risk would be more serious if Bauböck would also introduce in the 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/report.htm>, p. xiv (accessed 
30 July 2013). See also Abizadeh (2010: 358) and Bauböck (2011: 684). 
249 Rainer Bauböck, personal correspondence on file with the author, April 2013. 
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‘hypermigration’ model a radical psychological transformation in the sense that all people would not 
only live in other countries than their origin states, but also that they would not even have the tendency 
of taking roots anymore, anywhere. This is, I admit, a frightful thought. In consequence, my claim is 
that neither the number of persons changing citizenship according to residence, nor the frequency of 
this change could be seen as serious arguments against a residence-based model of citizenship. 
 
8.1.2. Over-inclusion (2): the liberal argument 
A very liberal argument is put forward by David Owen, who is defending a concept of ‘transnational 
citizenship’ which accepts political inclusion of all four categories we have taken into account: 
irregular migrants, temporary workers, dual citizens and ‘external quasi-citizens’. This argument 
defends full inclusion as an element ‘of an account of transnational political equality’ (Owen 2010), 
(Owen 2013) and simply requires the ‘incorporation of both immigrants and emigrants into the polity’ 
(Owen 2011a). I want to criticise this standpoint as suffering of the same deficiency as Bauböck’s: that 
is, I will claim it is also over-inclusive. I begin by quickly reminding the disagreement presented in 
chapter one between Owen and López-Guerra over the adequacy of a residence-based citizenship 
account. 
The argument put forward by López-Guerra is rather elegant and simple: he builds on Robert 
Dahl’s principle of inclusion, according to which ‘all subjected to the laws’ of a political community 
should have a say in making those laws (Dahl 1989); in consequence, all permanent residents of a state 
should have political rights – hence, be full citizens – of that state (López-Guerra 2005: 220-221). The 
reverse is, in this author’s opinion, also true: since long-term or permanent expatriates are no longer 
subject to the laws of their origin countries, they should lose the right to decide on those laws – that is, 
they should lose full citizenship status. In other words, if long-term or permanent residency requires as 
a matter of justice full political rights for all qualified individuals, then long-term or permanent non-
residency should imply the disenfranchisement of all such persons (López-Guerra 2005: 216). In 
consequence it seems that the thrust of the argument lies on whether permanent residents are indeed not 
subjected to the law of their origin countries.  
Owen considers that López-Guerra is wrong: even if we accept Dahl’s criteria of full inclusion 
into the demos – being of age, being mentally sane, habitually residing in the territory and thus being 
subject to the laws of that territory’s government (Dahl 1989) – this doesn’t mean that non-residents 
can be reasonably excluded (Owen 2011a). Indeed, ‘external’ citizens are also subject to some – 
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arguably, many – of the home state’s laws: for example, they must have a say at least in constitutional 
referenda and maybe other situations where the nature of their membership is at stake – for example, a 
referendum on whether the state should ‘institute or abolish expatriate voting’ (Owen 2010), (Owen 
2011a). The basic idea seems to be that although residence is a sufficient, it is not also a ‘necessary 
condition for being subject to the decisions of the state’ – hence long-term non-resident individuals can 
still be full citizens of their home state (Owen 2011c). Moreover, expatriates should also enjoy voting 
rights – seen as ‘permissible’ for national legislative and presidential elections, and as ‘required’ for 
constitutional referenda. This is because the latter expresses the basic rules of a political community, 
and every member of that community should be entitled to have a say in their design (Owen 2011b). 
However I believe this author may miss the point here, since it seems that López-Guerra and 
Owen are discussing two different problems situated at two different levels. The first problem is who 
should be a citizen, and this is the most basic level. López-Guerra answers this question by proposing 
the residence-based criterion. Only after we offer an answer to this question can we go further and ask, 
as Owen does, how different categories of citizens – in this case, ‘external’ citizens – should be treated 
by the home state. López-Guerra’s answer to the first question is that after a period of residence abroad 
and naturalisation in another country, these individuals are not considered citizens anymore, so there is 
no point in asking what rights they should have as citizens – however, we could ask indeed what rights 
can be offered them as ‘external quasi-citizens’. But if this is true, then Owen’s critique fails, since we 
cannot ask what rights a group of individuals must enjoy as citizens of a state as long as we decided 
that they are not citizens of that state (anymore) in the first place. And notice that this is not to deny 
that there are laws that apply to non-resident members: on the contrary there are, but they are applying 
according to my model only to (mono-)citizens – for example, they are applying to people who work in 
embassies, or to temporary ‘external’ mono-citizens – and not to those who lost their citizenship status 
because the state deprived them of citizenship according to a possible international legal trend against 
multiple citizenship. Owen’s reasoning works: (a) only in an international system where dual 
citizenship is largely accepted, which is our present world (which I have tried to criticise), or (b) in an 
international system where dual citizenship is not accepted, and immigrants either find it difficult to 
naturalise or they deliberately choose not to naturalise (for a discussion of the later alternative, see the 
next section). 
Owen could of course reply that if a state takes the basic decision of who should be considered 
a citizen, then all actual – resident and non-resident – citizens should have a say in such a process 
(Owen 2010). This takes us back to the problem of who should be a citizen/stakeholder/decision-maker 
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in the first place and who should decide this. Irrespective of our preferences in answering such a 
question, we have to understand that all principles advanced by political theorists and philosophers 
exclude ab initio some categories – as non-citizens – in one way or another. For example Bauböck’s 
‘stakeholdership’ theory excludes third generation emigrants and beyond (regarding second-generation 
emigrants without a period of previous residence in the home state, exclusion is limited to franchise 
and it is not strictly mandatory). So the decision about who is holding a stake is made by the principle 
itself – and the very principle excludes ab initio some categories. In the same vein, a residence-based 
principle produces its own exclusions: it excludes those who do not permanently reside in the country. I 
have explained in the last three chapters the reasons why even first generation long-term emigrants 
should be excluded from political membership and the mechanism of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ which 
can still offer them other forms of inclusion. 
But Owen may still claim that non-residents have a right to citizenship of the origin state since 
that community is a source of ‘noninstrumental value’ for them. In his own words, he thinks that one 
general criterion for acquisition of citizenship is ‘an entitlement to a fair opportunity not to suffer the 
loss of political membership insofar as the political community is a source/site of noninstrumental 
value for oneself’ (Owen 2011b: 5). But this is rather strange since it is hard to understand what this 
‘noninstrumental value’ is supposed to mean, and it is also difficult to imagine why such a value could 
be considered strong enough to entitle an individual to a citizenship claim. Since in the same paragraph 
Owen distinguishes between generations and believes that this entitlement is stronger for first 
generation emigrants and becomes gradually weaker for each of the following generations, it seems 
that the ‘noninstrumental value’ refers to different family members, friends, and emotions that tie a 
first-generation emigrant to her origin country. However, as I have already argued in chapters six and 
seven (and also in the paragraph 8.1.1) above, having such links to one or many countries should not be 
considered as being enough to support a citizenship claim. 
Interestingly, Owen’s theory still seems to be close to my proposal since he makes a distinction 
between ‘political membership’ and ‘national citizenship’ (Owen 2011c: 12-13), (Owen 2011a). 
According to him political rights should be linked to the former, and should be automatically – that is, 
mandatorily – offered to long-term residents, while other rights (diplomatic protection, automatic right 
to re-entry, the right to transmit nationality to children) should be linked to the latter on a voluntary 
basis: ‘we may hold both that there is a compelling argument for the mandated acquisition of full 
political rights or political membership (…), but also that the acquisition of national citizenship itself 
should involve a voluntary act on the part of the immigrant’ (Owen 2011c: 13). However, this 
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distinction is dubious: political membership cannot be reduced to political rights, but it should also 
include diplomatic protection – indeed, it would be curious to have the right to vote abroad as a 
temporary ‘external’ member of a political community without also enjoying the right to be 
diplomatically protected for exercising such a right – the right to re-entry and that of transmitting 
nationality to children. But if this is so, then the only reasonable distinction could be one between 
‘political membership’ and ‘national belonging:’ indeed, one could be a member of a state without also 
being a member of a specific nation – or belonging to a specific ethnicity – of that state. But then the 
relevance of Owen’s distinction fails in our debate: citizenship rights – political rights included – 
should be offered based on residence. What other rights one should enjoy as a member of one of the 
nations or ethnicities that constitute a political association – for example, ‘indigenous rights’ (Kymlicka 
2007), (Waldron 2003), (Kingsbury 1998) – is quite another, different subject. 
However Owen is still explicitly arguing against citizenship based on pure residence since, 
according to him, such a proposal cannot meet ‘certain basic standards of sociological and 
psychological realism;’ moreover, he believes that 
 
‘this proposal could only be a viable principle if one’s identification with, or sense of belonging to, 
a polity were purely a function of residence combined with automatic mandated political inclusion 
such that non-residence plus automatic mandated political exclusion would suffice to eliminate 
one’s identification with the polity of one’s original nationality’ (Owen 2010) 
 
Owen thinks that this is unrealistic on two grounds. Firstly, he considers – together with Rainer 
Bauböck – that migrants should choose citizenship voluntarily and not have it imposed on them. 
Secondly, in Owen’s view residence-based citizenship overlooks a sociological reality: first generation 
immigrants ‘typically retain a strong sense of identification with their polity of original nationality, 
continuing to regard the quality of their own lives as bound to that community of fate’ (Owen 2010). I 
believe these two reasons for which Owen considers a residence-based model must fail can be easily 
answered. Regarding the first one, I think this author mistakenly sees – in the above quote – a sine qua 
non link between a residence-based theory and automatic acquisition of citizenship; according to him, 
if (a) citizenship is based on residence, and (b) long-term absence implies loss of origin country’s 
citizenship, then (c) there must be an automatic acquisition of citizenship in order to avoid both 
statelessness and a high proportion of second-class citizens in the state of residence. 
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But this is not necessarily true: as I will argue in the following section – and as most political 
theorists accept – the intention of going back to the origin country fades over time, and since 
individuals intend to remain in the host state there is no reason they would not apply for full status. An 
example here is offered by temporary workers in Germany. Rubio Marín claims that ‘as time passes 
[…] the actual chances and/or intentions to go back diminish’ (2000: 107). However, not everyone 
agrees. Rainer Bauböck, for example, would point to ‘the well-known pattern that labour migrants 
intend to stay until the age of retirement and then return to their country of origin.’ According to him, 
in these cases long-term residence is not an indicator for lack of intention to return. In consequence 
‘one should not build a normative argument on a contestable and empirically quite variably 
assumptions like this one.’250
Moreover, even if the intention of going back to the origin country may not always fade away 
over time, the number of new full citizens can be enlarged by the host state, which must offer serious 
incentives for citizenship acquisition to those who are not yet entirely convinced. And finally, if at the 
end of the day there still remains a small number of individuals who are consciously and stubbornly 
refusing the host state’s citizenship, then some balance or compromise between individual liberty and 
social equality could be reached even if this would imply an exception to the residence-based 
citizenship norm.
 I readily agree, but from a liberal democratic point of view we may still 
ask whether such long-term residence status without citizenship (for a person that entered the host 
country in search of a job in her mid-twenties and then comes back to the origin country in her mid-
sixties) is acceptable (even for EU internal migrants, who might arguably be more reluctant to apply for 
the host state citizenship). My proposal here (host state citizenship coupled with an ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ status in the origin country, which offers both the right to return and the possibility of 
reacquiring citizenship when the person returns) may still offer a better solution. 
251
Regarding the second reason advanced by Owen for the failure of the residence-based model of 
citizenship, if we accept that generally both links and the intention to return to the origin country fade 
in time, it is difficult to claim that there is a ‘sociological reality’ according to which migrants 
‘typically’ retain a ‘strong’ sense of belonging to the origin country and see themselves ‘bound to that 
community of fate.’ And even supposing that this is true – even if first generation emigrants have a 
strong sense of belonging to their country of origin – such a sense is not normatively relevant for a 
 In consequence, a residence-based model of citizenship can still be supported even 
if we accept that citizenship must be voluntarily acquired. 
                                                 
250 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, July 2013. 
251 For an extensive discussion of these three arguments, see section 8.1.3. below. 
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claim to citizenship; we can still ask what exactly keeping ‘a strong sense of belonging’ and feeling 
‘bound to that community of fate’ really mean such that this meaning would be enough to support a 
citizenship claim. Suppose I have lived in Romania in a town full of German ethnic Romanian citizens. 
I have learned German, I have German friends, I am crazy in love with German art and philosophy; as 
a matter of fact, intellectually and psychologically I feel myself closer to German than to Romanian 
culture. However I am a Romanian ethnic and this did not entitle me (as German ethnicity had entitled 
my friends after the 1989 Revolution) to apply for German citizenship. In this case, ‘a strong sense of 
belonging’ and feeling ‘bound to that community of fate’ (to use Owen’s words) didn’t offer me – quite 
rightly, indeed – a claim to citizenship. 
Moreover, as I have already tried to explain in chapter seven above, the presupposition that 
citizenship and the state are based on a psychological link between citizens it’s a form of nationalism 
that we should rather dismiss. Indeed, a Romanian supporter of Chelsea’s football team may feel more 
psychologically linked to a Greek supporter of the same team than to another Romanian who is a 
supporter of whatever rival team. This also functions the other way around: psychologically, 
‘ethnizens’ may feel themselves as being emotionally linked to another state than their state of 
residence and citizenship, but this does not automatically entitle them to acquire that state’s citizenship. 
In consequence, turning to psychology (to what Owen defines as ‘certain basic standards of… 
psychological realism’) or to sociology cannot be an argument against residence-based citizenship since 
(a) the psychological attachment to a state does not entitle me from a legal point of view to that state’s 
citizenship, and (b) the other way around, not having any psychological attachment to my own country 
does not entitle the state to suspend my citizenship. Finally, I accept that there may be of course many 
‘sources of belonging’ that are not based on residence – but it is hard to understand why they could (or 
should) be seen as entitling one to citizenship acquisition. 
 
8.1.3. Forced inclusion: automatic naturalisation 
The third theory is not only over-inclusive – since it accepts multiple citizenship – but it also advocates 
a form of forced inclusion: besides accepting non-resident members of a political community, Ruth 
Rubio-Marín also requires mechanical inclusion of temporary and irregular migrants through an 
automatic naturalisation after ten years of residence. According to her, inclusion must be 
‘automatically […] and […] unconditionally’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 6). It is important to state that in 
Rubio-Marín’s view automatic residence-based naturalisation is defendable only if dual citizenship is 
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either permitted or unavoidable; the reason is that the state of residence has no right to force 
denaturalisation in the state of origin.252
But if this is correct and all these social factors – residence, work, family, friends, participating in 
society’s social and cultural life – support a rightful membership claim, and further if social 
membership also implies a rightful claim to citizenship, then by the same token a lack of social 
membership – and not accessing social factors because of residence abroad – in the origin country 
should imply loss of citizenship. In other words, if ‘developing a set of attachments’ after a long 
residence period in a host state is making that state ‘the centre of their existence in practical terms’ 
 This idea is extremely interesting, since it promises to be a 
form of purely residence-based theory: both types of ‘citizens-minus’ (irregular migrants and 
temporary workers) are supposed to become full citizens after a period of time spent in the host 
country; moreover, as the author claims, the only requirement of the nationalization procedure should 
be previous residence: there should be no other conditions. However, my proposal of residence-based 
citizenship is different from this theory in three important ways. 
 Firstly, I believe Rubio-Marín doesn’t go all the way: if permanent residence automatically 
implies acquisition of the host state’s citizenship after a period of time, then logically lack of 
permanent residency status must also imply loss of any previous citizenship after a period of absence. 
As we have already seen, this is the way Brochmann explains Norway’s opposition to dual citizenship: 
the loss of citizenship for living continuously abroad is ‘the complement of the acquisition requirement 
of stable residency for foreigners wanting to naturalise in Norway’ (Brochmann 2010: 11). So if 
‘forced’ automatic naturalisation is the only reasonable policy after ten years of residence, then why not 
a similar ‘forced’ denaturalisation after taking another citizenship and ten years of residing outside the 
previous country of citizenship? Moreover, the problem is that the arguments Rubio-Marín is offering 
in order to defend automatic citizenship based on residence also seem to justify exclusion of dual 
citizenship. For example, she considers that 
 
‘The claim to automatic incorporation relies, first of all, on the relevance of social membership for 
defining the bounds of the relevant democratic polity […] The basic idea is that membership is first, 
and above all, a social fact, determined by social factors such as living, working or raising a family and 
participating in the social and cultural life of a community.’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 21) 
 
                                                 
252 ‘Given that states lack the power to dissolve their resident aliens’ previous nationalities, and that a condition for the valid 
application of automatic membership is that the person will not be deprived of her prior nationality, the path of automatic 
membership would lead to an increase in the numbers of dual or multiple citizenship.’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 126). 
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(Rubio-Marín 2000: 85), and if this directly supports a claim to citizenship, then the origin country is 
not the centre of migrants’ existence anymore. Furthermore, if ‘the centre of existence’ supports a 
claim to membership, then the lack of it justifies loss of origin country’s citizenship. This is even more 
the case when, as this author readily accepts, ‘as time passes […] the actual chances and/or intentions 
to go back diminish’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 107). At the end of the day, if it is true that ‘residential 
stability […] is a condition for the fully free exercise of […] rights and freedoms’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 
110), then not satisfying the residence condition should normally imply loss of citizenship – but only as 
long as the host state’s citizenship is acquired, in order to prevent statelessness. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that although the author is much concerned about social equality, she fails to discuss the 
advantages enjoyed by multiple citizens in comparison with mono-citizens, like the right to exit.253
 Secondly, I cannot accept the long-term residence of ten years supported by Rubio-Marín. As I 
have already mentioned in chapter three on irregular migrants, I do believe that the time threshold 
cannot be decided by a normative theory – it will rather depend on each state’s decision. However, it 
seems reasonable that, since ‘our lifetime is limited’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 33), this threshold shouldn’t 
be very demanding. True, the author accepts that individuals could apply for citizenship status after 
five years of legal residence, so this would not be a problem for temporary workers. But irregular 
migrants in this case may linger in an illegal status in their country of residence for a very long time 
period of five years (Rubio-Marín 2000: 23-24): a period during which they cannot make use of their 
most basic human and social rights because of fears of deportation. It is true that, on the other hand, we 
cannot accept that once in the territory, they should be accepted as legal migrants since this would 
subvert a political community’s right of regulating migration flows.
 
254
 Thirdly, a liberal-democratic theory of residence-based citizenship should not transform 
inclusion into a mandatory and automatic process. This may not be obvious at a first look: on the 
contrary, since such a theory, on the one hand, does not accept dual citizenship, and on the other hand, 
 However, the time period must 
be reduced, and I have proposed a maximum period of one year, after which an irregular migrant 
should be able to apply for regularization based on the unique condition of residence. Afterwards he 
can be set on the path to full citizenship as any other regular migrant, and I have proposed that the 
residence criterion – which should be the only requirement for accessing citizenship status – should 
match the practice of very liberal countries (Serbia, Canada, New Zealand and Belgium until 2012) – 
that is, three years. 
                                                 
253 For a full discussion of such advantages, see chapter five above. 
254 For the rejection of the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ view, see chapter three above. 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
237 
 
it links citizenship with residence, not residing in the origin state for more than three years triggers loss 
of citizenship. In consequence, in order to prevent statelessness, it seems that the host state citizenship 
should be necessarily acquired after three years of residence. Moreover, even when – despite 
international covenants – dual citizenship is accepted, having a class of permanent residents who are 
not caring about full citizenship status and do not apply for it means accepting a permanent second-
class citizenship status based on self-exclusion, and this could be very detrimental for a liberal 
democracy and its values (Rubio-Marín 2000: 102). 
 There are three ways one could answer this argument. The first one refers to the individual 
migrant’s liberty and freedom of choice, and it has already been proposed by a political theorist who 
advances a Rawlsian argument based on the worth of liberty to persons. Since immigrants have a larger 
frame of social ties than permanent residents which are also native-born citizens, in an international 
system where multiple formal membership is not available they should at least have the right to choose 
their citizenship. This also maximizes the political impact of an immigrant choice: 
 
‘Allowing them to choose between different nominal citizenships does not fully compensate for their 
political marginalization but this liberty enables them to maximize the political impact of whatever 
orientation they choose for themselves’ (Bauböck 1994a: 90) 
 
However, Bauböck argues (Bauböck 1994a: 91), and Rubio-Marín agrees (Rubio-Marín 2000: 113-
114) that the argument loses its force in an alternative international system where dual citizenship is 
largely acknowledged: since multiple membership is accepted, there is no need to choose as long as 
one can keep both formal statuses, and the host state’s citizenship can be automatically conferred to 
permanent residents since it does not imply losing the former formal status. However, I have argued in 
chapter five on multiple citizens that dual citizenship should be abandoned; if my argument holds, then 
citizenship acquisition should rest – as Bauböck argues – on immigrant’s free choice rather than on an 
automatic conferral. 
 The second possibility to answer Rubio-Marín’s challenge refers to the conditions for securing 
democratic values of the receiving society. According to this author, when there are large numbers of 
permanent residents who do not apply for citizenship this situation may have two different negative 
effects on the host state: on the one hand, it diminishes the level of civic commitment, ‘thus eroding the 
society’s commitment to a free and equal society’ (Rubio-Marín 2000: 116); and, on the other hand, it 
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creates a second class of citizens which infringes a liberal democracy’s commitment to equality. 
However, we should not overestimate either the number of people or the reasons for which such 
immigrants would choose not to access full citizenship status. As we have already seen, this author 
accepts both that, as time passes, the intentions to go back diminish (Rubio-Marín 2000: 107), and that 
‘the fewer the conditions on which naturalization is granted, the higher the naturalization rates are’ 
(Rubio-Marín 2000: 111). But in this case the longer the immigrant is residing in a host country where 
the only naturalisation condition is a (small) number of years of previous residence, the higher the 
chance that this person would apply for citizenship.255
If this is correct, then it is difficult to understand the need for mandatory/automatic 
naturalisation. As long as the immigrant is well aware of the consequences her choice implies, and as 
long as the number of permanent residents who consciously decide not to naturalise and keep their 
former citizenship
 
256
                                                 
255 Some authors have recently started to question this claim by arguing that naturalisation rates depend not only on 
residence years and naturalisation conditions in the host state, but also on ‘the relationship between country of origin 
features, individual characteristics and the institutional opportunity structure in which naturalisation take place’ (Vink, 
Prokic and Dronkers 2012: 3). After analysing 16 European countries the authors claim that ‘the more accessible citizenship 
policies matter little for immigrants from highly developed countries, particularly those with fewer years of residence, but 
matter significantly for immigrants from less developed countries’ (Vink, Prokic and Dronkers 2012: 1). However, even in 
this case the authors claim that residence matters irrespective of origin country factors: ‘the longer the immigrant resides in 
a country, the higher the expectation of legal incorporation in the host country community’ (Vink, Prokic and Dronkers 
2012: 5-6). 
256 As I am trying to explain in section 8.2. (see below), the existence of those who refuse to naturalise in the country of 
residence and keep their origin country’s citizenship creates a problem a liberal residence-based model finds difficult to deal 
with. Here both states should be able to admit an exception: the state of origin should not deprive them of citizenship, while 
the host state should not enforce its citizenship on them. Even if this may be ‘the exception that proves the rule’, this 
difficulty still raises a serious problem for a residence-based model of citizenship if it wants to keep itself away of a policy 
of automatic naturalisation. 
 is low, the problem Rubio-Marín identifies is overrated. True, someone may 
advance an argument according to which even if only one single immigrant wittingly chooses to remain 
a permanent resident and the host country accepts, then the state has infringed its own liberal 
democratic values of social and political equality. However, at the end of the day we could discern a 
philosophical conflict between different values a liberal democratic theory may cherish: in this case we 
may have a clash between the interests of an individual and those of a political community – that is, a 
conflict between liberty and equality. There is of course no simple and straightforward answer to such 
highly theoretical debate; however, we may confidently accept that as long as the number of permanent 
residents who deliberately refuse to apply for citizenship is low, a compromise between individual 
liberty and society’s concern for equality can be easily accessed without seriously infringing liberal 
democratic norms. 
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It is important to ask whether this kind of balancing of competing considerations and 
discounting of rare events challenges some of the earlier arguments against dual citizenship.257 I must 
accept that it might. For example, if we accept (as exception) that some immigrants may be allowed to 
(conscientiously and in an informed manner) refuse to naturalise as long as their number is low,258
 And thus we arrive at the third way in which we can respond to Rubio-Marín’s challenge. If a 
large number of immigrants refuse to apply for their country of residence’s citizenship, there are two 
solutions we have to contemplate. As this author suggests, the burden should be carried by the 
immigrant: she must be set on the path to citizenship and after a residence period she must undergo an 
automatic naturalisation. But there is a second solution this author does not contemplate: according to 
it, the burden should not fall on the immigrant who has to naturalise but on the state to create 
stimulating incentives to convince even the most stubborn migrant to become a citizen. According to 
this solution, the state should ‘aggressively’ promote citizenship acquisition, both by continuously 
 then 
we could also accept (as exception) some conflicts of jurisdiction regarding dual citizens. The same 
argument can be used in cases of conflicts regarding military obligations or regional conflicts 
determined by troubled histories. So why dual citizenship should not be also accepted? However, two 
remarks are in order here. The most important one refers, once again, to the very meaning of 
citizenship, which is the possession of the right to vote and the right to stand for elections. If (as we 
have already seen in chapter five) possessing voting rights may raise various problems (like double 
voting or deciding political outcomes whose consequences one does not have to bear) then external 
voting rights may be prohibited. But if this correct, being a citizen but also lacking the right to vote and 
the right to stand for elections is meaningless. This is one reason why arguments for accepting a small 
number of immigrants who do not want to naturalise cannot be also used to support dual citizenship. 
The second remark is related exactly to the problem of ‘rare events’: compared with the number of 
immigrants that do not want to naturalize in the host state, dual citizenship is clearly not a ‘rare event’. 
On the contrary, the number of multiple citizens continue to rise. At the end of the day, Bauböck’s 
‘hypermigration’ model, where in every state the majority of citizens would be non-residents and the 
majority of residents would be non-citizens may prove that a residence-based citizenship theory is the 
best policy. As the number of people migrating is continuing to increase, this is not such a far-fetched 
case. 
                                                 
257 I would like to thank Joseph Carens for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the 
author, November 2013). 
258 The situation is of course different if their number is high, and in such a case mandated naturalisation may prove to be 
the answer. 
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advertising through various channels the importance of full citizenship, and by offering incentives 
immigrants could find hard to refuse. A counter-argument here would state that ‘incentive-based 
solutions cannot guarantee an outcome if there are several independent agents (state of origin and 
residence) that control the relevant incentives’.259
Such incentives are already a common practice in the Western world, where states are trying to 
convince their citizens to act in specific ways which are seen as valuable and contributing to the 
community’s welfare. For example, in order to ensure intergenerational continuity, many countries are 
offering financial incentives to young persons to marry and have children: these incentives may take 
different forms, like the ‘first marriage bonus,’
 However, in my theoretical model a three-year 
residence requirement and active promotion of citizenship acquisition (in the host state) coupled with 
the guarantee of an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime (in the origin country) may be enough in order 
to boost naturalisation rates. 
260
 In conclusion, we may ask ourselves whether this situation of having some – very few – 
permanent residents that refuse to naturalise even after a long-term residence is worse, from the point 
of view of liberal democratic values, than implementing a system of mandatory/automatic 
naturalisation. Which is the lesser evil? Mandatory/automatic naturalisation could enforce a state’s 
commitment to democracy, but surely it could also easily diminish its pledge to liberalism and 
individual freedom. As already stated, the interesting theoretical debate on the collision between the 
two major philosophical concepts of freedom and equality is likely to continue for a long time ahead; 
but for our purposes, I consider that accepting a very small number of persons conscientiously refusing 
to naturalise is better than making naturalisation automatic/mandatory for all permanent residents. The 
two most important ideas here concern the state – which should vigorously promote naturalisation – 
 various subsidies when buying for the first time an 
apartment, and so on. Increasing and enlarging this type of incentives in order to especially target 
immigrant persons reluctant to become full citizens may be a better alternative than automatic 
naturalisation. Of course, we can easily imagine some persons that would still refuse to naturalise: 
however, a large-scale phenomenon of second-class citizenship is unlikely to develop, so accepting 
some dissenters (i.e. immigrants who refuse to naturalise and keep their origin country citizenship) 
cannot destroy liberal democratic values. 
                                                 
259 Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, July 2013. 
260 In Romania, starting with 2007 young people marrying for the first time were eligible to receive a ‘first marriage bonus’ 
of 200 Euros. In 2010 this law was repealed because of the economic crisis. Source: 
http://www.avocatnet.ro/content/forum%7CdisplayTopicPage/topicID_65355/Acordarea-sumei-de-200-euro-prima-
casatorie.html#axzz2MPGjIeBl; http://www.dlep-iasi.ro/casatorii/informatii-generale-despre-casatoria-civila--1.html 
(accessed 12 March 2013).  
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and the individual – who should be able to make a personal cost-benefit analysis and decide for herself. 
At the end of the day, such a cost-benefit analysis is a continuous rather than singular act, so if at some 
moment in the future the permanent resident changes her mind, she can access naturalisation without 
any difficulty. 
 
8.1.4. Negotiated exclusion and forced exclusion of ‘citizens-minus’ 
An interesting argument which accepts that there may be a moral case for letting irregular migrants and 
temporary workers enjoy less rights for an indefinite time and not offering them the possibility to 
access full citizenship is offered by political theorists in two ways. On the one hand, we have seen in 
chapter four on temporary workers that Torresi and Ottonelli try to explain why temporary migrants are 
ready to trade some of their rights by making a distinction between the social and the political space: 
while the latter is that of equal rights and depends on the host state for being provided, the social bases 
of self-respect are situated in the origin country. The disentanglement of these two spaces – which is 
not experienced by resident citizens – makes possible a trade-off between enjoying equal rights in the 
host state where the temporary migrants are residing and improving their condition at home. In other 
words, temporary migrants accept a lower status in the host state in order to enhance their status in the 
origin state. However, this creates a problem for Western countries’ liberal democratic standards 
regarding equal treatment. These authors support a solution that would mediate between the democratic 
goals of social equality and the plans of migrant workers by advancing a more complex notion of 
‘equality based on special status’ (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). The authors do not go further and do not 
offer practical examples how this mediation could be designed – however, the basic idea is that a 
liberal democracy should accept temporary workers’ plans by admitting and designing some ‘partial 
citizenship’, or ‘citizen-minus’ status, even if this goes against liberal and democratic values. I will call 
this a ‘negotiated exclusion’. 
 The same suggestion was offered even before the aforementioned study, based on more 
empirical arguments, by Daniel A. Bell, who also accepts the idea of permanent partial citizenship for 
temporary migrants. As we have seen in chapter one and four, unlike in the Western states, in 
Singapore and Hong Kong temporary workers do not have any chance to access equal rights or full 
citizenship status; the dilemma between rights and numbers has been solved there in favour of 
numbers. In this political space migrants have more pressuring concerns than their lack of equal or 
human rights: they protest against plans of limiting daily working hours, against cutting wages in times 
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of crisis, or against the two-week rule which obliges a worker to return to her origin country if she can’t 
find another job in two weeks after having lost the previous one. Lack of democracy seems to be quite 
beneficial for this category, since a democratic political space which would offer full voting rights to 
employers would also make politicians more sympathetic to their constituency rather than to temporary 
migrants: 
 
‘the relative lack of political democracy in Hong Kong may not be harmful – and may in fact be 
beneficial – to former domestic workers in the territory […] If employers can vote for their 
community's decision makers, they will likely favor policies that work to the detriment of their 
domestic workers in cases of conflict. Politicians, for their part, may be tempted to pander to the 
interests of employers’ (Bell 2005: 47).261
 So the authors taken into account here believe that, as long as the first best option, that is full 
equal rights, cannot be a solution – and it cannot be basically because, according to their opinion, such 
 
 
Even if offering full and equal rights would be the best option, there are still four serious counter-
arguments against such a policy. The first concerns migrants’ consent: they are agents, they accept less 
rights for a limited period of time in order to earn more money; for them this is a worthy temporary 
sacrifice. The second is a public opinion counter-argument: in situations like that of Hong Kong, where 
because of overcrowding not even citizens can bring in their mainland relatives, offering migrants full 
rights and full citizenship status would not be welcomed by public opinion. The third counter-argument 
is exactly the ‘rights versus numbers’ dilemma: from the temporary workers’ point of view, it is better 
to have access to an economic market and have fewer rights than the other way around. Finally, the 
fourth argument relates to reduction of global poverty – since such programs appear to help both 
individuals and sending states. Bell accepts that foreign aid is a better moral alternative (Pogge 1997), 
but he shows firstly that remittances are much bigger than foreign aid, and secondly that foreign aid in 
the hands of a corrupt government cannot solve any problem. The conclusion is that a differentiated 
treatment between temporary migrants and citizens can be accepted – even when this implies 
permanent partial citizenship – if this arrangement (a) is accepted by migrants as working for their 
benefit; (b) improves the lives of people from poor societies; and (c) there is no other real alternative 
(Bell 2005: 57). I will call this the ‘forced exclusion’ alternative. 
                                                 
261 In Hong Kong citizens do have voting rights, although they are limited: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Hong_Kong#Political_parties_and_elections (last accessed 10 August 2013). 
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an option would limit the number of accepted legal migrants and would not help to support world 
poverty relief – some second best option must be found. In their view, this second best option is some 
sort of a lesser status than full citizenship for long-term immigrants – a lesser status that may prove to 
be a permanent partial citizenship. Any supporter of residence-based citizenship would disagree with 
this conclusion, and I tried to offer arguments against such a status in chapters 3 and 4. 
But there may be an even deeper normative problem here. Criticising Torresi and Ottonelli’s 
paper, Rainer Bauböck believes there are more profound implications of the normative disconnection 
between the social space of self-respect (in the origin state) and the political space of rights (in the host 
state): on the one hand, there is a worry regarding provision of full citizenship rights to temporary 
migrants who don’t care too much about citizenship anyway; on the other hand, the ‘hypermigration’ 
model – as we saw in section 8.1.1. above – shows that a large-scale temporary migration may have 
large implications on the structure of democratic citizenship (Bauböck 2011: 685). In the 
aforementioned section I tried to criticise the assumptions of the ‘hypermigration’ model: indeed, today 
both the number of persons changing citizenship according to residence, and the frequency of this 
change is rather small and cannot have an influence on the democratic citizenship. But even in a 
situation where the ‘hypermigration’ model could become real, other methods may be available in 
order to stabilise the demos: offering incentives to stay – exactly in the sense Western states today are 
offering incentives to youngsters to create a family and have children262
                                                 
262 I am not claiming that such financial incentives for increasing fertility rates are necessarily effective in developed 
countries. My point is rather that an intelligent plan which combines higher financial incentives with other types of support 
(in this particular case: employment opportunities for women with children and public childcare services) may prove to be a 
convincing public policy which could be an example for state initiatives offering people incentives to stay. I would like to 
thank Rainer Bauböck for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with the author, July 2013). 
 – may prove to be a 
democratic and convincing initiative. Indeed, if people come and go in extremely high numbers without 
caring about citizenship rights, this may prove to be a crisis of citizenship per se, or of that state’s 
politics. But people are rather conservative and they tend to take roots at some point in their lives – as 
we have already seen in chapter four, a popular slogan says that ‘there is nothing more permanent than 
temporary foreign workers’ (Ruhs 2005: 1). Foreign workers are taking roots; they become parts of the 
social fabric, as it happened in Germany or the United States. Denying their right to citizenship is 
transforming them into second-class citizens. In consequence, the best choice here is to offer them 
citizenship after three years of residence: if they do not care about this citizenship, they will relinquish 
it after three years of living in yet another country whose citizenship they should acquire (after three 
years of residence). But if they do care about the place they are leaving in, about the place their 
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children will grow up in, then citizenship will be seen as an important asset. Residence-based 
citizenship is once more the only satisfactory solution. 
 
8.2. What residence-based citizenship can and what it cannot solve 
No normative theory can easily explain everything that it sets up to clarify, and this is also the case 
with residence-based citizenship. But before discussing the problems this proposal finds difficult to 
answer, let us first review what it is able to provide for – what its main advantages are. Firstly, it can 
solve without difficulties the theoretical problems raised by partial citizenship status in a liberal 
democracy: if social equality and individual freedom are values polities intend to uphold, then full legal 
status – i.e., citizenship – is required for permanent residents. If this is correct, then most of the 
problems raised by irregular migrants and temporary migrant workers can be easily solved. Regarding 
the first category, it is true that immigration control functions not only at the borders, but also inside the 
country, and irregulars can be deported once found. However, I have claimed that after a period of 
residence this should no longer be possible: I have proposed that after one year of residence some form 
of legal status must be easily accessed, maybe with the help of the ‘firewall’ mechanism proposed by 
Carens263
 Secondly, the residence-based citizenship proposal can easily offer an answer to a rather 
difficult problem in political theory: the task of matching the two categories of ‘permanent residents’ 
and ‘citizens’. As we have seen above in Rainer Bauböck’s ‘hypermigration’ model, a liberal 
democratic polity as we know it today would be seriously undermined if most residents were non-
citizens, and most citizens were non-residents. By offering full formal status to permanent residents and 
by stripping of citizenship those who leave – offering them instead a status of ‘external quasi-
 or through some form of simple rolling regularisation.  
Regarding the second category, it is clear that state authorities have only two options: firstly, 
they can devise temporary worker programs which strictly allow for only a short period of residence – 
for example, if the requirement for citizenship acquisition is three years then such programs should be 
strictly designed for a shorter period of time. In this case workers are coming, and after less than three 
years they must go back to the origin country. Secondly, it is also true that many employers do not 
want to lose experienced workers – so there may be some pressure on the government for exceptions. 
In this case, if the residence criterion is met – be it a liberal criterion of three years or the standard one 
of five years – then access to citizenship status must be provided. 
                                                 
263 See chapter three for an extended discussion of the firewall proposal. 
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citizenship’ – a residence-based theory can easily solve the matching problem. We have already seen in 
this chapter that the critique according to which such an alternative implies an unstable demos does not 
hold: the numbers of individuals changing permanent residence (hence citizenship) and the frequency 
of this change for the same individuals are rather small. Moreover, migrants usually tend to finally 
become rooted, to have a family, to raise children and grandchildren. And, as we have already seen, 
even in a real ‘hypermigration’ situation states may offer different types of strong incentives for 
permanent resident status (hence citizenship). 
 Thirdly, another smaller but real advantage of residence-based citizenship is the solution 
offered to those states which are seriously concerned about marriages of convenience: simply put, 
being married or not to a citizen has no consequence on citizenship acquisition and naturalisation 
procedures as long as residence is the only requirement. Of course, it is true that bogus marriages may 
still be used as a kind of passport which may provide access to the territory: but this is a problem which 
is linked to immigration rather than to citizenship acquisition laws, so even the authorities concerned 
may be very different. In other words, false marriage may offer access to territory, but not direct access 
to citizenship since the only requirement for citizenship is residence, and being married to a citizen has 
no legal consequence on citizenship acquisition. 
 Finally, maybe the most important advantage of residence-based citizenship is a normative one: 
indeed, it simply destroys the need for various morally debated requirements states usually set up today 
for citizenship acquisition – like knowledge of the official language, of the local customs and history, 
and so on. If we set aside cumbersome arguments used in political battles, at the end of the day what 
matters for qualifying for citizenship is the fact that one is living in the territory and is subjected to the 
laws governing that territory. I have tried to claim that nothing else should be taken into account. 
 However, as we have already seen, like any other normative theory residence-based citizenship 
also meets some serious difficulties. I have already discussed and tried to answer some of them. For 
example, in the previous chapter (see section 7.4.3.) I have discussed two objections. The first was 
related to the capacity a residence-based regime supposedly has to increase statelessness. I have 
answered that the fear of increasing statelessness is unfounded, since immigrants can retain their 
former citizenship for three years (the time required to qualify for the actual host state citizenship); and 
even if a small number of immigrants refuse to apply for the new state’s citizenship (and are thus 
allowed to keep their former citizenship), this cannot threaten democratic institutions. But a more 
difficult problem for a residence-based citizenship proposal related to this issue is the legal construction 
of such an exception: who could claim the exception, and under which condition? An easy way to 
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answer would be to say that such a candidate is ‘any long-term resident that refuses to naturalise, under 
the condition of an expressed statement’. This would create a problem in the European Union, since EU 
internal immigrants may be the least likely to naturalise and to renounce their origin country’s 
citizenship. But in this case, such exception would not be in any way ‘exceptional’. How such an 
exception should be conceived in this unique case should be a subject for further research. 
The second objection claimed that in coerced migrations (like those resulting from ethnic 
cleansing in Yugoslavia) origin states must not have the right to deprive persons they have forced out 
of their territory of their citizenship on grounds of residence abroad. My answer was that under a 
residence-based proposal there are many other forms of compensation besides a dual citizenship 
regime, and my example was a combination between the citizenship of their new country of residence 
and an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status in their origin country. 
Thirdly, this theory faces problems in approaching the ‘impossible subject’ (Ngai 2004) of 
illegal migration. In this case, the residence conjecture I tried to defend has troubles in answering the 
charge raised from the ‘touch the territory and you’re in’ perspective. The challenge is of course not 
directly faced: since the accent lies on residence, an irregular migrant that simply touched the territory 
does not thereby have a right to be counted in. However, since the proposed residence requirement is 
rather liberal – three years of permanent legal residence before qualifying for citizenship, but also a 
maximum of one year of (illegal) residence before applying for the legal status – then touching the 
territory is an extremely important but also very dangerous ‘contest’ whose reward is legal status in a 
first phase, and access to full citizenship at a second stage. I readily accept that residence-based 
citizenship cannot find, as any other normative theory, an entirely decent and flawless answer to the 
problem of ‘impossible subjects’. However, I also strongly believe that it does offer one of the best 
solutions: if we take into account that (a) border management is not perfect, (b) irregulars will continue 
to come, and (c) both proposals of ‘irregulars forever’ (no possibility of becoming legal) (Swain 2009) 
and that of ‘automatic acquisition of citizenship after ten years of residence’ (Rubio-Marín 2000) are 
unacceptable and do not solve the problem anyway, I believe the solution I have proposed – which 
accepts expulsion of irregulars within one year of residence but also requires as a matter of justice 
offering them a legal status after this period and then opening for them the path to full citizenship – is 
the best alternative we have. 
 A fourth difficulty faced by a residence-based citizenship theory concerns the difference I have 
proposed between dual citizenship and ‘external quasi-citizenship’. As we have already seen, a simpler 
and more elegant solution would be to abandon the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status and to design 
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dual citizenship in such a way that it lacks voting rights – or, in other words, to link voting rights to 
residence. This way we have only one external status instead of two; moreover, residents are not 
threatened to live under a political situation decided by non-resident citizens. In this sense some may 
propose the Spanish system of ‘dormant’ and ‘active’ citizenship (Rubio Marín, Sobrino et al. 2012: 
23), which implies that the two or more citizenships one individual may have are never active at the 
same time, because their activation depends on residence. The ‘active’ citizenship is the citizenship of 
residence, and all other citizenships are ‘dormant’ until the individual enjoying multiple status changes 
her permanent residence in another country of citizenship: in this case, the citizenship of the new state 
of residence becomes active, while the former one becomes ‘dormant’.  
I do agree that such a theory would not be radically different from my proposal; however, there 
may be two reasons for rejecting it. Firstly, a ‘dormant citizenship’ is still a ‘full citizenship’ status in 
some sense, and thus creates many of the problems faced by dual citizenship, as we have seen in 
chapter five: states can strip unwanted multiple citizens of their citizenship; problems of ‘loyalty’ and 
‘identity dilution’ are still present; irredentist politics can still be promoted (as in Eastern Europe); and 
the principle of citizenship equality is still infringed regarding the welfare state, the exit option, and 
military considerations.264
8.3. Avenues for further research 
 Secondly, presently diplomatic protection is definitely linked to full 
citizenship status irrespective of whether this is ‘active’ or ‘dormant’, so international conflicts 
regarding diplomatic protection can still appear. Even though I accept such a proposal may be more 
elegant than the theory I am trying to defend, I believe that it can still face some difficulties a 
residence-based citizenship proposal is already shielded against. 
 
The prospects for the development of residence-based citizenship laws in Western countries are rather 
slim: in the last century, and especially in the last thirty years, citizenship legislation has become even 
more concentrated on ius sanguinis, on strongly limiting ius soli, and on discouraging immigration and 
naturalisation of foreigners – coupled with an increased toleration of double citizenship and easy-going 
regulations regarding ‘external quasi-citizens’, both attitudes being strongly connected with an 
                                                 
264 Joseph Carens (personal communication on file with the author, November 2013) asks why these problems don’t also 
apply to the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ model. I believe they don’t apply since ‘external quasi-citizenship’ is not a ‘legal 
status’ in international law but only a ‘favourable treatment’ recognised and accepted only in the state that offers it. In 
consequence, one state cannot strip a person of her citizenship status as long as she is a mono-citizen of this state (even 
though she may have twenty ‘external quasi-citizenships’ in other states) since she would become statelessness; the same 
person cannot have the problem of conflicting military conscriptions, and so on. 
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legislative turn towards ethnicity and communitarianism. The few countries –Serbia, Sweden, Norway, 
Portugal, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA – that are practicing different instances of a residence-
based system of citizenship do not seem to have any chances to be soon followed by others. On the 
contrary, the economic crisis coupled with an increasing migration – due to affordable means of 
transportation – may have dramatic consequences in what regards immigration and citizenship 
legislation even in the aforementioned states, as was the case with Belgium, which tightened 
naturalisation conditions in 2012. However, the way national legislations will change in the future is an 
interesting subject of further research; moreover, if the concept of legal residence has lately become in 
some countries (e.g. Belgium, Norway and Sweden) more important than the concept of citizenship, 
then it is interesting to normatively research how citizenship will be legally redesigned in order to 
remain a meaningful legal term. Other specific opportunities for research are offered by each major 
subject I have taken into account in the previous chapters. 
In what concerns illegal migration, at the normative level at least three topics deserve further 
discussion. Firstly, this study did not approach two additional actors that need to be taken into account. 
On the one hand, I have concentrated my enquiry only on undocumented persons that settle in the host 
state, setting aside other categories of individuals like circular irregular migrants. In their case the 
normative questions could be entirely different, since this group does not have the intention to remain 
in the host state. In consequence, receiving countries may not be morally obliged to set them on the 
path to full citizenship status, but only to offer some form of regularisation which would guarantee a 
number of social and economic rights. However, in this case a circular migration program (which 
would offer, for example, the right to enter two months per year in the agricultural season) may prove 
to be a solution that needs to be taken into account. On the other hand, I have also set aside normative 
questions related to transit states: indeed, not all irregulars settle immediately in a specific state; some 
of them get stuck in or delay leaving the transit country, sometimes even for a long period of time. 
What are such a state’s moral duties towards them? And should other states (probably destination 
states) share the burden? 
Secondly, I have argued that after one year of illegal presence a person should be regularised. 
But the importance of this claim may touch upon other difficult normative discussions, like the one 
concerning the right a state has to control both borders and membership. As we have seen, according to 
Bauböck and Fine, the state has a limited right to control entry (it can restrict immigration only if 
unrestricted freedom of movement threatens its capacity of maintaining democratic self-government, 
public order, public health, the welfare state and in case of natural disasters) and no right to control 
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membership (Bauböck 2010a), (Baubock 2012), (Fine 2014, forthcoming). But if this is correct, how 
would the ‘nation-state’ evolve? Could we say that it will become a simple administrator of its 
territory, with limited rights to control entry – or even no rights, according to Carens (1987) – with no 
rights to control membership, and no rights to control the future of its specific culture(s)? Thirdly, it is 
interesting to see what the current ‘battle’ against illegal immigration in the Western world provides for 
the future, especially whether Western countries would decide to continue the current pattern of 
‘fighting’ the phenomenon or whether international financial help and controlled migration – as 
instances of an increased interest in global justice (Caney 2005), (Pogge 2002), (Sangiovanni 2007)265
First of all, even if we decide, contrary to the normative concerns specified in chapter five, that 
dual citizenship should be accepted, then it is interesting to see where we draw the line: that is, 
shouldn’t there be a limit to the number of citizenships a person may enjoy? One example offers 
 
– will take the lead. 
The chapter on temporary workers pointed to some normative problems that must be further 
investigated. Firstly, it is important to try to strike a proper balance in immigration states between the 
democratic ideal of citizenship equality and individual plans of temporary workers. How such a 
balance can be achieved and what are the rights temporary workers may be allowed to negotiate should 
be further researched. Secondly, as we have already seen, the problem of migrant workers’ agency 
offered a new force to the consent theory in political philosophy. If, as Dumbrava claimed, membership 
rules should be ‘minimalist politic’ but also – and more important – ‘partly voluntaristic’ since ‘some 
may choose voluntarily to join the political community’ (Dumbrava 2010: 3), then immigration studies 
may help consent theory to make a triumphal return as a main theory in the field of political obligation. 
Concerning ‘citizens-plus,’ the acceptance of multiple citizenship seems to be a strong 
international trend – but, as we have already seen in chapter seven on present-day citizenship 
legislation in fifty states, it is a bit premature to claim – as Faist did – that the majority of states 
acknowledge today one form of multiple citizenship or another  (Faist 2007d: 1); for a global count of 
states tolerating double citizenship in 2008 one can consult the study delivered by Faist and Jürgen 
(Faist and Jürgen 2008: 4). It is premature at least for the reason that the opposite affirmation seems 
also true: the majority of states prohibit today one form of multiple citizenship or another – see the 
same world map offered by Faist and Jürgen. But even if we accept the optimistic view on the trend 
towards multiple status, it is important to take into account some normative aspects that are not entirely 
clear. 
                                                 
265 For a different view which argues against thick notions of global justice see Nagel (2005). 
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obvious reasons of concern: suppose that a university professor who is also a European citizen moves 
every six years from a European country to another. Given the nature of her job she can probably easily 
apply for residency in each state: the citizenship legislations in many Member States open the path to 
full citizenship status after five years of residence.266
Secondly, it would be also interesting to investigate whether multiple citizenship can really help 
to spread liberal and democratic norms, as its supporters claim to be the case (Bloemraad 2007: 182).
 But if this is the case, how many citizenships can 
such a person obtain in her long academic life? Probably around ten; but then we should ask whether 
this ‘collection of citizenships’ is not only a rational calculation in pursuit of purely instrumental 
purposes. In any case, such an example shows that the primary aim of multiple citizenship policy – i.e., 
acknowledgment and acceptance of multiple ties which are real and important for a specific individual 
– loses its point: such a status is not desired because of genuine ties a person may have with several 
political communities (for this, an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status is enough); it is most probably 
wished for only because of instrumental benefits it can offer. Further sociological and normative 
research regarding the way multiple citizens desire and make use of this status could offer interesting 
findings. 
267
‘External quasi citizenship’ programs are rather difficult to assess at this time. On the one hand, 
they are new inventions (all cases surveyed in this study materialised fewer than twenty years ago) and, 
 
The evidence we have so far is rather inconclusive, since, on the one hand, individuals holding illiberal 
views do not abandon them by simply taking another citizenship and, on the other hand, dual 
citizenship can facilitate terrorists’ movement and actions, as it has been the case with different terrorist 
attacks in the last decades. Thirdly, it would be exciting to explore, from a normative perspective, what 
would happen in a world in which every individual would enjoy multiple citizenship status. Such a 
situation would be probably close to the ‘hypermigration’ model imagined by Rainer Bauböck, where 
every citizen of a state is not at the same time a resident, and every resident is not a citizen: this would 
imply that states do not have a stable demos, and such a situation would put an end to the liberal-
democratic polities as we know and understand them now (Bauböck 2011). 
                                                 
266 As specified in chapter one, in relation to residence-based citizenship my focus is on the simple presence in the territory 
– which makes an individual a societal member over time; as such the difference between ‘residence’ (simple legal presence 
in the territory) and ‘permanent residence’ (a legal status offered when specific requirements are fulfilled) is not important 
in my discussion. 
267 Not all scholars agree with this claim. For example, Rainer Bauböck considers that ‘toleration of dual citizenship is 
required by liberal norms’, but not instrumental for spreading liberal norms. He considers that ‘it might be in certain 
contexts, where there are “political remittances” from liberal immigration states to illiberal emigration states, but this is a 
contingent and contextual effect that is not essential for justifying toleration’ (personal communication on file with the 
author, August 2013). 
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on the other hand, some of them have been quickly transformed into multiple citizenship statuses. For 
example, the Hungarian ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status was extensively employed for nine years, 
from the 2001 Status Law until the 2010 offer of dual citizenship; after 2010 it is accessed only by 
those who cannot apply for Hungarian citizenship without also losing their home state citizenship (for 
example, this is the case of Hungarian ethnic Slovak citizens). In Mexico such a pure status existed for 
an even shorter period: from 1997, when nationality was declared ‘everlasting’, until 2005, when non-
residents received the right to vote in presidential elections. However, as long as full political rights are 
not offered to non-residents, we can still consider this an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status. Finally, 
both Turkey and India still support such a program for different reasons: Turkey does not want to lose 
the relation with its diaspora living in countries that do not accept dual citizenship, while India prefers 
to offer this status (instead dual citizenship) to Indians abroad but differentiates between poor and rich 
Indians, and between Indians coming from friendly or unfriendly countries. 
So possible subjects for further research include how sustainable such a status may be in the 
long run, what are the conditions that make it more preferable as a state policy than toleration of dual 
citizenship, and how it contributes to a transnational space which overrides national borders. However, 
further research also needs to be done in a normative perspective: since ‘external quasi-citizenship’ 
programs also incorporate the right to return – a right which was exclusively linked to citizenship status 
until twenty years ago – how is this restructuring the make-up of citizenship today? What does 
citizenship amount to anymore (except access to the right to vote and the right to stand for elections) if 
all other political, social, economic, and human rights – plus finally the right to return – are 
disconnected from citizenship status? And what does citizenship amount to anymore when even voting 
rights are disconnected from citizenship status (Arrighi, Bauböck et al. 2013)? A second avenue for 
further normative research concerns the eligibility criteria for such a status. On the one hand, it seems 
morally unacceptable to devise it on the basis of ethnicity, as Hungary and Turkey did; in this respect, 
India and Mexico seem to be more liberal, since their conditions were former citizenship and presence 
in the territory or being a descendant of a citizen. But on the other hand, the Venice Commission 
endorsed in 2001 the special bond between kin minorities and kin states, supporting the latter’s right to 
intervene for minority protection goals. 
I have claimed at the beginning of this chapter that citizenship should be strictly a legal term 
that offers a basket of rights to residents; moreover, in the residence-based theory I am proposing 
citizenship is absolutely disconnected from other considerations like national, ethnic, economic, social, 
emotional, cultural and family ties. It is difficult to find a good comparison, but sometimes I see 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
252 
 
residence-based citizenship as membership in an academic institution. In a university, for example, one 
finds life-long members (people who work in administration, some professors), many temporary 
workers (students and most junior professors), dual citizenship is sometimes accepted (professors who 
leave for one semester each year to teach in another university) and sometimes not (some universities 
ask academics to dedicate all their professional life to them as long as they are members), and finally 
‘external quasi citizens’ (alumni who may sometime return as post-docs or even professors). Being a 
member of a university’s academic environment offers a basket of rights (similar to citizenship rights) 
that non-members do not have (the right to use the library’s electronic resources, which those who 
leave lose; the right to have an email account based on the university’s internet domain; the right to 
vote for some decisions or to be represented by student representatives, etc.).  
But one enjoys this basket of rights only as long as one is a member; when one changes 
universities one also changes memberships; one loses most of the rights enjoyed at the former 
university and receives another basket of almost similar rights at the new university. But the lost basket 
of rights may be taken back as soon as one returns – and the possibility to return (although not a ‘right’, 
as in the case of citizenship) is always among the possibilities an alumnus has. Of course, the fact that 
such a membership is disconnected from emotional and ‘family’ ties does not mean that such ties do 
not exist: many of us have strong sentiments for the university where we have written our PhDs, or for 
those with whom we have worked for a long time. But such emotions are disconnected from the legal 
basket of rights. 
It is maybe too early for such a ‘radical’ view; but the reason is that we are still influenced by a 
form of nationalist thinking which was very strong in the last two centuries and unavoidably linked 
citizenship with belonging. My form of residence-based citizenship tries to destroy this strong link. The 
time for such a theory may not yet have come, but as long as people continue to move and immigration 
will keep rising, its chances may improve. 
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Annex 
 
Table 1. Irregular migrants – numbers and percentages out of total population in twelve European Countries, 
European Union and the USA 
 
Country Estimated 
population 
Regular 
migrants 
Estimated 
number of 
irregulars 
Percentage of 
irregulars with 
regard to total 
population 
Trend 
Austria 8,300,000 (2007) 826,000 (2007) 36,250 (2008) (0.4%) decreasing 
France 60,000,000 (1999) 14,000,000 
(citizens with 
immigration 
background – i.e. 
having an 
immigrant parent 
or grandparent) 
(1999) 
200,000 – 
400,000 (1999, 
2005) 
(0.3% - 0.7 %) stable 
Germany 82,400,000 (2006) 15,100,000 
(citizens with 
migration 
background – i.e. 
they or at least 
one parent were 
born abroad) 
(2006) 
100,000 – 
1,000,000 
(2006) 
(0.1% - 1.2%) stable (since 
2003) 
Greece 11,192,849 (2007) 678,268 (2008) 280,446 (end of 
2007) 
(2.5%) decreasing 
Hungary 10,080,000 (2006) 166,693 (end of 
2007) 
30,000 – 50,000 
(2007) 
(0.3% - 0.5%) decreasing 
(but: strong 
need for more 
immigrants) (a) 
Italy 59,000,000 (2007) 2,940,000 (2007) 349,000 (2007) (0.6%) ‘rollercoaster’ 
effect: (i) 
‘amnesty effect’ 
+ (Järve and 
Poleshchuk) 
‘recall’ effect 
(b) 
Poland 38,125,479 (end of 
2006) 
200,000 (end of 
2006) 
50,000 – 
450,000 (2004) 
(0.1% - 1.2%) expected to 
increase 
(reason: strong 
need for 
immigrants) (a) 
The Slovak 
Republic 
5,400,998 (2007) 41,214 (2007) 15,000 – 20,000 
(end of 2007) 
(0.3% - 0.4%) expected to 
increase  
(reason: need 
for immigrants 
+ economic 
development) 
(a) 
Spain 44,000,000 (2007) 5,220,000 (2008) 349,000 (2008) (0.8%) decreasing 
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Country Estimated 
population 
Regular 
migrants 
Estimated 
number of 
irregulars 
Percentage of 
irregulars with 
regard to total 
population 
Trend 
The Czech 
Republic 
10,674,947 (2010) 
(c) 
392,315 (end of 
2007) 
17,000 – 
300,000 (2000s) 
(0.1% - 2.8%) decreasing 
The 
Netherlands 
16,660,555 (2011) 
(c) 
1,732,379 
(foreign-born 
citizens) (2007) 
100,000 - 
200,000 (2000s) 
(0.6 % - 1.2%) stable / 
decreasing (EU 
enlargement) 
UK 58,789,194 (2001) 4,900,000 
(foreign-born 
citizens) (2001) 
430,000 (2001) 
(d) 
670,000 (2005) 
(e) 
1,000,000 
(2003) (f) 
(0.7%) 
(1.1%) 
(1.7%) 
? 
European 
Union 
497,683,272 
(2008) (c) 
19,500,000 non-
EU27 citizens 
(2008) (g) 
5,500,000 
(2007) (h) 
10,000,000 
(2008) (i) 
(1.1% - 2%) decreasing (EU 
enlargement, 
increased border 
control, etc.) 
USA 308,745,538 
(2010) (c) 
? 11-12,000,000 
(2008) (j) 
(3.7% - 3.9%) ? 
 
(a) Because of population ageing, negative demographic growth and high level of emigration, there is a need for immigrants 
in Hungarian and Polish economy. Plans have been proposed in order to attract immigrants from third countries (immigrants 
from China for Hungary and from India, Bangladesh or Pakistan for Poland). These plans have not been implemented 
because of two main reasons: (a) the fear that immigrants would use these programs to go further West; (b) the fear of 
reproducing Western Europe’s difficult experiences with multiculturalism (‘distant cultural’ background) (Futo 2008: 16), 
(Iglicka and Gmaj 2008: 39) 
(b) The “rollercoaster” trend has two different effects: ‘1) the “amnesty effect”: the reduction in the number of 
undocumented migrants caused by the regularization process; 2) the “recall effect”: the increase in unauthorized inflows in 
the periods preceding the amnesties, ‘since more potential irregular migrants may be attracted by the opportunity of 
obtaining legal status’ (Fasani 2009: 32) 
(c) No data in the Clandestino country report; the number for the Czech Republic represents an estimate for 2010 (source: 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech_republic, retrieved 10 January 2011); the number for the Netherlands is an 
estimate for 2011 (source: ‘Netherlands Official Population Clock’, http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/themas/bevolking/cijfers/extra/bevolkingsteller.htm, retrieved 10 January 2011); the number for the European 
Union is for 2008 (source: Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes
&labeling=labels&plugin=1, retrieved 10 January 2011); the number for the USA represents the 2010 census (source: 
United States Census Bureau, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php, retrieved 10 January 
2011) 
(d) See (Woodbridge 2005)for a central estimate for 2001; see also (Vollmer 2009: 27) 
(e) Migration Watch UK (think-tank close to conservatives), estimate for 2005 (central estimate) (Vollmer 2009) 
(f) International Organization for Migration (2003), citing UK Immigration Service Union (ideologically-imbued 
association of Immigration Officers) (Vollmer 2009) 
(g) Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-16122009-BP/EN/3-16122009-BP-EN.PDF, 
accessed 10 January 2011 
(h) Source: Council of Europe, Regularisation programmes for irregular migrants, Resolution 1568 (2007), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/eres1568.htm (consulted 9 January 2011) 
(i) (Divinský 2008: 3) 
(j) (Massey 2009), (Fasani 2009: 74) 
? = no data 
Source: author’s calculation after Clandestino’s twelve country reports and other sources mentioned above 
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Table 2. Collective regularisations (amnesties) in twelve European Countries 
Country Collective (extraordinary) regularisations Notes 
Austria 1990s: 30,000 
2007-2008: ? (no data) 
1990s: “Sanierungsaktion”, implemented 
in 1990: irregularly employed migrants 
could obtain work permits regularised 
the residence status of applicants 
2007-2008: amnesty for illegally 
employed care workers 
France 1982: 150,000 
1997-1998: 90,000 (out of 130.000 applications) 
2006: 6,000 
- 
Germany no collective regularisation - 
Greece 1998: 219,024 (applications) 
2001: 361,110 (regularised individuals) 
2005: ? (no data) 
incomplete data in the report! 
Hungary 2004: 1,128 (out of 1,406 applications) - 
Italy 1986: 105,000 
1990: 217,626 
1995: 244,492 
1998: 217,124 
2002: 702,156 
‘rollercoaster’ effect: (a) ‘amnesty 
effect’ + (b) ‘recall’ effect* 
Poland [2003: ‘small’ amnesty: 282] 
 
 
2003: ‘big’ amnesty: 2,747 (out of 3,512 
applications) 
 
 
2007: 554 until 14 July 2008 (out of 2,028 
applications) 
‘2003 small’ amnesty = irregular 
immigrants who wish to leave Poland 
without registration on the list of 
unwanted foreigners 
2003 ‘big’ amnesty (regularisation) = for 
irregulars who came to Poland before 
1997; (proof of 5 years of residence) 
2007: also for irregular who came to 
Poland before 1997; this time, proof of 
10 years of residence 
The Slovak Republic no collective regularisation - 
Spain (1) 1985-1986: 23,000 (out of 44,000 
applications) (mostly affected Moroccans in the 
Spanish African towns of Ceuta and Melilla) 
(2) 1991: 110,000 (out of 130,000 applications) 
(3) 1996: 22,000 (out of 25,000 applications) 
(4) 2000-2001: 
2000: 152,207 (out of 244,327 applications) 
2000 Reexamination: 36,013 (out of 57,616 
applications) 
2001 Ecuadorians: 24,352 (out of 24,884 
applications) 
2001 Rootedness: 157,883 (out of 338,680 
applications) 
(5) 2005 Normalisation: 578,375 (out of 691,655 
applications) 
5 collective regularisations, 1,103,830  
regularised persons (out of 1,506,032 
applications) 
 
+ ordinary regularisation due to 
settlement or rootedness (‘arraigo’) 
(conditions: 3 years of stay + work 
contract OR 2 years of stay + 12 months’ 
work) (2007: 28,314 ordinary 
regularisations) 
The Czech Republic no collective regularisation - 
The Netherlands 1975: 15,000 
1979: 1,800 
1991: 2,000 
1999: 1,800 
2007: 27,500 
five regularisations extremely limited in 
scope; 
1975-2000: roughly 20,000 regularised 
irregular immigrants 
‘The outcome of these regularisations 
has not been substantial on the pool of 
irregular migrants’ 
2007: for the asylum applicants rejected 
before the 2000 Aliens Act 
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Country Collective (extraordinary) regularisations Notes 
UK 1974-1978: for Commonwealth citizens 
2003: ‘family amnesty’ → 16,870 families  
2004: ‘humanitarian grounds’ → 4,080 
individuals 
only three small & special 
regularisations 
2003: amnesty ‘granted to all asylum 
seekers who had a dependant minor 
regardless of the status of their case’ 
 
+ case-by-case regularizations on 
‘compassionate grounds’ 
+ ‘after 14 years of stay in the country 
irrespective from the legal status, 
persons can apply for leave to remain 
under the so-called 14-years-consession’ 
 
* the “rollercoaster” trend has two different effects: ‘1) the “amnesty effect”: the reduction in the number of undocumented 
migrants caused by the regularization process; 2) the “recall effect”: the increase in unauthorized inflows in the periods 
preceding the amnesties, since more potential irregular migrants may be attracted by the opportunity of obtaining legal 
status’ (Fasani 2009: 32) 
 
Source: author’s compilation after Clandestino’s twelve country reports 
 
Table 3. Age composition of irregular migrants in twelve European Countries 
 
Country Age composition of irregular migrants 
Austria 19-50 years: 76,5-89% 
[19-30years: 48%] 
France 20-50 years: the majority 
Germany 20-40 years: the majority (70% of persons 
apprehended by the police for illegal entry) 
Greece 15-50 years: 89% 
[15-30 years: 48%; 31-50 years: 41%] 
Hungary active age: 83.3% 
[ 20-59 years: 90-95%; 2008: 70 % of asylum 
applicants are in the age group of 18-34] 
Italy 15-39 years: 82%  
[15-29 years: 52%; 30-39 years: 30%] 
> 40 years: 18% 
[‘undocumented migrants are significantly 
younger than their documented counterpart’] 
Poland 20-55 years: 75% 
The Slovak Republic 20-34 years: 44% 
[15-64: 90-95%] 
Spain 16-39 years: 79% 
[16-24 years: 18%; 25-39 years: 61%] 
The Czech Republic 20-49 years: 72% 
The Netherlands <40 years: 80% 
UK 20-35 years: 70% 
 
Source: author’s compilation after Clandestino’s twelve country reports 
Stavilă, Andrei (2013), Citizens-minus and citizens-plus : a normative attempt to defend citizenship acquisition as 
an entitlement based on residence 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/94484
257 
 
Table 4. ‘External quasi-citizenship’ and dual citizenship regimes 
in India, Mexico, Turkey and Hungary. Comparative perspective 
 
 ‘External 
quasi-
citizenship’ 
regime 
Dual Citizenship(DC)  
regime 
Important rights and /or facilities 
enjoyed by ‘external quasi-citizens 
Important 
rights NOT 
enjoyed by 
targeted 
persons 
India 1999 onwards 
(green card for 
PIOs) 
Abolished in 1955 • right to return 
• citizenship can be re-acquired 
by returning to territory 
• right to buy and own property 
• right to invest and live in India 
• admittance to educational 
institutions 
• eligibility for national housing 
schemes 
Political 
rights, 
some 
social 
rights 
Mexico 1997-2005 
(Mexican 
nationality 
cannot be lost) 
No: dual nationality is 
accepted while dual 
citizenship (DC) is not 
• right to return 
• full citizenship rights can be re-
acquired by returning to territory 
• right to acquire property in the 
coastal and border zones 
Political 
rights, 
peacetime 
military 
service 
Turkey - Yes, since 1981. But: 
(a) the Turkish person 
must obtain Turkish 
authorities’ approval for 
DC status 
(b) immigrants in Turkey 
do not enjoy the same DC 
status as emigrants 
• the right to return 
• social rights 
External 
voting 
rights 
(until 
writing this 
study) 
The pink card 
(1995-2004) 
 
The blue card  
(2004 onwards) 
 
[‘privileged 
non-citizen 
status’] 
- rights offered by the pink/blue cards 
(excluding rights offered by DC): 
• right to return 
• rights that foreigners do not 
enjoy: free movement, property rights, 
residence, the right to work and to invest 
in the country,  practicing certain 
professions, buying land in the villages 
or in security sensitive areas, eligibility 
for inheritance ; the funeral of a foreigner 
in Turkey requires special permission 
• children of ‘external quasi-
citizens’ also acquire the above rights 
• retention of attained social 
security rights 
no voting 
rights; 
no right to 
be 
employed 
in the 
public 
sector 
Hungary (a) 1920-1947 - Elements of an ‘external quasi-
citizenship’ regime (but not a proper 
status): 
• right to return 
• subsidies for ethnic Hungarian 
educational, cultural, and media 
institutions 
• political support to Hungarian 
political organisations in their new states 
• collection of economic and 
demographic data about Hungarian 
ethnic communities in order to support 
No 
important 
social 
rights;  
no political 
rights 
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claims for border revisionism 
(b) Status Law 
(2001-2011)  
- ‘External quasi-citizenship’ regime (2) 
(Status Law, 2001-2011) (most important 
benefits): 
• right to return 
• subsidies to public 
transportation 
• free access to Hungarian 
Universities and other educational 
benefits (extended to everyone learning 
Hungarian in the 2003 revision of the 
Status Law) 
• work permit valid 3 
months/year (withdrawn in the 2003 
revision of the Status Law) 
• benefits from the state health-
care and welfare systems from those who 
worked 3 months /year (withdrawn in the 
2003 revision of the Status Law) 
• subsidies in the country of 
residence for educational, cultural and 
entrepreneurial projects 
• symbolic value of identity 
cards: official acceptance of holder’s 
membership in the Hungarian nation free 
movement in Hungary to non-EU 
citizens 
No 
important 
social 
rights;  
no political 
rights 
- Yes (2010 onwards) DC regime for ethnic Hungarians (2010 
onwards): 
• First phase (2010-2011): DC 
without political rights 
• Second phase (2011 onwards): 
DC with some special form of voting 
rights 
- 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
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